
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THE WAR WITH JAPAN

PART 1

(December 1941 to August 1942)

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DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK
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PREFACE

This account of the war with Japan has been written for use in the instruction of cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is based for the most part on material furnished by the Historical Division, Department of the Army. Much valuable information has been obtained from the publications of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, in acknowledging indebtedness to others it is not desired to place on them the responsibility for any factual errors or for any conclusions drawn.

This and other pamphlets on World War II are constantly being revised as additional information becomes available. It will be appreciated if military personnel who note any apparent errors or discrepancies, or who have comments or suggestions for the improvement of the subject matter, will communicate them to:

The Professor of Military Art and Engineering
U. S. Military Academy
West Point, N. Y.

August 1947

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THE WAR WITH JAPAN

PART I

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INTRODUCTION

Japan's entry into World War II came at the end of a ten-year period of military conquest in Asia. In 1931 the Japanese overran all of Manchuria, and during the succeeding years they continually sought further territorial expansion in northern China (**Map 1**). United under the Central Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese people finally offered an adamant resistance to any further encroachment by Japan.

The crisis came in July 1937, when Japan inaugurated the Sino–Japanese War * with an ambitious offensive calculated to reduce China to submission. Although large areas were easily overrun in 1937 and 1938, the Japanese found that they could not break the Chinese will to resist (**Map 2**). The seizure of Canton in late 1938 not only deprived China of a major port but isolated the British possession of Hong Kong as well. The fall of Hankow necessitated the shifting of China's capital to Chungking, in the west.

In an effort to avoid any wasteful expenditure of strength in the China war Japan, after 1938, resorted to a policy of economic strangulation. During 1939 Hainan and the Spratly Islands were annexed, and strong amphibious expeditions seized all of the major ports along the southeast coast of China. In 1940 Japan's attention shifted still farther south; and the Vichy French Government was forced to yield important concessions in Indo–China, including the right of entry of Japanese troops. A treaty was concluded with Thailand; and by the end of the year the Japanese were dangerously close to the Burma Road, last important supply channel from the outside world to China. Japan's formal adherence to the Axis in September 1940 provided still another indication of her ultimate aims (**Map 3**).

* An account of the Sino–Japanese War prior to 7 December 1941 is contained in the appendix.

The year 1941 saw no important change in the situation in China. Serving as mediator in a territorial dispute between Thailand and Indo–China, Japan further improved her relations with Thailand by upholding that country's claims. In April she signed a five-year nonaggression pact with Russia. After this momentous diplomatic coup Japan turned southward again and completed her occupation of Indo–China by the end of July. As the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands joined in placing an economic embargo on all trade with Japan, the situation in the Far East became increasingly explosive.

The map shows the general situation just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The strategic importance of the many bases acquired by the Japanese during the Sino–Japanese War should be evident. Having secured her flank and rear by diplomatic negotiations with Russia, Japan was now prepared to exploit her already large territorial conquests by a further advance southward to vast strategic areas possessing the richest supply of natural resources in the Far East.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The basis of Japan's bid for supremacy in the Far East was armed power. Beginning with the successful seizure of Manchuria in 1931 she displayed a complete disregard for the various treaties drawn up after World War I to insure the maintenance of peace in this hemisphere. While world attention was focused on the rearming of Germany, Japan converted her industries to war production and steadily increased the size and strength of her armed forces.

Japan's decision to fight the combined forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth—as well as China and the Netherlands—was neither hasty nor irrational. It had long been obvious to her that the establishment of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" would inevitably result in conflict with the Occidental nations. Unquestionably the crisis was now at hand. The stringent economic restrictions put into effect by the United States meant that Japan could no longer import the necessary raw materials for war production. Complete abandonment of her nationalistic ambitions was unthinkable; the only alternative was to make herself self-sufficient by seizing the rich Southern Resources Area, held only weakly by far-away England and the Netherlands Government in Exile.

With a much inferior war potential, Japan did not delude herself into believing that she could defeat the combined forces of the Occi-

dental powers. To strike at them quickly and devastatingly, when their full strength could not be utilized against her, was her only chance for victory. It was in the timing of her attack that Japan's shrewdly calculated chances of success lay.

From the Japanese point of view it was fortunate indeed that events transpiring in Europe favored Germany so heavily. The Nazi cause was ascendant, forcing the anti-Axis powers to the brink of the final precipice. France and the Netherlands were already out of the picture; Britain was fighting for her life in the Middle East; even Soviet Russia was struggling for survival under the relentless impact of the victorious German invasion armies. Never had the opportunity for conquest in the Far East seemed better than in late 1941. Only the United States could offer immediate resistance of any consequence, and even she was largely preoccupied with the conflict in Europe. Unprepared for war on two fronts, the United States was already committed, through her lend-lease program, to the support of the nations allied against the European Axis. Despite her tremendous potential strength she could not immediately put a large, well-trained force in the field for operations against Japan.

Certainly the time was at hand for Japan to act with vigor and celerity if her dream of empire were ever to be realized. It would take several years for the United States and Britain to muster their full strength in the Pacific, precious years during which Japan could seize and develop the immense resources of the Far East and make herself impregnable against counterattack.

During four and a half years of campaigning in China the soldiers of Japan had become inured to the rigors of war. Their training had been rounded out with actual combat experience; and their guns, tanks, planes, and other equipment had been tested as only the crucible of real war can test them. The close coordination of land, sea, and air power in joint operations had been mastered. The numerous amphibious attacks against China's seaports had taught many important lessons and had provided invaluable experience for future operations of this type. The increased combat efficiency of Japan's armed forces, as well as the gain in raw materials, had more than offset the comparatively small losses suffered in the fighting against the Chinese. In mid-1941 Japan quietly began to withdraw from China many of her seasoned and well-equipped units, replacing them with newly drafted troops who were generally provided with second-rate equipment.

By 7 December the strength of the Japanese Army had increased to 2,400,000 trained men. Available reserves, only partially trained, totaled another 3,000,000. Japan's air fleet consisted of 7,500 planes, 2,675 of which were first-line combat aircraft. The Army and the Navy air forces normally functioned independently of each other and were about equal in strength. The Army air force had 1,375 combat planes; the Navy air force had 1,300, including about 500 carrier-based planes. There was a reservoir of 6,000 trained pilots; 2,500, Army and 3,500, Navy. The average first-line pilot had 500 to 800 flying hours, and about 50 per cent of the Army and 10 per cent of the Navy pilots were veterans of combat either in the China or in the frequent border clashes with the Russians on the northern frontier of Manchuria. In December 1941 the rate of new plane construction was 425 per month, and additional pilots were being trained at the rate of 2,750 per year.

At the outbreak of the war the exact strength of the Japanese Navy was unknown to the rest of the world. Dissatisfied with the lesser role formerly assigned her by the other powers, Japan in 1934 denounced all naval agreements.* After 1936 she built up her Navy behind a veil of absolute secrecy until, as subsequently disclosed, she had by December 1941 a fleet of 230 major vessels.**

Japan's most serious weakness was in her merchant marine. An industrial island kingdom like Britain, she faced the necessity of importing tremendous quantities of unprocessed materials for home consumption and for the manufacture of war goods. The additional task of carrying supplies and troops to forces conducting operations on a widespread front would increase the burden by 100 per cent. Japanese shipping had grown to about 6,000,000 tons. This would be sufficient for the conduct of the war as long as undue losses were not experienced, but there was no margin of safety. It was anticipated that production could keep pace with normal attrition but nothing more.

Japan's strength lay not only in the size and training of her armed forces but also in their strategic disposition at the time she launched

* In 1922 the 5:5:3 ratio for all capital ships had been agreed upon at the Washington Arms Conference by Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. In 1930 the parties to the original treaty agreed to further limitations, this time with respect to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

** Her line of battle comprised ten battleships, nine carriers (four of which were large), eighteen heavy cruisers, seventeen light cruisers, 112 destroyers, and sixty-four submarines. Two super-battleships, each of 64,000 tons and mounting 18-inch guns, were nearing completion, as were a considerable number of other fleet units.

her offensive. The mandated islands in the Central Pacific provided excellent bases for operations to the east against Hawaii, to the west against the Philippines, and to the south against New Guinea, the Solomons, and Australia. Guam and Wake Islands were so near that they could be easily taken. Harbors and airfields in the Kurile Islands stretched menacingly toward the Aleutians. Hainan Island and the coastal areas seized from China furnished sites for air bases which, together with fields in Formosa, the Ryukyu Islands, and Japan proper, could protect warships and merchant shipping moving south. The complete occupation of Indo–China in 1941 extended the line of advance bases close enough to Malaya to support easily an attack on that peninsula and the key British naval base at Singapore. The Philippine Islands, main American outpost in the Far East, were tightly hemmed in on three sides by bases in the Palau Islands, in Formosa and Hainan, in the Spratly Islands, and at Camranh Bay in Indo–China. Hong Kong, which along with Singapore and Manila constituted the foundation of Anglo–Saxon power and influence in the Far East, was completely isolated by a strong cordon of Japanese troops and by the bases in Formosa and Hainan. With persistent foresight Japan had laid well the foundation for her future drive to the south.

While Japan readied herself for war during 1941, the Occidental powers in the Far East stirred uneasily at the unmistakable implications of her aggressive conduct. However, any formal unification of plans, preparations, and command was not considered feasible prior to a declaration of war. The governments of the democracies were handicapped in this respect by their scruples as well as by their openly avowed desire for peace. Above all, it was desired to avoid the commission of any act which might be construed as overt by Japan.

When the necessity for reinforcements began to be more clearly realized, it was too late. Britain, locked in her struggle with Germany, was unable to send any sizable amount of help to the Far East. Australia and New Zealand had already dispatched the bulk of their forces to assist the mother country in North Africa. Some British and Australian units were diverted to Malaya, and a few Canadian troops were sent to Hong Kong; but Britain was forced to rely mostly on native troops for the defense of her Far Eastern possessions. With the home country occupied by Germany, the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies had to depend upon their own resources and upon such assistance as could be furnished by the United States. American airplanes were purchased, and pilots were sent

to this country for training. Unfortunately the war began before many of the planes could be delivered. The only country with any real military power for use in the Pacific was the United States. Our strength, however, rested chiefly in the Hawaiian Islands, 5,000 miles from the heart of the Far East. In the Philippines, American forces had but limited means at their disposal.

West of Hawaii the Allies were able to oppose the efficient and well-equipped Japanese war machine with a total strength of about 350,000 poorly equipped ground troops, some ninety warships, and less than 900 planes, the majority of which were obsolete. This force, largely untrained and inexperienced, and made up of a mixture of nationalities with divergent customs, languages, and interests, was scattered across the wide Pacific from Wake Island to Burma and from Hong Kong to Australia. The principal centers of Allied strength in the Far East were Malaya and the Philippine Islands;* for although additional forces occupied Australia, Burma, Hong Kong, and the Indies,** they were widely dispersed and too weak to be effective unless heavily reinforced.

In event of war the only source of immediate reinforcements for the Far Eastern theater was Hawaii. There, at Pearl Harbor, was based the United States Pacific Fleet, a strategically mobile surface and naval-air striking force. Should this fleet be neutralized or destroyed, considerable time would elapse before another striking force could be formed to effect the relief of the forces trapped in the Far East.

In the Hawaiian Islands a strong Army garrison of 59,000 protected the important naval and air facilities on Oahu. The Hawaiian

* The British Far Eastern Fleet at Singapore comprised one battleship, one battle cruiser, one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, and five destroyers. Three divisions, plus miscellaneous troops equivalent to a fourth, defended Malaya; and there were 332 aircraft, only a few of which were up-to-date combat types.

In the Philippines the American Asiatic Fleet consisted of one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, thirteen destroyers, twenty-nine submarines, and miscellaneous supporting vessels. Troops available for defense of the islands totaled about 110,000. The Far Eastern Air Force had 316 planes, 150 of which were nonoperational for lack of spare parts.

** Australia could furnish four cruisers and several lesser warships. She had a good-sized militia, which by law could be employed only in defense of the homeland, and 165 operational aircraft.

Burma was held by the equivalent of two divisions, largely composed of Burmese. Hong Kong had a garrison of 12,000.

A small but capable Dutch fleet of four cruisers, six destroyers, and eighteen submarines was in the Indies, as were 85,000 Dutch troops (over 90 per cent Asiatics) and some 200 aircraft.

Air Force was considered to be one of the best-trained and most powerful that we had. Adding its 273 aircraft to the 301 land-based Navy planes in Hawaii, the total was an imposing air strength of 574. However, only 123 of the Army and 148 of the Navy aircraft were actually suitable for combat, making a somewhat less impressive total of 271 planes. About 180 first-line aircraft were carried aboard the two carriers present in Hawaiian waters on 7 December, and a squadron of Navy patrol bombers was based at Midway Island. The Pacific Fleet comprised in its entirety nine battleships, three aircraft carriers, two heavy cruisers, eighteen light cruisers, fifty-four destroyers, and twenty-two submarines. However, one battleship, one carrier, three light cruisers, nine destroyers, and ten submarines were in ports on the west coast of the United States on 7 December, and one light cruiser was visiting in Asiatic waters.

In considering the over-all military strength of the United States on the eve of war it should be borne in mind that we had already committed a large part of our production of war materials to the conflict in Europe. After the passage of the Lend-Lease Act by Congress on 11 March 1941 a steadily increasing stream of planes, ships, guns, tanks, and other matériel flowed to the countries resisting the Axis Powers. Naturally this affected the state of our own preparedness.

By 7 December 1941 our Army had reached a peak strength of over 1,500,000 men, of whom about 1,000,000 were not yet completely trained. Our Army Air Forces had 1,157 first-line combat aircraft, 159 of which were four-engine bombers. The United States Navy consisted of 347 warships, totaling over 1,350,000 tons, plus a fleet of auxiliary vessels.* Our merchant shipping aggregated over 10,000,000 tons and was growing rapidly.

In studying the operations in the Pacific it is important that certain conditions—in large part peculiar to that theater—be kept in mind:

1. Only air and sea lines of communication were available for the movement of troops and supplies to various parts of the huge theater of war. The tremendous logistical problem became the limiting factor in the size of the forces engaged in active operations.

* Our major combat elements comprised seventeen battleships, seven aircraft carriers, one escort carrier, eighteen heavy cruisers, twenty light cruisers, 172 destroyers, and 112 submarines. Construction of additional ships had been started in our shipyards in accordance with an ambitious plan for the expansion of the Navy.

2. The safe movement of forces necessitated the control of properly equipped naval and air bases. Of the myriads of islands in the Pacific Ocean only a few—because of location, size, terrain, tides, ability to sustain life, and other factors—are suitable for bases. Obviously the execution of planned operations largely revolved about control or lack of control of those bases.

3. Extremely long-range planning was normally required because of the great distances between points in the theater and the relatively slow rate of travel by water.

4. The use of large masses of troops on any one battlefield was precluded by the limited size of most of the islands and by the difficult terrain of the larger areas.

5. Most operations were individual in nature, requiring that troops be highly trained and provided with special equipment. Proficiency in amphibious operations and in jungle warfare was extremely important.

6. The role of air power was even more important in the Pacific than in Europe because of the longer and more tenuous lines of communication.

7. Combined land, air, and sea power had to be used together as one team, strategically and tactically. No single one of them could gain a victory without the assistance of the other two.

JAPANESE WAR PLAN

During the war the Japanese military hierarchy completely dominated the nation, economically and politically as well as militarily. The war powers of neither the Army nor the Navy were subject to control by any other governmental body. The two factions exercised their authority only by means of mutual agreement, and nothing could be accomplished in matters upon which there was divided opinion.

The Imperial General Headquarters, formed for the purpose of wielding supreme military command, was built around the general staffs of the two services.* Although primarily concerned with operational planning, this body also exercised great influence on national war policies.

* Field Marshal Sugiyama served as Chief of the Army General Staff from October 1940 to February 1944. Admiral of the Fleet Nagano became Chief of the Naval General Staff in April 1941 and served until 1944. These two leaders and Premier Tojo exercised almost absolute control over Japan's conduct of the war.

The basic war plan, as formulated by the Imperial General Headquarters and placed in effect on 7 December 1941, was divided into three successive phases:

1. Initial offensive operations designed to achieve the following objectives:

a. Neutralization of the United States Pacific Fleet.

b. Seizure of the rich Southern Resources Area and the elimination of all Allied forces isolated in the Far East.

c. Seizure of strategic areas and islands essential to the establishment of a perimeter for the defense of the Southern Resources Area and the Japanese homeland.

2. Consolidation and strengthening of the perimeter, with a strategic ring of fortified bases extending from the Kuriles through Wake Island, the Marshall, Gilbert, and Bismarck Islands, northern New Guinea, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya, and Burma.

3. The interception and destruction of any attacking forces that might attempt to penetrate the defensive perimeter and the waging of a war of attrition to destroy the will to fight of the United States, the principal antagonist. No responsible Japanese leader believed that an invasion of the United States was feasible within the forseeable future.

Subsidiary plans were also formulated, outlining lesser operations in support of the basic plan. The two most important of these covered:

1. Raids on Allied advance bases in order to reduce their operating capabilities as well as to inflict maximum possible losses on enemy air and naval units.

2. Operations against Allied lines of communication, featuring submarine warfare in the German style.

Time was a major factor in Japan's calculations. It was vital that the first phase of her basic war plan be completed quickly, since only then could the second and third phases be properly executed. The overconfident Japanese planners expected the result of the operations in the first phase to determine the outcome of the whole war. It was realized that the United States had a greater war potential than Japan, but it was not anticipated that the war would last long enough for the disparity to become effective. The situation in Europe and the rapidity of Japanese conquest would leave America with no choice but to accept a fait accompli in the Pacific.

The main prize of the war for Japan would be the rich Southern Resources Area. Possession and unrestricted exploitation of this

region would make her economically self-sufficient. Here were the raw materials she needed: nickel, manganese, bauxite, iron, gold, oil, 90 per cent of the world's quinine, 85 per cent of its rubber, and 65 per cent of its tin. Without them Japan could neither continue her campaign in China nor meet the demands of the war with the Allies that their seizure would inaugurate. Moreover, her gain would be her enemies' loss. The effort of the Allies both in Europe and in the Pacific would be seriously hampered by the lack of raw materials normally imported from the Far East.

JAPANESE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

INITIAL PLANS AND PREPARATIONS (Map 4)

The operation plans for the execution of the initial phase of the basic Japanese war plan were complex and minute. At first glance they would appear to be unorthodox and fraught with danger. A "centrifugal" offensive was to be undertaken. Simultaneous blows were to be struck at Pearl Harbor, Wake, Guam, Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines—offensives in almost every direction of the compass. A plan to begin attacks on all fronts at the same time is, to put it mildly, unusual. Sound strategy has always dictated that a nation fighting on several fronts should concentrate for a decision on one while holding on the others. The risk accepted by the Japanese strategic planners lay in the great dispersion of forces required to execute simultaneous attacks at such widely separated points. Defeat in detail might well be the result.

On closer scrutiny, however, we see that the risk was well calculated. Taking full advantage of her great superiority in combat power immediately available, as well as her strategic central position and interior lines, Japan was undertaking an offensive that promised to gain the greatest results in the shortest possible time. Striking everywhere at once would not only exploit the essential element of surprise but would throw the Allies on the defensive on all fronts and confuse them as to her true objectives. Her unorthodox strategy was tailor-made to fit the unusual conditions in the Pacific. It would take full advantage of the Allies' weakness, not only in armed strength but also in divergent interests. It would be normal for each to attempt to defend her own territory, and this would effectively hinder any move to combine and concentrate the available Allied forces during the initial phase. A quick victory by Japan on all fronts while the Allies were still weak was indeed quite possible. Once the first phase of her war plan had been completed,

she would completely dominate the whole of the Far East. The Allies, operating at the end of long supply lines and without benefit of well-developed advance bases, would find reconquest a difficult and prolonged, if not impossible, operation.

According to the plan, hostilities were to commence with surprise air attacks against widely separated objectives. The most important of these, and the first in point of time, was to be the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Japan's projected drive southward would be protected on the right flank by her occupation of the coast of Asia and by her nonaggression pact with Russia. The Chinese Army, almost entirely cut off from supply by the outside world, would be unable to initiate offensive operations; and Russia would be busy concentrating all her remaining strength in a last desperate effort to stem the tide of German invasion.

In order to secure the left flank of the advance to the south the Japanese planned to neutralize the United States Pacific Fleet, the only real threat. The development of carrier-based naval air power in the years after World War I presented the ideal weapon for such a task. The fast carrier forces of the Japanese Navy were fully capable of executing a very-long-range surprise attack, although the United States did not fully apprehend such a capability. To carry out the Hawaiian attack the Japanese selected their First Air Fleet, a strategically mobile striking force built around a nucleus of six fast carriers.

Once the key strike at Pearl Harbor had been completed, strong air attacks, preliminary to invasion, were to be launched against the Philippines and Malaya for the primary purpose of destroying the main Allied concentrations of air power in the Far East. Air blows against Hong Kong, Wake, and Guam would also inaugurate those subsidiary operations.*

* Initial employment of the Japanese first-line aircraft (1,375 Army, 1,300 Navy) was planned as follows:

	Army	Navy	
		Land-Based	*Ship-Based*
Pearl Harbor			414
Philippines	150	360	50
Malaya and Burma	450	125	
China	175		
Central Pacific		110	
Manchuria	450		
Japan	150		168 (misc.)
Seaplanes with the fleet			73

The main attack of Japan's centrifugal offensive was to be the drive to seize the rich Southern Resources Area. In the opening period of operations a two-pronged attack was to be made, one prong against Malaya and the other against the Philippines. At the same time Guam, Wake, Hong Kong, British Borneo, and Thailand were to be occupied; and advance bases were to be established in the Bismarcks, Dutch Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas, and Timor. After the capture of Malaya and the Philippines the two main forces were to combine for the invasion of Java, the heart of the Dutch empire. By this time the First Air Fleet would have completed operations in the Central Pacific and could lend its overwhelming power to the assault. At an opportune time large-scale operations in Burma were also to commence, with the minimum objective of cutting supply routes to China. Upon the successful conclusion of these campaigns the first-phase objectives of the basic war plan would have been attained. The second and third phases would then follow, and Japan would revert to the strategic defensive while undertaking the secondary offensive operations that, as we have seen, were called for by the subsidiary plans.

Even before the completion of the planning the Japanese Army and Navy set in operation intensive training programs designed to prepare each ground, air, and naval unit for its assigned mission. Specially equipped divisions* with selected veteran personnel were given amphibious training on the south coast of China and were then moved to Hainan, Formosa, or French Indo–China for exhaustive maneuvers over terrain similar to that in the Philippines and Malaya. These troops soon became seasoned jungle fighters and experts in landing operations. Naval and air units underwent realistic maneuvers in support of the ground forces and also trained for special operations such as the attack on Pearl Harbor.

As Japan prepared for war, the Allies in the Far East began to realize her intent. A series of informal military conferences between American, British, and Dutch staff officers resulted in some general agreements on steps to be taken in the event of hostilities. Because of the relatively small forces available to the Allies in this theater the strategy would necessarily have to be defensive pending receipt of reinforcements. All plans were based upon probable Japanese courses of action. Generally speaking, there was a tendency to underestimate the Japanese strength and to discount the possibility of simultaneous attacks over a large area. No definite agreement was reached on the problem of unified command.

* The Japanese had adopted a triangular organization for most of their divisions, leaving them with an average strength of 22,000 men.

The militaristic government of General Tojo, who grasped the reins of power on 17 October 1941, was not slow to exercise its mandate. Only eighteen days later, on 5 November, the Imperial General Headquarters issued its master plan for war operations. Top Army and Navy commanders were warned that war was believed to be unavoidable, and they were directed to complete all required preparations by the first part of December.

Meanwhile, on 18 November, Special Envoy Kurusu arrived in the United States to assist Ambassador Nomura in the diplomatic negotiations then being conducted. After-knowledge indicates that the Japanese by this time actually had little hope, or even desire, for securing by peaceful methods what might more certainly be obtained by war. However, the continuation of discussions up to the actual commencement of hostilities might well deceive the United States and materially aid in securing the strategic surprise that was so essential to the Japanese plan of military operations.

In Washington, on 20 November, the first in a chain of significant events took place. On that date the Japanese envoys submitted to our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, a proposal that stipulated in effect that the United States withdraw its aid and support to the Chinese Government and resume the commercial relations with Japan prevailing prior to the economic embargo. In turn the Japanese promised to withdraw immediately from southern French Indo–China and later, after the conclusion of the war with China, to evacuate Indo–China entirely. As might have been expected, this instrument of appeasement was immediately rejected by the United States Government. A counterproposal was offered on 26 November. This was the famous "Ten Points," calling for complete abandonment by the Japanese of their policy of aggrandizement in East Asia. The American document proposed among other things that Japan withdraw all her military and police forces from China and French Indo–China and that both governments yield all extraterritorial rights in China.

Insofar as Japan was concerned, her proposal of 20 November had constituted an ultimatum. When the disapproval of the United States was indicated, the Imperial Headquarters, on 21 November, ordered all forces preparing for war operations to proceed to suitable standby areas and authorized them to employ any strength necessary for self-defense against interfering Allied forces. The First Air Fleet was directed to leave its assembly point in the Kuriles and move toward Pearl Harbor, subject however to recall should negotiations assume a more favorable aspect.

In order to screen these final preparations for attack the Japanese envoys in Washington expressed complete willingness to continue the discussions. The Japanese Government, however, considered the "Ten Points" memorandum to be an American ultimatum; and since its own ultimatum of 20 November was now firmly and officially rejected, the only possible recourse was to armed force. On 1 December all military commanders in the field were notified that the decision to enter into a state of war had been made. X-day, as it was termed, was designated as 8 December

On 3 December the Japanese Government telegraphed its diplomatic representatives abroad to destroy all codes and ciphers and to burn all secret documents. The Ambassadors at Rome and Berlin were instructed to notify the Governments of Italy and Germany that war would be declared against the United States on 8 December.

The stage was set; and on 7 December, Japan raised the curtain, laying bare her choice of war as an instrument of national policy. But the first scene in this grim new drama was a startling one. It unfolded, not on Southeast Asia, as had been expected, but on Pearl Harbor, at the very threshold of continental United States.

CENTRAL PACIFIC OPERATIONS*

Pearl Harbor.—Since 1935 the American garrison in Hawaii had been provided with more troops and munitions of war than any other oversea outpost. Despite this, there was by 1940 a serious shortage of modern equipment and trained personnel. The growing pains of our country's mobilization for defense were everywhere evident, and not until February 1941 was it possible to inaugurate the movement to Hawaii of troop reinforcements and items of modern war matériel. The United States, unfortunately, was not prepared for war; the flow of munitions from our embryonic war industries was still only a trickle. Our plan of strategy in the Pacific was defensive, and our condition of readiness was predicated upon the avoidance of outright hostilities until April 1942.

The principle of unified command was not applied to Hawaii in the days before the war. Our Navy was dependent upon the facilities of the great fleet base at Pearl Harbor, but in event of hostilities its mission would be to conduct operations at sea. It was not anticipated, of course, that the fleet would fight in the harbor. The mission of our Army forces in Hawaii was to guard against invasion or air attack, so that the fleet anchorage and the yards at Pearl Harbor

* Although most of the Japanese first-phase operations took place concurrently, they will be discussed separately in the following pages.

would be secure for the use of the Navy. To insure the successful accomplishment of this mission it was imperative that the closest liaison be established between the two services.

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short* commanded all Army troops in the Hawaiian Department. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, senior Navy officer in the Pacific, was Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Authority in Hawaii was exercised by mutual cooperation between these two commanders. A comprehensive plan of defense by all land, air, and naval forces had been drawn up; and joint maneuvers were held periodically to test thoroughly the various security measures and the general condition of readiness.

The Navy, in addition to special searches conducted by surface task forces, was charged with maintaining a 700-mile offshore air patrol that would thoroughly cover the area around the island of Oahu. The twenty-mile inshore patrol was the Army's responsibility. A total of nine radar sets—three fixed and six mobile—were set up and operated on Oahu by the Army, the sweep of search extending to a maximum distance of slightly over 130 miles. Prior to the attack these sets were not in continuous operation, mainly because of a deficiency of spare parts and trained personnel.

An essential element of our Hawaiian air defenses was the Army's Aircraft Warning Service. Although faithfully patterned on the British procedure that had proven so effective in the air war over England, our warning service was still in its infancy. In theory the information center received and evaluated all reports from air patrols, radar stations, visual observation posts, and other Army and Navy sources; and centralized communication channels of all types insured the rapid dissemination of orders and intelligence. In actual practice, however, the Aircraft Warning Service was only partially operative before 7 December.

Superimposed upon the critical shortages that hampered all American military commands was the additional burden of training—the tremendous problem of coping with the inexperience of such forces as were available. Emphasis was laid, and rightly so, on this phase of our war preparation. The ground, naval, and air forces in Hawaii, no less than other commands in other areas, performed their training requirements with diligence and efficiency. Available means, however, were not sufficient to permit the simul-

* The ranks of officers as given throughout this narrative were those held during the operations discussed. Unless otherwise indicated, all naval commanders listed were officers of the United States Navy, and all troop commanders were officers of the United States Army.

taneous execution of training measures and a full war alert. Here was the crux of the matter. At some point, or at some time, in the march of events toward outright war in the Pacific a signal would have to be given for the abandonment of the training mission and the assumption of the war mission. For the reception of such a signal the commanders in Hawaii necessarily would have to be most attentive to all instructions from their superiors in Washington. The quality of the intelligence services available to our Government would primarily determine the degree of accuracy with which the imminence of war could be forecast.*

It was in January 1941 that the plan for a surprise attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor first became the subject of serious consideration by the Japanese.** As has been indicated, the strategic purpose of the attack was to render impotent the United States Pacific Fleet in order to gain sufficient time and freedom of action for the uninterrupted conquest of the Southern Resources Area and for the establishment of a defensive perimeter. The mission of the attack force, the First Air Fleet, was to deprive the Pacific Fleet of its striking power for a period of three to six months by sinking or seriously damaging four battleships and four aircraft carriers. In order to accomplish this the Imperial Headquarters was prepared to lose one-third of the participating units. No landing in Hawaii was contemplated, since the objective could be attained by air attack alone. Besides, invasion was considered impracticable because of the shortage of time for preparations, the necessity for secrecy in the movement of the striking force, and—from the logistical standpoint—a general inability to support another amphibious operation at this time.

* Despite all Japanese measures for secrecy the United States Government was successful in forecasting the imminence of war with Japan, although not the place of initial attack. This was because of our fortuitous possession of "Magic," the key to Japan's highly secret diplomatic code. Well before 7 December our Army cryptographers had succeeded in reconstructing the Japanese coding device; and since the enemy never discovered this, some remarkable intelligence came into our hands. As an important byproduct the reports of the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin furnished us throughout the war with some of the best information obtainable on the plans and movements of the Germans.

** During this month a preliminary study of the proposed operation was made at the direction of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet. Early in September work commenced on the details of the actual plan. By this time training and other preparations were well under way.

In deciding on the tactics of the attack the Japanese planners reached the conclusion that the most effective weapon of destruction against capital ships was the airborne torpedo,* although horizontal and dive-bombing strikes would supplement the torpedo attack. To protect the attacking air units, as well as the task force itself, a sizeable group of fighter aircraft was to be employed against American planes and their facilities on the ground.

A matter vital to the success of the entire operation was the selection of a favorable course of approach to the objective. The most important factors to be considered were the element of surprise and the ability to refuel at sea; if either failed, the attack would be impossible. A central or southern route of approach to the Hawaiian Archipelago would unquestionably afford calm seas and ease in refueling, but the hazard of being discovered by American patrol planes or ships was too great. A northern track, passing between Midway and the Aleutian Islands, would greatly increase the chances of surprise, although adverse weather might seriously complicate the difficult task of refueling at sea. After careful deliberation the northern route was selected, it being estimated that the refueling problem could be overcome by intensive training. In order to avoid detection of the task force in the approach it was planned to maintain complete radio silence and to use a screening force of destroyers and submarines ahead of the main body.

Intensive training of the designated air groups was begun in the seclusion of Japan's Inland Sea in August 1941. All units were reinforced to above strength, and the flight personnel selected were the most efficient and best-trained in the Japanese Navy. Emphasis was placed on shallow-water torpedo drops, on horizontal and dive-bombing techniques, and on strafing tactics. Refueling exercises were conducted by surface vessels. By mid-November the task force was ready for action.

As we have already seen, the Combined Fleet was warned by a dispatch from the Imperial General Headquarters on 5 November that war was unavoidable and all preparations should be completed by the first part of December. In obedience to this order Admiral Yamamoto on 7 November directed all elements of the First Air Fleet to assemble at Hitokappu Bay, in the Kuriles, by 22 November.

* The supercharged warhead of the Japanese torpedo made it the most destructive agent of its kind possessed by any Navy in the world, including our own. For the Pearl Harbor attack special vanes were fitted to the torpedoes to prevent them from penetrating to too great a depth.

At the same time the detailed plans for the attack were issued, and 8 December was fixed as the target date.*

Within the prescribed time the concentration of the First Air Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, had been effected. In readiness lay a task force comprising six aircraft carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, nine destroyers, three submarines, and eight tankers. All these warships were fast and modern vessels, specially selected for their long cruising range.

As we have seen, the keystone of Japan's entire plan of offensive operations was the attack on Pearl Harbor. The exact moment of this blow was to determine the timing of all attacks elsewhere. It was vital that no premature action be taken in any other area; for if this should occur, the land, air, and naval defenses of Hawaii would be alerted. Surprise was essential for the successful neutralization of the Pacific Fleet; otherwise the attack, which was actually a raid, would be foredoomed to failure.

Imperial Headquarters possessed detailed information concerning American fleet units, air strength, and fixed military installations in Hawaii. Of particular importance was the well-known fact that the Pacific Fleet normally maneuvered at sea from Monday through Friday of the week and then came into port for the week end. In order to capitalize upon the advantages to be derived from this inviting custom the Japanese selected a Sunday for the day of attack. To facilitate surprise the striking air groups were scheduled to take off from their carriers as close to dawn as possible; and the opening of the attack was set for 0800, Hawaiian time, about one hour after sunrise.

On 27 November the two commanders in Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel and General Short, received from their superiors in Washington similar messages warning that war with Japan was imminent. From this moment on, their decisions and actions were fraught with particular significance.

On 28 November orders were issued to bomb any unidentified submarines found in the waters around Oahu, and ships at sea were also directed to bomb all suspicious submarine contacts. Patrol vessels began sweeping the approaches to Pearl Harbor for mines. Submarines of the Pacific Fleet went on continuous war patrol in the direction of Midway and Wake Islands, and carrier task forces put

* It should be borne in mind that all dates west of the International Date Line are one day advanced over those east of the line. Hence 8 December meant 7 December at Pearl Harbor.

to sea bearing aircraft reinforcements for the defenses of those two isolated outposts. In general a fairly effective reconnaissance screen was maintained to the south and west of Hawaii by air and fleet units of the Navy. The offshore patrol, however, was neither operating continuously nor covering all possible sectors of approach. Admiral Kimmel did not believe that he had enough long-range patrol planes available to carry out such reconnaissance, considering maintenance and training requirements. For this reason he concentrated his efforts on covering the most likely avenues of approach. Since no surface units were maneuvering north of Hawaii either, this important sector was thus left wholly unguarded.

The warning dispatch of 27 November was not considered by General Short to be a war warning; he construed it otherwise. Because of the large Japanese population in the Hawaiian Islands* it had seemed likely that sabotage would present the most serious threat to our military establishment, and detailed plans had already been drawn up to guard against this internal danger. The plan for protection against sabotage was placed in effect immediately and was diligently followed up to the time of the Japanese attack on 7 December. Unfortunately this type of alert required the close grouping of planes, antiaircraft guns, motor transportation, and other equipment so that an effective guard against saboteurs could be maintained.

In similar manner practically all troop units, including antiaircraft batteries, were called in from maneuvers in the field and were assembled in garrison to await the signal for riot duty. The Aircraft Warning Service continued to function with emphasis upon training and progressed at only a slow rate toward a realistic operating procedure. The radar stations, for example, fully performed their search missions during only the dawn period. After a three-hour alert, from 0400 to 0700 daily, the sets reverted to a lesser condition of readiness.

On 3 December, Admiral Kimmel received from Washington a dispatch informing him of the destruction of secret codes and other documents by Japanese diplomats abroad. Although liaison between the Army and Navy commands in Hawaii was ostensibly functioning well, this new intelligence was not forwarded to General Short. Nor, for that matter, did Admiral Kimmel take any steps to remove the fleet from Pearl Harbor over the fateful week end of 7 December.

* Numbering almost 160,000, the Japanese element comprised 37 per cent of the total population. About 35,000 of these were aliens.

Despite an outer semblance of excellent liaison between the two services, the dual commanders in Hawaii were not familiar in more than a perfunctory fashion with each other's dispositions and measures for defense. General Short assumed that the offshore patrol was functioning and that the Navy would give him early warning of any enemy air attack. Admiral Kimmel assumed that the Air Warning Service was operating on a twenty-four hour schedule and that the Army was in constant readiness to carry out its mission of protecting Pearl Harbor. Neither commander verified his assumptions. The basic flaw was that each leaned over backwards to avoid giving offense by appearing to meddle in the proper affairs of the other.

While the diplomats talked peace in Washington, the Japanese First Air Fleet followed its long course eastward. The cover plan for the attack consisted of deceptive radio messages broadcast from the vicinity of the Inland Sea in such a manner as to give the impression that the carrier task force was still in home waters. Our radio intercept service, which was doing its utmost to locate the Japanese carrier force, monitored the enemy's dummy traffic but was only partially deceived. However, the First Air Fleet maintained absolute radio silence during the entire period of its approach to Pearl Harbor and hence could not be detected by our intercept service.

As the days passed, the First Air Fleet moved steadily along its track—first to the east, then to the southeast, and finally, at 2130 on 6 December,* sharply to the south. No other ships had been encountered, and the task force had successfully escaped detection. At 0600 on 7 December the First Air Fleet arrived at the launching point, 200 miles north of Oahu. Admiral Nagumo was precisely on schedule.

At this time the situation as known to Nagumo was that eight battleships and many lesser vessels were in Pearl Harbor for the week end, as usual (**Map 5**). The American carriers were reported to be at sea, but he hoped that they would have returned by the time the air groups arrived over Pearl Harbor. Detailed information on the state of our defenses in Hawaii had been flowing to Japan for many years through the intricate channels of her espionage net. Another good source was tapped when the crews of merchant ships that had called at Hawaii in mid-November were interrogated. Last-minute intelligence was supplied by enemy agents in Hawaii, who were permitted to transmit their messages to Tokyo over the com-

* East longitude time. The International Date Line had been crossed.

mercial telegraph. From 1 to 6 December the latest information on the berthing arrangements of the Pacific Fleet was sent to Japan and from there was relayed to the attack force en route to Pearl Harbor. Other sources of last-minute information were the commercial radio broadcasts from Hawaii and the reports from submarines on reconnaissance duty in the surrounding ocean areas.

Aboard the six carriers that formed the nucleus of the First Air Fleet were 414 aircraft. It was planned to use 360 of these in the attack on Pearl Harbor; the remaining fifty-four, all fighters, were to be held back for the protection of the carriers. The principal target of the attack was, of course, the Pacific Fleet; but slightly more than half of the striking air force was to be employed against American airfields and aircraft as a defensive precaution.

At the beginning of the attack the Japanese fighter planes were to patrol en masse over Oahu, destroying all American planes found airborne and securing complete supremacy in the air. Once absolute control had been achieved, the fighter group was then to split up and attack the various airfields on Oahu and planes found on the ground. It was known that the United States Army fighter planes were normally based at Wheeler Field and that carrier planes of the Pacific Fleet were usually kept at the Ford Island Naval Air Station when the carriers were in harbor. So these two air bases were to be attacked first in order to prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against the bombers and torpedo planes that were to strike the Pacific Fleet. Planes of the second wave were to continue the air neutralization tactics, thus affording protection for the withdrawal of the air elements and the task force itself.

At 0600, after a final briefing aboard the carriers of the First Air Fleet, the planes of the first wave began to take off. Strategic surprise was assured; tactical surprise was to be gained also, through purely fortuitous circumstances.

At anchor in Pearl Harbor on this Sunday morning were eighty-six ships of the United States Pacific Fleet. Only the two carrier task forces and miscellaneous units patrolling at sea were missing.* Warships that were present included eight battleships, three heavy

* Task Force 8, commanded by Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, was about 200 miles southwest of Oahu returning from Wake Island. It comprised the carrier *Enterprise*, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers.

Task Force 2, commanded by Rear Admiral John H. Newton, comprised the carrier *Lexington*, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers. It was 400 miles southeast of Midway Island en route from Hawaii.

Eight other cruisers were at sea engaged in maneuvers, patrols, and convoy-escort duty.

cruisers, six light cruisers, twenty-nine destroyers, and five submarines. Aboard ship were 97 per cent of the enlisted personnel and 60 per cent of the officer complement. The battleships were moored abreast of each other along the southeast side of Ford Island. The aircraft carriers customarily were berthed along the northwest side of Ford Island while their planes hangared at the Ford Island Naval Air Station, but on this day there were no carriers in the harbor. Several vessels, including one battleship, were in drydock in the Navy Yard, which was located on the eastern side of Pearl Harbor. Other ships were moored alongside the docks in the Navy Yard or out in the harbor, many of them in pairs.

Approximately 50 per cent of the land-based naval aircraft on Oahu were in a condition of readiness calling for full combat status within not to exceed four hours. Admiral Kimmel had available a total of 130 first-line combat planes, of which sixty-nine were long-range patrol bombers and sixty-one were carrier types. The complement of the aircraft carriers, absent at sea, was another 180 planes. However, only eighteen of these, from the *Enterprise,* arrived at Pearl Harbor in time to participate in the action.

All dispositions of the Army forces were still in accordance with the antisabotage alert. Planes of the Hawaiian Air Force were to be ready for combat on four-hour notice. The eighty-six guns of the antiaircraft command were not in their firing positions, nor had any ammunition been issued to them. The Army air strength available totaled 263 planes, of which only 123 were serviceable combat types. Six out of twelve Flying Fortresses were in operating condition. Two additional squadrons of unarmed Flying Fortresses, part of the 7th Bombardment Group (H), arrived during the height of the attack en route to the Philippines. They could not be fueled and armed, however, in time to take part in the action.

The first hint to the defenders of Hawaii that trouble was brewing came well before the attacking Japanese planes rode in with the break of day. At 0342 on 7 December a Navy mine sweeper patrolling off the mouth of Pearl Harbor momentarily sighted a submarine's periscope, apparently heading for the entrance to the harbor. A nearby destroyer immediately conducted a search, but the effort proved fruitless and was abandoned after an hour. The report appeared to be an error.

By 0430, however, at least one Japanese midget submarine was actually reconnoitering inside Pearl Harbor. Slipping past the antisubmarine net, which had been lowered to enable a garbage scow to

leave the harbor, the enemy submarine made a complete circuit of Ford Island and then escaped undetected.*

The first definite indication of an attack on Oahu came at 0630, when the same destroyer and a target ship both detected a submarine conning tower with an unfamiliar silhouette heading for the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Since the undersea craft was operating submerged in a prohibited area, the destroyer's commander shouldered without hesitation the heavy responsibility of ordering an immediate attack. Following his standing instructions implicitly, he engaged the submarine with gunfire and depth charges and destroyed it. Two messages were promptly sent to naval headquarters, but no alert ensued nor was the Army informed.

Another warning of the impending attack was given by a radar station of the Aircraft Warning Service. The detector unit, located near Kahuku Point, had purely by chance remained in operation after 0700, the normal closing time. The experienced chief operator on the set was voluntarily giving extra instruction to a new man. At 0702 an unusual formation appeared on the screen. A large group of aircraft about 130 miles distant was approaching Oahu from almost due north. A report was telephoned to the information center at 0720; but the officer on duty, who was inexperienced, did not consider it necessary to take any action because of the expected arrival of a group of Flying Fortresses from the mainland. He assumed that the radar had picked up these friendly planes—though that would mean they were considerably off course.

While these two separate incidents were proving so singularly unproductive of alarm to the garrison of Oahu, a third warning was on the way. This was in the form of a last-minute emergency message from the War Department in Washington. Dispatched at 0648 (Hawaiian time) via commercial radio, the warning arrived in Honolulu at 0733. The messenger, however, was diverted by the Japanese attack and did not deliver the message to Department Headquarters until 1145.

In this manner all opportunities for advance warning passed unheeded. The first wave of Japanese planes approached Oahu above the protection of a dense cloud layer. At 0750 the order to attack was given, and the first blows fell almost simultaneously. Everywhere the surprise was complete. When the leading Japanese fighter group arrived over Oahu, no American planes were found off the

* The tiny craft subsequently ran aground on the beach outside of Pearl Harbor and was recovered intact. The ship's log revealed its peregrinations.

ground. Control of the air was thus secured immediately by default. The enemy fighters quickly split up to attack grounded aircraft on the various fields, the second mission assigned.

Finding our grounded aircraft perfect targets, the Japanese pilots struck Kaneohe Bay, Bellows Field, Ewa, and the Ford Island Naval Station devastating blows which left planes and hangars in blazing ruins. Only one small practice landing field, on the north shore near Haleiwa, was overlooked. Here was stationed one squadron of twelve fighter planes, temporarily detached from Wheeler Field. From this field five fighter planes took off and soon had shot down three enemy aircraft. They landed to refuel after the first Japanese attack had spent itself.

With the airfields on Oahu effectively neutralized, only antiaircraft fire was left to meet the attack on Pearl Harbor itself. Following a somewhat roundabout course, as shown on the map, the Japanese torpedo planes and horizontal bombers arrived at Pearl Harbor about 0755, just as the dive bombers and fighters struck Hickam Field and Ford Island. The timing of the attacks was perfect and secured the priceless advantage of complete tactical surprise right up to the very last minute.

No word of alarm had yet been received from the stunned garrison at Kaneohe, and the first warning at Pearl Harbor came from lookouts atop the signal tower in the Navy Yard. Hearing machine-gun fire and seeing the Japanese insignia on planes circling overhead, the lookouts rapidly hoisted visual alarm signals. At 0758, after bombs had begun to fall on Ford Island, the naval air commander broadcast the air-raid alert to all ships in the harbor.

The first attack on the anchored warships in Pearl Harbor was delivered at 0758. Twelve torpedo planes, approaching from the southeast, delivered the heaviest single blow in the entire assault on our fleet. All the outboard battleships in the pairs tied up along Battleship Row were struck by one or more torpedoes. As the rest of the Japanese torpedo planes arrived on the scene, followed by the first of the horizontal bombers, the systematic destruction of the capital warships continued without pause. Because no American carriers were in the harbor, the enemy aircraft chose to concentrate on the battleships, although some attacks were delivered against the lesser warships.

By 0825 many of the planes in the first wave had completed their missions, and they began to head back toward their carriers. While attacks continued to be carried out by the planes that had arrived last, the intensity of the action died down somewhat. During this

comparative lull the American forces attempted to tighten up their defenses, and to some extent they were successful.

About this time thirteen scout bombers from the carrier *Enterprise* landed on Ford Island and, after refueling, took to the air again. Five others had been shot down on the way in, and six of the remaining thirteen were to be destroyed in combat over Pearl Harbor. More Army fighters took off from Wheeler Field and Haleiwa, until fifteen were actively engaged. At 0835 another enemy midget submarine was detected inside Pearl Harbor; but before it could launch a torpedo, the small craft was rammed by a destroyer and sent to the bottom.

Fighters of the second wave of Japanese planes reached Oahu about 0855, and again the attacks became violent. Kaneohe, Wheeler Field, Ewa, Hickam Field, and Ford Island were once more subjected to attacks, which completed the thorough neutralization of these bases.

About 0900 the main striking force of the second wave began to arrive over Pearl Harbor. This group, consisting of eighty-one dive bombers, had been originally intended for use against our carriers. Since these were not present, most of the attacks were directed against the battleships and lesser vessels of the fleet. The small size of the bombs carried, destructive enough for use against thin-skinned carriers, was a handicap to effective employment against our capital ships. For this reason the second attack on the fleet was not as destructive as the first.

In half an hour the attacks began to wane, and by 0945 all Japanese aircraft had retired from Oahu. After rendezvousing twenty miles north of Kaena Point, each air group proceeded directly back to the carriers. The First Air Fleet quickly withdrew from Hawaiian waters. At no time had it been located by American forces.

A major disaster had befallen the United States Pacific Fleet. The Japanese attack, which lasted altogether one hour and fifty minutes, had taken an impressive toll. Of the eight battleships in the harbor the *Arizona* was a total loss, and the *Oklahoma, California, Nevada,* and *West Virginia* were all so severely damaged that it would take months to effect the necessary repairs.* The *Pennsylvania, Maryland,* and *Tennessee* had suffered lighter damage, but they, too, would

* Actually the antiquated *Oklahoma* was never repaired. Sold for salvage after the war, the stripped battleship foundered while being towed from Hawaii to the west coast.

require some repairs before seeing action again. Other ships of the fleet had also suffered from the attack.*

A shattering blow had also been dealt our air forces in Hawaii. Of the Navy's 148** serviceable combat aircraft, only 36 survived the raid; only sixty-three of the Army's 123 first-line planes were left usable. Altogether thirty-eight American aircraft engaged in aerial combat during the raid, shooting down at least ten enemy planes.

Casualties among Army personnel were 226 killed and 396 wounded. Losses of the Navy, including the Marine Corps, were extremely heavy, amounting to 3,077 killed and 876 wounded.

The Japanese lost twenty-nine planes in the attack, nine in the first wave and twenty in the second. Of the five midget submarines employed, none returned. A submarine of larger type was also listed as missing in action. These losses, however, were inconsequential as compared to the serious damage inflicted on our fleet and air forces.

Comments.—The Japanese attack on Hawaii was entirely successful in accomplishing its purpose. The only threat to Japan's left flank in her main drive southward had been effectively neutralized; and during the next five months the United States was to be chained to a role of passive defense, except for minor naval actions.

While there is little to criticize in the conduct of the attack itself, some doubt may be raised as to whether or not its purpose was sufficiently broad in scope. By their failure to concentrate on the supply installations and repair facilities at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese did little to prevent our Navy from continuing to use this base of operations. Moreover, the destruction of our warships, while admittedly great, did not approach the losses which would have been suffered if the attack had taken place at sea. The slight depth of the harbor facilitated the raising and refitting of many ships that otherwise would have disappeared permanently in deeper waters.

The execution of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was surpassed only by the careful planning and detailed preparation that went into it. Excellent intelligence as to the position, strength, and movements of the United States forces contributed greatly to the success of the operation.

* Smashed or sunk were the destroyers *Shaw, Cassin,* and *Downes,* the mine layer *Oglala,* the target ship *Utah* (mistaken by the Japanese for the carrier *Saratoga*), and a large floating drydock. Seriously crippled were the light cruisers *Helena, Honolulu,* and *Raleigh,* the seaplane tender *Curtis,* and the repair ship *Vestal.*

** Including the eighteen carrier planes that flew in from the *Enterprise.*

The achievement of surprise, both strategic and tactical, not only made the attack possible but accentuated its destructive power as well. Strategic surprise was secured in three general ways: (1) by the time of attack; (2) by the direction from which it came; and (3) by the means used. Japan struck Pearl Harbor prior to the issuance of a declaration of war and while her diplomats were maintaining the pretense of negotiations for peace. Moreover, it was deliberately made the first blow in her centrifugal offensive so that no other overt act would prematurely disclose her hostile intentions. The massing of Japanese troops in French Indo–China and the presence of large fleet elements in nearby waters focused the eyes of the world on Malaya. Hawaii, at the opposite end of the Pacific, seemed safe because of her remoteness as well as her strength. With the introduction of the carrier task force as a weapon of long-range destruction Japan brought to the attention of the world the potential striking power of this new means of attack.

American deficiencies in Hawaii may be divided into two general categories: first, those errors which resulted from the presence of command by mutual cooperation; and, second, those which resulted from the bad judgment displayed by the two commanders.

The failure in liaison between the two major commands in Hawaii has already been pointed out. It is particularly noteworthy that the critical breakdown occurred during the period 27 November to 7 December. This fact serves to emphasize the lesson that command by mutual cooperation is most inadequate at the very time when it should be the most dependable, that is, at the moment when decisive action is of the essence. It has been well said that ". . . this system presents unnecessary and inevitable opportunities for personal failures and shortcomings. The ubiquitous tendency to 'let George do it', to assume the other fellow will take care of the situation, is an inseparable part of command by mutual cooperation".*

With respect to the second category of deficiencies many controversial points may be argued. The general unpreparedness of our country for war in 1941 certainly led to an undesirable overburdening of our existing military establishment as well as to improvisation in place of the realistic planning and execution of national defense measures. Matériel and personnel shortages existed everywhere, but Hawaii was better off in this respect than any other oversea command. To quote General Marshall: ". . . if the Hawaiian

* From the report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack.

state of preparation in men and matériel was 100, Panama was almost 25 per cent, the Philippines about 10 per cent, and Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible."

To raise and equip almost overnight a large Army and Navy required our most strenuous efforts, and a necessary corollary to this main project was the task of training our newly inducted personnel. As already pointed out, the Hawaiian command had to bear its proportionate share of this training load; and it did so with energy and precision. It was on 27 November that the judgment of the two commanders in Hawaii first began to be faulty. The war warning received on this date was improperly construed by both Short and Kimmel. Training continued to be emphasized when it should have been apparent that from this point on the highest priority had to be given the primary mission of defense against enemy attack. Strangely enough, Hawaii was the only oversea outpost not to go on a full war alert as a result of the warning message. General Short did order his antisabotage alert, but it was worse than no alert at all because it brought the troops in from their defensive positions in the field. The Aircraft Warning System, which could have been in full operation even though other units were not alerted, was kept on its training schedule. No inshore patrol was functioning, utter dependence being placed on the Navy's offshore patrol. Admiral Kimmel, though somewhat more alarmed than General Short, kept the bulk of the fleet in harbor and only partially maintained the offshore patrol.

Since the end of the war these actions have been defined by the Congressional committee of investigation as the result of bad judgment on the part of Kimmel and Short. An important comment on the responsibility of command is contained in the following extract from the committee's report:

> Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have insisted they received no information that Hawaii was to be attacked. Yet commanders in the field cannot presume to expect that they will be advised of the exact time and place an enemy will attack or indeed that their particular post will be attacked. As outpost commanders it was their responsibility to be prepared against surprise and the worst possible contingency. . . .
>
> . . . It is not the duty of the outpost commander to speculate or rely on the possibilities of the enemy attacking at some other outpost instead of his own. It is his duty to meet him at his post at any time and to make the best possible fight that can be made against him with the weapons with which he has been supplied. . . .

Midway (Map 4).—Midway Island, one of the most westerly atolls in the Hawaiian chain, lies about 1,100 miles from Pearl Harbor. At the outbreak of the war this base, with its two-runway airfield that was capable of accommodating Flying Fortresses, was protected by a Marine Corps defense battalion and a squadron of twelve naval patrol bombers.

Alerted early on the morning of 7 December by news of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Marine garrison manned its defenses at once; but it was not until after dark that the expected attack came. Two Japanese destroyers arrived off the island at 2130 and began a thirty-minute bombardment of the airfield and other important installations. Approaching from the south, the enemy ships closed in at high speed. Their fire was extremely accurate, the third salvo scoring a direct hit on the plane hangar and setting it afire.

Searchlights on land lighted up the violently maneuvering warships, and the shore defense batteries went into action at point-blank range. The two destroyers, after being hit several times, retired at top speed. The attack on Midway was over, and not for another six months was this exposed base to be seriously threatened again.

Wake Island.—Lonely Wake Island lies 1,028 miles southwest of Midway, though only 300 miles from the northernmost atoll of the Marshall Islands. Thus situated, it offered to the Japanese an ideal location for an advance submarine and air base. In addition, control of Wake would further isolate the American forces in the Philippines.

Since the island was held by only a few hundred American troops, the Japanese Navy, which was responsible for the operation, anticipated little trouble in overcoming the defenses. A small naval task force* would sail from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshalls on 8 December to launch its assault as soon as practicable after its arrival off Wake. Preceding the landing, bombers would begin the destruction of the American defenses.

In the early morning hours of 8 December our troops on Wake were electrified by the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and a full alert was sounded at once. At 1158 the enemy attack began. On this and the following two days enemy bombers rained destruction on the island and its defenders. But despite critical losses our troops repulsed the first landing attempt, made on 11 December. Thoroughly discomfited by the stout resistance and having suffered from the accurate fire of the defending garrison, the task force withdrew to Kwajalein for a badly needed reorganization.

* This force comprised three light cruisers, six destroyers, and two small transports carrying 450 marines.

In the days that followed, hostile aircraft from the Marshall Islands bombed and strafed the island until every installation above ground was either damaged or destroyed. By 20 December, when a reinforced Japanese task force left Kwajalein for a second attempt, Wake had suffered a total of twelve major air raids. Only two of our fighter aircraft remained in usable condition.

On 23 December the second assault began. Beaching their transports on the south coast of the island, the Japanese troops rapidly spread out to overwhelm the exhausted garrison. The defenders surrendered when it became apparent that no further damage could be inflicted on the enemy.

Guam.—The largest island in the Central Pacific between Hawaii and the Philippines is Guam, the southernmost of the Marianas group. Wake Island, the nearest American possession to Guam in 1941, lay 1,500 miles to the east, while scarcely thirty miles to the north loomed the Japanese-held island of Rota. Both Rota and the strong base at Saipan, itself only seventy miles north of Guam, had been secretly fortified by the Japanese, while a reluctance to provoke Japan had led the United States to delay the much-needed development of Guam.

Our garrison on Guam, 400 naval personnel and 155 marines, was doomed from the moment hostilties commenced. There were no fortifications on the island, no airfields, no coast-defense guns, and no antiaircraft batteries. When Japanese bombers appeared on 8 December the helpless defenders could do little more than seek shelter.

After two days of air attacks a Japanese naval task force* from the Bonin Islands launched its assault on the western shore of the island. The first troops landed at 0330 on 10 December; and although the Americans fought back desperately, the issue was never in doubt. Shortly after daybreak the garrison surrendered.

OPERATIONS IN EAST ASIA

Hong Kong.—Strategically located on the southern coast of China about seventy-five miles southeast of Canton, the crown colony of Hong Kong had served for a century as the seat of British authority in East Asia. One of the world's most important shipping centers, Hong Kong along with Singapore and Manila formed an impressive triangle of Anglo-Saxon power and influence in the Far East.

* This task force comprised four cruisers, three destroyers, and a small group of transports that carried a regiment of Army troops.

However, by December 1941 the strength of this bastion was more apparent than real. Japanese control of Canton, Hainan Island, French Indo–China, and Formosa virtually sealed the fate of Hong Kong well before the firing of the first shot. Moreover, the British, suffering from the Occidental belief in the inferiority of the Japanese, failed to adopt a realistic attitude toward the situation.

War plans called for the execution of a delaying action behind three defensive lines constructed on the mainland (**Map 6**), followed by the eventual withdrawal of all troops to the island of Hong Kong. It was estimated that the system of mainland defenses would be able to check the attacker for at least three months, while the island itself was expected to hold out indefinitely.

Hong Kong stood high on Japan's list of critical points to be seized at the very beginning of hostilities. It's early reduction would not only facilitate the movement of troops and supplies to the south but, even more important, would strike a deathblow against Anglo-Saxon prestige and invincibility in the Orient.

Shortly after dawn on Monday morning, 8 December 1941,* the attack on Hong Kong began. While Japanese Army bombers from Canton leisurely wiped out the British air detachment, a reinforced division crossed the northern boundary of the colony and proceeded southward at will. Caught off guard, the British hastily manned the fortifications of the inner line and then settled down to a purely passive defense.

After probing the line for several days, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on the night of 11-12 December against a key strong point. Short on automatic weapons, with only one six-gun battery of field artillery in support, and having practically no reserve, the British were unable to close the hole torn in their line by the Japanese attack. Consequently it was decided to withdraw to the island of Hong Kong. In less than five days the enemy had overrun the entire mainland.

During the next few days the Japanese prepared for an assault on Hong Kong Island. Long-range artillery, opposed by little return fire from the British, began shelling installations and defense positions. One by one the water reservoirs on Hong Kong were destroyed; and morale, already low, grew steadily worse. On the night of 18 December the Japanese landed at North Point. By noon the next day a force of 2,000 had been ferried to the island. The British counterattack failed to materialize, and the battle became a succession of steady Japanese advances toward the south against

* West longitude time.

stubborn though passive resistance. By 24 December, with only a one-day supply of water remaining, the defending troops had reached a state of almost complete disorganization.

Since all hope for outside aid had vanished, the British finally decided to surrender in order to save further bloodshed. Arms were laid down on Christmas Day. In just eighteen days Hong Kong had been overrun completely.

Malaya, British Borneo, Thailand (Map 4).—We have seen that the Japanese main attack, designed to overrun the Southern Resources Area, was divided into two principal thrusts, one aimed at the Philippines and the other at Malaya. The Philippine campaign will be discussed later, but it should be kept in mind that it was concurrent with the campaign in Malaya.

Responsibility for all Army operations against the Southern Resources Area, including the Philippine campaign, rested with General Hisaichi Terauchi, commander of the Southern Army Group. Participating naval forces, cooperating with the Army on a basis of full equality, were grouped under Vice Admiral Kondo, commander of the Southern Force.*

Japanese strategy called for a quick seizure of Thailand while the main effort through Malaya toward Singapore was getting under way. Occupation of this centrally located country would provide excellent bases from which to operate first against Malaya and then against Burma. Moreover, once the Kra Isthmus was in Japanese hands, British troops in Malaya would be effectively separated from those in Burma.

The Japanese expected to stabilize Thailand with little or no resistance. Every opportunity to create good will and influence public opinion had been fully exploited, and as early as 1940 Japan had cemented her cordial relations with Thailand by a treaty of mutual respect and peace.

At 0200 on 8 December two Japanese divisions advanced across the Indo–China border on Bangkok, the capital of Thailand. By 0730 such token resistance as had been offered ceased completely, and the Government of Thailand soon announced a policy of fullest cooperation with Japan. One of the invading divisions moved southward down the Kra Isthmus to support the Malaya operation while the other marched northwest toward the border of Burma.

* Included the Philippine and Malay Forces, the Eleventh Air Fleet, and the Second Fleet. As commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto exercised strategic control over the Southern Force.

In order to secure the left flank of their main drive to Singapore, Japanese strategy called for the occupation of British Borneo as soon after the initiation of hostilities as possible. Geographically a component of the East Indies, Borneo was divided in ownership between Great Britain and the Netherlands. Rich in oil and minerals, this British portion of Borneo was garrisoned by one widely dispersed battalion of Indian infantry, plus some native constabulary.

In view of the paucity of military strength on the island the success of a determined Japanese attack was assured. On 16 December a naval task group of the Malay Force launched its assault elements at Miri, in northern Sarawak. By 1 January the entire protectorate was in Japanese hands, and a few days later their troops overran the remainder of British Borneo.

Let us now turn to Malaya, where the main Japanese drive was well under way. The Malay Peninsula is the most southern extremity of the continent of Asia. Separating the Indian Ocean from the South China Sea, this long and narrow strip of land is situated directly athwart the shortest trade route between Europe and the Far East. Between the tip of Malaya and the large island of Sumatra, one of the Netherlands East Indies, lies the strategically important Strait of Malacca, main passageway through which is funneled most of the commerce with the Orient. The island of Singapore commands the eastern exit of the strait, while Penang, to the north, controls the western exit almost as effectively. The southern half of the Malay Peninsula, including the two key islands of Penang and Singapore, constitutes British Malaya; the isthmus to the north belongs to Thailand.

For over a century Singapore, like Gibraltar and Malta, had served as a veritable pillar of strength in the structure of Britain's expanding colonial empire. In addition to its function as a port the island lent itself readily to the construction of a formidable naval base from which a strong fleet could operate to protect British interests and sea lanes in the Far East. Between the two world wars Singapore was developed at considerable expense into a thoroughly modern and supposedly impregnable base.

Above and beyond the strategic importance of its location in Southeast Asia, British Malaya has considerable economic value. Two natural resources, tin and rubber, are found in great quantities and constitute a rich and desirable source of utilitarian wealth in the eyes of a potential aggressor.

A central range of mountains forms the backbone of the Malay Peninsula **(Map 7)**, protecting the coastal plain in the west from

the full force of the monsoon that beats upon the eastern shore from November through February. It is in the comparative shelter of western Malaya that most of the great rubber plantations are to be found, and here also are located most of the large alluvial deposits of tin. The best roads in Malaya serve the rubber and tin industries as well as the west-coast towns, while the only major north-south highway runs from Singapore to Singora, in Thailand, paralleling the railroad along the west coast of Malaya to a junction with the Thailand rail line from Bangkok. Excellent sand beaches are plentiful along the east coast, although they are often fringed by dangerous reefs. In comparison, only a few suitable landing beaches are to be found along the western shore.

Over 70 per cent of British Malaya is covered by the green expanse of luxuriant jungle. The bulk of the peninsula is one vast tropical forest, laced by countless rivers and streams that form one of the most lavish water systems in the world. These sluggish waterways supply an important means of travel into the interior, frequently the only means. Through the seemingly impassable jungle wind many trails and well-worn game tracks, known only to the natives and those who have made a first-hand study of the terrain. Visibility seldom extends more than thirty or forty yards, and natural fields of fire are largely nonexistent.

The climate of Malaya is extremely humid. After a few minutes in the steaming jungle untrained troops become quite fatigued and find breathing difficult. Two to three months is the time normally required to acclimate them. An abundant rainfall facilitates the jungle's choking growth and feeds the great swamps in which the malaria-carrying mosquito breeds.

As in the case of Hong Kong, Great Britain after 1939 found herself unable to send large reinforcements to Malaya because of the demands of the war in Europe and North Africa. Nevertheless, by December 1941 the total strength of the British ground forces, under the over-all command of Lieutenant General A. E. Percival, had increased to over four divisions.* Unfortunately there existed a serious deficiency in equipment and supporting arms. Division artillery was generally below strength, and corps artillery was practically nonexistent. Training of the field forces closely followed the tactical theories that were practiced in Europe. Little effort had been made

* These were the 9th and 11th Indian Divisions of the Imperial III Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Lewis Heath commanding; the 8th Australian Division, under Major General Gordon Bennett; and more than the equivalent of a fourth division provided by the troops in one reserve Indian brigade, two Malayan volunteer brigades, and miscellaneous fortress and service units.

to fit arms and equipment to local conditions, and the troops were not adequately conditioned to withstand the rigors of jungle warfare. Events were to prove that the British ground forces in Malaya were neither physically nor mentally hardened to a degree sufficient to meet the tough, aggressive, and ruthless Japaness, most of whom had been realistically indoctrinated in the practical aspects of war by long service in China.

During 1941 Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, who functioned as commander in chief of all British forces in the Far East, had repeatedly asked for more planes to strengthen the defenses of Malaya. These requests had to be denied in favor of higher priorities in the active theaters of war. Thus in December there were less than 200 operational aircraft in Malaya, although a purely theoretical accounting would yield the higher figure of 332. Actually there were about sixty obsolete fighter planes and twice as many medium bombers, many of them so outmoded that pilots fresh from England found them totally unfamiliar. This paucity of air power was to prove very serious, particularly since no aircraft carriers were based at Singapore.

On 2 December 1941 the *Prince of Wales,* a new 35,000-ton battleship, and the *Repulse,* a 32,000-ton battle cruiser, arrived at Singapore to reinforce the few lesser warships already based there. These two imposing capital ships, plus three cruisers, six destroyers, and a number of auxiliaries, made up the Far Eastern Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Sir Tom Phillips and based permanently at Singapore.

While outwardly cognizant of the imminence of war with Japan, the British in Malaya were neither able to grasp its full import nor to effect the necessary preparations for defense. Military requirements frequently conflicted with commercial interests, and all too often the former were subordinated to the latter. The obvious lack of adequate military means to repel a Japanese invasion apparently stimulated little effort to prepare realistically for war. No attempt was made to train and arm any of the 700,000 Chinese in Malaya, all of whom had good reason to fight the Japanese. The polished phrases of statesmen and the glowing descriptions of journalists concerning the defenses of Singapore had won for the island the appellation of "impregnable fortress." This pleasant delusion was unfortunate, since not only most of the world grew to believe it but also those at Singapore, including, apparently, many who were charged with the defense and should have known better. The great guns of Singapore, frowning menacingly toward the sea, engendered

a lethargy aptly described as the "Singapore complex," much like the wave of apathy that pervaded France when that country rested complacently behind the Maginot Line during the so-called "Phony War" of 1939–40. Perhaps Singapore really was impregnable from the sea; unfortunately it was not destined to be assaulted from that direction.

The Japanese plans for the Malayan campaign were drawn up during the summer of 1941 by the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo. In the fall of the year Army staff officers, disguised as civilians, surveyed airfield sites and landing beaches on the Kra Isthmus down to the very border of Malaya; and by late October a large concentration of aircraft had begun to assemble in southern Indo–China.

The reduction of Singapore was, of course, mandatory for the success of Japan's entire southern campaign. In the plan of attack on Malaya, however, no sea-borne assault on Singapore was contemplated, as the defenses were considered too strong. Instead, the main attack was to be launched overland, down the peninsula from bases in Thailand. The first step in the Japanese strategic plan was to neutralize the British air force in Malaya and gain control of the air. The second step, to be initiated simultaneously with the opening of the air offensive, consisted of landings on the east coast of the Kra Isthmus to secure a base for future ground operations. One landing was also to be made at Kota Bharu, in Malaya proper, in order to avert a possible British advance into southern Thailand by threatening its flank and rear. The third and final step in the plan was the launching of a main drive down the west coast of Malaya while a secondary drive kept pace in the east, the two to join for the final assault on Singapore.

The ground force selected for the conquest of Malaya was the Twenty-fifth Army,* Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita commanding. The troops assigned initially consisted of two infantry divisions, four tank regiments, eleven artillery battalions, and miscellaneous service units. An additional division was to join the Twenty-fifth Army by an overland march from Bangkok once northern Thailand had been stabilized.

The Malay Force, comprising four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, twelve destroyers, six submarines, and a host of transports and auxiliaries, was to land the invasion troops, beginning on 8 December. Since two British capital ships were known to be at

* A Japanese army was the equivalent of our corps. An area army was comparable to our army.

Singapore, the Japanese Second Fleet, composed of two battleships, four heavy cruisers, and four destroyers, was placed in general support of the invasion armada.

Direct air support for the landings and for all ground operations was to be supplied by the Third Air Army, totaling 450 aircraft based initially at fields in southern Indo–China. Navy aircraft were charged with reconnaissance over the South China Sea and operations against the British fleet and naval base at Singapore.

While the Japanese were perfecting their plans and massing the forces to be used against Malaya, the British disposed their troops so as to meet any foreseeable contingency. The III Corps was assigned to the defense of all Malaya north of the state of Johore; the 8th Australian Division garrisoned Johore; and the remaining troops, equivalent, as we have seen, to more than a division, held Singapore itself. Beach defenses were prepared at all the best landing places along the east coast of Malaya, while along the northern frontier road blocks were set up to cover the most suitable avenues of approach from Thailand. The east-coast defenses were manned by the 9th Indian Division; the northern sector was held by the 11th Indian Division; and part of the 9th was in corps reserve at Ipoh. Bomber aircraft were dispersed largely in northern Malaya, while the fighter planes were based at Singapore for local defense.

In the event of an attack from Thailand the British plan of defense called for delaying action down the peninsula until sufficient reinforcements arrived in Malaya for the conduct of a counteroffensive. The northern border of Johore was to be the final line of resistance. In British opinion the Malayan jungle would present a generally impassable obstacle to the advance of Japanese troops, and the defense of this terrain would largely be resolved into the holding of a comparatively few canalized avenues of approach. There would be ample opportunity to gain time while awaiting reinforcements, and the problem of defense would become easier as the line of communication to Singapore grew shorter.

The first real intimation of attack came to the British late on 6 December when Admiral Phillips, then visiting Manila, learned that American patrol bombers had observed a strong Japanese task force rounding the southern tip of Indo–China. Phillips immediately flew back to his fleet at Singapore, and the Far Eastern Command alerted all forces in Malaya. They did not have long to wait.

At 0400 on 8 December, Japanese planes opened the Malayan campaign by bombing the airfields on Singapore Island. Shortly after daybreak a heavy and sustained aerial offensive was launched

against British airfields and planes in northern Malaya. The airdromes at Kota Bharu, Alor Star, Sungei Patani, Butterworth, and Georgetown were subjected to intensive bombing and straffing; and at the close of the first day's fighting the defenders in the eastern sector were left with but little air support. By the end of three days British air strength in northern Malaya had been almost completely wiped out.

While British air power on Malaya was thus being destroyed, the most spectacular air operation of the campaign was about to take place. In search of the Japanese invasion armada off Singora, Admiral Phillips had proceeded north with the *Prince of Wales*, the *Repulse*, and an escort of four destroyers. On 10 December a force of sixty-one torpedo planes and twenty-seven bombers, acting on information received from a reconnoitering submarine, struck the two British capital ships at a point some fifty miles east of Kuantan. Within two hours both ships had gone under. In exchange for four planes lost to antiaircraft fire the Japanese destroyed the only Allied capital warships in the Far East and in doing so won absolute freedom of the seas in that part of the world.

Meanwhile Japanese ground operations were progressing favorably. Coincident with the first air strikes in northern Malaya, enemy troops began to land at Singora, Patani, and Kota Bharu. Only at Kota Bharu were they initially unable to secure a beachhead. Even at this point, however, they succeeded in forcing the defenders to withdraw by reorganizing their attack and directing it south of the main defenses.

The Japanese force that had landed at Singora advanced straight down the west coast of Malaya (**Map 8**). Spearheaded by a regiment of tanks, it drove the British back to Alor Star, enveloped the position there by crossing supposedly impassable terrain, and forced a hurried withdrawal to Sungei Patani. Here the British right flank was again menaced by the advance of enemy troops south from Patani; and another hurried withdrawal was necessary, this time to a strong position behind the Perak River.

In eastern Malaya constant Japanese pressure had forced the British inland to Kuala Krai, while enemy units advancing along the coast reached Kuaha Trengganu.

This, then, was the situation on 25 December: British forces in the west were holding in a strong position behind the obstacle of the Perak River; in the east their troops held a position in depth along the narrow defile of the railroad south of Kuala Krai, while small units on the east coast retired in front of Japanese troops who

had occupied Kuala Trengganu. All airdromes north of the line Kuantan–Ipoh had been evacuated, and surviving fighter aircraft had been withdrawn to Singapore.

In the ground fighting on the mainland the Japanese by now had demonstrated their complete superiority over the British. The enemy troops, superbly trained and conditioned by extensive maneuvers on Hainan Island and in Indo–China, proved themselves to be masters of the art of jungle warfare. The tactics they employed were specially adapted to the terrain and exemplified the enemy's oft-repeated maxim, "infiltrate and envelop."

The Japanese strove with considerable success to achieve a high degree of mobility. The individual soldier was lightly clad. He carried light weapons, such as submachine guns, grenades, and small mortars. In contrast to the British, whose rations consisted almost entirely of bulky canned goods, the Japanese soldier, with a bottle of water, a ball of rice, and some pickles and preserved seaweed to make the rice palatable, could move unhampered through the jungle and yet have on his back sufficient food for three or four days. Moreover, it was comparatively simple to live off the country in a region where rice is a staple of diet. For these specially trained troops the dense jungle was in many cases an excellent avenue of covered approach rather than an impassable obstacle. Increased mobility on roads was gained by the use of bicycles; and small native boats or hastily constructed rafts furnished adequate transportation for the movement of troops and supplies along the numerous rivers and streams of Malaya, many of which flow in a direction parallel to the Japanese axis of advance.

The tactics and technique of infiltration were particularly suited to the temperament of the Japanese soldier. Small groups, or even individual soldiers, would pass undetected through a defensive position, assemble at a predetermined rendezvous in rear, and then suddenly launch a nerve-wracking assault against the unsuspecting defenders. Through the extensive use of firecrackers and other noise-making devices these enemy detachments frequently were able to convince the British that they were surrounded by a considerable force and should withdraw. Attacks on supply dumps and other rear-echelon installations contributed to the general confusion and panic. Occasionally enemy soldiers donned native garb and moved about quite freely behind the British lines, gathering information or indulging in sniping. Detection was normally difficult for the defenders, to whom the disguised Japanese looked like real natives. Snipers, lashed to trees or half-submerged in the muddy

waters of a rice paddy, would patiently wait for hours to fire a single shot, usually at an officer or a noncommissioned officer. There were many incidents in which an officer hearing his name called, stepped out of his tent to meet a fatal bullet.

The spearhead of every Japanese attack was the infantry. Supported by light tanks and armored cars moving along the road, the foot soldiers would spread out through the adjoining jungle in order to start their infiltration and establish the defenders flanks. The main attack might be made around one flank or both. During most of the early fighting in Malaya it was not practicable to bring up any large amount of artillery. Instead, Japanese Army aircraft were used in tactical support of the ground forces, bombing and strafing British troop concentrations, artillery positions, and road blocks. The close coordination between the enemy air and ground forces was outstanding throughout the campaign. The Third Air Army was also very successful in carrying out its primary mission of neutralizing British air power, destroying four out of every five of the defenders' planes on the ground. The chief oversight of the enemy's air arm was its failure to attack more persistently the long line of British retreat from northern Malaya to Singapore, thus allowing the defenders to withdraw rapidly whenever it became necessary.

By 25 December the forces of General Yamashita had reached the Perak River, in western Malaya. Here the 11th Indian Division had established a line of strong points defending the principal crossings of the river, which in itself was a considerable obstacle. The British position, despite its apparent strength, was very extended and ran generally parallel to the only line of retreat. This made it particularly vulnerable to an attack at the southern extremity. At dawn on 27 December the enemy made an unsuccessful attempt to force a crossing near the great tin center of Ipoh. The British, fearing that a second attack might be more successful, withdrew the troops from the northern part of the position so that they would not be cut off. This evacuation permitted the enemy to make a crossing north of Ipoh late in the day. In spite of unimpressive results gained from three attacks on the British position at Ipoh on 28 December, General Yamashita forced the defenders to withdraw to Trolak by executing an amphibious envelopment. The British regiment at Kuala Krai, now in a vulnerable position because of enemy advances along both coasts, began a steady withdrawal to the south.

Nor was the position at Trolak secure. After repulsing attacks for three successive days the defenders found that their left flank

had been enveloped by an enemy amphibious movement south of the Slim River. When the British withdrew on 7 January, Yamashita sent an armored group in pursuit.

The situation was now extremely critical. Units were severely depleted; the men were exhausted by over three weeks of continuous fighting; and morale was at the danger point.

As affairs on Malaya had grown progressively worse, the Far Eastern Command had removed its headquarters to Ceylon. On 2 January the establishment of a new unified command under General Sir Archibald P. Wavell had been announced. It was to Malaya that General Wavell first turned his attention. Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, he made the wise decision to withdraw all British forces to the Johore line, 125 miles to the south. On this position could be concentrated forces from eastern and western Malaya as well as the troops in Johore itself and reinforcements from Singapore.

The Johore Line, which the British planned to hold at all costs, paralleled the Muar River from the west coast to the vicinity of Gemas and then extended eastward to Mersing. The sector from Gemas to Muar, on the coast, was held by the newly organized Westforce. This composite group, commanded by General Bennett, included four battalions of the Australian 8th Division, elements of the 9th Indian Division, and the 45th Indian Brigade. East of Gemas the main battle position was held by two battalions of the Australian 8th Division and the bulk of the 9th Indian Division.

The main Japanese attack on the Johore Line was launched in the western sector on 17 January. On the coast and south of Gemas the enemy forced the line of the Muar River, overwhelming an overextended Indian brigade that had just arrived in the line. This crumbling of his left flank forced General Bennett to withdraw his center and right and to commit a portion of his reserve. Under steady Japanese pressure the troops were gradually withdrawn to the south, and it soon became evident that the heavy losses being suffered necessitated a withdrawal to Singapore. On the night of 30–31 January the last battered elements retired to the island. As the enemy entered Johore Bahru the next morning, the British blew a thirty-yard gap in the causeway; and the siege of Singapore began.

The Strait of Johore, which separates the island of Singapore from the mainland, averages less than a mile in width. The one connecting link is the Johore causeway, 1,100 yards long and forty yards wide. Over the thick concrete surface passes a three-lane highway, a double-track rail line, and the large mains that supply

the island with water. Built on a foundation of enormous boulders, the causeway would have required an incredible quantity of explosives for complete demolition.

During the week that followed withdrawal to Singapore the British hastily reorganized their forces and prepared additional defenses along the north shore. Inspiring leadership for Singapore's defenders was of vital importance, but it was not forthcoming. The official estimate of the situation was that the enemy would probably attempt to starve out the fortress rather than resort to a costly attack. The one bright aspect of the entire situation was the abundance of stores.

General Yamashita, however, was unwilling to lose time and ordered an assault. By 5 February artillery fire from the mainland had reached the proportions of a full bombardment. The British replied with all the artillery they had available, but the enemy superiority in this duel increased daily. The heavy fixed guns on Singapore were sited for defense of the naval base, with emphasis on the probability of bombardment by an enemy fleet. These guns had a flat trajectory, unsuitable for counterbattery fire, and were very short of high-explosive ammunition, although well stocked with armor-piercing.

On 8 February the Japanese began their assault on Singapore. During the morning a small force established a foothold on the island of Pulau Ubin, site of a group of coast-defense guns designed to protect the naval base. During the early evening the Japanese artillery, which had been pounding the island continuously since 5 February, concentrated the weight of its fire on a 5,000-yard front along the northwest coast. Shortly before midnight the shells began to fall farther inland, and the first wave of enemy troops started across the strait west of the causeway. At the first alarm British searchlights along the shore illuminated the crossing area. The Australians posted in the sector opened fire with all weapons but could inflict little damage on the armored landing barges of the Japanese. The searchlights were soon destroyed by machine-gun fire, and darkness returned to cloak the enemy's movements. Landing craft nosed their way as far as possible up the streams and inlets, often discharging troops behind the forward line of defense. Australian and Japanese units became hopelessly intermingled, a circumstance that favored the attackers. During the night over 3,000 enemy troops poured ashore, and at dawn the outnumbered defenders in this area were quickly mopped up. The Japanese in the bridgehead sent a force eastward to reduce the defenses at the island terminus of the causeway while the main body drove to the south.

In the meantime another strong group effected a landing at Pasir Laba, on the west coast of Singapore; and here too the Japanese troops crossed in a continuous stream. By midday they had reached Tenga Airdrome, five miles inland.

At this juncture the British attempted to put into execution a plan calling for a coordinated counterattack. Harried by enemy dive bombers, the attacking units delivered their assaults piecemeal and were easily repulsed. After this failure the troops in the sector between Pasir Laba and Kranji were forced to withdraw to avoid being trapped by the two converging Japanese forces. The northwestern quarter of the island was given up to the enemy, and the fate of Singapore was sealed.

The enemy force that had moved eastward from Kranji along the north shore had little difficulty in overcoming the defenders at the causeway. Japanese engineers bridged the gap that had been blown by the British, and during the night enemy tanks crossed to Singapore.

On 10 February, General Wavell arrived for a few hours and reiterated his orders to hold the fortress to the last ditch. During the day the defenders were driven back another five miles, and a fierce three-day fight began for the two large reservoirs. By morning of the 15th the British had been forced back to the suburbs of the city itself, while many of the best troops had been isolated in unconnected islands of resistance which the Japanese had contained and by-passed. When it became apparent that further resistance was useless, negotiations were opened with Yamashita for the purpose of securing terms. On the evening of 15 February the garrison surrendered unconditionally.

In slightly over two months the Japanese had marched 600 miles, had fought numerous engagements, and had reduced a fortress that had been considered impregnable. Over 70,000 British troops had been forced to lay down their arms and capitulate, including one fresh division that had arrived just in time for the final siege and surrender.

Comments.—The lack of any adequate Allied preparation for war with Japan was underlined by the disastrous results of the Malayan campaign. The general plan of strategy in the Far East that had been conceived before the war proved unrealistic on 8 December 1941, when it was found that Allied means were insufficient even to stop the Japanese, much less to retain the power of initiative. With the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* the great naval base at Singapore lost its significance, inasmuch as the only

other battle force in the Pacific, the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, had been crippled in the opening attack of the war. The theory that the British could hold Singapore, and possibly all of Malaya, until reinforcements could arrive proved to be fallacious. The unpreparedness of the Allied nations tied their hands at the time when powerful military forces were most needed. Only if the Japanese were a second-rate foe could the Allies succeed in holding everywhere with so little. It soon developed that the strength and intentions of the enemy had been seriously miscalculated, an error that lost the stakes before the game had fairly begun.

Because of their commitments in Europe the British had not found it possible to strengthen the defenses of Malaya as much as they would have liked. They had been able to assemble a fairly strong ground force and to dispatch the nucleus of a battle fleet, as we have seen. Aircraft, artillery, and tanks were not so abundant and could be sent only in limited quantities. The lack of modern aircraft was decisive in face of the overwhelming air force that the Japanese were able to concentrate for support of the ground campaign. Of the ninety-nine British fighters that had arrived as air reinforcements only seven were able to operate in early February.

The most glaring deficiency in the defense of Malaya was the failure of the local command to use properly even the limited means available. Little effort was made to condition and train the troops for jungle warfare. The prescribed tactics were based upon the erroneous assumption that most of the terrain of Malaya away from the roads was impassable. The British troops, already handicapped by their inferiority in equipment and weapons, soon became physically exhausted and mentally demoralized by the unorthodox fighting of the enemy. The long withdrawal down the peninsula further depressed the spirits of the troops and accustomed them to defeat.

The British strategy for the defense of Malaya was characterized by an undue reluctance to give up terrain on a peninsula that was too large to be held in its entirety by the limited forces available. Once the enemy had landed successfully, the first concern of the British should have been to concentrate their dispersed troops behind the protection of light delaying forces and not to commit them piecemeal in a vain attempt to outfight the enemy at his specialty, jungle warfare. The defenders would have done better to establish a strong defensive position across the lower part of the peninsula, abandoning all ground to the north, as they were ultimately forced to do. Such a plan, at least, would have insured the fullest use of the troops available. When the British finally did try to hold a fixed

position across northern Johore, their depleted forces were exhausted and demoralized as a result of the long withdrawal. There was no time to recuperate and regain confidence, either in Johore or on Singapore itself. The type of inspirational leadership that might have checked the deterioration of morale was unfortunately not present at the critical time.

It is true that many of the large guns on Singapore were unsuitable for defense against an assault from the north, but on the other hand they did serve by their very presence to protect the defenders from an attack in rear. It was the duty of the field forces to defend the northern approaches to Singapore, and a check on their resources would indicate that this responsibility might have been performed with at least a little more distinction. If the commander had been more determined, the siege of the fortress of Singapore in all probability would have lasted several months.

Little fault can be found with either the Japanese strategy or tactics in Malaya. By landing in Thailand the enemy avoided the principal British defenses, which were along the east coast and at Singapore. The drive down the west coast capitalized upon the relatively good avenue of invasion provided there. Japanese amphibious and jungle tactics were perfectly suited to the terrain and revealed careful preparation and planning as well as excellent intelligence. The air support of ground operations was generally well coordinated, and the air offensive to soften up Singapore and achieve supremacy in the skies over Malaya was one of the largest and most sustained aerial operations conducted by the Japanese during the entire war. Of particular interest was the destruction of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse*. This was the first time that a modern battleship in a condition of full combat readiness had ever been sunk by air attack alone. While the absence of protective fighter cover was decisive, it is still noteworthy that only four planes were lost to the ships' antiaircraft fire.

The conquest of Malaya won for the Japanese control of 42 per cent of the world's rubber and 27 per cent of its tin. The capture of Singapore secured one of the finest naval bases in the world and opened the gateway to the Indian Ocean.

The Allied strategic plan of defense in the Far East had received a serious blow. Not only had a base for combined naval operations been lost, but also the entire defensive line of the Netherlands East Indies had been enveloped on the west flank, previously considered its strongest point. Moreover, the inexplicably sudden fall of Singapore dealt a profound shock to Allied morale and gave birth to a wave of defeatism.

FIRST PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN (Map 4)

The Philippine Archipelago, comprising over 7,000 separate islands, lies about 500 miles off the southeast coast of Asia. This chain, extending 1,100 miles from north to south and 700 miles from east to west, possesses an irregular coastline totaling over 12,500 miles in length. There exist many fine harbors, most of them undeveloped, while excellent landing beaches are to be found in profusion.

From a military standpoint the Philippine Islands may be considered to fall into four strategic groupings: (1) Luzon; (2) Mindanao; (3) the Visayas, or central islands, lying generally between Luzon and Mindanao; and (4) the Sulu Archipelago, situated southeast of Mindanao, the chief island of which is Jolo. The great number of islands, as well as the difficulties involved in moving troops to any threatened point, largely resolves the problem of defense into an effort to hold only the largest and most important land areas, particularly Luzon and Mindanao.

The Philippines, by virtue of their natural strategic location, completely dominate the eastern part of the South China Sea, just as Indo–China and Singapore dominate the western and southern parts. Since Japan planned to employ this almost completely enclosed waterway as her principal avenue of traffic with the Southern Resources Area, it was vital that the Philippines be reduced promptly. Moreover, the occupation of the southern islands in the archipelago would provide excellent bases for an assault on the eastern portion of the Netherlands East Indies.

In addition to their military value the Philippine Islands possess natural resources of considerable value to Japan or any other empire-building nation. The largest chromite lode in the world and the most extensive high-grade iron ore deposits in the Far East are located in the Philippines. Gold mining is one of the country's chief sources of wealth, and manganese and copper are found in important quantities. Hemp, sugar, copra, cocoanut oil, and tobacco are the principal agricultural products, while virgin hardwood forests constitute a valuable reserve of national wealth. The total land available is ample for the needs of the population, which numbered almost 17,000,000 in 1941.

One fundamental weakness of the Philippines was their dependence upon the outside world. There were no heavy industries, no munitions plants, and only a few factories capable of supplying even the smallest items of military equipment. Gasoline and oil had to be imported, although a convenient source of supply was neighbor-

ing Borneo. Any prolonged defense of the islands, considering the logistics of modern war, depended upon control of the surrounding seas so that the lines of communication to outside sources of supply could be kept open.

The United States first gained possession of the Philippines in 1898, as a result of the Spanish–American War. Our policy of governing, from its very inception, was designed primarily for the benefit of the native peoples and not as a means of exploitation by us. Little by little, as the people proved themselves capable of it, a greater measure of self-government was accorded them. Finally, in 1934, Congress passed the Independence Act, a law that provided for complete Philippine independence by July 1946. In the years that followed we sought to direct affairs in such a manner that the conversion to independence would be effected with the least possible disruption of the normal social, political, and economic standards. This benevolent policy, while not enriching the coffers of our nation, did win the respect and loyalty of the Filipinos to a degree quite unprecedented in colonial affairs.

The fact that we intended to withdraw from the Philippines deterred us from any sizable enlargement of our defensive installations there. In general, only such funds as would maintain the status quo were appropriated during the thirties.

To assist the new Philippine Commonwealth in preparing its own defenses the United States in 1935 sent General Douglas MacArthur to serve as military adviser to the infant government. He retired from the United States Army in 1937, but President Quezon retained him to carry out the program for national defense that had been initiated in 1936. This project provided for a regular Philippine Army of 930 officers and 10,000 enlisted men, although in 1941 its strength was less than 40 per cent of this, primarily because of insufficient funds. A military mission of United States Army officers was charged with the organization and training of these Filipino regular troops. It was also planned to create a force of thirty reserve divisions within a period of ten years. It was envisioned that the entire Philippine Army, both regular and reserve components, would reach a total strength of 250,000 by the end of the first ten years. An air force was also to be organized and trained, and a naval offshore patrol was to be established in lieu of a regular navy, the cost of the latter being considered prohibitive.

During the years immediately preceding the war Japan succeeded in almost entirely surrounding the Philippine Islands. The arc formed by Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands to the north and the

Caroline and Marianas Islands to the east assumed the menacing shape of a nearly completed ring with the acquisition of Hainan Island, the Spratly group, and French Indo–China to the west. Only to the south, toward the Netherlands East Indies, did a line of communication remain that was not through Japanese-controlled waters.

On 26 July 1941 the United States, alarmed by Japan's threatening attitude in the Far East, decided to order the embryonic Philippine Army into the service of the Army of the United States, as legally provided for by the Independence Act of 1934. A new headquarters was created, known as the United States Army Forces in the Far East; and General MacArthur was recalled to active duty as a lieutenant general in order to assume the command. The regular component of the Philippine Army was inducted at once, and the mobilization of ten reserve divisions in successive increments was begun. National Guard antiaircraft and tank units were dispatched from the United States, and in November the 4th Marine Regiment was transferred from Shanghai, China.

By December 1941 the ground forces in the Philippines totaled about 110,000 effectives. American personnel numbered only 10,400, for the most part assigned to the 31st Infantry Regiment and various antiaircraft, armored, and harbor-defense units. Other troops consisted of 12,000 Philippine Scouts, 3,000 Constabulary, and the approximately 85,000 Philippine Army troops that had been activated by the time war broke out. It is important to bear in mind that the hastily mobilized Philippine Army lacked training and was inadequately equipped.

When war came to the Philippines, our Far East Air Force, under the command of Major General Lewis H. Brereton, comprised about 300 aircraft and 8,000 aviation personnel. But only 125 of the planes were suitable for combat. This nucleus of first-line aircraft consisted of thirty-five Flying Fortresses and ninety modern fighters. The American squadrons in the Philippines represented over 10 per cent of our total combat air strength at that time. Pilots and crews were all well-trained and lacked only actual combat experience.

Our naval strength consisted of the small Asiatic Fleet and three PT boats of the Philippine offshore patrol, under the command of Admiral Thomas C. Hart. One light cruiser of the Pacific Fleet was also present on 8 December, serving as a convoy escort.

In proportion to our total available means in 1941 the Philippine garrison received its proper share. About a hundred light tanks and the first fifty self-propelled artillery weapons delivered by our arsenals arrived there before the outbreak of war. The construc-

tion of additional airfields in the Philippines was authorized, and a project was undertaken for the improvement of air bases in Australia and the East Indies* in order to render them suitable for use by American air forces. Although funds were difficult to obtain, this air program would probably have been completed by 1 April 1942, the date by which we anticipated that our forces in the Far East would be fully prepared for war. By December 1941 some 500,000 tons of additional supplies and 20,000 troop reinforcements had been earmarked for dispatch to the Philippines, but the enemy struck before even the first shipments could arrive.

We have seen that the second prong of the main attack in the Japanese centrifugal offensive was to be the invasion of the Philippines. This stroke was to be closely coordinated with the other main blow, the drive on Malaya; and both were to commence upon notification that the Pearl Harbor attack had been successfully inaugurated. The general strategy of the attack on the Philippines was excellently conceived. It revolved around a series of four successive steps:

1. The destruction of American air power, the key operation of the entire campaign since it was both the means and, to a great extent, the end of the Japanese invasion.

2. The final complete isolation of the Philippine Islands by means of:

 (a) The attack on Pearl Harbor and the capture of Guam and Wake Islands, the connecting links with Hawaii.

 (b) The seizure of Davao, on Mindanao, thus severing the sole remaining line of communication from the Philippines to the outside world.

3. The capture of Luzon and the defeat of the principal body of American ground troops in the Far East.

4. The occupation of the rest of the Philippines and the mopping-up of surviving American forces.

Over a period of years the Japanese espionage net in the Philippines had collected a valuable store of information concerning the defenses of the country as well as the key terrain features. Japanese bars, shops, and photography studios had been set up in the vicinity of all important military establishments; they proved to be prolific sources of useful information. About two-thirds of the 30,000 Japanese in the Philippines had settled in or around Davao

*Among these bases were Rabaul, Port Moresby, Townsville, Brisbane, and Port Darwin.

and thus were able to pave the way by fifth-column activity for the force that was charged with landing there.

As a result of the war warning to all oversea garrisons on 27 November our forces in the Philippines went on a full war alert. Reconnaissance to the west as far as the coast of Indo–China was undertaken by the long-range patrol bombers of the Navy, while Army Flying Fortresses patrolled to the north. On 5 December sixteen of the Army heavy bombers were moved to Del Monte Airfield, on Mindanao, in order to gain some measure of safety through dispersion. The facilities at this newly constructed field were still primitive, however, and congested Clark Field, on Luzon, remained our only really satisfactory heavy bomber base in the Philippines.

As Japan's D-day approached, the forces that were allotted for the Philippine operation made the necessary last-minute arrangements. The Fourteenth Army, Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma commanding, was charged with carrying out the invasion. The bulk of the Third Fleet, a force comprising four cruisers, twelve destroyers, one seaplane carrier, and a host of auxiliaries, was designated the Northern Philippine Force and assigned to support the attacks on northern Luzon. The Southern Philippine Force, consisting of the remainder of the Third Fleet plus a carrier division, had a total of two small aircraft carriers, five cruisers, twenty-four destroyers, one seaplane carrier, and a large group of transports and supply ships. This force was assigned to support the landings on southern Luzon and in the Mindanao–Sulu Archipelago area. Additional naval support for the main landing, on northern Luzon, was to be provided by the two battleships, four cruisers, and four destroyers of the roving Second Fleet, once the landings in Malaya and British Borneo had been successfully carried out.

The Northern Philippine Force and the bulk of the Fourteenth Army were based on Formosa; the Southern Philippine Force and the remainder of the Army troops were based in the Palau and Ryukyu Islands; the Second Fleet operated from Camranh Bay, in Indo–China. Air support for the campaign was to be furnished by both Army and Navy aircraft.

For convenience of analysis the first Philippine campaign may be divided into two parts: first, and most important, the attack on Luzon; second, the concurrent operations against the other islands.

Luzon (Map 9).—Largest and most important of the Philippine Islands, Luzon stretches 500 miles from north to south, with a maximum width of about 140 miles. The broad section of the island, north of Manila, contains four distinct mountain ranges and two

great valleys or plains. From Aparri, in the extreme north, the forty-mile-wide Cagayan Valley offers a spacious route of invasion to the south. West of the Caraballo Mountains the Central, or Pampanga, Plain extends the avenue of approach as far as Manila Bay. This second great lowland, highly cultivated and averaging fifty miles in width, offers the best route for an invasion of Luzon. From the excellent landing beaches along the shores of capacious Lingayen Gulf to the city of Manila, capital and heart of the Philippines, is only 150 miles. Immediately to the south of Manila, Lake Taal and Laguna de Bay effectively canalize the routes of approach to the city from that direction. Particularly fine landing beaches are found at Legaspi and Antimonan, on the east coast, and along the shore of Batangas Province, in the west. As might be expected, Manila is the key to the island's communications, both road and rail.

Precipitation rather than temperature determines the seasonal distinctions. The northeast monsoon, which brings rain to eastern Luzon, prevails from October to May and then gives way to the southwest monsoon, which drenches western Luzon and is frequently accompanied by cyclonic storms or typhoons. The temperature averages about 80° F. the year round. Vegetation varies with the terrain. Great stands of pine trees high in the mountains yield to tropical forests on the lower slopes and in the uncultivated lowlands. While the cross-country movement of troops and supplies is often difficult and slow, yet the problem is somewhat easier than in Malaya. However, the usual tropical diseases, infections, and insects are everywhere present to harry unacclimated troops and reduce their efficiency.

For many years the United States had maintained only a token garrison in the Philippines. Our defensive installations, like our military forces, were generally confined to the island of Luzon. At Cavite, on the south shore of Manila Bay, we had built up a secondary naval base; and at Olongapo, on Subic Bay, we had established additional repair and service facilities for lesser ships. Although capable of serving our small Asiatic Fleet, these bases were entirely inadequate for the support of a large battle fleet built around capital ships. Thus the conduct of prolonged large-scale naval operations in the Far East would necessitate the use of Singapore by the American Navy.

In earlier days we had strongly fortified the islands of Corregidor, Caballo, Carabao, and El Fraile, although by modern standards their armament had become obsolete by 1941. On El Fraile, which is more nearly a submerged rock than an island, we had constructed

a reinforced-concrete fort whose resemblance to a battleship was made even more striking by the erection of a cage mast. These four island forts controlled the entrance to Manila Bay and protected the naval base at Cavite from an attack by sea. In Subic Bay, Grande Island had been similarly fortified as a defense against a naval attack on Olongapo.

In our basic strategy for the defense of the Philippines it had always been planned to hold all Luzon as long as possible and then to withdraw the ground forces to Bataan for a prolonged defense while the island forts protected Manila Bay and kept open the line of reinforcement for the eventual arrival of the United States Navy. The development of modern air power had not yet caused any change in this plan, but by December 1941 some additional air facilities had been constructed on Luzon. New airfields, suitable for the operation of fighter planes, had been completed at Iba and Del Carmen; other fields, though still unfinished on 8 December, provided emergency landing strips. The chief fighter base was Nichols Field; and the heavy bombers were at Clark Field, the only base usable by Flying Fortresses north of Del Monte Field, on Mindanao.

Of the 110,000 troops available for defense of the Philippines about 85,000 were concentrated on Luzon. Our entire air force was also based on this island, except for the sixteen heavy bombers that had been moved to Mindanao and a squadron of Navy patrol bombers that was located at Davao. Because of the war warning and his lack of air protection Admiral Hart had moved most of the warships in the Asiatic Fleet out of Manila Bay.

By 8 December the forces under General MacArthur in the Philippines had been grouped into five major commands. These were the North Luzon Force, the South Luzon Force, the Visayan–Mindanao Force, the Philippine Coast Artillery Command, and the USAFFE* reserve. The Visayan–Mindanao Force will be referred to later, in our discussion of operations in the southern Philippines. The Philippine Coast Artillery Command included all of the seacoast and antiaircraft artillery units and was charged primarily with the defense of Manila and Subic Bays. The remaining three commands were organized to conduct operations in the field for the defense of Luzon.

The North Luzon Force, Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright commanding, was the major defensive unit and comprised the 11th, 21st, and 31st Divisions** plus the 26th Cavalry and other Philip-

* United States Army Forces in the Far East.

** Philippine Army reserve divisions.

pine Scout units. The South Luzon Force, commanded by Brigadier General George M. Parker, Jr., consisted of the 41st and 51st Divisions,* elements of the 1st Regular Division, two regiments of the Constabulary, and a few miscellaneous units. The initial missions assigned both forces were, first, to prevent a landing and, second, if a landing could not be prevented, to attack and destroy the landing force.

The USAFFE reserve was retained directly under the command of General MacArthur. It included the Philippine Division, the 71st and 91st Divisions,* an armored group of two American tank battalions, and miscellaneous other units. The nucleus of the entire force engaged in the defense of Luzon was the well-trained and -equipped Philippine Division. In addition to two first-rate Philippine Scout infantry regiments the division included the American 31st Infantry Regiment and a full quota of division artillery.

The major command areas and the dispositions of the principal defensive units are shown on the map. The greater mass of strength north of Manila is obvious and accurately reflects the strategic plan for a withdrawal to Bataan after the execution of the maximum delaying action. Small patrols observed likely landing spots in the far north and in the extreme south of the island, but no large forces could be committed in those areas for fear of their being cut off from Bataan. Since the northeast monsoon prevails in December, the defending forces were properly concentrated to guard the best landing beaches on the west coast. Lingayen and Batangas were by far the most likely sites.

The Imperial General Headquarters had devoted a great deal of thought and preparation to the plans for the conquest of the Philippines. General Homma, considered one of Japan's most brilliant Army officers, was furnished an extremely detailed timetable for the invasion and was told to carry it out exactly as prescribed.

Since the key operation of the entire campaign was the destruction of American air power in the Philippines, the first blow was to be a surprise air attack executed on the opening day of the war, immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack. The principal objective of the ground forces was, of course, the island of Luzon. The first landings were to be made by special advance units at Aparri and Vigan, in the north, and at Legaspi, in the south. These operations were tentatively scheduled for D-day but might be postponed in the event of inclement weather. The time of attack on Pearl Harbor,

* Philippine Army reserve divisions.

rather than local weather conditions, was the determining factor in the timing of all of Japan's amphibious assaults at the beginning of the war.

The initial landings on Luzon were calculated to secure the flanks prior to the main landings at Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay. In addition, the airfields at Aparri and Legaspi would be gained for the use of Japanese land-based aircraft. The field at Aparri was particularly vital to the success of the operations because Army planes based in Formosa lacked sufficient range to give adequate support to the ground forces south of an east-west line through Baguio. Once air bases had been established at Aparri, Vigan, and Tuguegarao, Army planes would be able to take over the entire burden of cooperation with the ground troops; and the Navy could shift its aircraft to Davao in preparation for the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies.

If, as hoped, the defenders of Luzon dispatched large forces to the extreme north and south of the island, then the main landings executed two weeks later would be able to cut off their retreat. From Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay the two strong pincers of the main attack were to drive quickly to Manila. The Japanese were confident that the jaws of their trap would close before the defenders could escape to Bataan, and the decisive battle of the campaign was expected to take place in the Manila area. The fighting qualities of the troops opposing them were completely underestimated; the Japanese anticipated the full collapse of resistance once their overwhelming superiority could make itself felt.

At 0330 on 8 December our forces in the Philippines were formally notified that a state of war existed. This fact was far less surprising than the news that the first attack was even then being delivered by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. A full war alert was at once put into effect by all units.

About 0400 the radar set at Iba, the only station as yet set up, reported the approach of a large formation of planes from the northwest. One fighter squadron took off from Iba Field to make an interception, but the report proved to be erroneous. About 0915 another group of unidentified planes was reported over Lingayen Gulf headed for Manila. Two fighter squadrons took to the air immediately from Clark and Nichols Fields, but the enemy planes veered eastward and were not contacted. This flight of thirty-two Japanese Army bombers struck Baguio and Tuguegarao at 0930 and then retired unmolested to the north. Our two fighter squadrons were recalled for refueling.

The sole American unit in the Philippines that could be employed offensively against the Japanese was the heavy bombardment group of the Far East Air Force. Nineteen of the Flying Fortresses were at Clark Field on 8 December, and at 0800 they took to the air to avoid being caught on the ground by an enemy attack. Plans were laid for a strike against Formosa, but the orders were not immediately approved. It was deemed advisable to dispatch first a reconnaissance flight of three Fortresses in order to have photographic data on suitable targets for an air attack. Meanwhile the planes charged with the strike could be making the necessary preparations. At 1100 the Fortresses returned to Clark Field for refueling, bombing-up, and the briefing of crews. About the same time approval was received for the execution of the bombing mission against Formosa as soon as it could be mounted. Steps were taken to bring up the sixteen Fortresses from Mindanao during the night so that they would be available for missions by daybreak on the 9th.

Shortly after 1030, in response to another air-raid alert from the radar at Iba, four fighter squadrons, two from Nichols Field and one each from Iba and Del Carmen Fields, took to the air. The fifth squadron remained on the ground at Clark Field in reserve. No attack matured, however, and our fighters again began to run low on fuel. At noon the squadron from Iba returned for a landing, during which the enemy attacked the field without the slightest warning.

In their plans for wiping out the American air force in the Philippines the Japanese contemplated the use of Navy planes as the main striking force, since, as stated, the range from Formosa was too great for the effective employment of Army aircraft south of Baguio. In order to gain surprise the Navy planes were scheduled to take off before dawn; but a heavy fog blanketed their fields on the morning of 8 December, and the first aircraft did not leave until 1015.

When the weather finally cleared over the airfields, a force of seventy-two fighters and 100 bombers was sent out. The leading elements of this force arrived at Iba about 1205, just in time to strike our fighters while they were landing. A group of fifty-four bombers and fighters methodically neutralized the airfield, first dropping light demolition and incendiary bombs and then closing in for a vicious strafing attack. All ground installations, including our only operational radar set, were completely destroyed; and sixteen of our eighteen defending fighter planes were lost as well. The main body of the enemy air group, following on the heels of the force that attacked Iba, flew on to Clark Field.

At this time the two fighter squadrons from Nichols Field were in the air over Manila, the squadron at Clark Field was preparing to take off, and the squadron at Del Carmen Field was trying to take off for the protection of Clark Field but had already been considerably delayed by heavy clouds of dust over its runway. Thus there was no fighter cover for Clark Field at this critical moment.

In a devastating surprise attack, beginning about 1220 and lasting until 1337, the main enemy air group delivered a knockout blow against Clark Field. When the Japanese planes arrived, they found the entire American bomber force still on the ground, completely at their mercy. By the end of the intensive bombing and strafing attack most of the hangars and other installations had been destroyed, the runways had been heavily cratered, and twelve Flying Fortresses had been completely demolished. In addition, sixteen fighter planes had been destroyed; and five more Fortresses had been severely damaged. Our two fighter squadrons patrolling over Manila did not arrive until too late because, unfortunately, the radio station at Clark Field had been demolished by one of the first bombs dropped and no summons could be sent. The dust at Del Carmen Field prevented the take off of the squadron there in time to be of assistance. Three of our fighters at Clark Field gained the air successfully during the attack and accounted for five enemy planes.

By the close of 8 December one-half of our bomber force and one-third of our fighter strength had been wiped out. Moreover, repair and maintenance of the remaining aircraft was to prove increasingly difficult in view of the destruction of airfield facilities, both already accomplished and about to be experienced during the next few days.

The first landings on Luzon took place about 0530 on 10 December. At Aparri a crack Japanese regiment quickly brushed aside the one infantry company it found there while a battalion landed unopposed at Vigan. The Japanese troops pushed inland and began the construction of base facilities that would permit the transfer of Army aircraft to northern Luzon.

Our immediate reaction to this enemy action took the form of small-scale air attacks against the enemy transports and supporting warships. Our attacks, though causing some damage, were not effective enough to impede the progress of the Japanese.

During the morning the naval support group of the enemy's Northern Philippine Force was discovered about 300 miles northwest of Manila. Five of our Navy patrol bombers attacked this cruiser force at 1130, but only near misses were scored. The bombers returned just in time to run into a heavy air attack on Cavite, carried out by

fifty-four Japanese Navy bombers. Practically the entire navy yard was destroyed in a leisurely and accurate bombing that lasted for several hours. The bulk of the Asiatic Fleet had already been moved to the south by Admiral Hart, but three destroyers and many of our submarines were still in harbor. One submarine, a mine layer, and a merchant ship were sunk by the attacking planes; and one destroyer was damaged. Most of our remaining warships left Manila that night for the south.

The enemy planes that had bombed Cavite almost out of existence were afforded effective protection by an escort of some 150 fighter aircraft. Our own fighters, by now reduced to three operational squadrons, had taken to the air to intercept the raid; but they were unable to break through the enemy's fighter cover or to prevent the intensive strafing of Nichols and Nielson Fields. Our losses in aircraft were heavy and marked the last attempt to meet enemy forces in the air. Only thirty fighters survived, a remnant that would have to be conserved in order to provide the ground forces with the aerial reconnaissance that they needed so badly.

By the close of 10 December our sixteen remaining Fortresses had been removed to Mindanao. It was clear that in view of the enemy's overwhelming air superiority our heavy bombers could no longer operate safely from Luzon.

About noon on 11 December the enemy again bombed Cavite and Nichols Field. Upon the advice of Admiral Hart the merchant shipping in Manila Bay began a hasty exodus to the south; and some forty ships, aggregating over 200,000 tons, escaped safely. The Japanese had deliberately overlooked the inviting target presented by the merchantmen* because their plans called for concentration against our air force during the first week. The only permissible secondary targets were the warships of our Asiatic Fleet, since they too had offensive potentialities.

Shortly after daybreak on 12 December, Japanese aircraft again raided Nichols Field. About this time the enemy's Southern Philippine Force from the Palau Islands arrived off Legaspi, near the southeastern tip of Luzon; and two reinforced infantry battalions began to land. Word of the landing was flashed at once to Manila, but no immediate counteraction was taken beyond the strengthening of a line across the island near Antimonan. The South Luzon Force

* The only exception was the merchant ship sunk in the raid on 10 December. This vessel, of French registry, had a superstructure somewhat resembling that of an aircraft carrier.

had been instructed not to commit its forces south of this point for fear they would be cut off by later landings farther north.

Part of the Japanese force at Legaspi secured the area to the south while the remainder quickly pushed northward to Naga. Meanwhile, in northern Luzon, troops from Aparri captured Tuguegarao after a brisk skirmish; and the bulk of the force at Vigan moved down the coast toward San Fernando. Our ground forces remained in position pending the development of the anticipated main attack, which obviously would not come until the enemy had achieved absolute air supremacy.

The Japanese air raids continued unabated. Clark Field and Olongapo were bombed and strafed on the 12th, and seven of our Navy patrol bombers were destroyed while attempting to land on Subic Bay. On 13 and 14 December enemy aircraft were coming and going in a continuous stream, and one by one our planes were being put out of action. On the 14th our eleven surviving Navy patrol bombers were sent southward to the Netherlands Indies. With the exception of four planes later rebuilt at Manila the rest of our original force of thirty flying boats had been destroyed. Evacuation of the last search planes dealt another serious blow to General MacArthur's hopes for effective aerial reconnaissance.

About noon on 14 December six of our Fortresses on Mindanao were dispatched to Legaspi for an attack on the enemy landing force there. Only three of the planes were able to reach the target area. When they arrived, a fierce encounter took place with Japanese fighters from the two small aircraft carriers that were supporting the landing. Our bombing was ineffective; and two Fortresses, badly damaged, were lost in crash landings. After this raid our fourteen remaining bombers were withdrawn to Port Darwin, Australia, 1,500 miles away, where they would be safe from enemy air attack. Repair and service facilities at Darwin would permit adequate maintenance of the large aircraft, which Del Monte Field, now to be used as an advance base for staging attacks to the north, could not provide.

As the situation in the air rapidly deteriorated, General MacArthur set an inspiring example for his troops by his coolness and confidence. Quickly restoring order out of the confusion and demoralization that followed the enemy's first air attacks, MacArthur held in his ground forces with a tight rein. Despite the success of the enemy's initial landings no large units were prematurely committed. MacArthur calmly awaited the main attack, which he was confident had not yet been launched.

On 14 December the 31st Division was detached from the North Luzon Force, and General Wainwright was relieved from responsibility for the sector assigned that unit. When the enemy force at Vigan was observed moving southward, elements of the 11th Division were sent north to delay the advance. One infantry battalion set up defenses at San Fernando, two battalions plus some self-propelled artillery garrisoned Bauang, and one company was stationed at Damortis. On 16 December the North Luzon Force was ordered to hold the enemy north of San Fernando, and consequently the greater part of the force at Bauang moved up to the line established by the battalion at San Fernando.

On the night of 21 December the reinforced Japanese troops from Vigan attacked our troops at San Fernando and inflicted a decisive defeat. Forced back into the mountains to the east, two of our battalions were completely dispersed and cut off from the coastal road. At this critical moment the 71st Division was released to the North Luzon Force from reserve, and one regiment was immediately sent north to Bauang to fill the gap created by the defeat at San Fernando.

The Japanese attack down the east coast of Lingayen Gulf was only one part of a well-coordinated plan. The main landing on Luzon was about to take place, and for it the enemy had massed an imposing task force. Eighty-four ships of the Japanese Northern Philippine Force arrived in the gulf during the night, carrying a division, two tank regiments, and several additional field artillery battalions. At sea to the northwest the Second Fleet, with its battleships and heavy cruisers, was stationed in general support of the landing force. One brigade was in reserve on Formosa.

Early on 22 December the landings commenced under cover of darkness (**Map 10**). The three beaches selected were just south of Bauang, not far from the enemy force that was working its way down the coast. Since our main defenses were at the head of the gulf, the enemy met little opposition. At daybreak the regiment from the 71st Division that had been ordered north to Bauang was attacked on the flank by the enemy landing force, and with their line of retreat cut off our troops had to retire inland to Baguio. The 26th Cavalry was ordered to Damortis with instructions to hold until forced to retire and then conduct delaying action. It arrived at 0100, just in time to meet a fierce enemy attack. After three hours of fighting the regiment had to withdraw to its first delaying position, on the highway east of Damortis. By 23 December the remainder of the 71st Division had been brought up to a line through Rosario. The 26th Cavalry was given the mission of covering the

right flank of the 71st; the 11th Division extended its line to the northwest in order to support the left flank.

The situation on 23 December favored the Japanese, although no decisive action had taken place. Their landings at Bauang had turned the flank of our main defensive position at the head of the gulf and had secured the advantages of a junction with the force advancing down the coast from Vigan. Our troops holding the coastal corridor up to San Fernando had been unable to withstand the pressure from the north, and our beach defenses along the east coast of the gulf had proved too weak to repel the enemy landings. The seizure of Damortis had sealed the coastal corridor and secured the south flank of the Japanese beachhead.

If a counterattack was to be launched to drive the invader back off the beaches, the proper time was at hand. On the 23d General Wainwright drew up plans for a counterattack and requested additional forces from the USAFFE reserve. On this same day, however, a strong naval task force was observed east of Luzon heading toward Lamon Bay; and consequently it was felt that only the 91st Division could be spared to reinforce the North Luzon Force at this time.

The majority of the troops under General Wainwright's command were only partially trained and equipped. Some of them became demoralized when they encountered the enemy for the first time and fled from the field. Others, who were better disciplined, held their places but had little chance against the better-trained, war-experienced Japanese troops. In addition, a severe shortage of transportation seriously affected the mobility of our forces in the battle area.

The 26th Cavalry Regiment, which had suffered heavy casualties in the fighting at Damortis on the 22d, was withdrawn to Binalonan to reorganize; and the newly attached 91st Division was rushed north to support the 71st at Rosario. About 1700 a strong enemy attack was made against the line manned by the 71st Division, and a rout ensued. That night the leading regiment of the 91st Division was struck at Pozorrubio and also routed.

These defeats made the immediate execution of a counterattack impossible; and since the defenses of the Lingayen area were now in danger of being outflanked, General Wainwright sought permission to withdraw behind the Agno River in order to gain time for the preparation of a counterblow from that position. When approval was granted, the 11th and 21st Divisions began to fall back to the south. In the meantime the Japanese began to land in force at Lamon Bay during the early hours of 24 December, and General Mac-

Arthur found it necessary to inaugurate the planned withdrawal to Bataan. The North Luzon Force was ordered to carry out delaying action along five successive lines of defense that had been laid out in advance.

By the morning of 24 December, General Wainwright's forces were established in their first delaying position (designated the D-1 line), which extended from Urdaneta to Aguilar. At daybreak the enemy reached Binalonan and attacked the 26th Cavalry Regiment, which was still in position there. The gallant little band of cavalrymen resisted fiercely and delayed the Japanese for over nine hours before withdrawing toward Urdaneta.

The events that transpired south of Manila on 24 December decisively altered General MacArthur's initial plan to defeat the enemy on the beaches (**Map 11**). The Japanese Southern Philippine Force arrived in Lamon Bay during the night of 23–24 December. About forty ships stood off Antimonan shortly after midnight, and by 0400 another group of twelve vessels had closed in at Mauban. Japanese troops poured ashore at both points.

The limited strength of the South Luzon Force and the long stretch of vulnerable coastline to be protected had necessarily resulted in a dispersion of strength. The 41st Division was concentrated fairly well in the western sector, the most likely point of attack; but the 51st Division was assigned a much larger sector and had to spread out, even though reinforced by a regiment of the 1st Regular Division. The beach defenses at Antimonan were manned by a single reinforced company of infantry which was soon overwhelmed by the much superior Japanese landing force. There were no survivors. Quickly moving inland, the enemy troops severed the railroad and highway leading down the peninsula. This action cut off another infantry company that had been delaying the advance of the enemy from Naga. At Mauban the Japanese landed just as our troops were about to leave the area. One battalion of the 1st Division had been assigned to defend the beaches, but the entire one-regiment division had been ordered on 23 December to join the North Luzon Force. Manning a strong secondary position west of Mauban, the battalion held up the enemy advance inland on 24 December. To the south one regiment of the 51st Division delayed the Japanese approach to Lucena.

Opposed by an enemy superior in numbers, training, and equipment, General MacArthur decided to give up Manila and withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula, where rugged terrain, protected flanks, and restricted maneuver room would limit the enemy's ability to employ

his full strength. The plan of withdrawal had been worked out well before this, but the rapid decline of our air power made it imperative that the retirement be executed with celerity—before it was too late. The North Luzon Force was assigned the mission of protecting the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force into Bataan, and the retirement of the southern forces was accelerated.

Shortly before noon on 24 December, General Parker was ordered to move the 41st Division at once to Bataan and to turn over command of the South Luzon Force to Brigadier General Albert M. Jones. The 31st Division and two regiments of the Philippine Division also were moved to Bataan; together with the 41st Division they constituted General Parker's new command, the Bataan Defense Force. Preparations for the defense of the peninsula were intensified, and the plan to stock Bataan with supplies was put into effect. Orders were issued for the destruction and evacuation of the airfields in the Manila area, and the headquarters of the air force was moved to Australia. The sixteen surviving fighter planes were flown to newly constructed airstrips on Bataan, from where they were to continue to execute reconnaissance missions and occasional strafing attacks.

Thanks to the vigorous day-long defense of the 26th Cavalry Regiment at Binalonan the North Luzon Force successfully held the D-1 line on 24 December (**Map 10**). Light attacks took place at Urdaneta in the early evening; but General Wainwright was able to disengage his forces and withdraw them to the D-2 position, the line of the Agno River.

On 25 December, Headquarters of the United States Army Forces in the Far East was established on Corregidor; and General MacArthur declared Manila an open city effective the following day. The naval base at Cavite was blown up to prevent its stores, ammunition, and facilities from falling into the hands of the enemy. South of Manila rear-guard elements of the South Luzon Force delayed the advance of the Japanese while the 41st Division moved north to Bataan.

Meanwhile the North Luzon Force held the line of the Agno River. However, the advantage secured by the use of this strong position was largely nullified by its length. A full-scale enemy attack developed on 26 December in the vicinity of Rosales, and a breakthrough was achieved. Part of the 11th Division was cut off during the withdrawal; and the 26th Cavalry Regiment, completely exhausted by the conduct of a fine rear-guard action, had to be sent to the south for reorganization. By evening General Wainwright

had established his weakened forces on the D-3 position, the line Paniqui–Guimba–San Jose. Baguio and Dagupan were both occupied on this day by small enemy forces.

South of Manila the 51st Division blocked the main enemy advance in the vicinity of Lucena (**Map 11**). The Japanese who had landed at Mauban sent a containing force toward Pagsanjan while the main body moved through Lucban to support the principal drive up the highway to Manila. An almost complete lack of artillery during the first few days seriously hindered the enemy in his advance; and since only a few planes were based at Legaspi, the air support rendered was largely ineffectual. Our troops blew bridges and culverts and fought wherever the terrain was advantageous. The 194th Tank Battalion lent its very effective assistance to the infantry. As a result of these measures no important forces were cut off after the initial Japanese landings.

The city of Manila was heavily bombed on 26 December, despite the fact that it had been declared an open city. This callous attack was repeated on the following days.

The North Luzon Force, disposed along the D-3 line on 27 December, encountered only a few enemy patrols (**Map 10**). However, the pattern of the Japanese advance was now clear to General Wainwright. The enemy was moving down the Pampanga Valley in two columns of attack. One reinforced regiment, driving down Highway 3, maintained frontal pressure on the North Luzon Force. To the east the main enemy body, about a division in strength, followed Highway 5 and continually threatened to envelop the defenders' right flank. During the night of 27-28 December, Wainwright withdrew his tired forces to the D-4 line, running from Tarlac to Cabanatuan.

The Japanese on 30 December launched a large-scale coordinated assault against the North Luzon Force (**Map 11**). The 91st Division, at Cabanatuan, received the full force of the enemy's main attack. Defeated and driven back ten miles to Gapan, the 91st was again attacked late in the evening. A complete rout ensued, the disorganized survivors finally being rallied about twenty miles farther south. Meanwhile the Japanese secondary attack at Tarlac had failed to achieve any important gains.

By this time the rapidly changing situation had grown extremely precarious. The North Luzon Force, after the collapse of its right flank, was seriously exposed to an envelopment by the strong Japanese forces around Gapan. Moreover, the enemy breakthrough now endangered the planned withdrawal of the South Luzon Force, a large portion of which was still south of Manila.

General Wainwright withdrew his left flank and center to the D-5 position during the night and undertook measures to reconstitute his right flank on a somewhat modified final line of delaying action, extending generally through Bamban, Mount Arayat, and Sibul Springs. The North Luzon Force was ordered to protect the South Luzon Force from attack during its passage of the Pampanga River at the Calumpit Bridge, a vulnerable bottleneck in the line of retreat of the southern force. General Jones was informed of the situation in the north and was directed to expedite the withdrawal of his troops. The entire South Luzon Force was to clear the Calumpit Bridge not later than 0600 on 1 January, at which time the vital span was scheduled for destruction.

The greater part of the South Luzon Force was in a strong position between Lake Taal and Laguna de Bay, covering the shortest avenue of advance on Manila. Since no sizable enemy forces had yet approached, it was a relatively simple matter to break contact and withdraw swiftly. In compliance with his orders General Jones at once dispatched the 51st Division to Bataan, taking the precaution of ordering one regiment to Plaridel with the mission of covering the eastern approaches to the Calumpit Bridge. The two Constabulary regiments, constituting the rear guard of the South Luzon Force, withdrew to Manila during the night.

The rapid advance of the Japanese down Highway 5 had already penetrated the D-5 line as originally laid out. While the 11th and 21st Divisions continued to hold in the center and on the left, General Wainwright refused his right flank, taking advantage of the obstacle presented by the great swamp east of the Pampanga River. The depleted 71st Division,* in reserve, was moved to Baliuag to reinforce the remnants of the 91st Division, now numbering less than 500 men. This composite force took up a position behind the Maasin River. About 1030 on 31 December the enemy attacked down the highway but was unable to force a crossing of the river.

At this juncture General Jones was ordered to assume command of all troops east of the Pampanga River. The regiment of the 51st Division which had been left behind at Plaridel took up a position north of the town. One tank company and a few self-propelled artillery pieces supported the defense. About noon on 31 December, General Wainwright withdrew the few remaining troops of the 91st Division; and through a misunderstanding of orders the 71st Division began to retire from Baliuag. Fortunately General Wainwright arrived at Plaridel in midafternoon for a conference with General

* One infantry regiment and one battalion of field artillery.

Jones. When the evacuation of Baliuag came to light, Wainwright immediately ordered that the withdrawal of the 71st be halted and that a defensive line be established a few miles north of Plaridel.

The Japanese quickly occupied Baliuag, and General Jones grew still more concerned for the safety of the Calumpit Bridge. A counterattack was ordered to delay the enemy's advance; and about 1700 our tanks, supported by the self-propelled guns, assaulted Baliuag and inflicted considerable damage on the surprised enemy troops. This attack was followed by steady artillery fire that further demoralized the Japanese. The success of the counterattack is best illustrated by the fact that the enemy did not begin to advance again until about 0400 on 1 January.

All during the night of 31 December–1 January troops streamed across the Calumpit Bridge and headed for Bataan. Shortly before daybreak the rear guard of the South Luzon Force completed its crossing. As the last of the Constabulary sped to safety, followed by the troops of the 91st Division who had been holding the bridgehead, the span was ordered blown by General Wainwright, who was present at the critical spot.

The successful withdrawal of the South Luzon Force across the broad, unfordable Pampanga River completed the execution of one of the most hazardous of military operations, a movement across the front of an aggressive enemy. Very close cooperation between Generals Wainwright and Jones in the vicinity of Calumpit Bridge made possible the successful accomplishment of a most difficult mission. The bridge was a bottleneck that presented a serious hindrance to the withdrawal of the South Luzon Force; yet the two commanders retained full control of the situation and saved all their troops to fight again on Bataan. General MacArthur's excellent timing and economical use of forces had achieved the maximum delay practicable and had prolonged the campaign still further by conserving for use on Bataan the greater part of our ground strength.

The demolition work of the South Luzon Force rear guard had been so effective that the Japanese did not enter Manila until 1 January. The last of our submarines had departed on 31 December, and all our supplies in the area had either been moved to Bataan and Corregidor or destroyed. General MacArthur had outmaneuvered General Homma at every turn. In recognition of his accomplishments the American commander was now promoted to the rank of full general.

Upon crossing the Pampanga River the South Luzon Force ceased to exist as such, and its units became part of the Bataan Defense

Force. The North Luzon Force, however, continued to function as a rear guard. During the morning of 1 January our troops in the vicinity of Calumpit were bombed and strafed by enemy aircraft, and about 1330 the Japanese forced a crossing of the river. General Wainwright ordered his forces to withdraw to the line Guagua–Porac during the night, the enemy being held southeast of San Fernando long enough for all our troops to clear the road junction. The 71st and 91st Divisions were now sent to Bataan for reorganization. The new line of defense was held by the 11th Division on the right and the 21st Division on the left; the rejuvenated 26th Cavalry Regiment guarded the vulnerable north flank.

On 3 January the enemy, by this time thoroughly exasperated because of the miscarriage of his plans, launched a fierce, well-coordinated attack against both extremities of the Guagua–Porac line. Our troops suffered heavy casualties and were forced to withdraw when the Japanese enveloped Guagua from the south. By 6 January the North Luzon Force had moved into western Bataan. This valiant force, ably handled by General Wainwright, had successfully carried out a brilliant delaying operation from Lingayen Gulf to Layac. Out of the original 28,000 men only 16,000 survived the withdrawal, convincing proof of the fighting qualities of the Filipino soldier. The North Luzon Force ceased to exist at this time; and General Wainwright assumed command of the I Philippine Corps, assigned to defend the western sector of Bataan.

General Parker's Bataan Defense Force, which had been organizing the peninsula for defense since 24 December, was given the responsibility of covering the movement of the North Luzon Force to its new sector. A strong position at Layac was manned by the 26th Cavalry Regiment, the 31 Infantry Regiment, and remnants of the 71st Division, with two artillery battalions in support.

During the morning and early afternoon of 6 January the Japanese brought up the largest concentration of artillery that they had yet employed and commenced a punishing bombardment of our defensive position. After withstanding one strong infantry assault our troops withdrew under cover of darkness to the main battle position on Bataan.

By this time our strength in fighter planes had dwindled to ten, dispersed among several well-concealed landing fields that had been hastily constructed on Bataan during the period of withdrawal. The Japanese freely bombed Corregidor, particularly heavy raids occurring on 4, 5, and 6 January. Lack of important air opposition enabled the enemy to dispatch planes to the south and to Burma.

Our remaining forces on Bataan now totaled about 80,000 men, including some 15,000 Americans. In addition, about 2,000 of our troops who had been cut off in the withdrawal continued to carry on guerrilla warfare, mainly in northern Luzon. The food, housing, and sanitation problems on Bataan were greatly complicated by the presence of over 20,000 civilian refugees, a development that had not been foreseen in planning the defense. All troops were immediately placed on half rations.

The Bataan Peninsula is about thirty-two miles long and has a maximum width of twenty miles. The most prominent terrain features are Mount Natib, Mount Samat, and the Mariveles Mountains, all part of a single range that runs generally down the middle of the peninsula. Between Mount Natib and Mount Samat the heights slope downward to form a gap through which runs the most important lateral line of communication on Bataan, the all-weather road connecting Bagac with Pilar. North of this road Mount Natib dominates the terrain, which is heavily wooded and cut by many deep ravines, except for a narrow coastal strip extending through Abucay to the vicinity of Orion. In the west the mountains slope abruptly to the coast, and many shallow streams empty into the sea. The terrain in the southern half of Bataan is almost entirely mantled by dense woods or thick jungle growth. In many places the mountains extend westward to the coast, ending in steep cliffs or forming irregular fingers of land that jut out into the sea. Good sand beaches are found along the east shore. The bay at Mariveles forms a small natural harbor at the tip of the peninsula. Three miles off Bataan lies the island of Corregidor, which together with the three smaller island forts to the south dominates the ten-mile-wide entrance to spacious Manila Bay.

On Bataan a good all-weather two-lane road ran along the east coast from Layac almost to Mariveles, and another crossed the peninsula from Pilar to Bagac. A good dry-weather road connected Moron, on the west coast, with Mariveles and extended on to join the east-coast highway near Limay, forming a nearly complete line of communication around the perimeter of Bataan. Moron was connected with Olongapo by a narrow trail paralleling the shore, and other trails led into the interior of the peninsula from various points on the coast road.

The plan for the defense of Bataan provided for a main battle position, a reserve battle position, and beach defenses (**Map 12**). General Wainwright's I Corps occupied the western sector of the peninsula; the newly activated II Corps, General Parker command-

ing, was charged with the defense of the eastern sector. The now dissolved Bataan Defense Force had prepared the main battle position while the withdrawal from the Manila area was taking place. Some work had also been done on the beach defenses; but the reserve battle position was as yet little more than a line on the map, principally because of the limited time that had been available for construction.

The main line of resistance ran from Mauban to Abucay, a distance of about twenty miles. In the center of the position, Mount Natib and the surrounding area, the terrain was extremely difficult. Only patrols and detached outposts were assigned to that sector, reliance being placed upon pack mules for the transportation of supplies. The terrain itself was counted upon to provide protection against any important enemy attack. The rapid transfer of troops between the two adjacent corps would, of course, be impossible. It required two whole days to travel overland from the right flank of the I Corps to the left flank of the II Corps, and satisfactory contact never was established.

General Wainwright disposed his forces in the western sector to meet all eventualities. The 1st Division, reinforced, manned the main battle position; the 31st Division took over the beach defenses; and all the available artillery was disposed for close support of the battle line or to protect especially vulnerable landing points, such as Bagac. The surviving combat troops of the 71st Division were incorporated into the 91st Division. With the 26th Cavalry Regiment the 91st Division now constituted the corps reserve.

Because of the limited road net it appeared likely that the main Japanese strength would initially be brought to bear against the eastern half of the main battle position, the sector assigned to the II Corps. General Parker held his main line of resistance with the 51st Division, the 41st Division, and the 57th Infantry Regiment, in order from left to right. The 11th Division manned the beach defenses, and the 21st Division was in corps reserve. The artillery was massed in close support of the battle position.

On 9 January the first contact with the enemy was established north of Abucay. During this day and the one following, patrols drove in our outposts and developed the main line of resistance **(Map 13)**. The Japanese attacks on the II Corps front successively progressed to the west in an effort to locate and envelop the interior flank. Ignoring the narrow coastal strip of good terrain, which our artillery had surveyed for massed fires, the enemy preferred instead to attack over rough ground and through thick jungle. With an

abundance of fresh reinforcements at hand General Homma was in no mood to prolong the campaign unnecessarily. Beginning on 10 January a relentless pressure was applied that did not cease until our forces finally withdrew from this first position.

During the night of 10–11 January the enemy began a strong offensive with an attack on the right of the II Corps. For four days the attacks continued on this the sector of the 57th Infantry Regiment, but by timely counterattacks the regiment was able to maintain its position. During the same period attacks were launched against the front of the 41st Division. Seesaw attacks and counterattacks continued until 15 January without a major change in the situation. On 16 January, however, the 41st found its left threatened with envelopment and was forced to refuse that flank.

On the left of the II Corps front the 51st Division had been assigned to hold the most difficult terrain along the entire battle position. The formal defenses on this flank of the II Corps extended up the eastern slope of the mountains, gradually giving way to a line of small outposts. Mount Natib itself was not held, nor had it been possible to establish any contact with the right flank of the I Corps. On 12 and 13 January the enemy launched strong attacks against the interior regiment of the 51st Division and forced it to give way. The Japanese increased their pressure in this salient during the next two days in an effort to achieve a complete breakthrough. By the evening of 15 January the 51st had committed its reserve regiment, and all troops were nearing complete exhaustion. Shortly after noon on the 16th the Japanese broke through the center of the 51st Division's position and at the same time created a gap between that division and the 41st. Before reserves could be brought up from the rear the 51st Division collapsed. A portion of the regiment on the extreme left retained sufficient cohesion to cover the rout, delaying the enemy with a rear-guard action.

The situation of the II Corps had now become critical. Unless the main battle position could be restored in the sector of the 51st Division, the rest of the front would be enveloped from the west; and the II Corps would be forced to withdraw to the reserve battle position near Orion. The Philippine Division, less the 57th Infantry Regiment, was now released from general reserve by General MacArthur in order to support the II Corps. General Parker ordered the division to counterattack at daylight, 17 January, to regain the original battle position in the sector of the 51st Division.

In the meantime the 41st Division, reinforced, repulsed every enemy attack on its exposed left flank. This division distinguished itself by holding its sector throughout the battle, retiring only when

orders were finally given for the withdrawal of the entire II Corps. Much of the credit devolves upon the superior leadership of the division's officers, particularly the commanding general, Brigadier General Vincente Lim, the first Filipino ever to graduate from the United States Military Academy.

On the morning of 17 January the Philippine Division attacked to the north. Although the counterattack succeeded in temporarily re-establishing the original line of defense, increased pressure on the left flank of the II Corps indicated that a strong enemy attack might be launched at any moment. The full weight of the Japanese assault was felt on 22 January; and as the left flank of the II Corps began to yield ground, it became evident that the Philippine Division could not maintain the original front of the II Corps.

While these events were transpiring in the eastern sector, an equally grave situation was developing in the western sector. Although the enemy attacks here came somewhat later than those made in the east, they met with even greater success, primarily because the I Corps was seriously weakened by the transfer of troops to the threatened II Corps.

The enemy penetration in the sector of the II Corps on 16 January caused General MacArthur to send the entire 31st Division to reinforce that part of the front. This left only the reconstituted 91st Division available for the defense of the beaches along the west coast and forced General Wainwright to stretch his other forces extremely thin.

During the night of 20–21 January the Japanese infiltrated through the lightly held eastern sector of the I Corps front; and by morning their attack had reached the Moron–Bagac road, cutting off the 1st Division. Our troops counterattacked from both north and south, but enemy reinforcements soon arrived in numbers too great to be overcome.

By 22 January the entire main battle position on Bataan had become untenable. The Japanese had broken through the defenses of both the I and II Corps; and all available reserves, including the Philippine Division, had been unable to stop them. During the night orders were issued for the withdrawal of all forces to the reserve battle position, along the general line Gagac–Orion. The retrograde movement was to commence during the night of 23–24 January and be completed by daylight on the 26th.

Under the protection of strong covering forces, including our few remaining tanks, the I and II Corps executed their withdrawal as planned. The 1st Division, which had been cut off at Mauban, was

ordered to fall back by whatever means and routes it could find. Most of its troops escaped from the trap by using difficult trails, but the artillery and many of the infantry heavy weapons had to be destroyed and abandoned. During the night of 26 January our seven remaining fighter planes on Bataan attacked the enemy airfields in the Manila area and inflicted considerable damage on grounded aircraft.

Our new line of defense, the reserve battle position, extended across the narrow waist of the peninsula from Bagac to the vicinity of Orion (**Map 14**). The front to be defended was much shorter than the Mauban–Abucay line, and no mountain barrier existed in the center to split the two corps. Mount Samat dominated the position, affording excellent observation over the greater part of the front and the eastern approaches. Except for the relatively open terrain on both flanks the Bagac–Orion line was generally covered by dense jungle through which ran only a few tortuous trails. Because the Mauban–Abucay position had collapsed sooner than anticipated, the defenses of the reserve battle position were still incomplete. The most serious disadvantage of the new position, however, was the lack of adequate lateral routes of communication. Until the trails could be measurably improved, transverse movements would have to be made via the very long coast road.

The troops who manned the new battle position across the peninsula were now seasoned veterans. The tough fighting during the retreat to Bataan and the vicious battles along the Mauban–Abucay line had provided cruel but effective training. Conditioned to jungle fighting and well versed in Japanese tactics, our soldiers now met the enemy with a skill and determination that was reflected in the mounting casualties suffered by Homma's forces.

In the reorganization that now took place the 11th Division was transferred to the I Corps, and the Philippine Division was restored to USAFFE reserve. The 45th Infantry Regiment was also shifted to the zone of the I Corps; the 31st and 57th Regiments were concentrated near Limay, in the sector of the II Corps. The Philippine Division was never again to fight as a complete unit.

Enemy landings on either side of the peninsula behind the established front had been feared for some time, since it was not likely that the Japanese would ignore the advantages inherent in their undisputed control of the sea. On 23 January, just as the withdrawal from the Mauban–Abucay line was getting under way, the enemy struck at the west coast, well in rear of our new position. One landing was made at Quinauan Point, the other at Longaska-

wayan Point. The small-unit engagements that were inaugurated by this action lasted until 13 February, a three-week struggle known as the Battle of the Points.

Initially the enemy detachments were opposed by miscellaneous troops in the vicinity of the landings. Constabulary, Air Corps personnel, sailors, and marines, all organized into provisional infantry units, prevented advances inland until two regiments from the main battle position could be transferred to the scene of the landings.

At Longaskawayan Point a battalion of the 57th Infantry Regiment cleared the area of hostile troops by the 29th. At Quinanan Point attacks by the 45th Infantry Regiment from 28 January to 7 February succeeded in driving the Japanese into the sea. Two attempts to reinforce the small beachheads were repulsed by artillery, the few remaining fighter planes, and PT boats.

One other enemy battalion landed near the mouth of the Anyasin River on 27 January. Fortunately it proceeded inland at a very leisurely pace, allowing the 45th and 57th Infantry Regiments to move troops north to relieve the improvised units that were holding the defenses west of the coast road. Counterattacks, supported by tanks, began on 30 January; and by 13 February the beachhead had been wiped out. The Battle of the Points was over, and the threat to our rear had been eliminated.

In the meantime General Homma, hoping that he had drawn troops from the main battle position by his amphibious envelopments and desiring to break through the new position before it could be strengthened, launched a strong attack on the front of the I Corps on 27 January. Following on the heels of our withdrawal from the north, the Japanese, about a regiment in strength, passed through our main line of resistance almost unnoticed and reached an area deep in rear of the weakened 1st Division. Learning of this development, General Wainwright began a series of counterattacks in what became known as the Battle of the Pockets. Owing to the stubborn resistance of the Japanese it was not until the middle of February that the pockets were finally reduced and the gap in our main line of resistance closed. The morale of the troops in the I Corps reached its peak at this time. The Battle of the Points and the Battle of the Pockets together constituted the first important defeat that had been administered to the large and aggressive Japanese force.

In support of their main attack in the west the Japanese had also brought pressure to bear on the II Corps. A small attack was launched during the night of 27–28 January, but little gain was

made. On the following night elements of three regiments attacked on the heels of a strong artillery preparation, but again the assault was repulsed. This action marked the end of the enemy's effort in the east, he being then reduced to defending his position against local counterattacks by the II Corps.

The collapse of the Japanese offensive was a severe shock to General Homma. Operations in every other theater were meeting with phenomenal success, particularly in Malaya, where Singapore had fallen on 15 February with a bag of 73,000 prisoners. And to make matters worse, Homma was now required to give up one of his divisions for the scheduled assault on Java. This reduced his effective fighting strength to such an extent that he had to suspend offensive operations for the time being.

Japanese artillery had begun to move into positions along the south shore of Manila Bay as early as 15 January in order to shell our island forts at the mouth of the harbor (**Map 11**). Counterbattery fire from the forts forced the enemy batteries to withdraw to defiladed sites in the hills around Ternate, from where they resumed firing. The bombardment became increasingly heavy, and from this time on to the final surrender our harbor-defense guns were largely neutralized.

General Homma counted on a scarcity of food to weaken the defenders of Bataan while he was waiting for reinforcements, and his hopes were realized. The food stocks for our 78,000 troops and the 26,000 civilians on Bataan dwindled steadily. By mid-February a typical daily ration for one man consisted of four ounces of rice, three ounces of meat* or fish, two ounces of canned milk, four ounces of sugar, two ounces of salt, and a share in the one can of fruit allotted to each fifty men for a week. An occasional submarine arrived at Corregidor with food, but more often the cargo consisted of much-needed drugs or ammunition.

Malnutrition led inevitably to physical wastage and increased susceptibility to disease. Even those men on a full duty status could no longer muster the energy necessary for any sustained physical effort. Vitamin deficiency caused the almost universal spread of beriberi, while every day hundreds were admitted to the hospitals suffering from the ravages of malaria, dysentery, or hookworm. The shortage of drugs was serious, making it difficult to rehabilitate the sick and diseased so that they could fight again. Convalescence was prolonged by the inadequate diet, and nerve fatigue became in-

* Principally horse, mule, or carabao.

creasingly prevalent because of the lack of rest areas away from the combat zone.

The lull was slightly broken on 4 March when our four remaining fighter planes, equipped with improvised bomb racks, carried out an attack on shipping in Subic Bay. Three Japanese cargo ships were sunk and others were damaged, but the cost was three out of the four aircraft.

On 9 March the enemy bombarded the east coast of Bataan behind our front, employing artillery mounted on armored barges. By 11 March the troops were on a one-third ration,* and offensive action by our half-starved forces was no longer practicable.

In obedience to a direct order from President Roosevelt, General MacArthur left the Philippines on the night of 11 March. He and members of his staff were taken off Corregidor and transported to Mindanao by the four remaining PT boats. From there American bombers flew the party to Australia, where MacArthur took up his duties as supreme commander of the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific. By this time the Netherlands East Indies had been overrun by the Japanese, compelling the Allies to fall back on India and Australia. The loss of Australia would deprive us of the last good base of operations in the Far East and would immeasurably strengthen Japan's grip on the entire Pacific. To withstand the threat a commander of MacArthur's caliber was badly needed.

On 12 March, General Wainwright took command of the newly constituted Luzon Force, comprising all troops on Bataan. General Jones succeeded to the command of the I Corps.

Reinforcements were continually arriving to bolster General Homma's army. Within the space of a month the Japanese commander received an additional division from China, a reinforced regiment from Indo–China, and several artillery battalions from Hong Kong and Japan. In addition, a group of forty medium bombers was shifted from Burma to Luzon in order to give increased air support to the ground operations.

General Wainwright was promoted on 21 March to the rank of lieutenant general; and in compliance with orders from the War Department he became commander of the United States Forces in the Philippines, as the command was now designated** **(Map 15)**. Major General Edward P. King, Jr., took over as commander of the Luzon Force.

*Filipino, not the normal American ration.

** The United States Forces in the Philippines operated under the over-all direction of General MacArthur.

By 23 March the increased activity of enemy aircraft and artillery presaged a new offensive. Strong ground forces were detected massing in the mountainous area opposite the center of our defensive line. The weakest point along our front was judged to be the sector guarding Mount Samat, for here the best corridors of attack existed. In this region the Japanese would benefit from excellent cover; and even a limited breakthrough might win the key terrain feature of Mount Samat, a circumstance that likely would render our line to the east untenable. So the II Corps readied itself to receive a heavy assault on its left flank, probably on or after 26 March. By this time our troops had been reduced to quarter rations, and their combat efficiency had decreased to an estimated 20 per cent.

During the night of 27–28 March the Japanese probed the defenses of the II Corps, paying particular attention to the sector on the extreme left, adjacent to the I Corps. On the following day one regiment attacked in force, and our 41st Division was hard pressed to maintain its position. During the period 30 March to 2 April the left of the II Corps was under steadily increasing pressure, the enemy artillery and air force laying down a devastating bombardment that smothered our infantry and artillery positions.

At 0800 on 3 April the heaviest Japanese artillery preparation of the campaign began to fall on the area chosen by the enemy for his main attack, the sector of our 41st Division. The shelling of the battle position continued without a break until 1500, when the enemy guns shifted their fire to rear-area targets. At that moment planes came in at low altitude to strafe our defenses, and the enemy infantry attacked almost simultaneously. The 41st Division was driven back from the main line of resistance but managed to hold its reserve position with the aid of excellent artillery support. The 21st Division refused its left flank, and one reserve regiment was quickly brought up to reinforce the badly hurt 41st Division. During the night the shelling continued unabated. At daylight large flights of low-flying enemy aircraft bombed and machine-gunned our defenses, and soon afterward a well-coordinated ground attack was launched through the gap that had been created the previous day. By 0900 the 41st Division had almost completely disintegrated, and the main enemy attack shifted to the left flank of the 21st Division. General Wainwright dispatched all available reserves to the II Corps, and plans were made to counterattack on both sides of Mount Samat the following day.

On 5 April the Japanese continued to attack toward the southeast, employing a large number of tanks. The 21st Division gave way in complete disorder and soon ceased to exist as a fighting unit.

Shortly after daybreak the 31st Infantry Regiment, the 45th Infantry Regiment, and one regiment of the 31st Division counterattacked northward with the objective of restoring the main battle position in the breakthrough area. The 45th Infantry gained a few hundred yards; but the remaining forces collided head on with an enemy attack to the south and were forced to withdraw, leaving the 45th in danger of being cut off. This unit was extricated with considerable difficulty as the entire left flank of the II Corps gradually fell back toward the line of the San Vicente River. By the afternoon of 6 April our main forces were holding the east bank. Straggling was excessive and increasing hourly.

The relentless pressure continued on 7 April, and it was impossible for the II Corps to maintain its left flank. Strong Japanese forces drove south from Mount Samat while other units smashed directly at our exposed flank. The I Corps, now vulnerable to attack from the east, was ordered to withdraw to the Binuangan River. By dark all reserves on Bataan had been committed, and the II Corps was vainly attempting to hold along the Mamala River. During the night remnants of the II Corps fell back to the Alangan River, but by midafternoon on 8 April this position too had been enveloped. About 1,400 survivors took up a position along the Lamao River; but when it was enveloped late that night, organized resistance by the II Corps was no longer possible. The corps had completely disintegrated. The counterattacks that had been attempted by the I Corps in the meantime had failed entirely.

During the night of 8–9 April, American nurses and a few troops were evacuated from Bataan to Corregidor by means of barges and small boats. It had been planned to withdraw the entire 45th Infantry Regiment, but it could not be extricated in time from its position along the northern front of the I Corps.

The enemy air and artillery bombardment of our helpless troops had continued relentlessly. The annihilation of the II Corps had completely exposed our rear-area installations; and now the sick and wounded, as well as the civilian refugees, were squarely in the path of the advancing Japanese infantry. Of our 78,000 troops on Bataan almost 24,000 were in hospitals or convalescent areas.

Acting on instructions from General MacArthur, Wainwright had ordered the Luzon Force to continue its fight; but the unbearable conditions on Bataan made it impossible to do so. Late on the 8th General King came to the conclusion that the Luzon Force was no longer capable of inflicting damage on the enemy; and in order to prevent the ruthless massacre of the helpless troops he, on his

own responsibility, made the difficult decision to surrender. The destruction of all ammunition and major items of military equipment was ordered completed by 0600 on 9 April, at which time a flag of truce was sent forward to the Japanese.

General Homma insisted upon unconditional surrender and was furious when he learned that General King spoke only for the forces on Bataan. While our guns on Corregidor held their fire to avoid shelling them, the long Death March to the north began for the prisoners of war. It is known that on 10 May about 45,000 Filipino soldiers and 9,300 Americans were imprisoned at Camp O'Donnell, in central Luzon. The remainder of the Bataan troops, including some 950 Americans, had perished in the last fighting or during the Death March and subsequent incarceration at O'Donnell. A handful had escaped to the hills to carry on as guerillas.

Corregidor was the key bastion in the chain of island forts that stretched across the ten-mile entrance to Manila Bay. Shaped like a tadpole, the island is four miles long and about 1½ miles wide at its broadest point. The blunt head of Corregidor rises precipitously from the sea to an elevation of more than 600 feet, and here at the highest point is the only large flat area on the island. A deep saddle between the head and Malinta Hill forms the neck of the tadpole, and a low hogback extends eastward from Malinta Hill to form the vertebrae of a curved and slender tail. The most suitable landing places are found at the foot of James and Cheney Ravines on the head of the island, in the low region around North Dock, and along the north side of the tail, where narrow beaches afford a means of entrance to small ravines leading inland.

Corregidor's armament comprised eight 12-inch guns, twelve 12-inch mortars, two 10-inch guns, five 6-inch guns, twenty 155-mm. guns, and assorted weapons of lesser caliber, including antiaircraft guns. The fixed-gun emplacements, located on the head of the island, were open concrete pits, and therefore vulnerable to attack by air or plunging fire from Mariveles. Malinta Hill, a cone-shaped rock mass that contained a labyrinth of tunnels, was valuable for the shelter it offered. In the various laterals were housed General Wainwright's headquarters, a hospital, food and ammunition stocks, and other necessary facilities. Kindley Field, a short and narrow emergency landing strip, was of no importance during the siege. Beach defenses had been prepared wherever the shoreline presented a possible landing site, and alternative positions for the tractor-drawn 155-mm. guns had been located in almost every part of the island.

Once Bataan had been captured, the enemy lost no time in moving his artillery forward to positions from which Corregidor could be taken under fire. While the heavy guns on the south side of Manila Bay continued to bombard the island forts, the artillery at Mariveles opened up with such strong concentrations of fire against Corregidor that by 14 April it had succeeded in destroying most of the fixed guns on the head of the island. Enemy aircraft supplemented the shelling with incessant bombing attacks that contributed impressively to the destruction of both matériel and morale. As long as our guns could be kept in operating condition, they engaged in counterbattery fire against definitely located enemy targets. The turreted battery of four 14-inch guns on Fort Drum was particularly valuable. On 17 April an attack on Nichols Field was carried out by a flight of three Flying Fortresses, part of a squadron of thirteen assorted bombers that had been dispatched to Mindanao from Australia in order to give air cover for convoys attempting to reach Corregidor. This small raid gave evidence of the American will to strike offensively whenever possible and indicated the far-reaching potentialities of long-range bombardment aircraft.

An American officer who was stationed on Corregidor during the entire siege later prepared a descriptive report covering the last days of the beleaguered fortress. Extracts from this report are given below:*

> About 3 April, when the situation on Bataan began to appear serious, units were directed to lay in a reserve supply of water. Twelve-inch powder cans were used for this purpose. All units were supplied with food to be kept at battery positions. It was felt that the enemy would concentrate his fire on roads, power plants, water tanks, and the pumping plant. Staple food supplies on hand were sufficient to feed the harbor defenses until 30 June 1942, allowing forty ounces per ration, with an eighty-ounce ration for 1,500 hospital patients. Gasoline would last until August, Diesel fuel until 30 June.
>
> The outlying forts had normally been supplied with water by barge from Bataan. At this time the barge could be filled only at the north mine dock on Corregidor; the barge was then towed around Monkey Point (at the east end of the island) and to the forts. The water situation at the outlying forts became critical when damage to the outlet pipe at the dock and a hit on the water barge stopped the shipment of water. Reservoir reserves totaled three million gallons of water on Corregidor on 10 April 1942. Enemy shelling caused numerous leaks, which, with normal consumption, reduced the reserve of water to a three-day supply on 6 May, the day of sur-

* From the 15 November 1943 issue of *Military Reports*, a publication of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

render. The pumping plant was able to pump only one day during April. Either the pumping plant, the power line leading to it, or the power itself was out of commission at various times. All three elements were on the north shore of the island, facing Bataan.

All 155-mm. guns were ordered out of exposed positions and were distributed in one-gun units in defiladed positions on the island. These guns would normally have time to fire twenty salvos before being blanketed by mass artillery from Bataan. A gun was moved whenever enemy fire began to bracket its position. Telephone communication was always cut after the initial shelling, prior to 1000 each day. Communication sections would repair the lines by midnight, and by 1000 the following day the lines would be cut again.

Trucks and automobiles rapidly disappeared. Ordnance repairmen were working day and night. It is not an exaggeration to say that but for the trained ordnance personnel Corregidor's fire power would have become nonexistent long before this time.

Severe enemy shelling continued from 14 April, increasing daily. When the north-shore batteries were neutralized, the enemy put up an observation balloon and adjusted fire on the interior and south-shore batteries. Counterbattery fire from the batteries on Corregidor was a hit-and-run affair. After they had located a target and laid down a barrage, the enemy promptly blanketed the entire area surrounding the firing batteries. The roving one-gun units would move to new positions when the enemy barrage lifted and repeat the process. Coordinated fire, with stand-by batteries to harass enemy counterbattery positions, was tried. The limited matériel available was promptly silenced by enemy fire. The enemy apparently had allocated several batteries to each of the fixed installations, and at the first sign of fire from them he laid down an accurately adjusted barrage.

The most effective counterbattery units were the 12-inch mortars, which used instantaneous-fuze, 670-pound antipersonnel shells. The enemy finally located these batteries, concentrated his 240-mm. howitzers on them, and by constant shelling succeeded in reducing one battery from four guns to two. At another battery the 240-mm. shells literally cut through the magazine section separating the two mortar pits. The battery commander was aware of the danger and attempted to empty the magazines. Time was too short, however, and the magazine was blown up; the ten-ton mortars were found later 100 yards away from their home station.

Fire from the 14-inch guns at Fort Frank was sporadic, since enemy artillery on Cavite* blanketed the open disappearing-carriage batteries. The same situation held at Fort Hughes. The 14-inch turrets at Fort Drum kept up a continuous fire on Bataan. They were still firing five minutes prior to the surrender. The value of the turret guns can be appreciated when it is realized that, at one time or another, all guns on the fortified islands were rendered inoperative, with the sole exception of the 14-inch turrets on Fort Drum. In one day Fort Drum received over 1,000 direct hits on its

* Near Ternate, in the Province of Cavite.

deck. Over fifteen feet of this reinforced concrete deck was whittled away by the time of the final surrender, but this fort suffered few casualties and did excellent work.

Enemy bombing continued in conjunction with the shelling. At times only one height finder was in working condition among the five AA batteries. Interbattery telephones, however, kept all units informed of the altitude. AA batteries were harassed by enemy artillery during bombing raids. The raids increased to such frequency that the "all clear" was seldom heard.

About 1 May enemy artillery fire was intensified, and certain sections of the island were hit more heavily than others. The James Ravine area and the part of the island east of Malinta Hill were hit with more shells than were needed for counterbattery work. That distribution of fire was the first hint of impending landing operations. The firing continued in intensity from dawn until midnight. On 4 May it was estimated that over 16,000 shells hit Corregidor in twenty-four hours. Lack of telephone communication seriously hampered the gathering and dissemination of information. On 5 May the bombardment became intense all over the island. Enemy boat concentrations at Cabcaben were taken under fire by all guns. The 14-inch guns of Fort Drum and Fort Frank (barely within range) were kept quite busy and caused considerable damage to the enemy.

By this time it was evident that surrender was just a question of time. The number of wounded had taken a rapid rise in April. Three additional laterals in Malinta Tunnel were evacuated and turned over to the hospital. Guns were being damaged and destroyed more rapidly than the ordnance could repair them. Beach defense positions were being whittled away daily. The topography itself was being altered. The north-shore road north of Malinta Hill was literally blown into the bay. Battery commanders were reporting an increasing number of shell-shock cases daily. They could not be hospitalized. Kitchen installations, necessarily out in the open, were being blasted. Water pipes had been punctured to such an extent that, to avoid the loss of all water, only a limited number of outlets were made available; this meant water distributing points. With the enemy fire from the Cavite shore increasing in intensity, there were no safe roads to be used. The heavy shelling made it necessary to have breakfast at 0400 and the second meal of the day about 2200. Beach-defense 75-mm. guns were kept out of action so as not to disclose their positions until a hostile landing was attempted.

In April 1941 numerous machine-gun positions were constructed out of sandbags and salvaged lumber. No funds were available for the construction of reinforced concrete pillboxes. All approaches to the island had been covered with barbed-wire entanglements prior to the war. At the outbreak of the war all units began to improve the field fortifications. By the end of the campaign all machine-gun positions had been splinterproofed. During March the beach defenses had been further strengthened by the placing of

land mines in the dock areas. These mines were wired, but prior to the surrender practically all the mines were blown up by enemy artillery. At the entrances to James and Cheney Ravines sliding shutes were prepared in order to drop thirty-pound fragmentation bombs on the beaches.

On 4 May the Executive for Beach Defense reported extensive damage to beach-defense installations, particularly searchlights; this was due to the positions literally being blasted out. The light sandbagged positions were extremely vulnerable to 150-mm. shells. Severe enemy shelling continued throughout the day and night of 4 and 5 May. At 2100 on 5 May it became evident from the volume of shelling in the Kindley Field area that a landing would soon be attempted. Enemy boat activity in the Cabcaben area on previous days indicated the point of departure. Orders were issued to all batteries which were able to reach Cabcaben to shell that dock area. All units were alerted for beach defense.

About 2200, reports from the beach defense CP indicated barges approaching the tail of the island from Cabcaben. The 75-mm. and 37-mm. guns, which had not been used until this time, took the barges under fire at ranges seldom in excess of 300 yards. Beach defense officers at the scene reported that the slaughter of the Japanese in their barges was sickening. Searchlights on Corregidor were being knocked out as rapidly as they went into action. The 14-inch guns at Fort Hughes, Fort Frank, and Fort Drum were concentrated on the Cabcaben dock area. The smaller guns took the barges. Numerous landings were reported between Infantry Point and Cavalry Point. The beach defense units were in position and promptly limited the advance to not more than fifty yards inland.

By 0300, 6 May, the situation was under control, with the Japs pinned to the ground at the beach. In order to accomplish this, however, it had been necessary to throw in the last of the beach-defense reserves. Intense shelling of the island continued throughout the night. It was extremely heavy in the dock area, which looked like a Fourth of July celebration all night long. Reserves from the main part of the island, crossing the fire-swept dock area to reinforce the troops resisting at the beachhead, suffered heavy casualties.

At dawn another flotilla of barges began to approach the north dock area. Two 155-mm. guns, which had not been used up to this time, took the barges under fire. About half of these barges were sunk, and the rest turned around and headed for Mariveles Harbor. The enemy had landed three tanks during the night. At 1000 on 6 May the situation was unchanged, with the Japs pinned to the ground, and with all U. S. reserves committed in the area. Severe shelling continued over the main part of the island. All units were then instructed to destroy their guns and were informed that Corregidor would surrender at noon that day.

Desirous of ending hostilities before nightfall—since the enemy might by then be among the sick and wounded in Malinta Tunnel—General Wainwright on the afternoon of 6 May proceeded to Cab-

caben, on Bataan, in order to discuss terms with General Homma. The latter insisted that all forces in the Philippines be surrendered unconditionally. When Wainwright offered to surrender only the garrisons of the island forts, Homma left the meeting in anger; and the negotiations broke down completely. The American commander was permitted to return to Corregidor, where in the meantime the Japanese had been pressing their attack without pause. At midnight on 6 May, General Wainwright tendered to the senior Japanese officer on the island the formal surrender of all troops in the Philippines. The situation was such that the American commander had no other choice.

The cost to the enemy of the assault on Corregidor was approximately 4,000 casualties. In view of the heavy and sustained bombardment to which the island had been subjected the Japanese were surprised to encounter such strong resistance. Our own casualties during the last few days were about 2,000. The 11,500 surviving troops were disarmed by the enemy and became prisoners of war, remaining where captured until 28 May, when they were evacuated to a prison stockade in Manila.

Visayas–Mindanao (Map 16).—The concurrent operations that took place on the other islands of the Philippine Archipelago were small in scope and had little direct influence on the outcome of the Luzon campaign. The initial Japanese strategy was to seize bases for the support of the forthcoming invasion of the Netherlands East Indies. In general the enemy forces committed were content to hold the most important points on the major islands, leaving the interior areas to be mopped up at a later date.

The Japanese air offensive on 8 December 1941 included a raid on Davao. Executed by planes from two small aircraft carriers, the attack inflicted considerable damage on the few military targets available. Two of our long-range naval patrol bombers were destroyed on the water, but a lone destroyer slipped away unharmed.

South of Luzon our troops in the Philippines were organized as the Visayan–Mindanao Force, commanded by Colonel William F. Sharp. Assigned units included the 61st, 81st, and 101st Divisions, the 43d Infantry Regiment, a regiment of Constabulary troops, and one regiment each from the 1st, 71st, and 91st Divisions. The latter three regiments had been intended for use on Luzon, but the sudden outbreak of hostilities prevented the scheduled transfer. Part of the 81st Division was on Cebu, the bulk of the 61st held Panay, and most of the remaining forces were assigned the defense of Mindanao. Colonel Sharp had practically no artillery available.

On 20 December the Japanese landed a reinforced infantry regiment at Davao, elements of our 101st Division being too weak to offer more than light opposition before withdrawing to the north. With the aid of the many Japanese civilians living in and about the city the enemy troops had no difficulty in establishing a firm perimeter defense around Davao and the adjacent airfield.

Nine of our Flying Fortresses from Darwin raided enemy shipping at Davao on 22 December and then flew on to land at Del Monte Airfield. On 24 December a group of three heavy bombers struck Davao again. Because of inclement weather the results of these raids could not be observed.

A small enemy force occupied the island of Jolo on 25 December and immediately began to construct a large air base there. Six of our naval patrol bombers, now operating from Amboina in the Netherlands Indies, attempted a raid against enemy shipping at Jolo on 27 December but were driven off with the loss of four aircraft by swarms of enemy fighters.

On 31 December the Japanese established another beachhead on Mindanao—at Diges. By the first week in January they had prepared excellent advance bases at both Davao and Jolo for their contemplated invasion of the eastern part of the Netherlands Indies. The reorganized Third Fleet arrived during this period, and additional aircraft moved south from Formosa to supply the necessary air support.

Meanwhile our heavy bombers had begun to operate from advance bases in the Netherlands Indies with the mission of impeding the anticipated drive south by the enemy from the southern Philippines. On 4 January eight Fortresses executed a vigorous attack on Davao, damaging an enemy cruiser and one destroyer. Another raid was made on 9 January by nine heavy bombers, but it was ineffective because of poor visibility.

While General Sharp * employed his weak forces in guerrilla activity against the Japanese, every effort was made to keep open and strengthen the air route to Luzon. By 1 April some twenty-one landing fields had been built on Mindanao; but although the airfields were available, the planes were not. The demands of the campaign in the Netherlands Indies for the few planes we had, and the requirements for the defense of Australia, did not permit the dispatch of aircraft as far north as the Philippines except for an occasional raid. One result of our lack of air power was that such cargo

* Promoted to brigadier general on 18 December 1941 and to major general on 2 April 1942.

ships as succeeded in running the enemy blockade and reaching Cebu were unable to proceed north to Luzon. The necessary air cover could not be provided for them.

When General Homma realized that the capture of Bataan was not enough to force the surrender of the entire Philippines, he acted quickly to crush all remaining resistance on the other islands. Troops borrowed from Borneo landed on the east coast of Cebu on 10 April and rapidly occupied the important sections of the island. Several of our blockade runners had to be burned to prevent their falling into enemy hands, and the sea route of reinforcement to Corregidor was now definitely severed. On 11 April a composite group of three heavy and ten medium bombers arrived at Mindanao from Australia, sent for the purpose of providing air cover in a daring attempt to run supplies into Corregidor from Cebu by sea. Too late for this project, our aircraft instead bombed Cebu, Davao, and Nichols Field during the following two days.

On 18 April enemy forces made two landings on Panay, forcing our troops to withdraw to the hills. General Homma dispatched two surplus regiments from Luzon to reinforce his troops on Mindanao, and part of this fresh body effected a new landing near Cotabato on 29 April. The remainder came ashore at Cagayan on 2 May. General Sharp's forces, only partially trained and fighting without artillery, again could offer little effective resistance to the enemy assaults.

By now in secure possession of Cebu and Panay, the Japanese opened an offensive on all fronts for the purpose of overrunning Mindanao. Our troops executed delaying action and fell back toward the central plateau of the island. General Wainwright, fearing for the lives of the troops already surrendered, sent couriers to the various island commanders in the south with instructions to capitulate in accordance with the agreement reached at Corregidor. General Sharp acceded to these orders and surrendered his forces on Mindanao on 14 May. Three days later Brigadier General Bradford G. Chynoweth surrendered the troops on Cebu and Panay.

Comments.—The first Philippine campaign began on 8 December 1941 and ended with the fall of Corregidor on 6 May 1942, although informal guerrilla activity persisted until our return to the Philippines in 1944. The skill and determination of our isolated forces held the enemy at bay for five long months and compelled a much larger expenditure of Japanese arms and man power than had been expected.

The planning of the campaign by the Imperial General Headquarters was based upon excellent intelligence and could scarcely have been improved upon in its initial concept. The forces made available were ample to insure superiority in all arms if properly employed, while the selected commander, General Homma, enjoyed the reputation of being one of the finest troop leaders in the entire Japanese Army. The basic miscalculation by the enemy was in the degree of resistance that might be expected from the native Filipinos. It was the considered opinion of the Japanese High Command that the Philippine Army would collapse after a token resistance, leaving the relatively few American troops to carry on the defense as best they could. Nothing could have been farther from the fact, as shortly became evident to General Homma.

The annihilation of the American air force in the Philippines was both a primary objective of the Japanese campaign and the key operation for insuring its success. Land-based naval aircraft from Formosa executed this difficult task with remarkable ease and efficiency. The bulk of our air force was either wiped out or forced to withdraw during the first week of the war, at a cost to the enemy of only thirty planes shot down. The loss of so many of our heavy bombers at Clark Field on the first day has long been a subject of controversy. A reasonable conclusion is that our forces were handicapped by their lack of battle experience and by the generally inadequate facilities on the ground for the support, maintenance, and protection of heavy bombardment aircraft.

Once the enemy had gained control of the air over Luzon, it became obvious that our small Asiatic Fleet could no longer operate from Manila Bay. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* off Malaya had weakened Allied naval power in the Pacific to such an extent that our warships in Philippine waters had no choice except to withdraw to the shelter of the Netherlands East Indies.

With the battlefield thus isolated, the enemy had every opportunity for quick success on Luzon. The pincers attack on Manila was well-conceived, but the efficient execution of the planned withdrawal to Bataan thwarted the overconfident Japanese. Internal security was maintained by the loyal Philippine Government with the cooperation of nearly all the native population. Notwithstanding the few untrained units that broke and fled when first engaged in combat, the greater part of the Philippine Army forces offered a valiant resistance to the Japanese, dashing their hopes of encountering only token opposition.

General MacArthur's excellent timing and tight control of his troops made the withdrawal to Bataan possible. The successive blunders of his opposite number, General Homma, made it an unqualified success. In addition to underrating the caliber of the defenders, Homma failed to push forward aggressively; and he overlooked entirely the potential value of an early landing on the Bataan Peninsula.

The Mauban–Abucay line was not as strong tactically as the shorter line across the waist of the peninsula from Bagac to Orion. However, its selection as the main battle position did confer certain. advantages. The surfaced road from Bagac to Pilar provided a good route of lateral communication; the area behind the front was deep enough to afford security for our reserves and rear installations; and when the time came, it would be feasible to prolong the defense by falling back to the reserve position.

The Filipino troops who fought on Bataan won unforgetable distinction. Time and again the Philippine Scout units proved that they were more than a match for the best in the Japanese Army. Beyond all expectation the poorly equipped and half-trained soldiers of the Philippine Army reserve divisions, such as the 41st and 21st, fought the enemy to a standstill and showed their aggressive spirit by counterattacking successfully. A small nucleus of American officers provided inspiring leadership for these Filipino units, while the 31st Infantry Regiment and other all-American formations lived up to the finest traditions of the service.

The artillery played an especially important role in the defense of both Bataan and Corregidor. Functioning under extreme difficulties and against overpowering odds, our few guns inflicted heavy damage on the enemy and did much to stave off final defeat. But for the obsolescence of our emplacements on Corregidor the heavy artillery located there might have made the Japanese assault even more costly.

The ultimate defeat of our forces on Bataan and Corregidor was largely the result of continuous attrition without replenishment. Starvation, disease, and sheer physical exhaustion reduced the combat efficiency of our troops almost to the vanishing point. The tremendous number of civilian refugees caused an unforeseen drain on available supplies, but there was no humanitarian alternative to caring for them. Without air power to cover the long line of reinforcement and supply from Australia little could be done to send help to Luzon. The few attempts that were made by blockade runners were unsuccessful.

The fall of Corregidor on 6 May marked the end of the first phase of operations as planned by the enemy. Every campaign in this offensive phase had been fought to a successful conclusion. From their new bases overlooking India, Australia, and the many islands of the South and Central Pacific the Japanese eyed the new fields of conquest that seemed to beckon. As we shall see later, the temptation was too strong to be resisted.

FIRST BURMA CAMPAIGN

The initial Japanese operations against Burma were designed to support the right flank of the two-pronged main drive toward the heart of the Southern Resources Area. It was considered especially important that the Twenty-fifth Army, while campaigning in Malaya, be adequately safeguarded against a possible British offensive launched from Burma. For this reason the Fifteenth Army was assigned the mission of stabilizing Thailand and then moving into southern Burma for the purpose of securing Moulmein and blocking the overland route to Malaya. For this phase of the invasion of Burma the Fifteenth Army was given two divisions.

The Japanese strategic plan called for the invasion of Burma in force upon the successful completion of the Malayan campaign. Two additional divisions would be made available to the Fifteenth Army for this purpose. If victorious in Burma as well as in the Indies, the enemy would then have completed his occupation of the Southern Resources Area and would have established the defensive perimeter that was to be consolidated and strengthened during the second phase of the war. The immediate objectives of the attack on Burma were, of course, the destruction of the British forces there and the cutting of the Burma Road, China's main artery of supply from the outside world **(Map 17)**.

A British possession since 1886, Burma provides a natural strategic shield for India. The country is shaped like a hand, the greater portion of which is an extension of the mountain mass of central Asia. As the hand divides into fingers, so do the mountains split up into ranges that stretch southward to the Indian Ocean. Between them are the valleys through which run the Chindwin, Irrawaddy, and Salween Rivers.

The military significance of Burma lies in the fact that it is a barrier rather than a corridor, effectively blocking normal intercourse between India, Thailand, and southern China. The Himalayas seal off the north, while the mountain ranges that extend down the length of the country form successive ramparts against assault from either the east or west.

The heartland of Burma is the long central area drained by the great Irrawaddy River system. The valley and delta of this mighty watercourse form a vast field from which in normal years 7,000,000 tons of rice are harvested. Important oil fields are located on the banks of the Irrawaddy near Magwe, while along the Salween River, farther east, are found the mines that make Burma the largest single source of wolfram in the world.

Communications in Burma are generally confined to the inner basin. The only railroad and most of the surfaced roads extend in a north-south direction through the central valley. East-west communication facilities of any kind are limited and difficult.

In December 1941 a proposed overland route to India was still in the planning stage. The Burma Road was the only connecting link with China, and communications to Thailand were limited to a few jungle trails over the mountains. The compartmentation of Burma was a valuable safeguard against invasion, but it also had the less advantageous result of making the country utterly dependent upon the port of Rangoon for supply from the outside world. Utilization of the sea lanes was, of course, subject to naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean; but this presented no problem as long as Singapore stood to protect the eastern gateway.

The entire country has a tropical climate, with three distinct seasonal changes. The rainy or monsoon season begins about the middle of May and usually ends in late September. The dry or cool season follows, succeeded in turn by the hot premonsoon season, which usually begins early in March. The extensive jungles of Burma pose the same problems of sanitation, water supply, disease, and poisonous insects that are encountered in Malaya.

At the outbreak of war the British forces in Burma comprised only the 1st Burma Division and one additional Indian brigade, supported by an air force of sixteen obsolete fighter planes. The greater part of the troops had been raised in Burma, mainly from the hill tribes along the northern frontier. Many units were only partially trained, and there existed a serious shortage of artillery. Airfields at Akyab, Lashio, Myitkyina, Magwe, Rangoon, Moulmein, and down through Tenasserim provided a continuous air route for ferrying planes from India to either China or Malaya (**Map 16**).

When hostilities began on 8 December, the British Far Eastern Command, under Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham, felt certain that Burma would not be assailed by the enemy until Malaya had been disposed of. For this reason the plan to reinforce the Burma garrison with troops and aircraft was modified so that most of the

new units would go to Singapore instead. Major General D. K. McLeod, who commanded the forces in Burma, was assigned the twofold mission of protecting the Burma Road and retaining possession of the Tenasserim airfields, which were vital to the reinforcement of Singapore by air ferry. General McLeod disposed his forces with one brigade in Tenasserim, two brigades along the border southeast of Taungyi, and one brigade in and around Rangoon.

The first offensive action against Burma came on 11 December when Japanese planes, operating from their newly acquired bases in Thailand, struck at Tavoy airfield in Tenasserim. The next day Japanese ground troops crossed into Tenasserim from Chumpon and began an unopposed advance to the north which came to a halt at a strong British position south of Mergui after it had covered one hundred miles in a week.

On 23 December, Rangoon suffered its first of a series of air attacks. Though these caused but little damage to installations, they resulted in an exodus of native laborers to the hills. The flight of these workers brought about the complete paralysis of the port.

General Wavell, to whose command Burma had been transferred on 15 December, visited Chungking late in the month to confer with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on measures to be taken for the joint defense of the Burma Road. An agreement was reached whereby sizeable Chinese forces would be sent to Burma as soon as feasible. Soon afterward Wavell flew to Java, where new duties and the increasingly critical situation required his full attention. On 27 December, Lieutenant General T. J. Hutton replaced General McLeod as commander of all forces in Burma; on 5 March, Lieutenant General Harold R. Alexander succeeded General Hutton.

By mid-January the Japanese were ready to begin their invasion of Burma. Their plan provided for a converging drive on Moulmein by two divisions, one moving across the mountains from Mesod while the other drove to the north from Tavoy.

Forced back by steady enemy pressure on the ground and harried by air attack, the one British division in the area dropped back to the line of the Salween River, which it was hoped could be held for a considerable time **(Map 17)**. But the Japanese, encouraged by their victories to date, decided upon an early crossing of the Salween. While one division launched a secondary attack in the Moulmein area, another moved to the north, where it forced a crossing at Paan in early February. The defenders, thus threatened with isolation in the Martaban salient, hastily withdrew to Bilin, where the Japanese again enveloped their exposed north flank.

The operations now took the form of a contest for the bridge over the Sittang River. While the British division evacuating Bilin was slowed down by a direct pressure force of one enemy division, the other enemy division raced for the bridge, where a small British force had established a bridgehead in anticipation of the arrival of their comrades. When, on 23 February, Japanese troops reached the bridgehead, the retreating British division was still many miles away. Its guardians having no other choice, the span was blown, thus cutting the line of retreat of two brigades.

Despite the arrival of an armored brigade the British were now too weak to guard adequately the west bank of the Sittang. The costly sacrifice at the Sittang bridge had, however, delayed the enemy long enough for the destruction of the military stores at Rangoon and the evacuation of all remaining troops to the north.

There now existed no British line of communication, since there were no roads from India over which supplies could be brought. Logistical difficulties became insurmountable. By contrast, the Japanese were able to bring in supplies and reinforcements at will through the captured port. The new mission of the British Forces in Burma—and the only feasible one—was to delay the enemy and consume the effort of troops that might otherwise be employed elsewhere. The Chinese Fifth and Sixth Armies had already entered Burma in order to defend the Burma Road; and the British hoped that with this assistance the immediate threat to India might be postponed until the arrival of the monsoon, when large-scale offensive operations would have to cease.

From the beginning of the Burma campaign Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had shown a willingness to assist in the defense. The prime concern of the Chinese, of course, was that the flow of lend-lease supplies be continued over the Burma Road without interruption from the enemy. Major General Joseph W. Stilwell, United States Army, had been sent to China in early 1942 to serve as chief of staff to the Generalissimo. When plans were made for the formation and movement to Burma of the Chinese Expeditionary Force, Stilwell was appointed by Chiang to be the force commander. General Lo Cho Ying, the Chinese commander in chief, functioned as Stilwell's deputy.

By March the Chinese Sixth Army had taken over the defense of northeastern Burma. The Chinese Fifth Army followed the Sixth into Burma, and by 19 March the leading division had taken over the defense of Toungoo from the British. The Fifth Army, partially mechanized, was one of the best equipped and most aggressive for-

mations of the entire Chinese Army. Unfortunately the Sixth Army was much inferior. Despite its numerical superiority an average Chinese army was no more than the combat equivalent of a British division. In actual fire power a Chinese division was about equal to a British brigade. In the expeditionary force there was little artillery, a serious shortage of ammunition, and very few motor vehicles.

On 14 March, General Stilwell arrived in Lashio; and soon afterward plans were drawn up with the British for a coordinated defense of the general line Prome–Toungoo. Meanwhile General Brereton had been transferred from Java to India with the mission of organizing the new Tenth Air Force for operations in the China–Burma–India area. On 12 March 3,800 United States Army Air Forces personnel had debarked at Karachi, on the west coast of India. They were the vanguard of a total force of 10,000. The construction of airfields in Assam and Bengal was commenced at once, and Brereton informed General Stilwell that he would be able to lend effective air support to ground operations on or about 1 May. To coordinate the movement of supplies from the United States to China, Major General Raymond A. Wheeler, United States Army, was sent to India to serve as commander of the Service of Supply.

By 21 March the Japanese were exerting strong pressure on the single Chinese division in the Toungoo area. Enveloping the west flank of the Chinese force, the enemy soon succeeded in completely surrounding it. Although General Stilwell was able to extricate the encircled troops by an attack from the north, the situation was such that it was decided to withdraw.

Japanese aircraft now ruled supreme in the air. Under the intensive raids Allied morale slumped perceptibly, and the rear-area services began to disintegrate. To add to the difficulties of the situation Burmese hostility to the British began to show substantial military results. Many native troops deserted their units; sabotage became rife; espionage could not be controlled; and nearly all semblance of civil government disappeared.

By 8 April the British in Burma had established a defensive line south of Magwe. The Chinese Fifth Army occupied a position across the road to Mandalay, and the Sixth Army held Loikaw. Penetrating through a gap between the British and the Fifth Army, the Japanese swung to the west to block the retreat of the British rear guard.

Meanwhile the enemy had moved strong naval forces into the Bay of Bengal and by early April had secured naval supremacy in

this area. Two fresh infantry divisions were landed at Rangoon and moved to the north.

Now, while General Alexander was striving to extricate his rear guard, the reinforced Japanese struck the Chinese Sixth Army in front of Loikaw. Under the force of the heavy blows that army simply melted away.

At this juncture the central sector of the Allied defense became the major concern. The heavy losses of the British near Magwe had weakened the west flank, and the collapse of the east flank at Loikaw threatened the entire Allied position south of the Irrawaddy. Should Mandalay, site of the only bridge across the unfordable Irrawaddy River, be reached first by a Japanese enveloping force, the British and Chinese troops south of the river would be hopelessly trapped. So General Alexander dispatched the remaining elements of the 17th Indian Division and the 7th Armored Brigade to Thazi to strengthen the defense of the Fifth Chinese Army.

On 29 April the enemy captured Lashio, cutting the Burma Road and effectively isolating the Allied troops in Burma from any further reinforcement from China. Japanese troops began to move from Lashio on Mandalay while other elements advanced north along the open road to Bhamo.

By midnight on 30 April all Allied forces south of the Irrawaddy had crossed the bridge at Mandalay, and the span was demolished. The only course of action now left to the Allies was to attempt to save the remainder of their troops. The British elected to retreat into India by way of Kalewa; and, after nearly being cut off, some 12,000 survivors crossed the Chindwin River on 11 May.

General Stilwell, with a small party, left Burma by way of Indaw and followed jungle trails across the Chin Hills to Imphal. Some Chinese troops also followed this route; others escaped to India by way of the Hukawng Valley, in the far north.

Comments.—The British Empire ground forces employed in Burma consisted of 20,000 Indian troops, 7,000 British regulars, and possibly 15,000 fairly effective Burmese.* In addition, 95,000 Chinese troops entered Burma and participated in the final stages of the campaign. The over-all Allied ground strength was numerically equal to that of the enemy, but by virtue of their excellent training, equipment, and tactics the Japanese had little difficulty in establishing combat superiority. In contrast with other theaters the enemy's supremacy in the air was not made effective until late in the cam-

* Some Burmese troops fought with distinction, particularly those recruited from the northern hill tribes.

paign, when the raid on Magwe Airfield (22 March) definitely tipped the scales. The cost of Burma to the Japanese was 7,000 men killed and 102 planes destroyed.

The British committed many tactical errors in Burma. On the eve of invasion they were badly dispersed; they underestimated Japanese mobility over the hills and in the jungles; and, as in Malaya, they let their forces become too involved with the enemy while conducting delaying actions, thus slowing their retreat and permitting the Japanese to envelop time and again.

The end of the campaign in Burma found the British and the Chinese in poor accord. The British felt that they had been let down by Chiang's troops. The Chinese were surprised to find their allies in Burma so weak, particularly in the air. The feeling grew among the Chinese that they were being used to bear the brunt of the fighting. In any case, it was evident that Chinese troops would have to be properly fed, trained, equipped, led, and disciplined in order to become effective fighting units. In recognition of this need General Stilwell began the remolding of his Chinese divisions at Ramgarh, in India, where a large training center was set up.

Although the campaign in Burma was a major disaster for the Allies, one important strategic success was achieved. The enemy was forced to wage an extended campaign that was not completed until the start of the rainy season, which could be counted upon to delay an invasion of India until the following year, when adequate defenses would be ready.

CONQUEST OF THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES (Map 18)

In their sweeping offensive designed to overrun the Southern Resources Area the Japanese contemplated the ultimate acquisition of the richest part of that region, the Netherlands East Indies. But the conquest of this rich prize had to await the end of the campaigns in Malaya and the Philippines, not only because of the need for bases but also because the fate of the Indies would be largely decided by the degree of success attained against British sea power at Singapore and American air power on Luzon, the two principal bulwarks of Allied dominion in the Far East.

The East Indies comprise thousands of variegated islands, fortuitously associated in a tightly integrated chain that extends for almost 3,500 miles along the east-west axis. Geographically the Indies influence the strategy of war in the Far East in two dissimilar ways. From the standpoint of land power the islands form a span connecting the continents of Asia and Australia. They are

convenient steppingstones to the south, either by way of Malaya in the east or through Formosa and the Philippines in the west. At the same time they control the seas between the two continents by virtue of the physical obstacle they present to the free movement of naval forces. In recognition of this latter characteristic the East Indies have been called the Malay, or Melanesian, Barrier.

The islands abound in strategic raw materials, the greater part of which are yet undeveloped. Oil, rubber, and tin are major products that are valuable to the war economy of any nation. It was the oil of the Indies above all else that was to make it possible for Japan to prolong the war. Copra, quinine, lumber, and hemp are other important assets, while among the mineral resources are gold, diamonds, and untapped deposits of iron and coal. Sugar, rice, spices, and other agricultural surpluses are available for export in great quantities. An additional factor not to be overlooked is the proximity to these natural resources of a great pool of native labor. Over 60,000,000 people inhabit the East Indies, of whom 40,000,000 are massed on Java, the most highly developed as well as one of the largest of the islands.

The defense of the Indies involves many of the same problems that confront the defender of the Philippines, but to a greater extent. The islands are spread over a larger area, and the total length of coastline is considerably greater. Although the Malay Barrier presents a strong front to the south, it is somewhat more vulnerable to attack from the north, where there are excellent avenues of invasion, as already pointed out. The islands, with the exception of Java, possess very limited land communications, the hinterland being generally undeveloped and inaccessible. Strategic control depends upon the possession of the important coastal towns, with their harbors, airfields, and surrounding networks of roads. A huge army would have to be deployed merely to hold all of the islands, for the Malay Barrier is intrinsically an extremely long cordon subject to penetration at many places. A defense in depth can be obtained only by means of the offensive employment of a large navy and a powerful air force, neither of which was available to the Allies when the Japanese attacked in early 1942.

In December 1941 the Dutch Army in the East Indies numbered approximately 85,000 men, mainly concentrated on Java. The majority of these were native troops, poorly equipped and of uncertain combat efficiency. The naval forces available included three cruisers, six destroyers, and eighteen submarines, while about 200 aircraft of all types, generally obsolete, provided the air defense of the

entire Netherlands Indies. The principal naval base was located at Surabaya, on the island of Java. Airfields were situated at key points on all the major islands, with the largest bases on Java.

Because of their firm resistance to Japanese pressure for economic concessions in the Indies the Dutch had few illusions concerning their safety from attack. The Japanese, unable to assault the Indies immediately, delayed their declaration of war; but the Dutch went on the offensive as soon as Malaya was invaded, in accordance with agreements that had been drawn up with the British before 8 December. Dutch submarines operated in the South China Sea with conspicuous success, and the enemy landing force in British Borneo was bombed several times by Dutch aircraft.

The lack of direct Japanese pressure on the Indies permitted the defenders for the time being to employ their naval and air strength as they saw fit. They chose to mass on the left flank of the Malay Barrier in direct support of the British anchor at Singapore. Such a policy, however, had one serious drawback. The entire northern tier of the Malay Barrier was open to invasion should the enemy overcome or by-pass the Philippines. Dutch airfields had been strategically located so as to blockade the straits that led south through the Indies, but without the air power to use these bases the blockade would be ineffective.

When our Asiatic Fleet withdrew from the Philippines, it began to operate from the naval base at Surabaya. Our Flying Fortresses that had withdrawn to Australia prepared to move into the Indies in order to capitalize upon the Dutch air bases. A strong effort was made to build up a major staging base at Darwin; and Australian troops and aircraft were sent to reinforce Koepang, in Dutch Timor, so that the line of communication between Australia and Java could be kept open.

By the end of 1941 the Allied situation in the Far East was growing progressively worse. Hong Kong had already capitulated; our troops in the Philippines were withdrawing to Bataan; the enemy had established strong footholds in northern Borneo and the southern Philippines; and Singapore itself was being threatened at close range by a Japanese army that had yet to be checked. As the new year opened, Allied cooperation began to shows signs of strain. The Australians pressed for an adequate defense of their country; the British stressed the importance of holding Singapore; the Americans argued the need for reinforcement of the Philippines; and the Dutch, faced with the difficult problem of defending their vulnerable island chain, tried to enlist the cooperation of all their Allies.

During the period of these serious developments in the Far East events of considerable significance had been taking place in the United States. On 23 December 1941 a conference of the top British and American military authorities was convened in Washington. Among the important results of this historic conference was a plan for the unified direction of the war effort in the Far East. General Sir Archibald Wavell was designated supreme commander for all American, British, Dutch, and Australian forces, with Major General George H. Brett as his deputy.

On 10 January, General Wavell arrived in Java to take over his new command, which he named the American–British–Dutch–Australian Command (ABDACOM). A staff was selected from the senior Allied officers present in the theater, and a headquarters was established in the interior of Java. Admiral Hart was appointed commander of the Navy Operational Command; Lieutenant General Hein ter Poorten, of the Netherlands East Indies Army, took command of all ground forces grouped under the Army Operational Command.

The Allied defensive strategy was now directed toward holding the Malay Barrier, defined as the line Malay Peninsula–Sumatra–Java–northern Australia. Burma and Australia were essential supporting positions on the flanks. Communications with Luzon were to be reestablished and kept open by way of the northern Indies.

Since only the United States could provide any considerable reinforcements for the defense of the Malay Barrier, it was to our country that the other Allied nations looked for support. Long-range bombardment aircraft were especially desired by ABDACOM; and measures were undertaken to fly them to the theater from the United States by way of the South Atlantic, pending the opening of the South Pacific ferry route. While the British sent reinforcements to Malaya and Burma and arranged for the transfer of two Australian divisions from the Middle East to their homeland, the United States made every effort to dispatch troops, supplies, and aircraft to the Indies by way of the South Pacific and Australia.

By their early capture of Guam and Wake Islands the Japanese had effectively severed the shortest line of communication to the Philippines. With the blocking of the sea lanes in the Central Pacific the United States was forced to establish a new line of supply to the Far East by way of the Fiji Islands, New Caledonia, and Australia. The ultimate goal, of course, was to effect the relief of the Philippines. Australia became our main base in the Southwest Pacific, and plans were laid to reinforce General MacArthur by way

of Port Darwin and various key points in the Netherlands East Indies.

As long as Koepang, on the island of Timor, remained in Allied possession, the communications between Australia and the Indies were relatively secure. The problem of supplying the Philippines, however, was vastly more difficult, inasmuch as the Japanese controlled the sea lanes to the north. Our Asiatic Fleet, now based at Surabaya, was largely engaged in escorting convoys to Singapore in accordance with directives from ABDACOM. As a result any attempt by cargo ships to reach the Philippines was fraught with considerable danger.

Although the Japanese had resolved to postpone their attack on Java until after the fall of Singapore, preparatory operations were to be undertaken in the east in order to secure advance bases for the operation. During the last days of December (1941) and the early part of January (1942) the Japanese Navy developed strong bases at Davao and Jolo. The Third Fleet, which had supported the landings in the Philippines, was reorganized as the Netherlands East Indies Force and divided into an Eastern and a Western Invasion Force.

The crushing of the American air force on Luzon during the first week of the war made it possible to begin the offensive to the south prior to the conclusion of the Philippine campaign. With bases established at Jolo and Davao, the Japanese planned a simultaneous advance through the Molucca Sea and Macassar Strait for the purpose of occupying strategic points in Dutch Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas, and Timor.

On 11 January the enemy launched his first attacks against the Netherlands East Indies. The Western Invasion Force, supported by aircraft from Jolo, effected a landing at Tarakan, the Borneo oil port, and quickly subdued the small garrison that was stationed there. Fighter planes began to operate from the captured airfield at Tarakan almost immediately.

While the Western Invasion Force was assaulting Tarakan, the Eastern Invasion Force struck at Menado, a key base on the northern arm of Celebes. The attack was carried out by a special force of 600 Navy paratroops, dropped on the airfield by twenty transport planes that had flown from the air base at Davao. Menado was quickly made secure, and fighter planes arrived to extend the air offensive southward over the Molucca Sea.

The attention of ABDACOM, hitherto focused on the threat to Singapore, was now directed to the equally dangerous Japanese advance to the east. If not stopped, this offensive against the Malay

Barrier might break through to the shores of Australia, already selected, as we have seen, as the main base for future American operations in the theater. Admiral Hart's Navy Operational Command could muster a total Allied force of nine cruisers, twenty-three destroyers, and thirty-six submarines, supported by a handful of long-range naval patrol bombers. However, this force was largely engaged in escorting convoys to Singapore, with the result that no striking force was immediately available to stop the Japanese advances down Macassar Strait and the Molucca Sea.

By this time the Japanese tactics were becoming quite clear. Air, sea, and land forces were perfectly coordinated under a unified command; and since the initiative was maintained, it was easy to build up a local sea and air superiority prior to each successive move. After concentrating a strong task force at an advanced base, the enemy would dispatch land-based aircraft to overcome the consistently inferior Allied air opposition at the next point of attack. Then would come the warships to blast the coastal defenses and screen the landing of troops from numerous transports, usually shallow-draft vessels that were able to come in close to shore. As soon as the area was under control, the airfield would be repaired or improved; and land planes would quickly arrive to begin operations from the new base. An attack force would then be built up for the next move, and the cycle would be repeated.

These leapfrog tactics were well adapted to the geography of the East Indies, for the almost total absence of interior communications in most of the islands made it possible to gain control by the seizure of only the most important coastal points. As a rule the distance between points was too short to permit attack by our naval forces while the enemy was en route. The decisive factor was Japanese naval-air power. Not only did enemy planes provide excellent intelligence of Allied movements while screening their own surface operations, but they continually pounded Allied striking forces before they could approach their objectives.

While the Japanese consolidated their new bases at Tarakan and Menado, Admiral Hart strove to assemble a naval force to strike them during their next advance. Submarines posted in Macassar Strait and the Molucca Sea soon reported that the enemy was on the move in both areas. A fleet of four cruisers, thirteen destroyers, and nine transports was sighted heading down Macassar Strait toward Balikpapan. Planning a night torpedo attack in the constricted waters of the strait, Admiral Hart dispatched a force of two cruisers and four destroyers to the north. Unfortunately both

cruisers were accidentally disabled en route, leaving the four destroyers to carry out the attack alone.

At 0245 on 24 January the first hostile warship was sighted about six miles off Balikpapan, the enemy having landed on the previous day and occupied the port without opposition. The entire convoy was still present, and cargo ships were being unloaded by the unsuspecting Japanese. For more than an hour the American destroyers steamed back and forth through the midst of the enemy force, using only torpedoes as long as they lasted. Totally surprised, the Japanese warships could not identify their attackers; and as a result they held their fire through fear of shooting at their own ships. The American destroyers escaped to the south unharmed, after sinking four enemy transports and a patrol ship and damaging other vessels. This engagement, known as the Battle of Macassar Strait, was the first important surface action of the war for our Navy.

Meanwhile, on 23 January, the Eastern Invasion Force effected a landing at Kendari, on the southeast coast of Celebes, the port and adjoining airfield being seized without opposition. The next objective of the Eastern Invasion Force was Amboina, the most important Dutch base in the eastern part of the Indies. Repeated attacks by both land-based and carrier aircraft made it necessary to withdraw the Allied air and naval forces stationed there, but a strong garrison of Dutch and Australian troops was left behind to repel the imminent invasion. The Japanese landed troops on 30 January, and within a week the garrison had been forced to surrender.

In western Borneo elements of the Army force that had occupied Sarawak began to move down the coast. At the same time enemy planes based at Balikpapan carried out frequent raids on Banjermasin, in southern Borneo. These developments threatened to bring the invaders squarely opposite Java, across the narrow sea.

As the Japanese tide rolled on, the mission of ABDACOM became increasingly difficult. The enemy now controlled all the northern approaches to the Indies and would soon be ready to move directly against the main line of the Malay Barrier. The surviving Allied aircraft were operating from makeshift bases, and it was impossible to launch heavy bomber strikes of more than eight or ten planes against the enemy's multiple spearheads of attack. In addition, there existed a serious shortage of fighter planes, with the result that our bases and naval striking forces were afforded only negligible air cover against raids by the enemy's strong air force.

By early February, Japanese air attacks on Timor and against Macassar, in southern Celebes, were growing particularly intense. Enemy planes operating from Kendari and Balikpapan opened the

air offensive against Java itself with a tremendous raid on 3 February. The naval base at Surabaya and the airfields around Malang were struck a severe blow by a force of approximately 150 bombers and fighters. In addition to the heavy damage suffered by installations thirty-one Allied aircraft were destroyed, including four American heavy bombers. The inadequate air warning system and the total lack of antiaircraft weapons made the enemy's task easy.

While the Japanese on the east flank were commencing these aerial operations designed to soften up Java and Timor, their victorious forces in Malaya were preparing for the final assault on Singapore, western anchor of the Malay Barrier. As the jaws of the enemy vise steadily closed on the Indies, Admiral Hart drew together the remaining Allied naval forces in another attempt to create an effective striking force. The reported presence at Balikpapan of a large enemy invasion armada emphasized the urgency of the situation.

In an effort to repeat the success obtained in the Battle of Macassar Strait an Allied force of four cruisers and seven destroyers was organized under the command of Rear Admiral Karel W. Doorman, Dutch Navy, and was ordered to carry out a night attack on the Japanese transports at Balikpapan. Unfortunately the planes that bombed Surabaya on 3 February sighted the Allied warships, and on the following day all available enemy aircraft were concentrated against Admiral Doorman's force. Repeated air attacks off the northeastern tip of Java during the forenoon severely damaged two American cruisers and lightly damaged one Dutch cruiser, making it necessary to cancel the operation.

With the fall of Singapore imminent the Japanese were now prepared to open a full-scale attack against Java. The Sixteenth Army of General Terauchi's Southern Army Group was assigned the mission. Three divisions, flushed with recent victories, were made available to the Sixteenth Army. Adequate naval and air support was also provided.

Early on 14 February 450 Army paratroops were dropped at Palembang, in eastern Sumatra, in order to seize the nearby oil refineries before the Dutch could set off their prepared demolitions. The defending garrison eliminated most of the attackers, but on the following day a strong enemy invasion fleet successfully landed a Japanese division. Palembang was captured, along with its airfield and only partially damaged refineries; and the Japanese soon overcame all opposition in eastern Sumatra. An Allied naval task force moved north to attack the enemy shipping in Banka Strait, but heavy air attacks forced the abandonment of this offensive effort.

Subjected to daily bombing, the Allied naval base at Surabaya had become unusable except for stealthy visits by night. Since the entire northern coast of Java was equally vulnerable, ABDACOM decided to set up a fleet base at Tjilatjap, on the south coast. This new base would scarcely remain secure for long from enemy air attack, but it was extremely important that the Allied fleet be withdrawn from the Java Sea before the converging Japanese forces closed the trap by seizing control of the narrow straits at both ends of Java. Despite this imminent danger the fighting Dutch commander, Admiral Helfrich, chose to stay in the Java Sea as long as he was capable of inflicting damage on the enemy.

Meanwhile the line of communication to Australia was becoming increasingly hazardous. A fast troop convoy that left Darwin on 15 February for Java was turned back at sea by the fierce attacks of Japanese aircraft based at Kendari and Amboina. Our plan to make Darwin the main base on the western coast of Australia had to be radically revised in view of the fact that this port, already handicapped by a serious lack of facilities, was now exposed to enemy air attack from nearby land bases.

On 18 February the Japanese landed on the southeast coast of Bali and seized the airfield near Denpasar. Since this move exposed the entire sea area south of Java to air attack, the Allied reaction was immediate. Admiral Doorman, with a striking force of three cruisers and six destroyers, attacked the Japanese convoy during the night of 18-19 February. Losses suffered by the Allies in this Battle of Lombok Strait were one destroyer sunk and two cruisers and one destroyer damaged. Two of the six Japanese destroyers that participated were damaged, one of them so severely that it had to be towed to Macassar. After this battle the enemy's occupation of Bali continued without major opposition.

Concurrently with the advance on Bali strong naval forces moved south to deliver a crushing blow against the east flank of the Malay Barrier, with the intent to cut the line of communication between Australia and Java. During the forenoon of 19 February a powerful air strike was carried out against Darwin by over 200 enemy bombers and fighters operating from a group of four aircraft carriers. Encountering practically no opposition, the Japanese planes inflicted severe damage on the important air and harbor installations. One American destroyer and nine Allied cargo ships and transports were sunk, while virtually all other vessels in the harbor were heavily damaged. Eighteen of our few remaining aircraft were also destroyed. The city in flames, the entire area was ordered

evacuated by nightfall. It was now obvious that Darwin was too exposed to see extensive use as an advance base for some time to come.

While the enemy was neutralizing our air and naval strength at Darwin, a landing was effected at Dilli in Portuguese Timor. On the following day, 20 February, Navy paratroops were employed to seize the airfield at Koepang. Army troops were then put ashore, and Timor quickly became another link in the chain of successive Japanese conquests. The fall of Koepang marked the piercing of the east flank of the Malay Barrier. The 1,300-mile air ferry route from Australia to Java was now severed, and the enemy possessed a new air base that was much closer to Australia.

At this juncture General Wavell reached the depressing but logical conclusion that Japanese seizure of all the Netherlands Indies could not be long delayed. Java itself was virtually isolated and faced imminent invasion. The Allies were woefully weak, particularly in the air; and the enemy occupation of Timor and Sumatra reduced the likelihood of the arrival of reinforcements in any appreciable strength. Less than eighty aircraft remained in Java, of which only ten were heavy bombers that could be used as a striking force against the Japanese. Consequently ABDACOM was dissolved on 25 February, upon the departure of General Wavell for India. The Dutch assumed control of the defense of Java, the Allied forces remaining to fight under their command as long as resistance could serve a useful purpose. General Brett returned to Australia to command all United States Army forces in the Southwest Pacific.

To strengthen the defense of Java one more effort was made to bring in air reinforcements from Australia. An American seaplane tender* sailed for Tjilatjap with thirty-two assembled fighter planes on deck, but shortly before noon on 27 February nine Japanese land-based bombers sank the vessel only a few hours from its destination. A British tender, traveling separately, was more fortunate and arrived undetected at Tjilatjap on 28 February with twenty-seven crated fighter planes in its hold. But these were destined never to be used in combat; the sands of time were fast running out for the gallant Dutch.

The Japanese plan for the final assault on Java called for simultaneous landings at both ends of the island and at a central point on the north shore. Large invasion convoys, loaded down with assault troops, were assembled off Banka Island and near the southeastern tip of Borneo.

* The *Langley*.

Admiral Helfrich, now commanding all Allied naval forces in the Indies, conceived his mission to be the sinking or scattering of the enemy's invasion convoys before troops could be landed on Java. A striking force of five cruisers and nine destroyers was concentrated at Surabaya under the command of Admiral Doorman. These warships, belonging to four different nations and manned by personnel nearing the stage of complete exhaustion, were further handicapped by a universal need of repairs and a serious lack of fuel. There existed no common set of signals nor any great similarity in tactical methods. Nevertheless the little fleet sailed north on 27 February to intercept the Japanese invasion convoy then heading across the Java Sea toward Surabaya.

One hour out of port Admiral Doorman's task force encountered its first opposition, the leading elements of the enemy screening force. About 1615 the engagement, known as the Battle of the Java Sea, commenced with an exchange of gunfire at extreme range. Five Japanese cruisers and seven destroyers converged on the area, and a vicious battle took place during the next two hours. One Allied cruiser was severely damaged, two destroyers were sunk, and several other vessels suffered light injury. In return, heavy damage was inflicted on two enemy destroyers.

With the approach of darkness Admiral Doorman broke off the action in an attempt to evade the hostile warships and penetrate beyond the screen to his real objective, the enemy transports. The Allied force drove far to the northwest, but its search was fruitless in the absence of aerial reconnaissance. Enemy aircraft harassed Doorman's limping fleet all during the night, and most of the destroyers were forced to return to Surabaya for refueling. The remaining vessels, four cruisers and two destroyers, turned westward along the north coast of Java. One destroyer was torpedoed by an enemy submarine; the second, having stopped to rescue survivors, was forced to run for Surabaya at the approach of hostile surface units. Shortly before midnight the four cruisers, now deprived of their destroyer protection, encountered a strong group of Japanese warships. Two Dutch cruisers were sunk almost immediately, Admiral Doorman going down with his flagship. The two remaining Allied cruisers escaped to Batavia under cover of darkness.

The battle had ended in disaster for the Allies, and there was now no alternative but to withdraw our surviving vessels from the Java Sea. Admiral Helfrich ordered them to leave that night and to reassemble at Tjilatjap.

On 28 February the Japanese subjected air and naval installations on Java to extremely heavy air raids. As darkness set in,

four American destroyers left Surabaya with the intention of navigating the difficult waters of Bali Strait. One American destroyer, two Dutch destroyers, and a Dutch cruiser were unable to leave port because of severe battle damage and eventually became victims of enemy air attacks. The four serviceable destroyers fought their way through the narrow strait and several days later reached Australia in safety.

Shortly before midnight the Japanese Sixteenth Army effected its main landing near Batavia while a secondary attack was launched against Semarang. The principal invasion convoy comprised four cruisers, twenty destroyers, and about fifty transports. As the enemy landing forces were storming the beaches west of Batavia, an unexpected development occurred. Two Allied cruisers,* attempting to escape undetected through Sunda Strait by closely hugging the shore, suddenly appeared amidst the Japanese convoy. Before the enemy could rally from his surprise, our ships sank three loaded transports, although in doing so they sacrificed their chances of escape. After the arrival of enemy reinforcements the battle soon ended with the sinking of the two fighting cruisers, but not before Dutch shore batteries severely damaged two Japanese destroyers and several transports.

On 1 March enemy aircraft caught twenty of the last remaining Allied planes in Java on the ground and destroyed them with bombs. The only Allied warships still afloat in the Java Sea, one crippled cruiser and two destroyers, were intercepted on their way to Sunda Strait and sunk off Bawean Island by a superior force of enemy warships. Since the rapid success of the greatly superior Japanese ground forces on Java made it obvious that no port or airfield on the island was tenable, air and naval units were ordered to withdraw to Australia. Two American destroyers and several smaller vessels that sailed from Tjilatjap were lost en route.

Major resistance on Java ended on 9 March with the formal surrender by the Dutch of the entire Netherlands East Indies. The Malay Barrier had been lost and the Allies split in twain. The United States was now forced to undertake vigorous measures for the defense of Australia, for the enemy was not far away.

Comments.—The Netherlands East Indies campaign was a struggle between opposing air and naval forces in a tremendous land and water area. The superiority of Japanese sea-air power was decisive. Allied striking forces were too inferior to conduct effective offensive operations, and the continual attrition incident to the vig-

* The *Houston* and the *Perth*.

orous attacks of the enemy upon our bases caused us to become weaker and weaker. The Japanese Navy proved conclusively that it was not a "bathtub navy", and its land-based air units demonstrated once again that our prewar estimate had been badly in error.

That the Malay Barrier was indefensible against a superior foe is very evident in retrospect. The vast extent of the Indies made it impossible to prevent the enemy from securing advance air bases. Only superior air power, operating from well-guarded bases could have insured the defense of the islands.

From the Allied viewpoint one of the most significant features of the campaign was the attempt to achieve a unity of command. Facing a rapidly advancing enemy, and hindered by differences in language and national aspirations, ABDACOM never functioned as a unified command in the strict sense; but this pioneer effort did succeed in establishing a firm basis for future combined operations by Allied forces. Considering the limited resources available to the defenders of the Indies, it may be truthfully said that they did the best they could with what they had.

SOUTH SEAS OFFENSIVE (Map 4).

We have seen that Japan's basic war plan contemplated that the first phase of operations would be conducted for the purpose of establishing a defensive perimeter. As one means toward that end the opening assault on 8 December had included the rapid occupation of Guam and Wake Islands. Subsequent offensive operations were directed toward the extension of the perimeter in the South and Southwest Pacific areas.

During the latter part of December (1941) the Japanese took possession of the Gilbert Islands, landing troops on Tarawa and Makin atolls. Concurrently with the centrifugal attacks being carried out in the Far East strong enemy forces were mounted for an invasion of the New Guinea–Bismarck Archipelago area, the Japanese Fourth Fleet being assigned the command responsibility for this new undertaking. Ground troops made available included several special naval landing forces and an infantry regiment. Land-based planes were to support the invasion from bases in the Caroline Islands, and two aircraft carriers of the First Air Fleet were to lend their strength to the initial attacks.

After World War I the Bismarck Archipelago, Northeast New Guinea, and Bougainville, in the Solomon Islands, were all mandated to Australia (**Map 19**). The rest of the Solomons and Papua, in southeastern New Guinea, were already British protectorates under

the jurisdiction of the Governor General of Australia. Dominating the northern shores of the Coral Sea, these islands provide an excellent line of departure for an enemy intent upon either striking the northeastern shoulder of Australia or moving against the eastward line of communication from that continent to the United States.

The principal Japanese objective in the Bismarck Archipelago was Rabaul, seat of the Australian-mandated area. Here was situated one of the best natural harbors in the Pacific, while the contiguous terrain was ideal for the construction of air facilities. By virtue of its central strategic location Rabaul offered an excellent site for an advance Japanese base from which control could be exercised over the area bounded by New Guinea, the Bismarcks, and the Solomon Islands.

On 3 January the enemy offensive was inaugurated with the bombing of Rabaul by twenty-two planes operating from Truk, in the Caroline Islands. On the following day the raid was repeated. By 20 January the Japanese carrier force had arrived in the area, and more than one hundred bombers and fighters struck at Rabaul to soften up the defenses in preparation for a landing. The only Australian aircraft at Rabaul, five training planes, opposed the enemy in the air but were quickly shot down.

While Japanese forces in the Netherlands East Indies were pouring ashore at Balikpapan and Kendari on 23 January, the Fourth Fleet was simultaneously engaged in assaulting Rabaul, Kavieng, and Kieta, the last-named on Bougainville Island. The only opposition encountered was at Rabaul, where 1,400 Australian troops, supported by four artillery pieces, resisted over 4,000 enemy troops as long as they could. About 600 of the defenders eventually escaped to Australia.

From their new base at Rabaul, Japanese aircraft bombed Madang, Lae, and Salamaua, on the northern coast of New Guinea. Attacking Port Moresby with six planes on 3 February, the enemy extended his effective range of air attack to within 335 miles of Australia. On 8 February, Gasmata, in southern New Britain, was occupied without resistance.

By this time the Japanese air group at Rabaul comprised thirty-six fighters, thirty-six bombers, and eighteen flying boats. To oppose this force the Australians could muster no more than thirty-four combat aircraft, none of which were fighters.*

* It should be borne in mind that the greater part of Allied air strength in the Southwest Pacific had been drawn into the Netherlands East Indies campaign.

Meanwhile a new American naval task force had been constituted for the protection of the extended and vulnerable lines of communication from the United States to Australia via the South Pacific. Under the command of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown the aircraft carrier *Lexington,* four heavy cruisers, and ten destroyers proceeded to the Southwest Pacific. On 19 February twelve Flying Fortresses from Hawaii arrived at Townsville, on the northeast coast of Australia. These planes were assigned the mission of cooperating with the naval task force for the protection of the South Pacific line of supply.

After studying the situation, Admiral Brown prepared a plan for a coordinated air and surface attack on Rabaul by his naval task force and the heavy bombers at Townsville. But during the approach the naval striking force was detected by enemy reconnaissance planes, and shortly afterward a vigorous air battle developed some 250 miles southeast of Rabaul. Two Japanese flying boats and sixteen medium bombers were shot down when they attempted an attack against the *Lexington.* We lost two aircraft in the action. However, since surprise had been lost, the strike against Rabaul was canceled; and our forces withdrew to the south.

On 23 February the Fifth Air Force* executed the first American bombardment of Rabaul. Six Fortresses from Townsville sank one cargo ship and destroyed three fighter planes at the Japanese base.

There were in Australia at this time no American ground combat forces with the exception of field artillery and antiaircraft elements **(Map 20).** Reinforcements from the United States were limited by the critical shortage of available shipping as well as by the need for air and ground forces in other theaters of war. Since Australia herself had few troops and little productive capacity, the problem of defense in the Southwest Pacific was a serious one.

In view of the enemy's offensive capabilities throughout the Pacific the creation of an American striking force in Australia had to be subordinated to the task of concentrating adequate defensive forces along the line of supply. Accordingly Hawaii was strengthened; garrisons were sent to Christmas, Canton, and the Fiji Islands; and a large task force under Brigadier General Alexander M. Patch was dispatched to New Caledonia via Australia. After a short stay at Brisbane, General Patch's force sailed on 6 March with a strong escort of four cruisers and four destroyers. A carrier

* Constituted on 5 February 1942. Component combat units in Australia by the end of March were the 19th Bombardment Group (H), the 3d Bombardment Group (L), and the 8th, 35th, and 49th Pursuit Groups.

strike against Rabaul had been planned to cover the movement of the New Caledonia task force; but when the Japanese landed on 8 March at Lae and Salamaua, in northeastern New Guinea, the original plan was altered to provide instead for a heavy strike against the enemy invasion force **(Map 19).**

Under the command of Admiral Brown a sizable task force, comprising the aircraft carriers *Lexington* and *Yorktown,* four heavy cruisers, and ten destroyers, moved north into the Gulf of Papua for an air attack over the mountain backbone of New Guinea against the Japanese amphibious forces at Lae and Salamaua. The inadequately charted waters south of New Guinea and the hazards of flight over the unexplored jungles and around the 13,000-foot peaks of the Owen-Stanley Range entailed an unusual risk for the American striking force. But the nature of the plan made it likely that surprise would be obtained and lessened the danger of enemy action against our precious, irreplaceable warships. Early on 10 March 104 carrier planes were launched while the task force was fifty miles off the southern coast of Papua. Proceeding over the mountains by way of the 7,500-foot pass at Kokoda, the attacking planes discovered twenty-six Japanese ships in the Lae–Salamaua bight. Completely surprised, the enemy lost six cargo vessels and suffered damage to a number of other ships. No hostile fighters were encountered, and only one American plane was shot down by antiaircraft fire. By noon all of our aircraft had returned to their carriers, and the task force withdrew to the south. Army planes of the Fifth Air Force operated against the enemy in Huon Gulf on the same day. On 12 March the New Caledonia task force arrived safely at its destination.

With the securing of a foothold in northern New Guinea and the seizure of a strong advance base at Rabaul the Japanese had completed their offensive to establish a Pacific defensive perimeter as envisioned by the basic war plan. The extraordinary ease with which this task had been accomplished was to lure the enemy into a program of further expansion, but for the time being relative quiet descended upon the theater.

THE ALLIED REORGANIZATION (Map 20)

On 23 December 1941 the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washington to confer with the President and the United States Chiefs of Staff on the immediate strategy for the combined conduct of the war against the Axis. It was soon agreed that the defeat of Germany

should be assigned priority over the defeat of Japan, a decision of far-reaching significance. Since it was most desirable that a method be evolved for the control of all British and American military resources, a new and comprehensive procedure was established for achieving unity of effort through the medium of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In February 1942 an American agency known as the Joint* Chiefs of Staff was established under the direction of the President. During the entire course of the war the members of this body were: General of the Army** George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army; Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet; General of the Army Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces; and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President. In addition to coordinating the activities of the Army and Navy the Joint Chiefs of Staff were charged with the strategic conduct of the war in operations for which the United States had the sole or primary responsibility.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, composed of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, had world jurisdiction in order to insure the complete coordination of the war effort of Great Britain and the United States. Problems of the war were under continuous consideration at the headquarters in Washington, where representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff were also stationed. Representatives of other Allied nations and dominions attended the Washington meetings from time to time. At intervals the Combined Chiefs of Staff met with the heads of their governments to discuss and decide upon the over-all conduct of the war. These international conferences made possible timely decisions not only with respect to strategy and command relationships for combined operations but also with respect to the commitments of each country. The decisions were, of course, implemented by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The early adoption of the principle of unity of command was one important development of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This cardinal precept placed the responsibility and authority for a contemplated operation

* In formal military parlance *combined* always meant American and British; *joint* meant the combination of the three services—land, sea, and air—within the military structure of one country alone.

** The ranks given here were those held at the end of the war.

under one commander directly answerable to the Joint or the Combined Chiefs.

Broad discussions relating to the war effort in the Pacific were made possible by the formation of the Pacific War Council. This body, which met periodically in Washington, was composed of representatives of the United States, Australia, Canada, China, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippine Commonwealth, and the United Kingdom. Liaison was maintained with Russia through an Allied Military Mission to Moscow and with China by means of the Allied Military Council at Chungking.

Early in March 1942 the steadily deteriorating situation in the Pacific led to the beginning of a series of discussions between the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands relative to the conduct of the war against Japan. By agreement of the various governments concerned the Pacific Theater was designated an area of United States strategic responsibility. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were assigned jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and the factors necessary for its implementation, including the allocation of all forces and materials. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were granted jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy and direct control of the Pacific commands.

The Pacific Theater was reorganized and divided into the Southwest Pacific Area and the Pacific Ocean Areas. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was appointed Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas; and General MacArthur was recalled from the Philippines to Australia to serve as Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area. The Pacific Ocean Areas command was in turn subdivided into the North, South, and Central Pacific Areas. Admiral Nimitz retained direct command in the North and Central Pacific; but for the South Pacific Area he was instructed to appoint a commander who, acting under his authority, would control its combined forces.

In addition to this comprehensive reorganization of the Pacific theater steps were taken to clarify and recast the command establishment in China and Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean and Middle East areas were assigned to the strategic direction of the United Kingdom, and the British Chiefs of Staff assumed jurisdiction over all operational strategy. China was designated an area of United States strategic responsibility, with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek exercising supreme command. As has been noted, General Stilwell acted as Chiang's chief of staff. For administrative purposes the China–Burma–India Command Area was established, initially through the issuance of a United States Army directive to General

Stilwell, who in addition to his other duties was the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China–Burma–India.

The boundaries and inclusive areas of the various commands newly arrayed against Japan were as shown on the map. A revision of the dividing line between the contiguous South and Southwest Pacific Areas was effected somewhat later, as will be seen, when the commander of the South Pacific Area was assigned responsibility for an invasion of Guadalcanal, in the lower Solomons.

The strategic policy approved for the Pacific Theater in early 1942 was entirely defensive, although the desirability of taking more aggressive action was indicated. Directives were issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlining the manifold responsibilities of the newly organized command areas. General MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, was assigned the major missions of: (1) holding Australia as a base for future offensive operations; (2) checking the Japanese advance southward; (3) protecting land, sea, and air communications within his area; and (4) maintaining the American position in the Philippines. The principal missions to be executed by Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, were: (1) to maintain the lines of communication between the United States and the Southwest Pacific; (2) to contain the enemy forces in his area; (3) to support operations in the Southwest Pacific Area; and (4) to aid in the defense of North America. The vital importance of the first of these missions resulted in the establishment of a strong subordinate command in the South Pacific Area, as has been noted.

Both General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were instructed to prepare for the assumption of an amphibious offensive, the initial steps of which were to be launched from the South and Southwest Pacific Areas as soon as appropriate forces could be assembled.

THE ALLIED DEFENSIVE–OFFENSIVE

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

General MacArthur, who had arrived in Australia from the Philippines on 17 March, formally assumed command of the Southwest Pacific Area on 18 April, with headquarters at Melbourne. MacArthur's forces were organized into five subordinate commands: (1) Allied Land Forces, under General Sir Thomas Blamey of the Australian Army; (2) Allied Air Forces, under Lieutenant General Brett; (3) Allied Naval Forces, Vice Admiral Herbert F.

Leary commanding; (4) United States Forces in the Philippines, under General Wainwright; and (5) United States Forces in Australia, under the command of Major General Julian F. Barnes.

By the end of April the principal ground forces in Australia were: one American division, the recently arrived 41st; four regular Australian divisions, three of which had been returned from the Middle East; and seven divisions of the Civilian Military Forces, a militia which had been conscripted for home defense. In addition, the American 32d Division was due to arrive sometime in May. The Allied air forces comprised the American 3d(L), 19th(H), and 22d(M) Bombardment Groups and the 8th, 35th, and 49th Fighter Groups, along with about 150 Australian planes. The principal Allied naval units immediately available were one American, one Dutch, and four Australian cruisers, plus a number of destroyers and auxiliary craft.

General MacArthur considered none of the three arms of his command—ground, naval, or air—adequate to carry out the missions that he had been assigned; but the decision had already been made by the Chiefs of State to defeat Germany first, and therefore only minimum forces could be allocated to other theaters.

General MacArthur's conception of future offensive operations was based upon the movement forward of air power by successive bounds in order to gain local air superiority, provide adequate cover for the advance of surface elements, and isolate each successive enemy position prior to the final assault by all arms. Since Port Moresby, in southern New Guinea, was the most advanced Allied position in the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur planned to reinforce it and develop a major air base there. This development was barely under way when Japanese naval and air concentrations in the Bismarcks indicated that the enemy was about to renew his offensive toward the south.

The complete success of the offensive operations during the first phase of the Japanese basic war plan had left them in firm possession of all the land areas that had been scheduled for occupation. In accordance with phase two of the war plan the defensive perimeter was now to be consolidated and strengthened. But the unexpected ease with which the initial operations had been carried out influenced the Japanese High Command to delay the second phase and adopt an alternative plan calling for further expansion.

In order to exploit the advantage that had already been gained over the Allies the enemy decided that his next step would be the occupation of the Solomon Islands and the capture of Port Moresby.

These operations would not only strengthen the original perimeter through New Guinea and the Bismarcks but, if successful, would pave the way for subsequent attacks against New Caledonia, the Fiji Islands, and Samoa. The seizure of these three objectives would effectively sever the line of communication between Australia and the United States.

The first move by the Japanese toward the execution of their two-pronged drive to encircle the Coral Sea was the occupation of Tulagi, in the southern Solomons **(Map 19)**, on 3 May. In order to interrupt this operation Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, who commanded an American naval task force in the Coral Sea (comprising the aircraft carrier *Yorktown*, three cruisers, and six destroyers), proceeded north immediately. On 4 May our carrier-based aircraft executed a daylong attack on the enemy convoy at Tulagi, sinking one destroyer and a number of smaller vessels and damaging a destroyer and a mine layer. Only three planes were lost by the task force before it retired southward to join other naval units.

Forewarned that the enemy was at last about to send a strong amphibious force southward through the Coral Sea, Allied naval forces assembled for the approaching battle.* Reinforcements, including two more carriers, were en route from Pearl Harbor but arrived too late to join in the battle which was about to begin.

For the sea-borne invasion of Port Moresby the Japanese had formed a task force comprising two aircraft carriers, one escort carrier, eleven cruisers, thirteen destroyers, three seaplane tenders, and a host of auxiliaries. Five transports were loaded with troops. While the transports and their naval escort assembled in the northern Solomons, the Japanese main carrier force, which had departed from Truk, swept eastward around the Solomon Islands and entered the Coral Sea from that direction.

On 6 May, Allied land-based bombers from Australia discovered the enemy transport force moving across the open sea toward the southeastern tip of New Guinea. Admiral Fletcher immediately moved north, and early on 7 May scouting planes located the invasion force off the Louisiade Islands. An attack was carried out about noon by our carrier-based aircraft that resulted in the sinking of the enemy's escort carrier. The attack was not repeated because Admiral Fletcher considered it advisable to retain his striking

* The breaking of the Japanese secret code prior to the war by our Army cryptographers enabled us frequently to gain invaluable information of impending operations. It was through that means that we learned of the coming movement into the Coral Sea. Thus we were able to concentrate our limited naval strength at the right time.

air groups for use against the two large enemy aircraft carriers, which had as yet not been located.

At the very time that our planes were carrying out their midday attack, aircraft from the Japanese carriers, which were operating to the eastward, had located and sunk one of our destroyers and a fleet oiler. A fortunate misidentification by enemy scouting planes had directed the Japanese carrier planes to these isolated units while our main carrier force lay exposed to attack well to the north. Shortly after dusk a group of twenty-seven enemy aircraft accidentally came upon our carrier force. These planes had already jettisoned their bombs, and a few of them attempted to land on our carriers. When they discovered their mistake, they flew on to their own carriers and were observed landing only thirty miles away by our radar.*

Neither side attempted a night attack, but early on the following day the opposing carrier groups located each other and launched their aircraft for what was to be the first carrier-against-carrier battle in history. In the resulting exchange of blows our planes severely damaged one enemy carrier, while the Japanese inflicted damage on both of our carriers. The *Lexington* was so badly damaged that she had to be sunk by torpedoes from our own destroyers.

In addition to surface casualties the two-day Battle of the Coral Sea cost the enemy eighty carrier aircraft, while we lost sixty-six planes. Since both naval forces terminated the engagement and withdrew almost simultaneously, the battle may be regarded tactically as a draw. However, the enemy's abandonment of the effort to advance on Port Moresby by sea constituted a definite strategic victory for the Allied cause. The future trend in naval operations was indicated by the unique nature of this engagement, the first major naval battle ever to be fought without surface ships exchanging a shot.

After the repulse of the Japanese in the Coral Sea, General MacArthur proceeded with the development of the northeastern Australia–New Guinea area. An airdrome was established at Milne Bay, in eastern New Guinea, while Port Moresby and other bases were strengthened as rapidly as possible. The Battle of Midway, which took place in the Central Pacific in June, had important and far-reaching repercussions, one of which was the adoption of a more active policy in the Pacific by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 2 July a directive was issued calling for the inauguration of offensive opera-

* The enemy's lack of radar in the Battle of the Coral Sea gave our forces an important advantage.

tions in the near future in both the South and Southwest Pacific Areas. The target date selected was 1 August, and the boundary between the two commands was shifted to the 159th meridian so that Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Commander, South Pacific Area, might conduct operations against the southern Solomons simultaneously with an amphibious drive along the northeastern coast of New Guinea by General MacArthur.

But the planned offensive in New Guinea was forestalled by a renewal of enemy activity late in July. The Japanese, having been forced by the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway to give up the plan for an amphibious invasion of Port Moresby, were now determined to accomplish the same result by driving overland with their ground forces. On 22 July a reinforced infantry regiment landed at Gona and quickly moved inland by way of Buna. By 28 July the enemy had captured Kokoda, key to the mountain pass through the Owen-Stanley Range. So on the eve of our invasion of Guadalcanal by forces in the South Pacific Area, General MacArthur was fighting hard to stem the Japanese drive on Port Moresby. The New Guinea counteroffensive, which was to have been coordinated with the attack on the Solomons, would have to await the checking of the enemy's offensive. However, the increasing threat of the Japanese in the Solomons to our lines of communication to the Southwest Pacific could not be safely ignored any longer. Enemy troops had landed on Guadalcanal on 6 July, and the construction of an airfield was being rushed to completion. Hence the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered that the South Pacific Command's counteroffensive be initiated by 7 August (1942).

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS (Map 20)

After the attack against Pearl Harbor there was little enemy activity in the Central Pacific. Initially content with their seizure of Wake and Guam Islands, the Japanese devoted their full energy to the southern campaigns. Confident that the United States had been rendered impotent for many months to come, the enemy stripped his Central Pacific bases of practically all naval and air strength. Only submarines remained to operate in the waters of the eastern Pacific, but this arm of the Japanese Navy proved to be surprisingly ineffective.

As a result of the American disaster at Pearl Harbor on 7 December the Hawaiian command was completely reorganized. As has been noted, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz became Commander in

Chief, United States Pacific Fleet; Lieutenant General Delos C. Emmons assumed command of all Army forces in Hawaii; and Brigadier General Clarence L. Tinker took over the Hawaiian Air Force, which on 5 February 1942 was redesignated the Seventh Air Force.

Raids by Naval Task Forces.—On 1 February the Pacific Fleet inaugurated a series of offensive raids against the most prominent Japanese bases in the Central Pacific Area. The general purpose of these attacks was to inflict damage on the enemy and prevent, if possible, the concentration of strong naval and air forces that might be employed in aggressive action to the eastward. While the raids were unpretentious in scale, they did disclose enemy weaknesses and provided battle training for our naval personnel.

The first of the successive blows was dealt the Marshall and Gilbert Islands by a naval task force under the command of Vice Admiral William F. Halsey. Forces participating in the attack included the aircraft carriers *Enterprise* and *Yorktown,* five cruisers, and ten destroyers. Surprising the enemy completely, Admiral Halsey's task force carried out successful air and naval bombardments against Kwajalein, Taroa, Wotje, and other atolls in the Marshall Islands and struck at Makin, in the Gilberts, as well.

On 24 February, Admiral Halsey led a task force comprising the carrier *Enterprise,* two cruisers, and seven destroyers against Wake Island. On 4 March the *Enterprise* and two cruisers raided Marcus Island, within 1,200 miles of Japan.

More important than the actual damage caused by these carrier raids, in which our losses were extremely light, was the knowledge gained of the correct methods of waging aerial warfare in the Pacific and the demonstration of the potentialities of a powerful, fast-moving carrier task force. Furthermore, the successful execution of even these small offensive operations stimulated the morale of American forces everywhere.

Doolittle's Raid.—In faraway India early in April transport planes of the Tenth Air Force were obliged to ferry aviation gas and oil to Chinese airfields for an undisclosed purpose. The cause of these preparations was a daring plan for a small combined operation in the western Pacific by the United States Navy and the Army Air Forces. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle a group of sixteen Army medium bombers was being readied for a strike against Japan itself. Once the feasibility of launching these relatively long-range planes from an aircraft carrier had been demonstrated, carefully selected crews were given special training over a considerable period of time. On 1 April the

carrier *Hornet*, with the Army bombers aboard, departed from the west coast for a rendezvous at sea with other naval forces.

The complete task force, when assembled, comprised the carriers *Hornet* and *Enterprise*, four cruisers, eight destroyers, and two oilers. It was the mission of the force commander, Admiral Halsey, to get the *Hornet* as close to the coast of Japan as safety would permit. Plans called for the launching of the Army bombers at a point 400 miles from Tokyo, allowing the planes just enough fuel to reach the airfields in China that had been prepared for their arrival. Early on 18 April, however, the task force encountered small enemy patrol ships, part of the picket line established by the Japanese to report raids such as this. The time of departure was then advanced; and shortly after 0800 Colonel Doolittle's air group took off for Tokyo, still over 600 miles away. There was but a remote chance of reaching the Chinese airfields, but at least the enemy targets were within range.

As it happened, the Japanese were completely surprised when our planes arrived; for though a picket boat had flashed a radio warning, the enemy believed that carrier planes would be used and that they could not arrive until the next day in view of their limited range. About noon the American bombers struck Tokyo and other nearby cities. All planes ran out of fuel before they could reach the designated landing fields in China, but the crews of only two fell into enemy hands.

The effect of the successful raid on morale in the United States was electric and did much to counteract the depressive feeling that had resulted from the surrender of Bataan. For the enemy, the Tokyo raid confirmed the need for additional bases to the east and was a strong contributing factor in the decision to expand the originally planned defensive perimeter.

In addition to the drives on Port Moresby and New Caledonia in the Southwest Pacific the Japanese now readied major forces for a twin attack on Midway and the western Aleutians.

Midway.—Having learned during their repulse in the Coral Sea that all of our available carriers were operating in that area, the Japanese estimated that the time was ripe for swift concerted attacks on Midway and the Aleutians. The failure of the amphibious expedition to seize Port Moresby had been euphemistically described as a crushing defeat of American carrier forces, and morale in the Imperial Navy reached a new peak. Puzzled over the source of our 18 April raid on Tokyo, the Japanese viewed with increasing concern and disfavor the American land bases nearest their homeland.

Moreover, Admiral Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, felt that the seizure of Midway would in all probability lure the United States Pacific Fleet into a decisive battle, the winning of which might make possible a negotiated peace to end the war.

The Midway and the Aleutian operations were to be closely coordinated. While the main Japanese naval force was seeking a decision in the Central Pacific, a smaller fleet was to carry out a reconnaissance in force in the western Aleutians. By timing the northern attack to occur one day earlier than the main blow against Midway the enemy hoped to achieve the effect of a strategic feint and thus confuse us as to the time and direction of the principal thrust.

For the attack on Midway, Admiral Yamamoto brought forth for the first time the concentrated might of the Japanese Navy, the Grand Fleet being organized (for this operation) into three separate groups: the Main Body, the Striking Force, and the Occupation Force. Yamamoto personally commanded the Main Body, which comprised seven battleships, one small aircraft carrier, three cruisers, and thirteen destroyers. The Striking Force was Vice Admiral Nagumo's First Air Fleet, which had made the attack on Pearl Harbor. It now comprised four large aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, three cruisers, and sixteen destroyers. Bearing almost 5,000 Army and Navy troops destined to garrison Midway after its capture, the Occupation Force consisted of two battleships, eight cruisers, twenty-nine destroyers, and eighteen cargo vessels and transports. The over-all strength then of this great surface armada was five aircraft carriers, eleven battleships, fourteen cruisers, fifty-eight destroyers, and all the requisite auxiliaries. In addition, a fleet of seventeen submarines operated in general support, being charged with the execution of long-range reconnaissance.

By virtue of our knowledge of their code the aggressive intentions of the Japanese became known to us at a date early enough to permit the adoption of maximum defensive measures. As the unsuspecting enemy prepared to exploit his strategic interior lines by shifting the weight of his attack from the Southwest Pacific to the Central Pacific, our naval forces quickly returned from the Coral Sea to meet the threat. The warning also gave us time to strengthen the local defenses of Midway and extend the range of submarine and aerial reconnaissance.

By 2 June our naval forces had completed their rendezvous northeast of the threatened island. Divided into two separate carrier task forces, one under the command of Rear Admiral Fletcher and

the other under Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, the American fleet had available the aircraft carriers *Enterprise, Yorktown,* and *Hornet,* eight cruisers, and fourteen destroyers. Covering all approaches to Midway was a group of twenty-five submarines. Eighteen Army heavy bombers and four medium bombers arrived by 3 June to strengthen the island's air power, which included sixty-eight Marine fighters and bombers and thirty naval patrol bombers. Our three carriers had 225 planes, as against the approximately 250 aircraft that were on the four large carriers of the Japanese First Air Fleet.

Early on 3 June a naval patrol bomber discovered the Japanese Occupation Force about 500 miles southwest of Midway. In midafternoon a group of nine Flying Fortresses carried out a high-altitude attack on this force, but no hits were scored. Shortly after midnight four of our naval patrol boats attempted a torpedo attack and succeeded in damaging one Japanese transport.

At 0545 on 4 June another of our flying boats finally located the Striking Force, the whereabouts of which had been our most anxious concern. Its planes were reported to be in the air and heading for Midway from the northwest. As the island's radar tracked the approach of the Japanese carrier-based aircraft, all American planes able to leave the ground took off. The enemy attack force, comprising almost 150 bombers and fighters from three of the large carriers, struck Midway at 0630. Very heavy damage was inflicted on the island's installations, but the runways were spared for future Japanese use. The raid lasted until 0715, by which time the defending Marine Corps fighter planes had shot down forty-three of the enemy aircraft for a loss of fifteen of ours.

Meanwhile Army and Marine Corps land-based bombers from Midway were engaged in attacks on the Striking Force. A sizable group of enemy aircraft, including the entire complement of one carrier, had been withheld from the Midway strike; and consequently the attacking American planes encountered fierce resistance in the air. Four torpedo-carrying Army medium bombers and a detachment of six Navy torpedo planes opened the attack on the enemy carrier force at 0705. No hits were registered, and seven of our aircraft were shot down. After a brief lull a squadron of thirty Marine dive bombers from Midway arrived at the scene of action and pressed home a heavy attack on the Japanese carriers. Again the enemy's excellent fighter defense prevented any success, and eleven of our planes were destroyed. A high-level attack during this period by sixteen Flying Fortresses was also ineffective.

The three American aircraft carriers, positioned about 200 miles north of Midway, had meanwhile launched their planes. When the Striking Force altered its course to the northward, our carrier planes failed to reach the target, except for one torpedo squadron. This squadron attacked alone at 1020, but all of its fifteen planes were shot down by enemy fighters before any success could be obtained. The torpedo squadrons from our other two carriers then arrived on the scene and began their attacks. Twenty out of the twenty-six torpedo planes were shot down without any hits being scored on the now violently maneuvering enemy carriers. However, this final sacrifice was not in vain. Two squadrons of our dive bombers, accompanied by fighters, had arrived at the height of the torpedo attack. The enemy, unable to launch additional fighter planes, was subjected to a devastating dive-bombing attack that he could not check. Within a period of only a few minutes three of the carriers were mortally wounded in a fierce action that cost us eighteen dive bombers. The stricken enemy vessels, with most of their planes below deck, burned furiously. During the afternoon a violent internal explosion destroyed one of the carriers, while a second was torpedoed and sunk by an American submarine. The third carrier remained afloat until the following day, when it had to be scuttled by its crew.

The fourth and only remaining aircraft carrier of the Japanese Striking Force escaped damage and rapidly moved northward. Shortly after noon the enemy located our carrier *Yorktown,* and a strong attack soon developed. Despite the best efforts of our defending fighters, dive bombers and torpedo planes damaged the *Yorktown* so severely that she had to be abandoned. Three days later, while being towed, the helpless vessel was torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine. One of our destroyers was lost at the same time.

While the enemy carrier planes were engaged in the attack on the *Yorktown,* dive bombers from our other two carriers located the last of the Japanese carriers. The enemy vessel was attacked about 1400 and vitally damaged at the cost of two of our planes. Completely helpless, this carrier too was scuttled by its crew.

The loss of all four aircraft carriers of the Japanese Striking Force on 4 June was the turning point in the Battle of Midway. Control of the air had been won by us, and the odds were all against the now-disorganized enemy. So Admiral Yamamoto abandoned the assault and ordered a full retirement.

Extremely bad weather hampered American air units during the pursuit on 5 June, and no important results were achieved. On the

following day the straggling Japanese cruiser force was contacted by our carrier planes. Dive bombers attacked and succeeded in sinking one cruiser and severely damaging another in this the final action of the battle. Our carrier forces then withdrew to refuel, and the Japanese fleet retired westward. As in the Battle of the Coral Sea, surface vessels made no contact during the entire engagement.

During the battle the Main Body of the Combined Fleet came no closer than 500 miles from Midway, except for a cruiser force that was sent out to cover the retirement of more important units.

In view of the strategic situation at the time the Battle of Midway was one of the decisive battles of the war in the Pacific, if not the decisive one. The enemy's expansion to the east was stopped, and Midway remained in our possession. Admiral Yamamoto's ambitious plan to destroy the United States Pacific Fleet was thwarted, with the result that Japan could no longer hope for an early end of the war. The loss of four major aircraft carriers, together with 250 aircraft, deprived the Japanese of the powerful striking force with which they had achieved their early conquests and upon which they depended for their defense against American counterattack. Our loss of one carrier, one destroyer, and 150 aircraft was severe but not irremediable. From this time on the balance of power in the Pacific shifted steadily in favor of the United States.

Aleutians.—On 18 May word was received in Alaska that a strong Japanese amphibious attack would probably materialize during the first few days of June. Steps were immediately taken to strengthen our defense of the Aleutian Islands, one of the most important approaches to the United States.

By order of Admiral Nimitz, unified command in the North Pacific was established on 21 May. Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, commanding Task Force 8, was given control of all Army, Navy, and Canadian forces in the theater. Our total naval strength at this time consisted of five cruisers, eleven destroyers, six submarines, and a small group of supporting vessels. Since it was known that the enemy would approach with at least two aircraft carriers, Admiral Theobald was instructed not to risk his few warships against the Japanese invasion force unless there existed an excellent opportunity to gain major results. Our policy would be to defend the Aleutians with land-based air power.

Air reinforcements were rushed from the United States until 169 planes were available in the Alaskan theater. However, only two partially completed airfields were near enough to block a Japanese invasion of the Aleutians. During the previous four months Army

engineers had been secretly engaged in the construction of a landing strip at Cold Harbor, east of Dutch Harbor, and another on Umnak Island, almost a hundred miles to the west. By early June the Eleventh Air Force, Brigadier General William O. Butler commanding, had established twenty-three planes at Umnak and twenty-two at Cold Harbor. In addition, a reinforced bombardment squadron was based at Kodiak; and a group of twenty-four long-range naval patrol planes was operating from Dutch Harbor and Kodiak. Altogether seventy-eight aircraft were available for the immediate defense of the Aleutians.

The Japanese plan was to strike a paralyzing air blow against Dutch Harbor one day prior to the main attack at Midway and to occupy the islands of Attu and Kiska in the western Aleutians. To carry out the invasion Vice Admiral Moshiro Hosogaya, commander of the Fifth Fleet, had available a task force comprising two small aircraft carriers, eight cruisers, fifteen destroyers, one seaplane tender, five submarines, and various auxiliary vessels.

While the main body of the Japanese Fifth Fleet steamed toward the western Aleutians, the Second Mobile Force, composed of the two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, and three destroyers, advanced swiftly on Dutch Harbor. Early on 3 June the fifty-six fighter and light-bomber planes aboard the carriers were launched for an attack on Dutch Harbor, but because of adverse weather only nineteen of the aircraft reached the objective. Warned by radar, the defenders harassed the Japanese with antiaircraft fire and escaped with but little damage.

On the afternoon of the following day the Second Mobile Force launched another strike against Dutch Harbor. This attack, carried out by thirty-two planes, did considerable damage to ground installations. While returning from the raid the carrier planes rendezvoused off Umnak Island at a point almost directly over the newly constructed American airfield, of whose existence the enemy had not the slightest inkling. Our defending fighters quickly shot down four of the hostile aircraft at the cost of two of our planes.

During the attack on Dutch Harbor, American search planes equipped with airborne radar located the Second Mobile Force, and land-based bombers made repeated attacks through the overcast. Although no damage was inflicted, the Japanese carrier force retired from the area because of the unexpected strength of American air resistance. Total air losses during the two-day operation were seven for the enemy and eight for the defenders.

On 6 June a Japanese naval landing battalion occupied Kiska, and on the following day an Army battalion landed on Attu. Because

of the usual unfavorable weather American search planes did not discover the landings until four days later, by which time the enemy was firmly established. Since at the moment most of the available ships, planes, and trained troops were badly needed in other areas, no immediate action could be undertaken to recapture Kiska and Attu. The Eleventh Air Force began a campaign to bomb the enemy out, but this was found to be impracticable.

Despite the fact that the shortest distance between the United States and Japan is along the great circle route through the Aleutians, experience in the area finally convinced both sides that the almost indescribably bad weather makes it one of the most unsuitable regions in the world for combat operations, particularly in the air. This fact partially explains why neither side attempted to use the Aleutians as a base for important operations.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE WAR UP TO 7 AUGUST 1942

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities on 7 December 1941 the growing truculence of Japan had been evidenced on many occasions. Few who were aware of the facts could doubt that she would seize a propitious moment to embark upon war as an instrument to further her national policy. In early December that moment arrived. German arms had routed the British from the continent of Europe, and Russia seemed to be tottering on the brink of defeat. As a consequence only the United States was capable of reinforcing the widely dispersed Allied forces in the Far East.

Our country, however, was not prepared for war, although strong measures were being undertaken to accelerate a program for greater industrial production and an increase in the size of the armed forces. By virtue of our decision to oppose the expansionist policies of both Germany and Japan we found ourselves committed on two separate fronts. The consequent division of our limited military power placed us for the time being in a distinctly unfavorable strategic position. It was anticipated that our defenses in the Pacific would be adequate by April 1942, leaving us free to use our principal resources against Germany, the stronger and more dangerous opponent; but we were not given that much time.

The inital disproportion in strength between the Allies and Japan was augmented further by the boldness and resourcefulness of the enemy's strategy. Deliberately embarking on a war of limited objectives, the Japanese were able to strike on many fronts at once. The great centrifugal offensive immediately placed the scattered

Allied centers of resistance on the defensive. Each of the Allies was caught between the problem of defending her own national interests and the necessity for relinquishing large areas in order to concentrate for an effective resistance. The enemy's initial successes were largely due to the full exploitation of this condition of affairs.

The geography of the Pacific Theater dictated a new type of warfare, characterized generally by a sustained struggle for control of the sea and the air above it. In addition to the excellent coordination effected between air, ground, and sea forces the Japanese first demonstrated to the world the strategic mobility, range, and destructive power of the carrier striking force. These and other relatively new concepts showed the enemy to be an antagonist as progressive as he was aggressive and ruthless. In measuring the success of his offensive operations it is worthy of note that never before in military history had such widespread conquests been carried out in so little time and at such small cost.

The prewar underestimation of Japan by the Allies extended also to the fighting qualities of the individual Japanese. It did not take long to discover, once hostilities had begun, that the enemy soldier, sailor, or airman was generally an extremely able fighting man. In particular, the Japanese soldier proved in hand-to-hand combat with Anglo–Saxon troops that he was tough, aggressive, and imbued with a fanatical courage. Because of his upbringing the average soldier was little affected by the hardships of campaigning, while the religious aspect of his stern discipline made even death seem inconsequential. Indoctrinated with the belief that capture meant death by torture as well as lasting disgrace to his family, he fought either to win or die, eschewing any middle course.

It was the boast of the Japanese Army that no terrain is impassable. Nowhere did this axiom receive more abundant proof than in the enemy's conduct of the jungle campaigns. As a result of the character and extent of the fighting that took place in Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines the Allies found it necessary to formulate entirely new concepts with regard to jungle warfare.

By August 1942 Japan had conquered a vast area in the western Pacific and Southeast Asia, including the Southern Resources Area with its abundance of critical raw materials. Revising their original and more conservative plan, the victory-drunk Japanese had driven to a line that was to be the high-water mark of their advance.

The situation of the United Nations in August 1942 was exceedingly unfavorable on the surface. In southern Russia the great German summer offensive had overrun large areas and had reached

the Caucasus, threatening the important Allied oil reserves in the Middle East. In North Africa, Rommel had pressed the British back to Cairo and was about to open a final drive for the Suez Canal, a vital link in the lifeline of the British Empire. And in the Pacific, despite their naval reverses, the Japanese were driving across the Owen–Stanley Mountains to secure Port Moresby and add all of New Guinea to their area of conquest.

One of the great lessons of World War II was that no nation can prevent war by neglecting her defenses or by failing to employ the proper foresight and alertness in detecting potential aggressors. The Axis nations relied heavily upon our weakness, and the timing and direction of their attack were designed to exploit it fully. The degree of this self-imposed handicap has been aptly described by General Marshall:

> Democratic governments devote their resources primarily to improving the standard of living of their people. Therefore, when attacked by nations which have concentrated on preparations for a war of conquest, the initial successes inevitably will go to the aggressors. This was the case with the democracies of western Europe and later on was found true in the case of the United States. Approximately eight months were required by this country, acting in collaboration with its Allies, to accumulate the munitions, train the initial forces, and then to transport them to theaters of operations where they could be employed in offensive action against the enemy. This phase of the great emergency ended in August 1942 with the successful assault on the Japanese positions at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands.

APPENDIX

THE SINO–JAPANESE WAR

INTRODUCTION (Map 1)

No study of the great struggle in the Pacific should be attempted without briefly reviewing the prewar conflict that raged in China between the determined people of that nation and the Japanese; for the war in the Pacific was the direct result of Japan's effort to establish a great empire—an effort that began as an incident in 1937, when she opened her drive for a "New Order in East Asia," but the roots of which go farther back into history.

The Sino–Japanese War of 1894–95 initiated Japan's long string of acquisitions in China. As a result of that war Korea was made an independent state and the island of Formosa and the Kwantung Peninsula were annexed by Japan. (In 1910 Japan annexed Korea outright.) Russian, German, and French pressure, however, forced the Japanese to relinquish the Kwantung Peninsula; and Russia leased it from China in 1898.

After the suppression of the Boxer Uprising in 1900, Japan and other interested nations demanded and were granted the right to maintain troops in China and to patrol her waters with gunboats.

In their quick victory over the Russians in the Russo–Japanese War, 1904–05, the Japanese claimed as the victor's spoils the Kwantung Peninsula and the southern half of Sakhalin Island.*

During World War I Japan seized German port concessions in Shantung and forthwith handed China an ultimatum—the infamous Twenty-one Demands. The granting of these demands would have made China a virtual protectorate of Japan. The United States and Great Britain protested strenuously against this attempt to end the open-door policy in China. As a result the Washington Nine Power Conference in 1922 recognized China's territorial integrity. Japan withdrew from Shantung but never divested herself of her interests there.

In 1931 the Mukden Incident (a bomb supposedly wrecked a por-

* Shown on Map 3.

tion of the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railroad) was Japan's excuse for overrunning Manchuria, charging that the Chinese were unable to suppress bandits. All of Manchuria was soon occupied, and Henry Pu-yi, former boy-emperor of China, was installed as nominal head of the puppet Empire of Manchukuo. The United States and the League of Nations protested against this violation of the Nine Power Conference agreements. Japan answered their protests by resigning from the League. She promptly consolidated her position by sweeping through Jehol, which she incorporated into Manchukuo in 1933.

By 1932 the steady and growing aggression of Japan had kindled some spirit of resistance in the Chinese people. In Shanghai a successful boycott threatened to close Japanese cotton mills there. A riot ensued, and two Japanese monks were killed. Japan immediately sent in reinforcements to restore order. The Chinese Central Government hastily dispatched 65,000 troops to Shanghai. A well-equipped Japanese army of 50,000 was finally required to drive the Chinese forces from the area, and the controversy was settled by negotiation. Japan lost face in this engagement but succeeded in destroying all the Chinese factories in the vicinity, eliminating competition for years to come.

The years 1933 to 1936 were filled with instances of Japan's intrigue and pressure in further efforts to extend her domination of China. As he had during the preceding twenty years, Major General Kenji Doihara, the Japanese "Lawrence of Manchuria," played a leading role in these fifth-column activities. Torn by the civil wars of the previous two decades, China offered fertile soil for Japanese seeds of dissension.

Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Chinese Central Government, was trying to avoid a war that would mean certain death for New China. The tremendous task of uniting over 450 million people into a strong nation had just begun. At first he acceded to Japanese demands, knowing that his country had neither the strength nor the temperament to resist. He carefully husbanded China's meager military stores, and devoted his attention to training and equipping an army and developing his people's will to resist.

Resentment against Japan's ever increasing encroachment reached new heights by 1936, and Chinese resistance stiffened. Chiang refused to grant additional concessions and insisted that Japan cease her violations of China's sovereignty. China, although not yet a strong, united nation, had ceased to be the "geographical expression" that Japan's Yosuki Matsuoka had dubbed her during the League of Nations' Manchurian inquiry. A crisis was rapidly de-

veloping, and both nations hastened to strengthen their military forces. Japan struck in July 1937, hoping to defeat the Central Government's forces before a united China could face her. The map shows the excellent position Japan had gained for herself during the preceding years in preparation for the war that was now at hand.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

In 1937 Japan had a standing Army of 300,000 carefully picked and thoroughly trained troops. A reserve of over 2,000,000 had been built up under a system of compulsory military training. In addition to these troops Japan also had a Manchukuoan Army of 100,000 to 150,000 Chinese natives officered by Japanese. The entire Army had just been reorganized and its artillery and other equipment modernized. Particular emphasis was placed on tanks, motors, aviation, and automatic weapons.

In support of her Army, Japan had the third largest Navy in the world, comprising some 200 warships, many recently modernized. The combined Army and Navy air forces had 2,000 first-line planes and an adequate supply of well-trained pilots who were to prove themselves surprisingly efficient.

China had available in 1937 over 2,000,000 troops under control of the Central Government or loyal local war lords. In efficiency and training they ranged from miserably armed, nondescript bands of provincials to the few well-equipped, German-trained divisions of Chiang Kai-shek. Less than 100,000 men were even reasonably well equipped for modern warfare. Some provincial divisions were fairly efficient; but almost all units were sorely lacking in trained leaders and modern equipment, especially artillery. General Chu Teh's communist army in the northwest consisted of 100,000 to 150,000 trained troops, especially suited to guerrilla warfare. Chinese artillery averaged less than one gun per thousand soldiers, there being probably fewer than 1,000 usable guns in all China. The antitank and antiaircraft guns were mostly antiquated, and there were only a few tanks. There was a fair supply of machine guns and rifles, but these were of all makes and ages.

China had only two or three hundred first-line planes, mostly of American, Italian, and Russian manufacture. She had available but a limited number of trained Chinese pilots, built around a nucleus of foreign aviators. The Chinese Navy was practically nonexistent, the only ships being a number of old destroyers and gunboats and twelve light cruisers, ten of which were built before World War I.

The only bright ray in this appalling lack of the necessities of modern war lay in China's enormous reserve of untrained man power available in her population of over 450,000,000.

Japan lacked most of the natural resources vital to modern warfare and was forced to import them. Her large merchant marine was adequate for this task. Her extensive industries were capable of rapid mobilization for war production and were prepared to produce a steady supply of munitions, provided the necessary raw materials could be obtained from the outside.

China, on the other hand, was endowed bountifully with raw materials but lacked large industries that could be converted to the production of munitions. Her absurdly small manufacturing capacity was insufficient to produce even enough small-arms ammunition for extensive operations, to say nothing of heavier supplies or equipment. Lacking a large reserve of munitions, China's effective participation in a major war was largely dependent upon her ability to obtain supplies from outside sources.

Every conceivable type of terrain and climate is included in the vast theater of operations that is China. Gently rolling tableland, spacious prairies, rushing rivers, and occasional mountains make up the fertile area in the eastern portion—known as the great plain of China. This region, which extends to the sea, includes what is called China's "rice bowl" and at the outbreak of hostilities contained all of her limited manufacturing facilities. There resides the bulk of her population. Toward the southwest, China ends in the Tibetan plateau and the lofty Himalayas. The Gobi Desert, the Siberian wastes, and the Mongolian plateau on the northwest are separated from the plain by jumbled hill masses 6,000 to 12,000 feet high. In the north the winters are cold; warm summers are accompanied by short seasons of heavy rains that flood rivers and mire land transportation deep in mud. In the south the climate is tropical, with abundant rainfall.

Two great rivers in China are of primary military importance. In the north the great Hwang Ho or Yellow River, called "China's sorrow," is a major military obstacle—wide, relatively shallow, infrequently bridged, and subject to devastating floods that often result in a change of course. Even more formidable is the Yangtze River in central China, a tremendous stream of great length and width that is uncrossed by bridges. It is a most valuable artery of commerce that accommodates vessels of deep draft for hundreds of

miles, and upon which shallow-draft vessels can ride deep into the interior.

Under Chiang Kai-shek's able leadership during the prewar years great improvements were wrought in China's communication system. New roads and railroads were built and existing ones improved. Most of her internal transportation was, however, still very primitive. She still relied mainly upon human and animal transport, while using sampans and other small boats on her rivers and canals.

China's front door, of course, is her seacoast. Its many harbors were her chief means of communication with the outside world, particularly the large ports of Shanghai and Canton. The latter, during the early stages of the hostilities, handled as much as 75 per cent of all military supplies imported. Overland routes from China to neighboring countries were only four in number. Two of these strategic lines of communication connected with Russia. From Kalgan a caravan and motor route led north across Mongolia and reached the Trans-Siberian Railroad near Irkutsk. The other route to Russia, much of it a modern metalled highway, followed the old caravan route from Sian to Siberia via Lanchow, Ansi, and Urumchi. The third line of communication was a narrow-gauge railroad running from the French port of Haiphong, in Indo–China, to Kunming, where it joined with unimproved mountain roads leading to Changsha, Chungking, and Sian. The fourth route, also a narrow-gauge railroad, led from Rangoon to Lashio in Burma, where it too connected with unimproved roads to Kunming, Changsha, Chungking, and Sian. As the war went on, these roads were improved. In 1938 a fairly modern motor highway between Chungking, Kunming, and Burma, promptly christened the Burma Road, was rushed to completion. In sixteen months 200,000 Chinese laborers completed this amazing highway. The work included the construction of 300 bridges and 2,000 culverts.

The map shows how these routes tied into the major road and railroad network in China.

OPERATIONS FROM 1937 TO 1940

During the night of 7–8 July 1937, Japanese troops on maneuvers clashed with Chinese soldiers guarding the ancient Marco Polo Bridge, twelve miles west of Peiping. Efforts to settle the matter through diplomatic channels failed, and the war that masqueraded for over six years under the sobriquet of the "Incident in China" was under way.

Japanese strategy for the conduct of the war embraced the following elements:

1. Establishment of a base of operation in the Peiping–Tientsin area from which to launch the principal attack.
2. A secondary attack at Shanghai.
3. Cutting of all Chinese supply routes to the outside world.
4. Air bombardment, not only of the Chinese armed forces but of the far-flung cities of China wherever possible, in order to break the people's will to resist.

The main attack was to be made from the north because it was hoped that the Chinese armies would thus be prevented from retreating into the deserts and mountains of western China. Once driven there, into the arms of Soviet Russia, the result might be endless guerrilla warfare—fatal to Japan's economy. An attack from the north promised to cut China's supply routes to Russia and offered the possibility of hammering the Chinese forces against the anvil of the secondary attack at Shanghai, thereby ending the war quickly. Probably the deciding factor in the decision to make this the main effort was that troops, equipment, and supplies were already on the ground in this area.

Shanghai was chosen for the secondary attack for the following reasons:

1. To create a diversion of Chinese forces from the north to protect that city.
2. To aim a blow at her economic position by capturing the financial heart of China and cutting off revenue from customs duties.
3. To obtain an excellent port for supplying Japanese troops in further operations.
4. To gain control of and utilize one of China's most important communication lines, the Yangtze River.

The initiation of active military operations in the Shanghai area demanded some untoward act by the Chinese there, since Japan could not openly tread on the toes of the various foreign powers represented in the International Settlement at Shanghai. Such an act was soon forthcoming under the skillful hands of the versatile Japanese.

Although the Japanese Army was vastly superior to China's varied assortment of troops, Japan's financial condition made a relatively short war highly desirable. Sound Chinese strategy, therefore, dictated the avoidance of decisive battles, the conservatiion of war ma-

terial and trained forces, the development of latent strength, the utilization of the vast area of China to draw out and disperse Japanese forces, and the slow exhaustion of Japan's resources until battle might be given under conditions more favorable to China. Chiang Kai-shek desired to sell space at the highest possible cost to the enemy in order to gain time to build up his own strength. Obviously such strategy presented the serious problems of holding together a widely scattered people and of supplying a large army despite the loss of highly important productive areas and routes of communication.

Japan's first move was to send forces west along the Kalgan–Paotow Railway in order to cut the Chinese supply routes to Russia and to protect the right flank of the main attack. This force, assisted by Mongols under Prince Teh (won to the Japanese cause by promises of an independent Mongolkuo), had by late August captured Kalgan and had forced the Chinese back on Tatung. The invaders soon overran the provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan, and on 1 November 1937 Japan proclaimed the new puppet state of Mongolkuo.

Early in September the Japanese consolidated the command of their independent armies in the north under General Count Hisaichi Terauchi, former Minister of War. While the operations in the west were under way, General Terauchi moved his central and eastern forces to a line of departure twenty miles south of the Peiping–Tientsin Railway. Reinforced to an estimated 250,000 men, and with his right flank now secure, Terauchi launched the main attack from that position on 14 September. The attack was made by two columns moving along the Peiping–Hankow and the Tientsin–Pukow railroad lines. Slowly the better-equipped enemy forces fought their way southward.

Their control of the conquered territory, however, extended no farther beyond the railroad rights of way than the glitter of their bayonets could be seen. These railroads, now vital Japanese supply routes, were subjected to constant night raids by Chinese guerrillas who posed as peasant farmers by day.

The Japanese advance in northern China stalled in November. Extended communication lines, the necessity of holding the large Kwantung Army in Manchukuo against the threat of a possible Russian attack, and the withdrawal of some forces to reinforce the Shanghai front reduced the invaders' superiority; and the Chinese armies held.

At Shanghai, in the meantime, the Japanese had found the excuse for launching their secondary attack. On the night of 9 August 1937 a clash at the Hungjao airport, outside Shanghai, between Chinese guards and inquisitive marines from the Japanese permanent garrison resulted in the killing of a Chinese sentry, a Japanese officer, and a Japanese seaman. Demands for the withdrawal of Chinese police from Shanghai and the evacuation of Chinese fortifications in the area were promptly refused. Two days later a Japanese naval force arrived and put ashore 4,000 marines to reinforce the permanent garrison. The Chinese rushed their crack German-trained 88th Division to the scene. On 13 August brushes between patrols occurred, and Japanese artillery opened fire. The spectacular and destructive Battle of Shanghai had begun.

The fighting around Shanghai was bitter and determined. Japan was forced to reinforce her troops in this area to such an extent that instead of fighting a war with a main attack in the north and a secondary effort at Shanghai, she found herself fighting a war on two fronts. Available reinforcements from Japan were all sent to the Shanghai front. Still more troops were secured by withdrawing units from the northern front. After several frontal assaults the Japanese employed amphibious forces in landings on the north shore of Hangchow Bay and along the south bank of the Yangtze River, thus turning the Chinese positions on the peninsula. Using an armored motorboat flotilla, the Japanese advanced quickly across Lake Tai, easily crossing this major military obstacle. These amphibious operations provided excellent training for the Japanese and a preview for the rest of the world of what was to come later in Malaya. Nanking was captured by the Japanese on 13 December and turned over to the troops for unrestrained sack, which continued for days amid scenes of panic and disorder. It was during the attack on Nanking that the United States gunboat *Panay* was sunk in the Yangtze River by Japanese bombers.

The year 1938 witnessed the closing of the Lunghai corridor, the capture of Hankow, and, with the taking of Canton, the extension of the invaders' control of China's coast **(Map 2)**.

Japan's initial operations during this year were directed at joining her two fronts by closing the Lunghai corridor—the area lying between the two fronts and extending to the sea. Offensives were launched from both north and south, with the vital rail center of Suchow as their objective. Suchow was finally captured late in May, but the bulk of Chinese forces had been skillfully withdrawn, leaving only the smoking ruins of the doomed city to satisfy Japanese

claims of a "Tannenberg of the East." In April, while the offensives against Suchow were still going on, the Chinese achieved their first outstanding victory in the undeclared war. A counteroffensive at Taierchwang cut off 60,000 Japanese troops; 30,000 of them fell as casualties, and the rest fought their way out, leaving huge quantities of arms and supplies to the jubilant Chinese. This victory had a tremendous effect on China's morale and will to resist, for it was the first time in modern history that a Japanese army had suffered a great military disaster.

After the closing of the corridor Japan's next thrust was to the west, against the railroad that runs from Chengchow to Hankow. The Japanese drive on Chegchow was stopped when the Chinese destroyed the dikes along the swollen Yellow River. "China's sorrow" surged over the countryside, sweeping the invader from the outskirts of Chengchow, destroying supplies, isolating many enemy units, and miring down large quantities of trucks, tanks, and artillery, which the Japanese had to abandon. The operation at Chengchow had to be given up, and the Japanese shifted their effort to the Yangtze Valley—against Hankow, the temporary capital of China. After five months of probably the bloodiest fighting of the war Hankow fell. Its capture, however, was largely accomplished by events that had transpired at Canton, farther to the south.

Emboldened in their anti-British stand by the September negotiations at Munich, the Japanese landed a force of about 40,000 men at Bias Bay (famed hideout of Chinese pirates), only twenty miles northeast of British Hong Kong. Their mission was to cut the Canton–Hankow Railway, which supplied Chinese forces at Hankow, and to capture Canton. Under cover of an intensive aerial assault this force brushed aside the weak Chinese militia there and occupied Canton, practically without firing a shot. The cutting of the railroad made the Chinese position at Hankow untenable. The occupation of Canton deprived China of another important source of revenue and closed her front door, leaving only the four overland supply routes available. In addition, Japan had gained an excellent springboard from which to launch an attack on Hong Kong.

Before quitting Hankow for Chungking, Chiang Kai-shek removed the bulk of Chinese manufacturing machinery to the interior. He then ordered the application of a scorched-earth policy, leaving to the invader only the smouldering remains of a once prosperous trade center.

Early in the year 1939 Japan seized the island of Hainan, off the south coast of China; this brought her threateningly near to Indo-China's port of Haiphong. About the same time the Japanese an-

nounced the addition to their empire of the Sinnan Island group, which includes the Spratly Islands. (The nearest island of the Philippines is only seventy miles from this group.) This move to the south definitely strengthened Japan's position in the South China Sea, gave her practical control of Indo-China's coastal waters, and placed her in an excellent position to strike at Borneo or Malaya.

On the main front in China only limited offensives were inaugurated by Japan. These were designed to gain complete control of the Canton–Hankow Railway. Nanchang was captured in March. In September the Japanese struck in the Changsha area but were repulsed. In December their attack was shifted to the south end of the railroad line, near Canton, and here they met with some success, moving about one hundred miles north along the railroad. Chinese counterattacks at that point not only stopped the advancing columns, but by the middle of January 1940 had forced them back to within twenty-five miles of Canton.

It was said that her offensive power had reached its peak with the capture of Hankow in 1938 and that the economic pinch of the war was now being felt by Japan. The stubborn and skillful Chinese resistance had definitely spoiled any chance of a quick success. Japan's strategy had undergone a radical change since July 1937. It is now evident that this change was brought about by events in Europe. Costly offensives were to be avoided, but every opportunity afforded by political or military moves in Europe was to be exploited. In order to economize on men and materials a program for the slow strangulation of China was undertaken. This type of operation would not only conserve Japan's strength but would also permit her to place that strength in strong strategic positions, ready for instant use when the time came.

In accordance with this new strategy the ports of Swatow, Amoy, Foochow, and Wenchow were occupied. Only the port of Pakhoi was left to Free China. In November the Japanese landed at Pakhoi and moved inland to Nanning. From this position they could bomb the Indo-China railroad to Kunming, an important Chinese supply line; and their troops were close enough to Indo-China to be sent there quickly should the opportunity arise.

With the advent of war in Europe in September 1939 Japan's belligerence and disregard for other nations' interests in the Far East increased. There was a noticeable stiffening of her anti-Occidental attitude, as was manifested by the harsh and humiliating treatment accorded foreign nationals. As time went on, the China Incident took on more of the aspect of a showdown between Japan and the Occidental nations for control of the Far East.

The United States entered the Far Eastern picture during 1939 when she denounced the Trade Treaty of 1911, leaving her free to cut off exports to Japan after 1 January 1940. Loss of this trade would be a serious blow to Japan's war effort.

OPERATIONS DURING 1940 AND 1941

Throughout 1940 the war in China was of secondary importance to Japan's southward move. The United States passed a compulsory military service act, appropriated funds for a much larger Navy, and placed exports to Japan on a day-to-day basis. Realizing that the time of reckoning was fast drawing near, Japan by-passed China in order to prepare for the inevitable conflict with the United States. Her military campaigns in China were conducted with the utmost economy of men and materials. As a result no important operations were undertaken during the year, and only minor changes took place in the situation there. Japan concentrated ostensibly on cutting Chinese supply lines, while actually securing bases from which to launch her bid for domination of half the world.

After the fall of France in June 1940 the impotent Vichy Government was forced to bow to Japanese demands to prohibit military supplies from entering China via Indo-China. In September, Japan gained concessions that allowed her to maintain troops in Indo-China. She occupied air bases within bombing distance of the Burma Road and confiscated large quantities of military supplies, valued by the Chinese at $8,000,000. She further prepared the way for her advances southward by signing a treaty of "mutual respect and peace" with Thailand, Indo-China's neighbor.

After Dunkirk, Britain, threatened with invasion at home, acquiesced in Japan's demands and in July 1940 closed the Burma Road for a period of three months. This step shut off every channel of supply to China except the long caravan route to Siberia. It marked the low point in her resistance. After her success in the Battle of Britain, however, Great Britain reopened the Burma Road in October; and China's morale improved tremendously.

Faced with the possible loss of oil supplies from the United States, Japan began a pressure campaign against the Netherlands East Indies, now on their own as a consequence of the occupation of Holland by Germany. Here, however, she was handed a strong rebuff.

In September 1940, after France had fallen and while Britain was fighting desperately to defend the homeland, Japan joined the Axis Powers.

As in the previous year, Japan manifested no apparent desire in 1941 to bring about a decision by force in China. That could wait; there was larger game in the offing. The few offensives actually undertaken took the form of raids, aimed at soft spots in the Chinese defenses. None met with any lasting success. The result of the year's fighting was the prolongation of an apparent stalemate.


The United States took a more active interest in China in 1941. Trained American Army fliers of the Officers' Reserve Corps were permitted to take service under Chiang Kai-shek. They became General Chennault's famous Flying Tigers, whose exploits are so well known. American engineers were sent to the Burma Road to untangle the traffic snarl there and to improve the road itself. They more than doubled the volume of goods moving to Chungking. In March, China began to receive assistance under the Lend-Lease Act.


Early in the year Japan acted as mediator between Thailand and Indo-China after their armed clash over territorial claims. Evidence indicates that this dispute, started late in 1940, had been incited by the Japanese. Thailand was granted certain territories, and Japan thereby increased her influence over that country. Her helpful attitude toward Thailand was to pay dividends later on when she moved into Malaya and then into Burma.


In April, Japan and Russia signed a five-year nonaggression pact. Japan had now secured her vulnerable right flank against attack, but she continued to maintain strong forces in Manchuria and made no immediate move to the south. In June, when Germany's attack on Russia seemed to insure the latter's adherence to the nonaggression pact, Japan again turned her attention to Indo-China. By the end of July the entire country had been occupied and, except in name, had become Japanese territory. The Vichy Government could do nothing but acquiesce.

As a result of this move the United States immediately placed an embargo on all Japanese trade and created a new command in the Philippines, the United States Forces in the Far East. Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur was named commander. As Britain and the Netherlands East Indies followed our lead in placing an embargo, Japan's principal sources of iron, oil, and rubber were lost to her. Henceforth she must depend on her newly acquired territories and her stock piles. Since these sources offered inadequate quantities of strategic materials for any prolonged operation, such as the China Incident was proving to be, Japan was faced with either quitting her campaign in China or seizing new sources of iron, oil, and rubber.

The occupation of Indo-China was the handiwork of Japan's new Government, headed by General Hideki Tojo and dominated by a jingoist Army clique. For this militaristic Government there was no backing out, but time was needed to complete the final preparations for war. As a screen for these preparations time-consuming negotiations were entered into with the United States. Mr. Saburo Kurusu was sent to Washington to assist the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, in the diplomatic discussions. Under this umbrella of deception the Japanese struck on 7 December 1941.



1
U. S. S. R.
TRANS-SIBERIAN R.R.
LAKE BAIKAL
IRKUTSK
SERGIOPOL
OUTER MONGOLIA
CARAVAN AND MOTOR ROUTE
GOBI DESERT
URUMCHI
CARAVAN AND MOTOR ROUTE
SINKIANG
ANSI
INNER MONGOLIA
SUIYAN
PAOTOW
KALGAN
CHAHAR
JEHOL
MANCHURIA (MANCHUKUO)
AMUR R.
KHABAROVSK
MUKDEN
HSINKING
HARBIN
VLADIVOSTOK
KWANTUNG PENINSULA
PORTARTHUR
PEIPING
TIENTSIN
TATUNG
GREAT WALL
KOREA (CHOSEN)
SHANTUNG
TSINAN
TSINGTAO
YELLOW SEA
TAIERCHWANG
HAICHOW
LANCHOW
CHENGCHOW
Hwang Ho
Yellow R.
SUCHOW
SIAN
CHINA
NANKING
PUKOW
SHANGHAI
LAKE TAI
HANGCHOW
ANKANG
LAOHOKOW
HANKOW
Yangtze River
CHENGTU
ICHANG
CHUNGKING
LAKE POYANG
TUNG TING LAKE
CHINKIANG
CHANGTEH
CHANGSHA
NANCHANG
WENCHOW
KWEITANG
TUYUN
HENGYANG
FOOCHOW
KUNMING
BURMA ROAD
KWEILIN
AMOY
LIUCHOW
SWATOW
CANTON
HONG KONG
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
NANNING
PAKHOI
KWANGCHOWAN
HAIPHONG
HANOI
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
HAINAN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
SPRATLY ISLANDS
500 MI.
BAY OF BENGAL
THAILAND
RANGOON
MOULMEIN
AKYAB
MANDALAY
LASHIO
CALCUTTA
RANGARH
INDIA
ASSAM
BHUTAN
SADIYA
LEDO
Brahmaputra R.
NEPAL
MTS.
TIBET
MAYA
KYUSHU
SHIKOKU
HONSHU
RYUKYU ISLANDS
OKINAWA
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
Chinese Territory Seized Prior to July 1937 and Major Japanese Drives in 1937
0 100 200 300 400 500
SCALE OF MILES


2
U. S. S. R.
TRANS-SIBERIAN R.R.
LAKE BAIKAL
IRKUTSK
SERGIOPOL
OUTER MONGOLIA
CARAVAN AND MOTOR ROUTE
URUMCHI
GOBI DESERT
SINKIANG
ANSI
INNER MONGOLIA
MANCHURIA (MANCHUKUO)
KHABAROVSK
TSITSIHAR
HARBIN
VLADIVOSTOK
HSINKING
MUKDEN
CHAHAR
JEHOL
SUIYAN
PAOTOW
KALGAN
TATUNG
PEIPING
TIENTSIN
KWANTUNG PENINSULA
PORT ARTHUR
KOREA (CHOSEN)
SHANTUNG
TSINAN
TSINGTAO
YELLOW SEA
LANCHOW
TAIEHCHWANG
HAICHOW
SUCHOW
LUNGHAI CORRIDOR
NANKING
SHANGHAI
HONSHU
KYUSHU
RYUKYU ISLANDS
OKINAWA
HIMALAYA MTS.
TIBET
NEPAL
BHUTAN
SIAN
CHINA
ANKANG
LAOHOKOW
HANKOW
CHENGTU
Yangtze River
ICHANG
CHUNGKING
TUNG TING LAKE
CHANGTEH
CHIHKIANG
CHANGSHA
NANCHANG
WENCHOW
HENGYANG
FOOCHOW
KWEITANG
TUYUN
KWEILIN
KUNMING
BURMA ROAD
LIUCHOW
AMOY
SWATOW
CANTON
HONGKONG
NANNING
PAKHOI
KWANGCHOWAN
HAIPHONG
HAINAN
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
SADIYA
LEDO
Brahmaputra R.
Ganges River
ASSAM
INDIA
RAMGARH
CALCUTTA
MYITKYINA
LASHIO
MANDALAY
BURMA
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
BAY OF BENGAL
AKYAB
RANGOON
MOULMEIN
THAILAND
Salween R.
Mekong R.
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Invaded early 1939
SPRATLY ISLANDS
500 MI.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
LEGEND
Territory occupied prior to 1938.
Line held at end of 1938.
" " " " " 1939.
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
Japanese Advances During
1938 and 1939
0 100 200 300 400 500
SCALE OF MILES




THE WAR WITH JAPAN

CONTEMPLATED EXPANSION
OF JAPANESE EMPIRE



THE WAR WITH JAPAN

OPENING OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE OFFENSIVE


THE WAR WITH JAPAN
5
The Attack on Pearl Harbor
7 December 1941
0 4 8
SCALE OF MILES
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
KAUAI
NIIHAU
OAHU
HONOLULU
MOLOKAI
MAUI
HAWAII
First Wave
0740
Second Wave
0850
54 Dive Bombers
45 Fighters
36 Fighters
81 Dive Bombers
54 Horizontal Bombers
40 Torpedo Bombers
50 Horizontal Bombers
KAHUKU POINT
KAHUKU
HALEIWA
KAENA POINT
KOOLAU RANGE
WAHIAWA
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
WHEELER FIELD
WAIANAE
WAIPAHU
PEARL HARBOR
Naval Air Station
Ford Is.
Navy Yard
HICKAM FIELD
EWA
Marine Base
BARBERS POINT
KANEOHE BAY
Naval Air Station
Ulupau Head
BELLOWS FIELD
KAIMUKI
HONOLULU
MAKAPUU HEAD
DIAMOND HEAD
KOKO HEAD
PACIFIC OCEAN


THE WAR WITH JAPAN


HONG KONG CAMPAIGN


8-25 December 1941


0 2 4 6


SCALE OF MILES






THE WAR WITH JAPAN 7
MALAYAN CAMPAIGN
British Dispositions and Japanese Landings 8 December 1941
0 25 50 75 100
SCALE OF MILES
TAVOY
THAILAND (SIAM)
BANGKOK
INDO-CHINA
TENASSERIM
MERGUI
GULF OF THAILAND
CHUMPON
VICTORIA POINT
ISTHMUS OF KRA
BAN DON
THAILAND (SIAM)
SINGORA
HAADYAI
PATANI
ALOR STAR
II
SUNGEI PATANI
KROH
GEORGETOWN
PENANG
BUTTERWORTH
Perak R.
IPOH
9
KUALA KRAI
KUALA TRENGGANU
KUALA DUNGUN
KUALA LIPIS
TELOK
TROLAK
Slim R.
KUANTAN
KUALA KUBU
KUALA SELANGOR
III
KUALA LUMPUR
PORT SWETTENHAM
FEDERATED MALAY STATES R.R.
SEREMBAN
ENDAU
GEMAS
MERSING
JEMALUANG
MALACCA
Muar R.
8 (Australian)
MUAR
BATU PAHAT
JOHORE BAHRU
SINGAPORE
STRAIT OF MALACCA
SUMATRA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
JOHORE
JOHORE BAHRU
NAVAL BASE
STRAIT OF
SELETAR
PULAU UBIN
TENGA
PASIR LABA
RESERVOIRS
SINGAPORE
SINGAPORE ISLAND
Equator


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 8
MALAYAN CAMPAIGN
Operations 8 December 1941 to 15 February 1942
0 25 50 75 100
SCALE OF MILES
From Indo-China through Thailand.
25 Dec.
28 Dec.
7 Jan.
11 Jan.
8 Jan.
14 Jan.
15 Jan.
31 Jan.
Night 8-9 Feb.
15 Feb.
THAILAND (SIAM)
INDO-CHINA
GULF OF THAILAND
BANGKOK
SINGORA
HAADYAI
PATANI
CHUMPON
VICTORIA POINT
ISTHMUS OF KRA
BAN DON
KOTA BHARU
KUALA TRENGGANU
KUALA DUNGUN
KUANTAN
KUALA LIPIS
KUALA LUMPUR
PENANG
GEORGETOWN
IPOH
MALACCA
JOHORE BAHRU
SINGAPORE
SINGAPORE ISLAND
STRAIT OF MALACCA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
SUMATRA
Equator


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 9
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
American Dispositions 10 December 1941 and Reactions to Japanese Landings to 23 December
0 25 50 75 100
SCALE OF MILES
From Formosa
BABUYAN ISLANDS
10 Dec.
APARRI
Army planes began to base in this area on 18 Dec.
12 Dec.
VIGAN
10 Dec.
LUZON
SAN FERNANDO (LaUNION)
22 Dec.
BAGUIO
CAMP JOHN HAY
BAYAMBONG
KIANGAN
LINGAYEN
21
71
91
USAFFE Reserve
TARLAC
26
IBA
Iba Field
Clark Field
Del Carmen Field
3
SAN FERNANDO (PAMPANGA)
Phil.
CALUMPIT
OLONGAPO
NORTH LUZON FORCE
SOUTH LUZON FORCE
Part from Ryukyu Is.
Part from Palau Is.
24 Dec.
MANILA
Nielson Field
FORT McKINLEY
Nichols Field
CAVITE
CORRECIDOR
CABALLO
CARABAO
41
5
LIPA
LUCENA
TAYABAS BAY
LAMON BAY
ALABAT I.
MAUBAN
LUCBAN
ATIMONAN
NAGA
CATANDUANES
LEGASPI
12 Dec.
From Palau Is.
SOUTH LUZON FORCE
VISAYAN-MINDANAO FORCE
MINDORO
MINDORO STRAIT
TABLAS STRAIT
SAN JOSE
SIBUYAN
SIBUYAN SEA
TABLAS
MASBATE
SAMAR
SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 10
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
Operations in Northern Luzon
22 - 28 December
0 5 10 20 30
SCALE OF MILES
22 Dec.
23 Dec.
24 Dec.
25 Dec.
26 Dec.
28 Dec.
D-1
D-2
D-3
D-4
D-5
(Planned)
XXX
NORTH LUZON FORCE
WAINWRIGHT
II (Part)
(71 Div)
71 (-)
11 (-)
21
26
91
(+)
(-)
LINGAYEN GULF
SOUTH CHINA SEA
LUZON
PACIFIC OCEAN
CARABALLO MOUNTAINS
SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS
ZAMBALES MTS
BAGUIO
BALAOAN
SAN FABIAN
DAGUPAN
SAN CARLOS
CABARUAN HILLS
ROSALES
CUYAPO
CAMILING
VICTORIA
TARLAC
CAPAS
CONCEPCION
GAPAN
SAN JOSE
BALER
BALER BAY
DINGALAN BAY
DASOL BAY
LINGAYEN
BOLINAO
AGNO
BACABAC
SAN QUINTIN
BURGOS
DIGDIG
CARRANGLAN
PANTABANGAN
LUPAO
NAMPICUAN
PAPAYA
CABU
PANGATIAN
LA PAZ
CAMP O'DONNELL
BOTOLAN
IBA
SAN FELIPE
SAN ANTONIO
SAN MARCELINO
SUBIC
STA. RITA
DINALUPIHAN
DUCAL
LUBAO
PORAC
MEXICO
SAN FERNANDO
Del Carmen
GUAGUA
CALUMPIT
PLARIDEL
BALIUAG
MEXICO
ANGELES
ARAYAT
MT. ARAYAT
MAGALANG
CLARK FIELD
DAU
FT. STOTSENBURG
MT. PINATUBO
DOLORES
CAPAS
PORAC
Pampanga R.
Angat R.
Meycauayan R.
UMIRAY
SIBUL SPRINGS
NORZAGARAY
IPO
LAMON BAY
(50 miles)


THE WAR WITH JAPAN (11)
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
Operations in Southern Luzon and the Withdrawal to Bataan
SCALE OF MILES
LUZON
D-4
D-5
(Planned)
Actual, 31 Dec.
30 Dec.
28 Dec.
NORTH LUZON FORCE
WAINWRIGHT
1-3 Jan.
6 Jan.
7 Jan.
MAIN BATTLE POSITION
WAINWRIGHT
PARKER
USAFFE
MacARTHUR
FOURTEENTH
HOMMA
31 Dec.
1 Jan.
SOUTH LUZON FORCE
PARKER (JONES)
Began moving into position 15 Jan.
En route to Bataan, 24 Dec.
29 Dec.
26-28 Dec.
25 Dec.
24 Dec.
27 Dec.
26 Dec.
MANILA BAY
LAGUNA DE BAY
LAKE TAAL
TAYABAS BAY
LAMON BAY
SOUTH CHINA SEA
ZAMBALES MOUNTAINS
SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS
CORREGIDOR
CAVITE
MANILA
PASAY
NICHOLS FIELD
NIELSON FIELD
CLARK FIELD
CAMP O'DONNELL
FT. STOTSENBURG
MT. PINATUBO
MT. SAMAT
MT. NATIB
MT. ORO
SAN FERNANDO
SAN JOSE
SAN ANTONIO
SAN NARCELINO
SAN FELIPE
SUBIC BAY
OLONGAPO
BAGAC
MORONG
MAUBAN
LIMAY
PILAR
ORION
BALAYAN
BATANGAS
LUCENA
SAN PABLO
LOS BAÑOS
TAGAYTAY
NASUGBU
CALUMPIT
PAMPANGA R.
AGNO R.
AGNO
LINGAYEN
BOTOLAN
IBA
CAPAS
DOLORES
ANGELES
ARAYAT
MEXICO
BALIUAG
MALOLOS
NOVALICHES
MONTALBAN
SAN MATEO
MARIKINA
PINUGAY
ANTIPOLO
TAYTAY
TANAY
PAGSANJAN
LUPAS
SINILOAN
SAN DIEGO
MUNTINLUPA
CANLUBAN
OLINGA
MAUBAN
TAYABAS
ANTIMONAN
NAGA
INFANTA
TAMALA
UMIRAY
PAPAYA
SIBUL SPRINGS
NORZAGARAY
PLARIDEL
SUBIC
STO. RITA
DINALUPIHAN
ZIGAGA
ABUCAY
CABCABEN
EL FRAILE
CARABAO I.
CABALLO I.
FT. HUGHES
FT. DRUM
FT. FRANK
TERNATE
LEMERY
CUENCA
TAAL
3 MILES





THE WAR WITH JAPAN

PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN

American Dispositions
7 January 1942

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SCALE OF MILES


13
SUBIC BAY
GRANDE I.
(Ft. Wint)
Sampaloc Pt.
PORT BINANGA
(-)
13 Jan.
20-21 Jan.
16-17 Jan.
MORON
MAUBAN
21-22 Jan.
12-17 Jan.
10-16 Jan.
10-15 Jan.
Ilo Ilo Creek
ABUCAY
MT. NATIB
4222
51
41
57
17-20 Jan.
BALANGA
Phil. (-)
51 (Reforming)
31 (Part)
26
11
PILAR
ORION
11
BAGAC
91
Tuol R.
Colo R.
MT. SAMAT
San Vicente R.
I
II
Mamala R.
LIMAY
SOUTH CHINA SEA
+4700
MARIVELES MTS.
Alangan R.
Binuangan R.
SERVICE COMMAND AREA
Lamao R.
TOBANG
Anyasin R.
MT. BATAAN
Agloloma R.
Canas Pt.
Quimauan Pt.
CABCABEN
MARIVELES
Longaskawayan Pt.
MARIVELES HARBOR
MANILA BAY
XXXX
USAFFE
MacARTHUR
CORREGIDOR I.
(Ft. Mills)
CABALLO I.
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
Operations Along the Moron-Abucay Line
10-22 January 1942
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SCALE OF MILES





THE WAR WITH JAPAN


PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN


First Japanese Offensive Against the Bagac – Orion Position
23 Jan. – 23 Feb.


0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SCALE OF MILES



SUBIC BAY
GRANDE I
(Ft. Wint)
Sampaloc Pt.
PORT BINANGA
to Olongapo
to Lazac
FOURTEENTH
HOMMA
MT. NATIB
ABUCAY
BALANGA
MORON
MAUBAN
PILAR
BAGAC
3 Apr.
4 Apr.
5 Apr.
6-7 Apr.
PROV.
8-9 Apr.
7 Apr.
7-8 Apr.
8 Apr.
LIMAY
MARIVELES MTS.
MT. BATAAN
Canas Pt.
Quimauon Pt.
Longaskawayan Pt.
MARIVELES HARBOR
CABCABEN
LUZON FORCE
KING
XXXX
USFIP
WAINWRIGHT
CORREGIDOR I.
(Ft. Mills)
CABALLO I.
SOUTH CHINA SEA
MANILA BAY
Binuangan R.
Anyasin R.
Agloloma
Alangan R.
Lamao R.
Talisay R.
Culis R.
San Vicente
Mabiga R.
5-6 May
MALINTA HILL
KINDLEY FIELD
SOUTH DOCK
NORTH DOCK
CORREGIDOR ISLAND
Japanese Landings
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
The Japanese Breakthrough 3-9 April
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SCALE OF MILES


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 16
Japanese Landing Operations
8 December 1941 - 6 May 1942
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
SCALE OF MILES
CHINA
BURMA
THAILAND
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
PHILIPPINE SEA
HAINAN
HONG KONG
Surrendered 25 Dec.
XXXX FOURTEENTH
XXXX FIFTEENTH
XXXX TWENTY-FIFTH
Philippines surrendered 6 May.
Surrendered 15 Feb.
10 Dec.
12 Dec.
22 Dec.
23 Dec.
23 Jan.
12 Dec.
18 Apr.
10 Apr.
2 May
8 Dec.
8 Dec.
16 Dec.
24 Dec.
2 Mar.
29 Apr.
20 Dec.
25 Dec.
31 Dec.
Apr.
RANGOON
MANDALAY
BHAMO
LASHIO
MYITKYINA
MOGAUNG
PROME
CHIENG MAI
MESOD
MOULMEIN
TAVOY
MERGUI
BANGKOK
CHUMPON
GULF OF THAILAND
Victoria Pt.
BAN DON
KRA ISTHMUS
ANDAMAN ISLANDS
NICOBAR ISLANDS
SAIGON
CAMRANH BAY
SPRATLY IS.
PALAWAN
SINGORA
PATANI
KOTA BHARU
PENANG
MALAY STATES
KUANTAN
MEDAN
STRAIT OF MALACCA
SINGAPORE
SUMATRA
INDIAN OCEAN
PAMANG-KAT
PONTIANAK
KUCHING
SARAWAK
BRUNEI BAY
BRUNEI
MIRI
NORTH BORNEO
WESTON
SANDAKEN
JOLO
ZAMBOANGA
COTABATO
DAVAO
DIGOS
MINDANAO
CAGAYAN DE ORO
MONTE
NEGROS
CEBU
LEYTE
BOHOL
SAMAR
MINDORO
PANAY
ISLANDS
MANILA
LINGAYEN GULF
VIGAN
APARRI
CAMON BAY
FORMOSA
TAKAO
SWATOW
AMOY
CANTON
HANOI
HAIPHONG
ULITHI
YAP
NGULU
PALAU ISLANDS
TARAKAN I.
CELEBES SEA
TALAUD
MOROTAI
HALMAHERA
MENADO
CELEBES
MOLUCCA IS.
SANSAPOR
VOGELKOP PEN.
BIAK
NOEMFOOR
WAKDE
SARMI
GERAM
BABO
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
AMBOINA
KENDARI
MACASSAR
MACASSAR STRAIT
MOLUCCA SEA
BANDA SEA
BORNEO (DUTCH)
BALIKPAPAN
BANJERMASIN
BANKA I.
PALEMBANG
JAVA SEA
BAWEAN I.
SUNDRA STRAIT
BATAVIA
JAVA
SEMARANG
SOERABAJA ((SURABAYA)
TJILATJAP
MALANG
BALI
LOMBOK
DENPASAR
SUMBA
FLORES
TIMOR (DUTCH)
DILLI (Port)
KOEPANG
TIMOR SEA
ARAFURA SEA
CHRISTMAS
DARWIN
AUSTRALIA
Equator


TIBET
BHUTAN
INDIA
ASSAM
NAGA HILLS
BURMA
CHINA
FRENCH INDO CHINA
THAILAND
BAY OF BENGAL
GULF OF MARTABAN
Brahmaputra R.
Assam-Bengal Railroad
Burma Road
To CHANGSHA
CHUNGKING
KUNMING
SADIYA
LEDO
FT. HERTZ
DIMAPUR
KOHIMA
MAINGKHAN
MYITKYINA
HOMALIN
IMPHAL
MOGAUNG
TENGYUEH
PAOSHAN
LUNGLING
TAMU
INDAW
WUNTHO
BHAMO
KYUKSE
KYUKSE
SHWEBO
MANDALAY
MAUNGDAW
AKYAB
RAMGARH
175 mi.
CALCUTTA
CHITTAGONG
RAGAN
TAUNGGYI
MONG PAYAK
HANOI
HAIPHONG
PROME
TAUNGUP
TOUNGOO
SITTANG R.
CHIENGMAI
MARTABAN
PAAN
ANDAMAN IS.
140 mi.
CAPE NEGRAIS
BANGKOK
100 MI.
11 May
29 Apr
30 Apr
18 Apr
18 Apr
30 Mar
7 Mar
Apr
XXXX BURMA
XXXX FIFTH
XXXX SIXTH
XXXX BURMA
HUTTON
(ALEXANDER)
XXXX FIFTEENTH
IIDA
XX (part)
XX (part)
III Ch
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
Invasion of Burma January–May 1942
0 50 100 200
SCALE OF MILES


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 18
Operations in the Netherlands East Indies
January – March 1942
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
SCALE OF MILES
CHINA
BURMA
THAILAND
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
HAINAN
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
PHILIPPINE SEA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
ANDAMAN ISLANDS
NICOBAR ISLANDS
KRA ISTHMUS
GULF OF THAILAND
CAMRANH BAY
SPRATLY IS.
PALAWAN
MINDORO
SAMAR
PANAY
CEBU
LEYTE
BOHOL
NEGROS
MINDANAO
PALAU ISLANDS
ULITHI
YAP
NGULU
SOUTH CHINA SEA
CELEBES SEA
SULU SEA
BORNEO (DUTCH)
NORTH BORNEO
SARAWAK
BRUNEI BAY
CELEBES
MOLUCCA IS.
HALMAHERA
MOROTAI
CERAM
BABO
VOGELKOP PEN.
NOEMFOOR
BIAK
SARMI
WAKDE
SANSAPOR
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
BANDA SEA
ARAFURA SEA
TIMOR SEA
TIMOR (DUTCH)
FLORES
SUMBA
JAVA
SUMATRA
BANKA I.
INDIAN OCEAN
Equator
XXXX FIFTEENTH
XXXX TWENTY-FIFTH MALAY STATES
XXXX SIXTEENTH
XXXX FOURTEENTH
May
Mar.
Jan.
Surrendered 25 Dec.
Philippines surrendered 6 May
Headquarters of Southern Army Group directing all land operations shown on the map
WEST. INVASION FORCE
EAST. INVASION FORCE
CARRIER STRIKING FORCE
11 Jan.
23 Jan.
30 Jan.
Surrendered 15 Feb.
1 Feb.
14 Feb.
28 Feb.
11 Feb.
10 Feb.
18 Feb.
19 Feb.
20 Feb.
Battle of Macassar Strait Nt. 23-24 Jan.
Battle of the Java Sea 27 Feb.
Battle of Lombok Strait 18-19 Feb.
Carrier Striking Force operated in this area from 25 Feb. to 9 Mar.
CHRISTMAS
DARWIN
AUSTRALIA


THE WAR WITH JAPAN
19
Operations in South and Southwest Pacific January – August 1942
0 50 100 200 300
SCALE OF MILES
FOURTH FLEET
Equator
159°
New boundary between South and Southwest Pacific Theaters established 2 July, 1942.
ADMIRALTY IS.
MANUS
LOS NEGROS
ST. MATTHIAS ISLANDS
KAVIENG
23 Jan.
NEW IRELAND
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO
RABAUL
WEWAK
NORTHEAST NEW GUINEA
MADANG
LONG
SAIDOR
DUMPU
VITIAZ STRAIT
C. GLOUCESTER
TALASEA
ARAWE
GASMATA
FINSCHHAFEN
8 Feb.
8 Mar.
LAE
SALAMAUA
HUON GULF
Air attack 10 Mar.
MOROBE
GULF OF PAPUA
OWEN STANLEY MTS.
SOGERI
BUNA
22 July
1 Aug.
PORT MORESBY
RIGO
GOODENOUGH
FERGUSSON
NORMANBY
MILNE BAY
TROBRIAND ISLANDS
WOODLARK
LOUISIADE ARCHIPELAGO
CARRIER TASK FORCE
CARRIER TASK FORCE 20 Feb.
13 Mar.
GREEN
BUKA
BOUGAINVILLE
23 Jan.
KIETA
EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY
TREASURY ISLANDS
CHOISEUL
VELLA LAVELLA
KOLOMBANGARA
NEW GEORGIA
MUNDA
RENDOVA
TRANSPORT FORCE
Invaded May–July
SANTA ISABEL
RUSSELL ISLANDS
3 May
FLORIDA
TULAGI
SAVO
6 July
MALAITA
GUADALCANAL
Air attack 4 May
SAN CRISTOBAL
RENNELL
CARRIER FORCE
Battle of the Coral Sea 4-8 May
7 May
CARRIER TASK FORCE
CARRIER TASK FORCE
SOLOMON SEA
SOLOMON ISLANDS
CORAL SEA



THE WAR WITH JAPAN

Area Under Japanese Control

6 August 1942

and the Allied Reorganization

30 March 1942

~~RESTRICTED~~

THE WAR WITH JAPAN

PART 2

(August 1942 to December 1944)



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

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DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK
1950

~~RESTRICTED~~

FOREWORD

This account of the war with Japan has been written for use in the instruction of cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is based for the most part on material furnished by the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff, and other War Department agencies. Much valuable information has also been obtained from the publications of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

However, in acknowledging indebtedness to others it is not desired to place on them the responsibility for any factual errors or for any conclusions drawn.

This and other pamphlets on World War II are constantly being revised as additional information becomes available. It will be appreciated if military personnel who note any apparent errors or discrepancies, or who have comments or suggestions for the improvement of the subject matter, will communicate them to:

The Professor of Military Art and Engineering,
U. S. Military Academy,
West Point, N. Y.

January 1947

ARMY-USMA, WEST POINT, N.Y.-2250 10-4-50

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THE WAR WITH JAPAN

PART 2

(August 1942 to December 1944)

—★—

INTRODUCTION

By 6 August 1942 the full tide of Japanese conquest had reached its high-water mark (**Map 1**). In only eight months of war the Allies had been swept from their holdings throughout the Far East by a military power that they had considered second-rate before 7 December 1941. But Japan's rapid advance had not been without disadvantages to her. Principal among these were the weak spots that developed in the extended periphery as an inevitable consequence of the dispersion of combat power. In a preceding account* we have covered the campaigns of Japanese conquest and the checks administered by American forces in the Coral Sea and off Midway Island. But the temporary halting of the enemy offensive was not in itself sufficient. It was now deemed necessary to undertake measures for first seizing and then holding the initiative.

In the following pages the events of importance that occurred during the period 7 August 1942 to 31 December 1944 will be recounted. Several of the more important operations will be treated fully, but the scope of this account precludes a detailed examination of all the engagements that took place in the vast Pacific theater during that time. Emphasis will be placed on the progress of the war as a whole rather than on individual battles. It should be borne in mind that many campaigns which are of necessity treated separately were actually concurrent and represented the component parts of an over-all strategic plan.

That part of the war with which we are concerned divides itself naturally into two periods: (1) operations from 7 August 1942 to the end of 1943 and (2) those during 1944. The first period witnessed the halt of the Japanese advance and the seizure of the initiative by the Allies. At the same time it was a period of major preparation for something more, the launching of a powerful counteroffensive in 1944.

* *The War With Japan, Part 1.*

OPERATIONS, 7 AUGUST 1942 TO 31 DECEMBER 1943

STRATEGIC SITUATION

The area under Japanese control, as shown on the map, indicates the gravity of the Allied situation in August 1942. The imminent danger to Australia and the vital supply lines from the United States is apparent. In two important engagements—the Battle of the Coral Sea in May and the Battle of Midway in June—the Allies already had repulsed further advances by the enemy. Japanese naval strength had suffered a serious blow at Midway, and the enemy found it necessary to reorganize his forces in order to prepare for his next move, which was to be another thrust toward Australia. However, by this time he was faced with the difficulty of supplying troops thousands of miles from home and along a front that extended from India through Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, and the Solomons, and thence north through the Gilberts to the Aleutians. Allied submarines and planes had taken an increasingly larger toll of shipping as the months went by, and the speed that had characterized Japanese operations during the early part of the war could no longer be maintained because there were fewer ships to cover greater distances.

Meanwhile the United States had acted to protect her shipping routes to Australia. Air bases and protective garrisons had been established on Palmyra and Canton, and in the Ellice, Fiji, and New Hebrides Islands. American troops, as early as March, had been sent to New Caledonia from Australia. Thus we had established a series of defensive island bases along a great arc reaching from Honolulu to Sydney. They were the steppingstones of our supply system and the springboards for our later offensive operations.

Early in May a Japanese naval landing force had occupied Tulagi, in the southern Solomons (**Map 2**). On 6 July troops and construction laborers landed on Guadalcanal and began to lay out an airfield. A large force disembarked on 22 July at Gona, on the north coast of New Guinea, and started to advance overland against Port Moresby. The loss of Moresby would force the Allies back to the Australian mainland and provide the Japanese with an excellent base from which to launch an invasion of that continent. The operation of enemy land-based aircraft from Guadalcanal would immediately imperil our control of the New Hebrides–New Caledonia area, the loss of which would result in the severing of our all-too-tenuous supply lines to Australia.

At this critical time the Allies decided to adopt the tactical offensive (while remaining on the strategic defensive) to stop the enemy's advance.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the immediate execution of a two-pronged counterattack: one prong directed toward northern New Guinea from Port Moresby; the other up the chain of the Solomons, with Guadalcanal as the initial objective. The final objective of both was Rabaul, the principal Japanese base in the Southwest Pacific. These operations were undertaken with the limited means available at the time, but their success led to our seizure of the initiative throughout the Pacific. The Guadalcanal campaign and the Papuan campaign in New Guinea were our first steps back on the road to Tokyo. Because of their importance and the lessons to be learned, they will be discussed in detail in these pages, although the same cannot be done for all the campaigns and battles of the war in the Pacific.

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA (Map 1)

The Guadalcanal operation, our first real offensive, was planned and executed under the direction of Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley,* who in April had assumed command of the newly organized South Pacific Area, with headquarters at Auckland, New Zealand. The Southwest Pacific Area remained under the command of General MacArthur. It soon became necessary to shift the boundary between the two commands in order that the area of the proposed operation would be included in the South Pacific Area. By directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the new dividing line was designated as the 159th meridian south from the equator, passing through Santa Isabel Island in the Solomons **(Map 2)**. Serving under Admiral Ghormley was Major General Millard F. Harmon, commander of all United States Army forces in the South Pacific Area.

On 14 June the advance echelon of the American 1st Marine Division arrived at Wellington, New Zealand, and on 11 July the main body reached that port **(Map 1)**. This division, under the command of Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, U. S. Marine Corps, expected to train in New Zealand in preparation for offensive operations to be undertaken some six months later. Consequently, little attention had been paid to the matter of loading, and supplies for the entire force were scattered throughout the ships of both convoys. On 26 June, well before the main convoy arrived, General Vandegrift was informed of the decision to seize certain Japanese-held areas in

* The ranks of officers as given throughout this narrative were those held during the operations discussed. Unless otherwise indicated, all naval commanders listed were officers of the United States Navy, and all troop commanders were officers of the United States Army.

the Solomon Islands. D-day for the operation was tentatively set for 1 August.

The period preceding D-day was one of feverish activity. Detailed plans for the offensive operation had to be prepared, and all ships had to be first unloaded and then combat unit loaded. The resultant delay, plus the late arrival of the main convoy, necessitated the postponement of D-day until 7 August.

On 22 July the marines left New Zealand and several days later rendezvoused 400 miles southeast of the Fiji Islands with other elements of the task force that was to make the assault on the Solomons. Here was gathered the largest amphibious force assembled by the United States up to that time. It included the 1st Marine Division,* reinforced by the 2d Marine Regiment ** and other troops—a total of 19,500 men carried in nineteen transports and four destroyer-transports. Naval warships assigned to the force included the aircraft carriers *Saratoga, Enterprise,* and *Wasp,* the battleship *North Carolina,* fourteen cruisers, and thirty destroyers. Miscellaneous other vessels brought the total number of ships to about eighty. Few, if any, of those who gazed at this mighty array of naval power could foresee that in an amazingly short time the rapidly expanding productive capacity of the United States would make possible the organization of a number of such task forces, each of a size that would dwarf the fleet now assembled.

The entire force then proceeded to the Fiji Islands, where four days were spent in landing exercises. Despite the bad weather, the necessity to observe radio silence for security reasons, and the precautions taken to preserve all landing barges and equipment for the real show—all of which prevented the attainment of genuine battle conditions—much valuable experience was gained during these dress rehearsals. On the evening of 31 July the task force got under way for Guadalcanal—the Allies' first, and what was destined to be the most critical, step up the ladder of the Solomons.

Guadalcanal Campaign (Map 3).—The immediate objectives to be seized and held by the expeditionary force were (1) the Tulagi–Gavutu–Tanambogo area, the largest and best developed anchorage in the southern Solomons, and (2) the nearly completed airfield on Guadalcanal.

Guadalcanal Island is some ninety miles long and up to twenty-five miles in width. Along its southern coast jagged mountains rise precipitously from the shoreline, reaching a height of 8000 feet.

* 1st and 5th Regiments only; the 7th was in Samoa.

** From the 2d Marine Division.

The northern slopes, densely wooded, give way abruptly to rolling foothills. Finger-like ridges reach into the flat coastal plain that extends along the north side of the island. Scattered throughout the high jungle foothills are numerous clearings, covered with thick, high, tough-stemmed grass. At frequent intervals streams and rivers, originating generally in the foothills, flow to the coast. Some, upon approaching the shore, become tidal lagoons flanked by heavily overgrown swamps. Others, notably the Lunga and the Tenaru, are swift streams, flowing in relatively firm ground and offering sites for fording. The thick jungle made travel, except along the rare native trails, an impossibility save at the cost of painfully slow cutting through masses of vines and creepers. The one road on Guadalcanal ran from Kokumbona to Taivu Point, skirting the shoreline all the way. The beaches are sand or gravel, falling away sharply from the water line. In many places coral reefs extend from the shore for several miles, making coastal traffic hazardous except for boats of the lightest draft. It was the broad, level coastal plain of the north coast of Guadalcanal that alone of all the territory in the southern Solomons offered terrain suitable for the construction of large airfields. In the Lunga area the Japanese were hard at work building the airfield that American marines later named Henderson Field.*

About twenty miles north of Guadalcanal lie Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and other smaller islands. Together with the much larger Florida Island, they bound the adjoining harbors of Tulagi and Gavutu. Before its seizure by the Japanese, Tulagi had been the seat of administration of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate. The British had built wharves, unloading facilities, and government buildings on the southeastern tip of the island.

Gavutu Island, a mile and three quarters to the east of Tulagi, is connected with Tanambogo by a stone causeway. These two islands form the western side of Gavutu Harbor, where the Japanese had developed a seaplane base.

Prior to our landing, intelligence reports had estimated the number of Japanese on Tulagi as approximately 800 and those on Gavutu–Tanambogo as about 1000. This estimate proved to be correct. On Guadalcanal, however, only 1900 Japanese were present (concentrated between Kukum and the mouth of the Tenaru River) in contrast to intelligence estimates of 3000 to 5000. About 1000 of the 1900 were labor troops of inferior fighting quality.

* Honoring Major Lofton R. Henderson, U. S. Marine Corps, who plunged his flaming dive bomber into an enemy carrier during the Battle of Midway.

The plan for our invasion of the Solomons illustrates the complex arrangements involved in coordinating the operation of land-based aircraft, naval and naval-air support forces, and ground combat units **(Map 2)**. The main features of the plan were as follows:

1. All land-based aircraft in the South Pacific Area, including Army planes,* were to be controlled by Rear Admiral John S. McCain, air commander under Admiral Ghormley. The airmen were to execute reconnaissance and bombardment missions in support of the invasion.

2. The Amphibious Force, composed of a transport group and a naval support group of eight cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and five mine sweepers, was under the command of Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner. This force was to make the assault, transporting and landing the marines and defending the convoy against surface attack. The Air Support Force, consisting of the three large carriers, one battleship, six cruisers, and sixteen destroyers, was commanded by Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes. It was to provide air support for the assault and security against hostile air attack. Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher was over-all commander of the two task forces. He reported directly to Admiral Ghormley.

3. The landing troops were divided into a Guadalcanal force, a Tulagi force, and a floating reserve. In view of the longer Japanese tenure of Tulagi and the more constricted nature of the terrain to be encountered, the best-trained Marine Corps battalions were assigned to the northern attack, although the Guadalcanal group was much stronger numerically. General Vandegrift, in addition to his duties as commander of the entire landing force, undertook the direct command of the Guadalcanal group. Brigadier General William H. Rupertus, the assistant division commander, led the Tulagi force.

4. The entire operation was to be assisted by air and naval units under the command of General MacArthur. The latter agreed to maintain a surveillance of the northwestern Solomons area and to interfere with any attempt by the enemy to send reinforcements to the Guadalcanal area from Rabaul. He also agreed to direct the heaviest possible air blows at that enemy base on the day Guadalcanal was attacked and for the four succeeding days. Admiral Nimitz would send some submarines to the vicinity of Truk to maintain a patrol there and to interfere with enemy reinforcements that might be dispatched from that base.

* Principally the 11th Bombardment Group (H) and the 67th Fighter Squadron; a total of thirty-five B-17's and thirty-eight P-39's and P-40's operating from airfields in the New Hebrides, Fiji Islands, and New Caledonia.

The greatest threat to the success of the expedition was the major landplane base the Japanese had established at Rabaul, only 675 miles from Guadalcanal. The possibility of being exposed to heavy attack from the air was a serious consideration, since the number of Allied aircraft available to neutralize the enemy's air power was extremely limited.

During the first six days of August the land-based planes under Rear Admiral McCain's command carried out their advance bombing missions and made energetic searches of the operations area and that to the east. They inflicted some damage to installations in the Guadalcanal–Tulagi area. Their scouting activities revealed no changes in the enemy defenses.

On 6 August, as it approached Guadalcanal from the south, the expeditionary force was favored by the weather, a low overcast effectively screening the fleet from air observation. During the night the Air Support Force headed straight for the southern shore, while the Amphibious Force proceeded around the western end of the island. As the latter approached Savo Island, it split into two parts, the Tulagi force going north and the rest of the ships south of the island **(Map 3)**.

It had been anticipated that the Japanese might have patrols in the passages on either side of Savo, and the escorting warships were on the alert. However, the surprise was complete; and there was no challenge as the ships slid through the darkness along the silent shores. There was still no sound from the enemy camp as the transports approached their debarkation areas. The surprise was so complete as to surprise the surprisers and raise the suspicion that the enemy had laid a trap.

At 0613 the morning silence was shattered by the booming guns of our warships. At almost precisely the same time planes operating from the carriers south of Guadalcanal put in their appearance and began to bomb and strafe their previously assigned targets. A short time later the transports came to a halt and began launching their landing craft. The times set for the landings were 0800 at Tulagi and 0910 at Guadalcanal.

Although, as stated, smaller numbers were to land in the Tulagi area, the operations there were considerably more complex than on Guadalcanal. On the latter, as we shall see, it was merely a matter of pouring first troops and then supplies onto a single beach. In the Tulagi region several landings were to be made, necessitating an elaborate schedule **(Map 4)**.

The main landing in this area was to be made at 0800 on Beach Blue on the west shore of Tulagi. The approach to this beach was dominated from the west by a promontory jutting south from Florida Island, known as the Haleta Peninsula. A preliminary landing at H minus 20 minutes (0740) was to be made there to deny the enemy the use of this position. A subsidiary landing at H plus 4 hours was to be made on the island of Gavutu, from where it was expected that Tanambogo could be captured by rushing the causeway connecting the two islands. Coral reefs around Gavutu made it impracticable to land anywhere but on the northeast shore, where Japanese-built concrete seaplane ramps could be used for the landing. During their approach to this area, however, landing craft would be dangerously exposed to fire, not only from Gavutu but also from the Halavo Peninsula; and, in the final stage of their approach, from Tanambogo. In order to reduce this danger, troops first had to be put ashore on the peninsula, whence they could provide a certain amount of protection for the small boats. This preliminary to the Gavutu landing was scheduled for H plus 30 minutes.

All of the landings were made according to schedule except that at Halavo, which was fifteen minutes late, owing to the long distance the boats had to travel from the transport area to the shore. At both Halavo and Haleta the landings were unopposed; and after a careful reconnaissance had revealed no sign of the enemy, the troops were withdrawn late in the afternoon.

At Tulagi, however, a Raider battalion, which landed unopposed on Beach Blue, ran into stiff resistance as it approached the southeast end of the island. At 0830 another battalion landed at the beach and advanced rapidly behind the Raiders. In spite of the intensive bombardment by aircraft and warships, few of the enemy had been killed. They had taken shelter in deep caves in the hills, emerging to fight furiously when the bombardment ceased. Cornered and forced back into their caves, some escaped through other exits, while others had to be ferreted out and killed with grenades or "Molotov cocktails." This made the marines' progress slow, and nightfall found the battle still going on.

During the night the Japanese made six counterattacks, the first of which came dangerously close to breaking our lines, but all were repulsed. Soon after 0700 on the 8th two battalions from the floating reserve landed at Beach Blue and added their weight to the attack already under way. Blasting the Japanese out of their hiding places, the marines advanced steadily, and by 1500 hours occupation of the island was complete, although mopping up of isolated sniper nests continued.

Meanwhile the troops landing on Gavutu had experienced great difficulty in gaining a foothold. After leaving the assembly area, the landing craft carrying the battalion landing team had to make a seven-mile run to the line of departure. During this run the boats bucked choppy seas, and by the time they arrived at the line of departure, all personnel were drenched and many were seasick.

Our planes had bombed Gavutu and Tanambogo at dawn, and the former had been shelled several times during the forenoon. Now, as the boats prepared to make their dash for the shore, the planes repeated their bombing attacks and the warships laid down supporting fire. But here, too, the Japanese suffered few losses from the bombardment, for as at Tulagi they took refuge in the caves that honeycombed the hills.

As the landing craft neared the northeast shore, it was discovered that the intense naval and air bombardment had wrecked the concrete seaplane ramps upon which the first wave was to land. Huge blocks of concrete made the approach of the boats impossible. Accordingly the wave split into two groups, one landing along a concrete dock to the right and the other veering to the left. From the hills the enemy poured machine-gun and automatic-rifle fire into the marines, one out of every ten being killed or wounded. Enemy fire was particularly heavy on those boats that landed at the dock, where the landing parties were held up for almost two hours. Troops on the left, however, were able to advance slowly and thus relieve the pressure on the right. Gradually our men extended their control, and by 1800 hours occupation of Gavutu was virtually complete. Sniper and machine-gun fire from Tanambogo had greatly hindered the progress on Gavutu, and in response to the marines' request, air and naval bombardments had been directed against the former island during the afternoon. However, enemy machine-gun fire still raked the causeway and prevented any advance across it to take Tanambogo.

At 1845, twenty-five minutes after sunset, the troops who had gone ashore earlier in the day at Haleta attempted to land on the northeast side of Tanambogo in order to take the Japanese in rear. Their plan to land under cover of darkness was frustrated when one of the last shells from the ship supporting their attack hit a fuel dump on the beach. The fuel ignited and soon illuminated the whole shore. A withering fire from the enemy on the hills converged on the marines silhouetted against the flaming oil, and they were forced to withdraw to Gavutu after suffering heavy casualties.

Early the next morning a battalion from the floating reserve was sent to Gavutu to assist in the assault on Tanambogo. After an

intensive shelling of the island one company of this battalion, led by two tanks, succeeded in landing on the east side of Tanambogo; and while the Japanese turned their attention to these troops, other marines rushed across the causeway from Gavutu. Although the fighting was close and savage, the marines finally exterminated the enemy, and Tanambogo was completely in our hands by 2200 hours, except for a few isolated sniper nests.

Of the 1800 Japanese reported to have been on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo Islands, twenty-three were captured, about seventy escaped to Florida Island, and the rest were killed. Our casualties were 108 killed or missing and 140 wounded. The other smaller islands were occupied with little opposition, but mopping-up operations on Florida Island extended over several weeks.

Guadalcanal, in the meantime, was the scene of major activity but no fighting (**Map 3**). Landing craft of the first wave ground ashore at Beach Red, between Lunga and Koli Points, at 0913 hours on 7 August. The beach itself extended 1600 yards from its western extremity, the mouth of the Tenaru River. As a suitable guide for the landing and a defensive obstacle in the event of a hostile counterattack from the west, the river was doubly useful. The assault, preceded by a short but intense naval bombardment, was executed by Combat Group A* with its two battalions abreast. The landing was unopposed, and Combat Group A advanced inland to cover the subsequent landing of Combat Group B. Once ashore, Combat Group B began an advance to the southwest with Mount Austen as its objective. Combat Group A then sent one battalion, reinforced, westward along the shore to the mouth of the Ilu River. It was hoped that Combat Group B, by immediately striking into the interior, could get behind the Japanese and prevent them from escaping to the mountains. Its advance proceeded slowly, however, hindered by the bad terrain and the inaccuracy of such maps as were available. It soon became apparent that the assigned objective, Mount Austen, was impossible of attainment. This commanding terrain feature was much farther inland than anticipated, and it was to be several months before American forces would capture it. Difficulties in fording the swift Tenaru River and in penetrating the dense jungle caused a halt at dusk to reorganize and prepare for a further advance the next day. No contact with the enemy had been made up to this time. Almost 11,000 marines were safely ashore on Guadalcanal.

* A Marine combat group is the equivalent of an Army regimental combat team. Combat Group A, however, had only two infantry battalions.

On the morning of the 8th both combat groups resumed the advance. Objectives for the day were Kukum and the line of the Lunga River to the west of the airfield. Progress became much swifter when it was learned from prisoners that the enemy garrison was considerably smaller than previously estimated and that it had fled precipitately to the west, leaving unmanned the defenses of the airfield and Lunga Point. Combat Group A (less one battalion left at the beach) crossed the Lunga River unopposed and reached Kukum at 1500 hours. Here it met light fire, which was quickly silenced. Combat Group B overran the airfield at 1600 and occupied the east bank of the Lunga River for the night.

Thus on the evening of 8 August, Tulagi harbor and the airfield on Guadalcanal, the main objectives of the expedition, were in our hands. But while the ground troops were meeting with such unbelievably easy success, other developments of grave importance were taking place.

Despite the precautions taken to prevent enemy aircraft at Rabaul from interfering with the landings, two air attacks were made on our ships on the 7th. Twenty planes out of the approximately sixty that attacked were shot down. We lost twelve planes and suffered damage to one destroyer. About noon on the 8th some forty enemy torpedo bombers, escorted by Zero fighters, attacked the transports. About twenty of these planes were shot down, fourteen of them by antiaircraft fire from the ships. One bomber crashed on the deck of a transport, starting a fire that subsequently destroyed the troopship. In addition, we lost one destroyer by torpedoing. All of our planes returned. These raids, while scoring hits on only three ships, had other consequences. First, they seriously interfered with the unloading of supplies, which already had lagged for lack of sufficient man power to keep the beach cleared. During the night of 7-8 August unloading of the transports was halted in order to clear the congestion of supplies already on shore. Second, the enemy raids, in which he lost a total of fifty planes,* also cost us some aircraft. Of the ninety-nine fighters on the three carriers, only seventy-eight remained in serviceable condition. Furthermore, fuel was running low. This situation, together with the fact that the enemy had been able to send a considerable number of bombers and torpedo planes to the operational area, prompted Admiral Fletcher to recommend the immediate withdrawal of the Air Support Force. His recommendation was approved by Admiral Ghormley, and early the next morning the carriers began their retirement to the south.

* Including those destroyed on the ground or water by our dawn attack on D-day.

With the carriers gone, it was decided to move out all of the other ships too, since the Amphibious Force would now be dangerously exposed to air attack. The danger was emphasized by a report that three Japanese cruisers, two destroyers, and two gunboats or seaplane tenders had been spotted off the east coast of Bougainville **(Map 2)** on the 8th.

Pending execution of the withdrawal, the cruisers and destroyers of the screening force took up a night disposition guarding the area between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands **(Map 3)** and the channel on either side of Savo Island. An enemy force of seven cruisers and one destroyer from the northwest entered the area undetected at 0145 on the 9th. Despite the fact that our naval units were patrolling the passages around Savo Island, complete surprise was achieved. The Japanese, aided by flares dropped by their planes, opened an effective fire with guns and torpedoes. There was little effective return fire from our surprised vessels. The enemy force struck first on the south side of Savo Island * and then circled the island to attack our ships in the northern passage from the rear. The whole engagement lasted about thirty minutes, after which the enemy retired to the northeast without attempting to exploit his success by attacking our transports, still unloading men and supplies on the beaches of Guadalcanal. Our naval losses, however, were heavy and were to leave us inferior in strength for several months. Four cruisers were sunk, and one cruiser and two destroyers were damaged. Generally speaking, the principal reason for our being surprised in this naval engagement was inexperience. Steps were taken to digest the lessons learned, and never again were our warships to experience a similar disaster.

The severe losses in the Battle of Savo Island increased the alarm for the safety of the ships in the Guadalcanal area. Hurried attempts to unload during the day of the 9th were again interrupted by an air-raid warning. Then, fearful of losing more of our limited amount of shipping and naval strength, the entire Amphibious Force steamed south that evening. This withdrawal was made in spite of the fact that the unloading of all ships had not been completed. The beachhead was uncovered, and the troops ashore were left with but meager supplies. Very little fuel had been unloaded for the landing craft left with the marines, and when some of the boats developed mechanical trouble, there were no spare parts available. This lack of landing craft and the fuel to run them made amphibious operations impracticable; and since there was always

* On the maps the names of naval battles are italicized.

danger that enemy reinforcements from Rabaul might be sent to Guadalcanal, the risk involved in sending troops very far afield over terrain that made their quick return impossible was considered too great. Accordingly, General Vandegrift decided to establish a perimeter defense around Henderson Field and to strike at the Japanese on the island only if they should come within reach. At the same time he requested reinforcements to strengthen the defense of the airfield and to provide a striking force for use beyond the perimeter in case the enemy attempted to land at some distant point. Ammunition was carefully husbanded, and all troops went on short rations.

Meanwhile engineers, using captured Japanese equipment for the most part, had begun the job of surfacing a 200-foot gap in the 3600-foot landing strip. On 20 August nineteen Marine Corps fighter planes and twelve scout bombers arrived at the field.* Prior to their arrival enemy aircraft and surface vessels had bombarded the marines with impunity, and their attacks on our small convoys had seriously interfered with attempts to bring in supplies. At the same time the enemy had taken advantage of our lack of air and naval power in the area to land additional supplies and reinforcements **(Map 5)**.

The first of a series of landings took place near Taivu Point on 17 August. A reinforced battalion, numbering about 1000 men, was the advance echelon of a force of 2200 that had been ordered to land on Guadalcanal and recapture the airfield. Confident of an easy victory, the Japanese commander did not wait for the second echelon to arrive but marched against the airfield on 20 August. The marines stopped his night attack on the beach at the mouth of the Ilu River. The next morning a battalion was sent around the enemy's left flank to cut his line of retreat. A few hours later the encirclement was complete, and by evening of the 21st the action had come to a close, with the enemy almost annihiliated. Over 900 Japanese were killed and fifteen were taken prisoner. Marine losses were exceedingly small by comparison—thirty-four killed and seventy-five wounded.

Intelligence reports had indicated that the enemy was steadily accumulating strength in the Rabaul area **(Map 10)**. By 23 August he had available three carriers, eight battleships, six cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, one seaplane carrier, fifteen transports, and about 160 land-based bombers and fighters. At this time our three carriers and their supporting ships were operating 150 miles south-

* On 22 August the first five Army planes arrived.

east of the Solomons, where they could support the marines on Guadalcanal and at the same time guard against an attack from the east against our line of communication. Unfortunately a combination of fueling needs and imperfect intelligence reports led to the retirement of the *Wasp* at the very time she was needed most. Our naval forces now numbered only two carriers, one battleship, four cruisers, and eleven destroyers. Also available were the thirty-one Marine planes on Guadalcanal and sixty-nine long-range patrol planes, thirty of which were Flying Fortresses.

On the morning of 23 August a search plane discovered the Japanese task force when it was about 250 miles north of Guadalcanal. It was moving south, and the American fleet immediately steamed north to intercept it. During the forenoon of the 24th the first contact was made northeast of Malaita Island. In the two-day action that followed, known as the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, air power decided the issue. The Japanese, all but stripped of carrier aircraft support, broke off the fight.

The results of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons were greatly in our favor. The Japanese lost one carrier, one destroyer, and one large transport. Ships damaged were one seaplane carrier and one light cruiser. About ninety enemy aircraft were shot down. Our losses were only one carrier damaged—the *Enterprise*—and twenty planes destroyed, including three of the Marine planes based at Guadalcanal. The battle was, as Admiral Nimitz pointed out, a "major victory, second only to Midway in forces involved." The first Japanese large-scale attempt to retake Guadalcanal had been repulsed.

The enemy, apparently reluctant to suffer more losses, now resorted to infiltration tactics in his attempt to build up his forces on Guadalcanal (**Map 5**). Fast destroyers, their decks loaded with men and equipment, approached the island under cover of darkness, put their cargo ashore near Taivu Point or Cape Esperance, and sped away before dawn. Another method used was to move troops and equipment in large ocean-going landing craft from island to island down the chain of the Solomons. By day these barges would remain concealed in hidden coves, leaving their protection only at nightfall and crossing open water under the cover of darkness. Some 6000 troops infiltrated onto the island in this manner between 30 August and 6 September. About 5000 assembled in the area between Taivu and Koli Points; the rest were put ashore in the western part of the island. Working parties proceeded to cut a trail to a point south of our position, where a north-south ridge offered an excellent approach to the airfield.

On the night of 12-13 September the Japanese, after a twenty-minute bombardment by cruisers and destroyers, probed our lines south of the airfield. Their attack made limited gains, and they dug in to hold the ground. At 1830 on the succeeding night a full-scale attack was launched against the perimeter, the main effort being made along the ridge south of the airfield. Here the defenders were driven back, and the defensive line was almost breached by an enemy force of 2000. Nevertheless, the marines were able to hold long enough for artillery to take position and stop the onslaught. Early the next morning a counterattack by fresh troops, supported by planes, restored our position. The badly battered Japanese were unable to renew their attacks in this area.

Several hours after the enemy began the main attack along the ridge, he also threw a battalion against the southeast sector of the perimeter, along the upper Ilu. Here, however, he was beaten off without making any appreciable headway. Feeble attacks against this sector were made on each of the two succeeding nights, but they proved ineffective. The enemy next struck the sector west of Kukum after daylight on the 14th, but his attack, which included a bayonet charge, was repulsed with heavy losses.

The Japanese plan for a three-pronged drive against the perimeter had failed. The main attack along the ridge had nearly succeeded, but the two supporting attacks had been poorly timed and were too weak to draw American reserves. The enemy's dispersion of forces and piecemeal attacks contributed to his costly defeat.

Following this three-day engagement, known as the Battle of the Ridge, only a few of the enemy returned to the Taivu area. The remainder pushed on to the west, cutting their trail as they went. They had been so confident of victory that they had gone into battle with only three days' provisions. They soon ran out of food, and their trek, which required about two weeks, became a struggle against the jungle, sickness, and starvation. Only about half of the force reached the coast.

In the Battle of the Ridge the enemy left over 600 dead on the field, and many more subsequently died of wounds. The marines' losses were eighty-three killed, twenty-eight missing, and 283 wounded.

On 18 September the 7th Regiment of the 1st Marine Division arrived on Guadalcanal. The situation improved in other respects also. Additional squadrons of fighters and scout bombers arrived at Henderson Field, where an unsurfaced fighter strip had been built to supplement the main runway. These much-needed air reinforcements brought the number of planes based on the island to

about sixty-five.* Two batteries of coast-defense guns were set up on Guadalcanal, and another battery was emplaced on Tulagi. More supplies were beginning to reach the troops, but many types of equipment were still lacking. There were no lights for the airfield, no hangars, repair shops, or bomb hoists. Fuel for the planes had to be poured from drums and was always scarce. In wet weather the runways turned into bogs. Clothing and shoes were scarce, since cargo space on the limited number of ships that came to the island was used for more precious supplies—food, munitions, and fuel. Malaria already was beginning its insidious work, incapacitating large numbers of troops. Although prospects were much brighter at the beginning of October than they had ever been, the marines were still in an unenviable position.

After their defeat in the Battle of the Ridge the Japanese decided that it was necessary to employ large combat units in order to retrieve the situation. Lieutenant General Haruyoshi Hyakutake, commander of the newly formed Seventeenth Army,** with headquarters at Rabaul, was ordered to the Solomons. Troops and supplies began to move to Guadalcanal at a steady rate. The "Tokyo Express," as the swift convoys of troop-ferrying destroyers and cruisers came to be known, operated almost nightly during the latter part of September and early October **(Map 6)**.

On the island our forces were not idle. Enemy troops had begun to mass east of the Matanikau River, and General Vandegrift decided to drive them out of this threatening position from where their light artillery could fire on the airfield. Six Marine battalions attacked westward on 7 October and by the 9th had driven the Japanese back across the Matanikau. Their main body retreated as far as the Bonegi River to await additional reinforcements. The desirability of holding the line of the Matanikau now outweighed the shortage of man power, and General Vandegrift knew that Army reinforcements were on the way to him. So a horseshoe defense was set up along the lower Matanikau some two miles away from the perimeter.

During this period most of the Japanese 2d Division had come ashore, together with supporting artillery, some tanks, and about 600 replacements. Enemy air attacks were now intensified with the consequent attrition of our defending planes at Henderson Field. By 12 October the newly arrived Japanese long-range artillery was

* Up to 31 September 171 Japanese planes had been destroyed by aircraft based at Henderson Field.

** Equivalent to our corps. A Japanese area army was equivalent to an American army.

in position near Kokumbona and was firing against the airfield as well as our landing beach at Kukum. Counterbattery fire was difficult, since the marines had no heavy field artillery.

The enemy, however, did not accomplish his reinforcement of Guadalcanal without cost. An American task force of four cruisers and five destroyers under Rear Admiral Norman Scott intercepted a force of four cruisers and one destroyer off Cape Esperance during the night of 11-12 October. Gaining a surprise as complete as the enemy had attained in the Battle of Savo Island two months before, our warships sank one cruiser and one destroyer, and damaged two cruisers. We lost one destroyer, and two of our cruisers and one destroyer were damaged.

On 13 October the 164th Infantry of the Americal Division*—sorely needed reinforcements for the malaria-ridden marines—disembarked at Lunga Point. At 1400 hours, while our fighters were on the ground refueling and rearming after combating a heavy noon raid, the enemy bombers attacked again, causing some casualties among the troops who were still moving ashore. That night a Japanese battleship force stood off the north coast of Guadalcanal and bombarded the airport area for several hours with 14-inch shells. This bombardment severely damaged the runways on Henderson Field and destroyed or damaged fifty-seven of our planes.

On the 14th the enemy pressure was relentless. Heavy air attacks and continuous field-artillery fire pounded our airdrome. By afternoon Henderson Field was almost knocked out. To make matters worse, the supply of aviation gasoline was just about exhausted. The pattern of enemy strategy became clear when shortly before dark a task force, including six transports, was discovered and attacked 120 miles north of Guadalcanal by our few remaining attack bombers. One transport was sunk, but the remainder pushed ahead under cover of the night. We now faced the most critical situation of the campaign.

About 0100 hours on the 15th the enemy battleship force arrived again off Lunga Point and commenced another heavy shelling of the airfield and defensive positions. Under cover of this bombardment the five remaining enemy transports with an escort of eight destroyers arrived off Tassafaronga Point and began to unload supplies and supporting troops for the 2d Division.

In the meantime gasoline for our aircraft was on the way. By mid-morning it began to arrive, ferried in by transport planes from bases to the southeast. Enough drums were kept coming to maintain our few remaining planes in the air at this critical time. All

* Formed of nondivisional units that had been sent to New Caledonia.

day on the 15th our aircraft attacked the enemy transports anchored off Tassafaronga, and in spite of heavy fighter protection, three of the ships were destroyed. The two surviving transports left the area with their destroyer escort at nightfall. On the 15th and 16th air reinforcements—twenty fighters and eighteen scout bombers—arrived to bolster our air defense of Guadalcanal.

On 17 October General Hyakutake arrived on Guadalcanal to take personal charge of operations. By this time the enemy had excellent knowledge of the location of the American defenses, and while our advance to the Matanikau had deprived him of a strategic bridgehead, at the same time it had considerably overextended the defending forces. Taking advantage of this, Hyakutake planned to launch a coordinated attack against two widely separated sectors on 23 October. The secondary attack by two regiments plus tanks was to cross the Matanikau at its mouth, break through the defenses there, and carry as far as the main perimeter defense near Kukum. The main-attack force of about division strength was to move to an assembly area south of the airfield and attack north simultaneously with the secondary attack. In the execution of this plan, however, the cutting of a fresh trail into the interior so delayed and exhausted the main-attack force that its effort was made a day later than planned. This enabled our troops to meet each attack separately and defeat the enemy in detail.

The secondary attack started late in the afternoon of the 23d with an intense artillery preparation, following which ten medium tanks attempted to cross the sand bar at the mouth of the Matanikau River. Two self-propelled 75-mm. guns and some 37-mm. antitank guns picked them off one by one as they moved in plain view across the bar. Meanwhile ten batteries of Marine field artillery directed a concentration of over 6000 rounds against the massed infantry near Point Cruz that was waiting to exploit the breakthrough of the tanks. This shelling, supplemented by the attack of our dive bombers, lasted until midnight and completely demoralized the enemy attack force. Marine patrols later discovered over 600 dead in this area, mute witnesses to the effect of our artillery fire. Since the enemy infantry had failed to come to grips, it had been unnecessary to move up any American reserves. Thus the Japanese secondary attack failed to contribute anything to the main attack that was to follow the next night.

At 2000 hours on the 24th, during a torrential downpour, the attack from the south started. An entire infantry regiment struck on a narrow front in the marshy lowlands between Edson's Ridge and the upper Ilu River. By 0300 of the 25th, when a battalion of

Army reinforcements entered the line, the marines had repulsed six assaults. At 0530, just before dawn, the last desperate attack began, and this time the Japanese succeeded in driving a salient into the line about 150 yards deep and 100 yards wide. However, they were unable to exploit this advantage; and as daylight came, the defenders cleaned out the pocket with a devastating cross fire. The enemy withdrew southward, leaving more than 300 dead on the field of battle.

Meanwhile, far to the east of Guadalcanal, all available American fleet units were steaming north to intercept a powerful Japanese naval task force whose mission was to seize control of all the sea area around Guadalcanal, send carrier-based aircraft to Henderson Field after its capture by the ground attack, and, finally, land additional troops for mopping-up operations against the defenders. But this mighty armada could not press forward until the airfield had been captured, since our land-based planes there made the waters of the southern Solomons extremely dangerous for surface vessels.

In the two and a half months of fighting up to 25 October, planes based on Henderson Field had shot down 314 enemy aircraft. We had lost thirty-two pilots during the same period. Guadalcanal had become a sinkhole for Japanese air power.

The heavy rains of the 23d and 24th had by now turned the airfield into a sea of mud; as a result, our planes could not take off at dawn on the 25th when hostile planes appeared. Flight after flight of Zero fighters strafed the field throughout the day, and large bomber formations attacked twice. Camouflage and dispersion, at first the only defense, proved surprisingly effective in holding down losses. As the runway dried, more and more American planes took to the air and by late afternoon had secured superiority. Twenty-seven enemy planes were shot down, five of them by antiaircraft fire.

While the Marine fighter planes were successfully defending the airfield, our scout bombers attacked enemy warships * that had been boldly cruising up and down the north shore and engaging in a duel with Marine coast-defense guns. One Japanese destroyer was severely damaged, and the entire force beat a hasty retreat to the north.

After nightfall on the 25th ground fighting flared up again on the island. The remainder of the enemy secondary-attack force along the coast had moved inland on the previous day and had crossed the upper reaches of the Matanikau River, beyond the positions of

* Not a part of the large naval task force referred to above. The warships here mentioned had the mission of giving fire support to the ground forces that were attempting to capture Henderson Field.

the marines. In an attempt to envelop the south flank of the horseshoe defense and cut its line of communication with the perimeter, the Japanese launched a heavy attack from south to north on a narrow front about 0300 hours on the 26th. Initially quite successful, they were decisively thrown back by the counterattack of our reserves and lost about 300 killed.

To the south, in the sector of the previous night's attack, the enemy main-attack force assaulted the perimeter twice, once at midnight and again about 0430. The defenders, by now well reinforced, repulsed both attacks with a loss to the enemy of over 600 dead.

While events on the island were thus taking a turn definitely in our favor, the great Japanese naval task force off to the east was advancing toward Guadalcanal. This armada included four carriers, four battleships, and a fleet of lesser warships and transports. On the morning of 26 October the much weaker American task force of two carriers, one battleship, six cruisers, and fourteen destroyers intercepted the enemy north of the Santa Cruz Islands and east of Malaita Island **(Map 10)**.

In the one-day naval-air Battle of Santa Cruz that ensued, four Japanese warships, including two carriers, one cruiser, and a destroyer, were hit by bombs or torpedoes, although none were destroyed. Four enemy air groups were cut to pieces. The planes attacking our task force numbered between 170 and 180. Of that number, fifty-six were shot down by antiaircraft fire and about the same number by our own planes. However, our smaller force also suffered. The aircraft carrier *Hornet* and a destroyer were sunk, and the *Enterprise,* the new battleship *South Dakota,* a cruiser, and a destroyer were all damaged. We also lost seventy-four carrier planes. In spite of the fact that our ships were forced to withdraw, the Japanese did not pursue but turned and retired to the north. They had learned that the American troops on Guadalcanal had stood fast once more and that land-based planes were still operating from Henderson Field.

Few if any of the marines and soldiers who stopped the savage mass attacks of the Japanese on Guadalcanal during the night of 25-26 October realized that their bitter struggle in the rain-soaked jungle was to affect profoundly the outcome of a naval engagement many miles away. The battle here was much too personal and furious to permit thought of anything other than the fighting at hand **(Map 6)**.

The ground battle continued during the next two days and nights, the enemy expending his strength in other furious but futile assaults against our lines. It was not until 28 October that the fighting

died away completely. The cost to the Japanese of their persistent efforts was considerable. Some 2200 were killed along the southern front and about 1200 in the Matanikau sector, a total of 3400 dead. This constituted the last serious offensive by enemy ground forces on Guadalcanal. Never again were they able to mass enough troops for a large-scale attack, although reinforcements continued to arrive from the northwest in small groups.

General Vandegrift immediately prepared to follow up his defensive victory, although the condition of his troops made only a limited offensive possible. For three months, almost without rest, the marines had been subjected to the strain of bombing, shelling, and repeated ground attacks. Ammunition was running low, and disease was making heavy inroads in the ranks. Nevertheless, the need for making Henderson Field secure led to an acceptance of the risks involved. Plans were quickly laid to move west across the Matanikau, destroy the enemy there, and drive the remnants beyond the Poha River, out of artillery range of the airfield.

Our attack began on 1 November, as planned, but after some success it had to be halted because of a new enemy threat. On the night of 2-3 November the Japanese landed two reinforced battalions, some 1500 men, in the cove east of Koli Point. The fact that this force was the advance echelon of the 38th Division * signified an important change in enemy strategy. The 38th, a division that had fought in China, Hong Kong, and Java, had been earmarked for operations elsewhere.

Moving against the freshly landed battalions, the marines made contact with them on 6 November along the Nalimbiu River and drove them back toward their beachhead. An attack by three battalions of marines encircled the Japanese just east of the mouth of the Metapona and killed some 450 of them. The remainder broke out of the trap and attempted to follow the inland trail to the western sector. A Raider battalion harried their retreat, and less than one third of the original force escaped.

On 4 November the 8th Regiment of the 2d Marine Division arrived on Guadalcanal, and it was decided to resume the attack to the west on 10 November with two full regiments. The operation was cancelled after a day and a half when it was learned that a new Japanese armada was en route to the island. General Vandegrift withdrew his forces to the line of the Matanikau and set about strengthening the defenses of the airfield. On 12 November 6000

* The 38th Division was brought in piecemeal from Rabaul between 2 November and 12 December.

very welcome reinforcements landed, including the 182d Infantry of the Americal Division.

The arrival of these new troops at this critical time was part of the defensive plan of Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., who on 18 October had succeeded Admiral Ghormley as commander of the South Pacific Area.

Inasmuch as only one carrier, the damaged *Enterprise,* was available in the area, it was of prime importance that Henderson Field be kept in continuous operation. All available planes in the South Pacific Area were staged forward to bases as close to Guadalcanal as possible, and plans were prepared for many of them to base at Henderson Field after they had been called into action.

It was known that the enemy had concentrated a powerful fleet in the northern Solomons, estimated to include two carriers, four battleships, five heavy cruisers, about thirty destroyers, and transports sufficient for one division of troops. Since time and space calculations indicated that this force could not reach Guadalcanal much earlier than 13 November, Admiral Halsey was able to time his own movements so as to achieve a maximum of surprise.

Our covering force of cruisers and destroyers under Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, which had arrived on the 12th as protection for the transports that were bringing in reinforcements, escorted the transport group clear of the area that evening. Shortly after midnight Admiral Callaghan's force re-entered the sound between Florida and Guadalcanal Islands. The plan called for the covering force to fight a delaying action, so that the battleship-carrier force under Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, which was off to the south, would have time to intercept the Japanese landing forces believed to be en route. As had been expected, enemy warships soon arrived from the northwest to shell Henderson Field. The night was so dark that the opposing forces nearly collided with each other southeast of Savo Island before a shot was fired. In a furious engagement lasting twenty-four minutes the superior Japanese force was turned back. During the last few minutes their scattered ships were firing at each other. One of their destroyers was sunk, and a battleship and another destroyer were left dead in the water to be finished off after daylight. Four other destroyers were damaged. The American force lost two antiaircraft cruisers and four destroyers, and suffered damage to three cruisers and three destroyers. In addition, it had the serious misfortune to lose Admirals Callaghan and Scott, its first and second in command, both of whom were killed in the battle. The valiant action of our small force, however, frustrated the enemy's attempt to bombard Henderson Field with the large-

caliber guns of his battleships, and it probably marked the turning point in the series of naval engagements known as the Battle of Guadalcanal.

On the morning of the 14th another enemy force of cruisers and destroyers arrived to shell Henderson Field. The ineffective bombardment was hastily broken off when our PT boats appeared in the area. The withdrawing warships were then attacked by planes from Henderson Field. One heavy cruiser was sunk and two other cruisers and one destroyer were damaged.

As anticipated, the main Japanese force was discovered on the 14th about 150 miles northwest of Guadalcanal. A group of twelve transports was preceded by a heavy advance guard of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, with an escort of fighter planes. Throughout the day aircraft from Henderson Field attacked the transport group. Eight ships were sunk or gutted by fire and four more were damaged, the latter being destroyed later near Tassafaronga Point, where they had beached themselves. One cruiser and one destroyer were also damaged by our planes.

By evening a task group (two new battleships * and four destroyers) from Admiral Kinkaid's main battle force reached Guadalcanal. Shortly after midnight contact was made in the channel south of Savo Island with a group of enemy warships that included one battleship, four cruisers, and nine destroyers. The presence of American battleships was evidently a complete surprise to the Japanese. Our more accurate gunfire caused them to retire after they had lost a battleship and a destroyer. Three American destroyers were sunk, and one battleship and one destroyer were damaged.

This action ended the Battle of Guadalcanal. Never again was the enemy so seriously to threaten our foothold in the southern Solomons. In three days of fighting he had suffered the loss of two battleships, one cruiser, three destroyers, and ten transports—a total of sixteen ships. Three cruisers, six destroyers, and two transports had been damaged. In addition, thousands of ground troops had been drowned when the transports were sunk. Our losses had been two light cruisers and seven destroyers sunk and eight other ships damaged. One of the damaged vessels, a light cruiser, was sunk by torpedoes while retiring from the action.

Ground activity in the latter half of November was confined mainly to constant pressure against the enemy beyond the Matanikau. Marine and Army troops pushed as far as Point Cruz, following which

* The *Washington* and the *South Dakota*.

there was no advance of importance for several weeks. Preparations were made to effect the relief of the 1st Marine Division by new Army units.

Another Japanese attempt to send reinforcements and supplies to Guadalcanal, in which eight destroyers were employed, was repulsed on the night of 30 November–1 December. Moving at top speed under cover of darkness, the destroyers passed through the channel south of Savo Island before an American force of five cruisers and six destroyers that was patrolling the sound could make an interception. In the ensuing Battle of Tassafaronga we suffered severe losses, largely because the enemy ships could maneuver better in the constricted area of action and because our radar was ineffective against targets close to shore. We lost one cruiser, and three others were severely damaged. Only one enemy destroyer was sunk, but the remainder retired to the northwest without accomplishing their mission.

The situation of the Japanese on the island deteriorated rapidly after the costly defeat suffered in the Battle of Guadalcanal. Only small quantities of supplies and no more than 1000 replacements were able to reach the island during the rest of the campaign. These troops and supplies arrived in driblets that were put ashore during the night by destroyers or submarines. The food situation, already bad, soon became desperate, except for those troops along the coast near the supply points. Disease took an increasing toll. In January General Hyakutake departed with his headquarters for Bougainville, and other senior commanders began to desert their troops and head for the northwest coast.

In contrast with the enemy situation, that of the Americans was improving rapidly. More and more ships bringing supplies and troops arrived as the days went by. By 4 January Major General Alexander M. Patch,* now in command of the island garrison, had approximately 58,000 men. The main tactical unit was the new XIV Corps, composed principally of the Americal and 25th (Army) Divisions and the 2d Marine Division. The 1st Marine Division had been withdrawn for a well-merited and much-needed rest on 9 December.

We now had sufficient strength to begin our final offensive (**Map 7**). The Americal Division was placed in reserve, the 25th took over the southern part of the line, and the 2d Marine Division occupied the coastal sector. Gradually our forces cleared the areas from which

* General Patch arrived on 19 November as commander of the Americal Division. He assumed over-all command of the island on 9 December upon the departure of General Vandegrift.

the real drive was to begin. Even so, it is doubtful that the Japanese knew exactly when it did start. General Patch had slowly increased the pressure on them until by 10 January the offensive was in full swing. One regiment of the 25th Division attacked Mount Austen, the southern anchor of the enemy's position. Penetrating just north of the hill, our troops succeeded in isolating that strong point. About the same time the remainder of the 25th Division and the 2d Marine Division began their attack. The marines advanced along the coastal road while the 25th Division pushed through the jungle in an enveloping maneuver designed to cut off the enemy at Kokumbona.

The fighting that ensued was bitter, and progress at first was slow. The enemy had taken advantage of the numerous north-south ridges and streams in this area and had established a strong defensive position. Despite his hopeless situation, he clung to his caves and dugouts with unbelievable tenacity and had to be rooted out practically by hand. Mortars and grenades proved very effective in this situation and were relied on heavily by our troops to open the way. By the 24th the Americans had reached Kokumbona, where the 25th Division's enveloping movement trapped several enemy units. These were quickly wiped out, and by the end of the month we had reached the Bonegi River.

It was apparent now that the Japanese were carrying out a delaying action to cover their retreat to Cape Esperance, and it was decided to land forces on the northwest coast of the island in order to cut them off. Accordingly troops from the reserve were put ashore at Verahue on the afternoon of 1 February. Their landing was unopposed, and they immediately set out for Cape Esperance.

On the night of 1-2 February the "Tokyo Express" reappeared off Cape Esperance, but this time its mission was to evacuate rather than to strengthen the garrison. During the period 1 to 7 February about 3000 troops, consisting mainly of high-ranking officers, their staffs, and service units, were evacuated in three runs by a fleet of ten to twenty destroyers. Practically all of the sick and wounded were left behind.

The two American forces converging on Cape Esperance met on 8 February, bringing the Guadalcanal campaign to a close six months after its inception.

For the Japanese it was a costly experience. In addition to the irretrievable loss of many warships and hundreds of planes with their experienced pilots, they used up some two and a half divisions of their best troops. Altogether, a total of 42,500 men were committed to Guadalcanal. Of these, some 24,000 were killed or were

drowned while attempting to land; 15,000 died of sickness, starvation, or wounds; 500 were captured; and only 3000 were evacuated. Total American casualties during the six months of fighting were 1743 killed and 4953 wounded, of whom 1242 killed and 2655 wounded were marines.

Comments on the Guadalcanal Campaign.—No list of the decisive battles of World War II would be complete without Guadalcanal, for there the advance of the Japanese was stopped completely and the initiative seized by the Allies. It is true that the campaign was not on the scale of the huge operations that brought final victory in the Pacific and in Europe and that the island was only one small sector of a front extending thousands of miles through the Pacific and Asia. But as the only active sector in the Pacific, except for New Guinea, Guadalcanal was the magnet which attracted powerful Japanese forces as well as the sinkhole in which they were dissipated. In the air the enemy committed piecemeal all of his fully trained Navy air units and some portion of his best Army squadrons. The loss of so many experienced air crews was a most serious blow. A captured Japanese combat report shows that they realized the importance of the fight that raged on and near the small island so far from the home shores of the opposing forces. The document contains the following statement: "It must be said that success or failure in recapturing Guadalcanal, and the results of the final naval battle related to it, is the fork in the road which leads to victory for them or for us." Subsequent events fully demonstrated the truth of that statement.

Admiral Halsey's expert and bold handling of the limited forces under his control finally retrieved what at times appeared to be a lost cause. Our invasion of the lower Solomons was born of the necessity to stop any further advance by the Japanese. We mustered the strength to seize Guadalcanal and Tulagi, but we were ill-pre-

pared to maintain our position there. The necessity to preserve our few aircraft carriers forced Admiral Ghormley to approve their withdrawal. This in turn led to the retirement of the partially unloaded transports—a move that nearly produced catastrophic results. In retrospect it seems that had the Japanese first collected their forces and then moved on Guadalcanal en masse, instead of attempting to retake the island by sending units in piecemeal, they surely must have overwhelmed our determined but isolated Marine garrison.

It should be remembered that our offensive was undertaken with limited means and at a time when the Japanese were free to throw much greater forces against the island outpost. Once our troops had captured Henderson Field and Tulagi Harbor, their mission became purely defensive. The conduct of that defense was excellent. General Vandegrift's defensive perimeter kept Henderson Field in operation, and, in turn, the aircraft based there attacked enemy ships that attempted to bring in reinforcements and supplies. Here we see the pattern of future operations in this theater. Unlike the war in Europe, most of the fighting in the Pacific featured the seizing of airfields and harbors by relatively small forces. The Guadalcanal venture differed from later offensive actions only in the length of time consumed, the main reason for this being that the Japanese were able to launch protracted counterattacks. As our power in the Pacific grew and we attacked the defensive periphery at many points, their ability to counterattack diminished correspondingly.

Our initial errors helped to prolong the gruelling struggle. There was no previous amphibious attack that could serve, as Guadalcanal later did, as a yardstick to measure the requirements of the projected operation. As a result, too few labor troops were included for unloading supplies, and some items of equipment were lacking because their need had not been foreseen. We had to learn many things as the war progressed.

Although committed to battle unintelligently, the Japanese soldier fought bravely and endured terrible privations. As the casualty figures indicate, he carried on to the bitter end, preferring death to surrender. Of the more than 42,000 enemy troops employed on the island, only 500 were captured, and many of those were from labor units.

From the strategic point of view the fight for Guadalcanal was a battle of logistics, as indeed was the entire war in the Pacific. After we had disrupted the enemy's supply and made our own secure, the crisis was over. That was Admiral Halsey's main job. Using every ounce of strength available and closely coordinating his moves with those of General MacArthur, he prepared to meet every new enemy

thrust whenever his excellent intelligence revealed it. In contrast to ours, the Japanese intelligence agencies failed miserably. They initially underestimated the size of our forces on Guadalcanal and then failed to discover their error until it was too late. By the time they sent large forces southward, we had been able to reinforce and resupply our troops, and more American warships had reached the area. Interrogation reports have revealed that only 20 per cent of the supplies dispatched from Rabaul to Guadalcanal ever reached there. As a result, the troops landed on the island continually lacked heavy equipment, adequate ammunition, and even enough food.

It is of interest to note how the vast front on which the Japanese were operating in the Pacific had already begun to consume their man power (**Map 10**). Captured Seventeenth Army orders later revealed that the 38th Division, most of which went to a watery grave near Guadalcanal, was originally intended to see service in New Guinea against General MacArthur's forces. Its diversion to Guadalcanal came just as MacArthur's troops were driving the enemy back across the Owen Stanley Range in New Guinea, and the Japanese forces there were deprived of an entire division for the decisive operation that followed in the Buna area. That campaign, which came to a victorious close two weeks before the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, will be discussed later. It was the second of our limited offensive operations, and the close teamwork between General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey that enabled our troops to take advantage of every enemy error at this time was only the first evidence of the coordination that was soon to make possible our advance up the Solomons.

During past wars ground soldiers have at times criticized their Navy colleagues for thinking too much of saving their ships instead of boldly striking at the enemy. If such thoughts were ever in the minds of American Army men, they were once and for all banished by the operations of Admiral Halsey's warships during the Guadalcanal campaign. Although almost always inferior in weight and numbers, our naval vessels did not hesitate to close with the enemy and "slug it out." This same boldness was to characterize all of our naval operations in the Pacific up to the final victory.

From Guadalcanal to Bougainville.—After the Japanese had been driven out of Guadalcanal, all efforts were directed toward improving the defensive strength of the island and establishing a base there which could support further operations. Japanese airfields in the New Georgia group of islands, northwest of Guadalcanal, were a threat that could not be overlooked. The main enemy air base was

at Munda Point on New Georgia Island, only about 200 miles from Henderson Field. A secondary base was on the southeast coast of Kolombangara Island. These fields had been targets for our bombers ever since they were first discovered in early December. During the ensuing three months our fliers conducted more than eighty raids against them, and several night bombardments by our warships were also undertaken. These operations, however, resulted only in temporarily neutralizing the fields, and it soon became evident that actual occupation was necessary to prevent their use.

Meanwhile, at the Casablanca conference in January 1943, it had been agreed that Japan had to be prevented from expanding further and from consolidating and exploiting her conquests despite the urgent need for concentrating against the European Axis. At the Washington conference, in May, it was determined to step up the pace of the advance on Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after consulting the area commanders, issued the necessary directives.

Since any further advance up the chain of the Solomons would carry Admiral Halsey's forces across the boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area, it was necessary to effect some revision of command. For this reason Halsey, who had been operating under Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, was now placed under the strategic command of General MacArthur.

As a first step Admiral Halsey decided to occupy the Russell Islands, which lie about sixty miles northwest of Henderson Field, in order that fighter aircraft could be staged as far forward as possible for operations against the central Solomons. On 21 February our troops landed unopposed in the Russells. Within a week 9000 men were ferried to the islands, where they immediately undertook the construction of two airstrips, a radar station, a PT base, and facilities to accommodate a large quantity of supplies.

During the following months combat troops underwent rigorous training for the assault on the Munda airfield, with emphasis placed on the lessons learned in the Guadalcanal campaign. The Americal Division and the 2d Marine Division had been withdrawn for a rest. (The former was to participate later in the Bougainville campaign, and the latter was destined to land at Tarawa, in the Gilberts.) The XIV Corps now comprised the 25th, 37th, and 43d Divisions. The 3d Marine Division had also arrived on Guadalcanal. General Patch, who had contracted malaria, was evacuated, and Major General Oscar W. Griswold succeeded to the command of the XIV Corps.

By mid-June, when the final preparations for the assault were about complete, we had available four airfields on Guadalcanal and

two in the Russells, all adequately staffed and ready to support the operation. Storage tanks for gasoline had been constructed and repair and maintenance facilities improved.

Meanwhile the Japanese Seventeenth Army, with headquarters at Buin, on the southern tip of Bougainville Island, was busily engaged in organizing the defenses in the central Solomons. Eighth Area Army Headquarters, under General Hitoshi Imamura, had been set up at Rabaul in November 1942 in order to command both the Seventeenth Army and the newly activated Eighteenth Army, which took over the operations in eastern New Guinea. By the beginning of 1943 heavy troop reinforcements were on the way, and the Japanese were preparing for large-scale defensive warfare in island areas which, according to their original plans, were to have been made secure several months earlier. A reinforced regiment of the 38th Division, which had been reconstituted at Rabaul after being almost wiped out at Guadalcanal, now garrisoned the New Georgia area. On Bougainville the principal combat force was the 6th Division, which was in the area around Buin.

Our assault on New Georgia was to be made by troops of the 37th and 43d Divisions, reinforced by Marine battalions, with the 25th Division held in reserve on Guadalcanal. Rendova Island, just a few miles south of Munda Point, was first to be occupied in strength to provide positions for 155-mm. guns and a staging point from which the real thrust against Munda would be made. As soon as the Munda airfield and other strategically important points on New Georgia were under control, preparations were to be made for the capture of Kolombangara.

The landing on Rendova was made early on 30 June under cover of an air umbrella of fighter planes. Only light resistance was encountered, and our warships effectively neutralized the fire from enemy batteries on Munda Point. Two days later our troops landed on New Georgia, east of Munda Point.

It had been anticipated that the forces assigned to the attack would be sufficient to complete the seizure of New Georgia within thirty days. But strong Japanese defenses,* mud, dense jungle, and inaccurate maps all combined to slow down the advance, and the 25th Division, less one regiment, was ordered to New Georgia in mid-July. On the 25th, after a regrouping of forces had been effected, a coordinated offensive was launched against the airfield. Munda was captured on 5 August, and twenty days later all organized resistance on New Georgia ceased, many of the enemy having

* Elements of the Japanese 6th Division at Buin came south to reinforce the defending garrison on New Georgia.

withdrawn to Kolombangara. During the thirty-seven days of the Munda operation our planes destroyed some 350 enemy aircraft at a cost of ninety-three of our own.

When the fall of Munda appeared imminent, a change in plans was made whereby Vella Lavella instead of Kolombangara Island became the next objective. The only enemy troops on Vella Lavella were several hundred men concentrated principally on the north coast, where they protected and operated barge supply points. There were no airfields on the island. So we see that the plan now was to by-pass the enemy defenses and airfield on Kolombangara and land many miles beyond on an island with negligible defenses and no airstrip. Once there, however, our troops would occupy a position athwart the enemy's supply route to Kolombangara, and air bases could be constructed that would advance our own bomb line to include Buin and Rabaul. Meanwhile the airfield on Kolombangara could be neutralized by American aircraft based at Munda.

The remaining regiment of the 25th Division, which had been left on Guadalcanal, together with Marine, engineer, and artillery units, landed without opposition on the southern end of Vella Lavella on 15 August. The construction of an airstrip was begun immediately after a defensive perimeter had been established. Early in September our men moved north to clear the island of Japanese troops. The small enemy garrison was driven into the northwestern part of the island by the end of the month.

On 27 September the newly constructed airstrip on Vella Lavella was placed in operation, and the Japanese on Kolombangara began to withdraw. During the height of the evacuation our naval forces attacked the enemy vessels engaged in the attempt, sinking several destroyers and some sixty barges and damaging many more.

By 6 October elements of the New Zealand 3d Division, which had arrived in Vella Lavella during mid-September to relieve the American forces there, had driven the enemy back to a narrow beachhead on the northwest coast. During the night of 6-7 October an estimated 400 Japanese were evacuated by the "Tokyo Express" at the cost of at least one destroyer sunk and several damaged by our alert naval forces.

Meanwhile all of the lesser islands in the New Georgia group had been occupied, and with the evacuation of the enemy from Vella Lavella the New Georgia operation came to a close. Our losses in the campaign were 1136 killed and 4140 wounded. Of some 8000 Japanese in the area over 2500 dead were counted.

Even before this operation ended, however, the next phase of the Solomons campaign had begun. During the latter half of September

our air force had turned its attention chiefly to Japanese air bases in the Bougainville area. Many of these attacks had been carried out by heavy bombers,* and considerable damage had been done. On the other hand, the enemy's air activity had dwindled until finally he limited his raids to night attacks only.

During the operations in the central Solomons many naval engagements also took place, the principal ones being indicated on the map. The Japanese continually attempted to reinforce their garrisons in the New Georgia group, and we, just as diligently, intercepted their night runs. Although losses were heavy on both sides, control of the waters in the upper Solomons area definitely passed to our Navy.

Results of the strategy of blockade and strangulation, as executed at Vella Lavella, became apparent as one enemy position after another was abandoned or easily mopped up by our troops. One of the islands evacuated by the Japanese was Santa Isabel, just east of New Georgia. The complete success of the strategy led to its adoption for the next phase in the Solomon Islands campaign.

In September preliminary plans were formulated for the seizure of a position on Bougainville from which aircraft could operate to neutralize Rabaul and from which the supply line from that base to the enemy's airfields and naval bases in the Buin area could be cut. Two alternate localities were finally selected, the Empress Augusta Bay area on the west coast and the Kieta area on the east coast. In order to determine which of these should be chosen, reconnaissance patrols were put ashore from submarines. On the basis of their reports a landing at Empress Augusta Bay was decided upon. Elements of the Japanese 17th Division had been sent from Rabaul in October to garrison Buka and the northern tip of Bougainville, while the 6th Division remained in the Buin area. Thus deployed, the Seventeenth Army was ill-prepared to cover our selected landing site at Empress Augusta Bay.

As the first step, the Treasury Islands were to be seized and developed as a staging area for landing craft. New Zealand troops landed there on the night of 26-27 October and drove light enemy forces back into the jungle, where they were mopped up a few days later.

Early on 28 October a Marine battalion executed diversionary landings on the northwest coast of Choiseul in order to gain surprise for our attack on Bougainville. The marines were withdrawn on

* All Army air units in the South Pacific Area belonged to the Thirteenth Air Force, activated 13 January 1943 and commanded by Major General Nathan F. Twining.

3 November after destroying enemy facilities and thoroughly confusing the Japanese as to where our main blow was to fall. Tokyo announced that 20,000 Allied troops had landed on Choiseul.

The 3d Marine Division of General Vandegrift's I Marine Amphibious Corps invaded Bougainville on 1 November. The landing, made on the north shore of Empress Augusta Bay, encountered only slight initial resistance, and our losses were negligible. Excellent air support of the assault was rendered by both carrier- and land-based planes. Long-range aircraft from the Southwest Pacific Area successfully neutralized the enemy base at Rabaul prior to the landing and continued their attacks while the beachhead was being established. On 5 November, and again on 11 November, Rabaul was subjected to the heaviest and most sustained air bombardments possible. Altogether more than 300 planes, both carrier- and land-based, took part in attacks that began before dawn and lasted well into the afternoon. Enemy warships were particularly hard hit and suffered heavy damage.

On 8 November the 37th Division began landing at the beachhead on Bougainville to reinforce the marines. So rapidly did we pour in troops and equipment that by 13 November 34,000 men and 23,000 tons of supplies had been put ashore. Early in November General Vandegrift left Bougainville to return to the United States, where he was to assume the duties of Commandant of the Marine Corps. Major General Roy S. Geiger, U. S. Marine Corps, succeeded to the command of our troops on Bougainville.

Army forces assumed responsibility for the beachhead on 15 December, and the 3d Marine Division was replaced by the Americal Division. General Griswold, commander of the XIV Corps, was now in charge of the ground operations. By the end of the year a naval base and three airfields had been put into operation. The mission of our forces on the island was to maintain a defensive perimeter, approximately ten miles long and five miles deep, guarding our installations in the Empress Augusta Bay area. The Japanese Seventeenth Army was now isolated, its line of communication to Rabaul severed by Allied air and naval power, while at the same time Rabaul itself, only 235 miles distant, was under constant air attack from our fields on Bougainville.

No further offensive action was undertaken by our forces on the island, for at this time a new strategic plan of operations against the enemy was about to be put into effect. The American troops were soon to be replaced by Australian units so that they could be used in other areas. Our casualties on Bougainville up to 30 April 1944 were 1027 killed, 130 missing or captured, and 4228 wounded.

It is to the Southwest Pacific Area that we now turn our attention. There, also, the enemy had been beaten back in the first stages of what was to be one of the most brilliant campaigns of the war.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA (Map 1)

When General MacArthur arrived in Australia from Corregidor on 17 March 1942 to assume command of the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, he found little comfort in the situation that faced him. Most of the Australian forces had not yet returned from the Middle East, and American troops had arrived in only limited numbers. Some of the latter (elements of the Americal Division) had already been sent to New Caledonia. Only a small number of Allied planes were on hand to strike back at the enemy's air thrusts, which by then had reached to Australia itself. The situation was indeed serious, for the fall of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies had spread the gloom of defeat everywhere, and Australia was busily preparing her own defenses against an expected Japanese invasion. The available forces were scarcely adequate to assure the success of the defense, much less to permit the assumption of offensive operations.

Despite these disadvantages, however, the situation was by no means hopeless. By the very nature of their strategic advances on all fronts the Japanese were bound to slow down as they extended their conquests. The construction of new airfields and naval bases could not be accomplished overnight. The dispersal of forces and matériel along many different axes of advance made concentration of combat power in any particular sector correspondingly slower and more difficult. The desperate resistance offered by our forces on Bataan and Corregidor and the checks administered in the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway went far toward gaining us the time that was essential for an adequate defense in the Southwest Pacific.

Early in April the 41st Division reached Melbourne, Australia, and a few weeks later the 32d Division landed at Adelaide. When the enemy began his overland advance across New Guinea in July, General MacArthur's position was materially improved over what it had been in March, although severe limitations still existed. It should be borne in mind that the invasion of Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 had the favorable effect of diverting considerable Japanese forces, including ground troops, from the campaign in New Guinea. Brilliant strategic planning was building the foundation for tactical success.

American reinforcements had arrived in the Southwest Pacific Area none too soon. The second Japanese attempt to capture Port

Moresby was about to begin, and this time the attack would be launched overland so that the American Navy could not again interfere **(Map 2)**.

On 22 July Major General Tomitaru Horii landed some 4400 troops at Gona, on the northeast coast of Papua. This force quickly occupied Buna, and by 28 July elements had penetrated inland to Kokoda, high in the Owen Stanley Mountains, where Australian resistance was met. Additional men and supplies poured in, and a base of operations was established in the Buna–Gona area. By 13 August over 11,000 troops had landed, and the drive on Port Moresby began.

The Japanese soon broke through the Australian defenses at Kokoda and then slowly fought their way across deep gorges and razor-backed ridges until they reached the southern slopes. Here the Australian resistance stiffened, and the enemy advance was halted on 14 September at a point less than thirty-two miles from Port Moresby.

During the critical last days of August the enemy had landed about 2000 troops at Milne Bay **(Map 8)** in order to seize the airstrip there and to advance along the coast against Port Moresby. Here, however, they ran into an ambush set by the numerically superior Australian troops * guarding this flank. After heavy fighting, in which they lost over 600 dead, the Japanese were dispersed. Most of the survivors were evacuated by destroyers, but a few were left to make their way as best they could up the coast to Buna.

Meanwhile Allied planes had been conducting relentless bombing and strafing attacks against the Japanese supply line, which ran over the difficult mountain trails from the Buna-Gona area. Early in September, when the enemy threat appeared most grave, General MacArthur had rushed the American 32d Division (less the 127th Infantry and the division artillery) from Australia to Port Moresby. These troops, sent partly by plane and partly by boat, had all arrived by 28 September, and one regiment, the 128th Infantry, had taken position on the left flank of the Australian 7th Division. A reinforced battalion of the 126th Infantry was moving along the coast toward Rigo, where a trail led inland to the Allied right flank. On this date General MacArthur ordered a counterattack against the half-starved Japanese.

Papuan Campaign.—The counterattack that was launched in the last days of September was the initial Allied blow in the Papuan cam-

* Two infantry brigades, reinforced, and two fighter squadrons. An Australian brigade is equivalent to our regiment.

paign. For the first time in the Southwest Pacific Area we had seized the initiative.

The enemy fell back under the weight of the Allied attack and soon was retreating toward Kokoda. The Australian 7th Division took up the pursuit as a direct-pressure force, while 32d Division units were given an encircling-force mission. The latter were to be flown across the mountains to the coast, from where it was hoped they would be able either to cut off the fleeing enemy or to launch a surprise attack against his base at Buna before he was ready to meet it. While the Australians laboriously made their way over the steep mountain trails toward Kokoda, the reinforced American battalion near Rigo was sent overland toward Jaure. Troops from the Milne Bay garrison were ordered to occupy Goodenough Island and the littoral of Collinwood Bay.

An old landing strip at Wanigela * was made serviceable, and by 18 October the 128th Infantry had been flown there. The regiment was then taken in small boats to Pongani, where it set to work constructing an airstrip so that the remaining American units in the Port Moresby area could be flown in.

By 2 November the Australians had reached Kokoda, and the American battalion had passed through Jaure en route to Bofu. The airstrip at Pongani was in operation, and the bulk of the 126th Infantry landed there between 9 and 11 November. However, it was now too late to intercept the retreating enemy. Australian patrols learned that "bush wireless" had carried the news of our airborne movement to the Japanese, and a surprise attack on Buna was no longer possible. By 18 November the Allied forces had reached the positions shown on the map.

The construction of additional airstrips near Dobodura and Popondetta was already underway by this date (**Map 9**). This important work was assigned the highest priority, since the lack of a harbor in the area made it necessary to depend on air transport for about 50 per cent of our supplies. Troops along the coast were supplied by small boats moving along the shore from a base at Milne Bay. This supply line, however, was exposed to enemy air attack and was frequently disrupted, throwing all of the supply burden on the limited number of aircraft for weeks at a time. As a result, the troops were occasionally on reduced rations, and great care had to be exercised in granting priorities for various types of supplies.

* Prior to the war many landing fields had been built in New Guinea by companies engaged in mining gold, since the airplane was the only means of getting supplies and equipment into the interior of the roadless country.

Before discussing the actual operations in the Buna–Sanananda area, it may be well to consider briefly our * position, the terrain, and the type of enemy defenses confronting us. The boundary between the Allied divisions is shown on the map. In general it ran along the Girua River. West of the river was the Australian 7th Division, commanded by Major General G. A. Vasey; east of the river was the American 32d Division, commanded by Major General Edwin F. Harding. Both forces were a part of the Advanced New Guinea Force, commanded by Lieutenant General E. F. Herring of the Australian Army.** About 90 per cent of the terrain in this area is jungle and swamp. Only a few trails led from our positions to the enemy's fortified areas at Buna and Sanananda. Between these trails all was jungle swamp. No lateral communication routes existed, and our attacks were canalized along the trails. This made complete coordination difficult to attain and resulted in a series of separate engagements.

The rainy season, which extends from November to January, had turned the trails into deep, sticky mud that all but sucked the soles off shoes. The average humidity for the month of December is 82 per cent, and the temperature ranges between 70° and 90° F. Malaria and dengue fever are prevalent in this part of New Guinea, and hordes of jungle insects and blood-sucking leeches are always present.

The enemy had taken every advantage of the terrain in constructing two strong defensive positions that were almost completely hidden in the swampy jungle. One of these lay across the Soputa–Sanananda road in the Australian zone of action; the other was in front of Buna and the unserviceable airstrip to the southeast, in the American zone. Gona was also ringed with defensive works. Thus all of the approaches to the enemy's base, except by sea, were covered by field fortifications. His defense consisted essentially of a network of mutually supporting bunkers organized in depth. Dugouts are not feasible in the Buna area because the water is too close to the surface, so the Japanese bunkers were almost entirely above ground. They were made of coconut logs up to eighteen inches in diameter, two or three layers of which provided the overhead cover. The walls were usually reinforced with oil drums or ammunition boxes filled with sand. Earth was heaped over the shelters, and fast-growing

* As used in this account, "our" refers, of course, to the Australian as well as the American forces.

** General Sir Thomas Blamey, Australian Army, commanded all Allied ground forces in New Guinea.

tropical vegetation soon made them practically indiscernible in the jungle underbrush. Even aerial photographs failed to reveal the location of many of these bunkers.

The enemy force at Buna totaled about 2200, of whom more than 1800 were veteran combat troops. Only a few of these had taken part in the disastrous retreat over the Owen Stanley Range; the rest were fresh and ready for battle. At Sanananda and Gona the enemy had over 3000 men. However, about two thirds of them had participated in the abortive advance on Port Moresby and were still suffering from the effects of that defeat. General Horii had been drowned while crossing a river during the retreat, and Major General Oda was now in command.

On 19 November an attack by two battalions of the 128th Infantry was made against the east flank of the Japanese defenses around Buna. It was raining, and visibility, always poor in the jungle, was so limited as to make ground observation almost impossible. The advance elements stumbled across unseen enemy bunkers and were met with rifle and automatic-weapons fire. The flashless powder used by the Japanese and the reverberation of sound in the thick jungle made it extremely difficult to locate the enemy's defenses. Our units lost contact with one another, and in the evening the attack was discontinued to allow a reorganization for a new attempt.

Two days later an all-out attack along the entire Buna front was ordered by division headquarters. It was to be preceded by a bombing of the enemy's position by our aircraft. At this time we had no artillery to support the operation, and only about one third of the 81-mm. mortars had been brought along because of transportation difficulties. Our attack on the 21st also failed. The front lines were so indistinct in the jungle that bombs were dropped among our own troops, causing some casualties and seriously affecting morale. The troops did not receive the attack order until long after the bombing was over, and so another bombardment was made in the afternoon, following which the attack began. On the right we made a slight advance, but met well-directed small-arms fire and withdrew to our original positions. Units on the left also moved forward but were stopped by the strong Japanese defenses. The lack of adequate lateral communications proved to be a great disadvantage. While the Japanese could reinforce either flank along the Buna front within a few minutes, it took a two-day march to move our troops from one wing to the other.

On 22 November the Australian 7th Division, reinforced by American units amounting to more than a battalion, launched a general attack against Gona and along the Soputa–Sanananda road. The

Australians, exhausted by their gruelling march across the Owen Stanleys, were unable to make any headway against the strong enemy defenses; but the American troops managed to work their way partly around the left flank of the enemy's first road block. During the following days they continued their envelopment until by 30 November two companies were astride the road in rear of the enemy's forward position. They established a road block to deny supplies to the encircled Japanese while other units held positions east of the road to protect the supply of our own troops. Operations for the following three weeks on the Sanananda front consisted essentially in maintaining this road block against desperate enemy attacks from all sides. During this period 2000 more Japanese troops landed to reinforce the garrison.

Meanwhile the 32d Division had been organized into two combat teams of about three battalions each. One, the Urbana Force, was assigned the western part of the division zone, facing Buna and Buna Mission; the other, the Warren Force, occupied the eastern part of the zone, along the coast.

Several attacks were made by each force during the following days, but no material gains were made. On 1 December Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of the American I Corps, landed at Dobodura to assume command of the troops in the American zone of action. General Eichelberger arrived just in time to witness fruitless attacks on both the Warren and Urbana fronts on 2 December. It was this repulse that brought our troops' morale to probably its lowest point. Even before the attack the men were tired and dispirited. Two weeks of fighting had failed to make even a dent in the strong Japanese position. Food had been so short that troops sometimes received only one sixth of a C ration per day. Rain alternated with stifling jungle heat, and the insects seemed even more determined than the enemy. Disease had inflicted more casualties than the Japanese, and all battalions had been reduced to about half strength. Some artillery had been sent forward by water and by air, and at the end of November nine Australian pieces and one American 105-mm. howitzer were on hand. But the ammunition supply was inadequate for even these few pieces.

General Eichelberger's first action was to regroup the units, reshuffle the command, and reorganize the supply system. Brigadier General Albert W. Waldron, division artillery commander, took over command of the 32d Division, and new commanders were assigned to the Warren and Urbana Forces.

Several Bren-gun carriers with Australian crews had arrived, and plans were laid for a general attack on 5 December. The Warren

Force was to attack with its main effort along the coast, following close behind the Bren-gun carriers. The Urbana Force was given the task of driving to the sea between Buna Village and the mission. The attack was to be preceded by an air bombardment of the enemy's defenses, and the artillery was to give all possible support to the Warren Force's main effort.

The attack began about 0830, small gains being made initially by the Warren Force. The presence of the Brens proved a complete surprise to the enemy, but he rallied quickly. Snipers in the trees picked off the exposed crews from above, while Japanese troops on the ground tossed grenades over the sides of the carriers. In a short time they were all immobilized, and our infantry following behind them met with unabated fire from the enemy's defenses. By 1000 hours our troops were forced to withdraw to their original positions.

The Urbana Force started its attack about 1030. It met little resistance for the first half hour of its advance through the jungle; but then as its leading elements came into the open near Buna Village, they were pinned to the ground by heavy mortar and machine-gun fire. Gradually, however, one platoon worked its way to the beach between the Japanese strong points at the village and at Buna Mission. Several enemy counterattacks were repulsed, and by nightfall additional troops had firmly established the corridor to the sea. The Japanese line had been broken for the first time since the campaign began.

Enemy counterattacks were repulsed again on the 6th, but our own troops were unable to take Buna. On 11 December a battalion of the 32d Division's last remaining regiment, the 127th Infantry, was brought in by air to relieve the troops in the corridor. This battalion attacked Buna Village on the 14th and captured it within an hour. Most of the enemy had retired before the attack was made.

Although heartbreaking setbacks, each with its share of casualties, had thus far attended the campaign, our situation was much improved by 15 December. One of the enemy's strong points was in our possession, and his forces east of Buna were cut off from those at Sanananda. The attacks by the Warren Force, while they had resulted in little or no gain, did serve to locate most of the enemy's ingeniously constructed bunkers. In addition, our troops had learned much from experience and were rapidly becoming battle-wise. Morale improved tremendously after the capture of Buna Village became known.

By 17 December the leading elements of an Australian brigade, including seven light tanks, had arrived by boat and had moved into the Warren zone. The next day another attack was made on this front, with the tanks leading the way. The attack made headway but met strong resistance. Three of the tanks were knocked out, and the Australian infantry following behind suffered heavy casualties. Thereafter progress was slow but steady. The attack was renewed each morning, and each night our forces halted to reorganize for the next day's assault. The Allies inched forward daily until 30 December. On that date a general reorganization of forces was made, and additional Australian tanks were put into the line.

Meanwhile the Urbana Force, following the capture of Buna Village, sent a battalion westward along the coast toward Tarakena, and the remainder turned its attention to the Japanese troops to the east. Repeated attacks at various points met with little success, but the constant pounding dissipated the enemy's strength, already suffering from lack of supplies and reinforcements. Finally, on 29 December, the Urbana Force drove another wedge to the sea just east of Buna Mission. Two days later other forces crossed the inlet west of the mission and established positions on the sand spit there. On 2 January Buna Mission was assaulted from both sides, and all resistance was overcome. The Urbana Force then attacked eastward along the coast to meet the Warren Force.

The Warren Force, supported by eleven tanks, jumped off on the morning of 1 January. Only light resistance was met. The main effort was made on the left, and in less than two hours it had carried to the sea. By nightfall only two pockets of enemy resistance remained. These were wiped out by 3 January, and organized resistance in the 32d Division's zone ceased on that date.*

Let us now return to the zone of action of the Australian 7th Division and see what happened there during this period. Soon after the establishment of the road block behind the most advanced enemy strong point on the Soputa–Sanananda road, another road block in rear of his second position was established. On 28 November a fresh Australian brigade, which had been flown into Popondetta, had joined with another Australian brigade for a drive on Gona. They smashed through the enemy's defenses there and captured Gona on 9 December. Now the Japanese at Sanananda were cut off from any escape except by sea. After mopping up the Gona area,

* After the fall of Buna General Blamey returned to Australia, and General Herring assumed command of all troops in New Guinea. General Eichelberger took over the Advanced New Guinea Force for the remainder of the campaign.

one brigade was withdrawn for use against the enemy positions on the road to Sanananda.

On 22 December the Americans holding the road blocks were relieved by fresh Australian troops. Eight days later the leading elements of the 163d Infantry of the American 41st Division landed at Dobodura and Popondetta and were attached to the Australian 7th Division. They took over the road block positions on 4 January, and preparations for a general attack were made in the hope of breaking the long stalemate. At this time the enemy was forced to rely upon the roundabout and difficult Killerton trail for the supply of his advanced strong points, while our supply line to the road blocks ran through the dense jungle east of the Soputa–Sanananda road and had to be patrolled constantly. The division plan of attack called for the 163d Infantry to cut Killerton trail and then to hold both possible lines of enemy retreat while one Australian brigade broke through the southernmost Japanese defenses at the junction of the Killerton trail with the Sanananda road. The Australians were then to drive up the trail to the sea and swing eastward to envelop the entire Sanananda defensive position, while the 163d Infantry reduced the remaining enemy defenses along the road. The 127th Infantry, in the 32d Division's zone, was to support the attack by pressing westward along the coast through Giruwa and joining with the Australians.

On 8 January the 127th Infantry, moving up from the Buna front, captured Tarakena and applied increasing pressure to the strong left flank of the enemy's Sanananda defenses. The 163d Infantry struck on 9 January and established under fire a road block on the Killerton trail, cutting the enemy's supply line to his advanced positions. Three days later the Australians, supported by a few tanks, attacked northward along the road. The attack met heavy resistance that quickly put the tanks out of action, and by noon failure was evident.

Along the Soputa–Sanananda road vigorous patrolling was carried out in order to obtain a more complete picture of the enemy situation. On the morning of the 14th it was discovered that the Japanese were about to evacuate their southernmost position. An immediate attack was ordered, and the strong point was quickly overrun by the Australians. On the following day the 163d Infantry stormed the next enemy position on the road and overcame the last resistance on the 16th. While this action was taking place, one Australian brigade and the left-flank battalion of the 163d Infantry pushed up the Killerton trail in an enveloping movement. The American battalion cut across a lateral trail north of the enemy's third strong point on

the Sanananda road and attacked from the rear. The Australian regiment drove on to Cape Killerton and then turned east to attack the enemy at Sanananda Point. Meanwhile the 127th Infantry, which had captured Tarakena, continued to fight its way westward along the coast. Attacked from all sides, the enemy realized that complete defeat was now certain. During the night of 16-17 January high-ranking officers removed wounded Japanese soldiers from barges in which they were to be evacuated and took their places.

The isolated Japanese units were overcome by the converging attacks of Allied units during the next six days. By 22 January all organized resistance west of the Girua River had been wiped out, and the Papuan campaign had come to a close.

Over 5000 of the enemy were killed in the Buna–Sanananda operation, and many others were mopped up in the days that followed. Of the 2200 Japanese at Buna, 1450 were buried or captured by our troops. Disease and starvation claimed many; only a few were evacuated..

A total of 13,646 American troops participated in the campaign. Of these 671 were killed and 2172 were wounded. Disease, however, took an even heavier toll, about 8000 of our troops being disabled by sickness.

Comments on the Papuan Campaign.—The Papuan operation may seem small when compared to operations in other theaters. Judged by the numbers of troops involved, it was indeed small, but in the results attained it will rank high among the decisive battles of our war with Japan. Here for the first time we defeated the enemy in an offensive operation.* In Papua we not only defeated experienced troops with units inexperienced in battle, but we met the enemy in his deliberately chosen and fortified positions and crushed him.

Many of the difficulties and mistakes that marked the campaign were a result of an action that had to be undertaken before the necessary preparations could be made. Available troops were hastily thrown in to stop the enemy's advance. Speed was so essential that many were flown to Port Moresby, leaving their artillery and most of their heavy mortars behind. Those who came by sea were also deprived of their heavy weapons because of the shortage of ships. Once the enemy was stopped, immediate offensive action was required if the threat to Port Moresby was to be eliminated. By striking quickly, while the Japanese were occupied at Guadalcanal, General MacArthur took advantage of the enemy's dispersion of strength. The tactical offensive that we adopted in order to protect

* The Guadalcanal campaign was still being fought.

Port Moresby led to the destruction of the enemy in Papua and to the seizure of the strategic offensive by the Allies in 1943. Without taking that first step up the New Guinea coast, the brilliant operations that followed could never have been undertaken.

Our troops in New Guinea learned the bitter lessons of jungle warfare by actual experience, and what they learned was to be of immense value in training divisions for subsequent operations. The enemy, the heat, the humidity, and the diseases of the jungle sapped the strength of our battalions. For example, the reinforced battalion of the 126th Infantry that operated on the Sanananda front, and which occupied the road blocks for almost four weeks, went into action with 1200 officers and men; on 9 January, when it was withdrawn from the lines, only 165 were left.

Leadership, as it does in all campaigns, played an important part in our success. General Eichelberger's assumption of command came at a time when morale was extremely low. The troops were poorly supplied, units were hopelessly intermingled, and costly repulses had been the only results of their attacks. General Eichelberger's first steps were to rectify as quickly as possible the deficiencies in supply and to reshuffle the command. Every effort was made to serve hot meals. Command was conferred on those who showed the ability to wield it. Thus it was that Staff Sergeant Herman J. Bottcher, who so ably led his platoon in creating and holding the corridor to the sea that isolated Buna Village, was made a captain on the field of battle.

For the first time in the war the Allies had transported and supplied entire units by air—an operation that was rendered even more difficult by the conditions encountered. The limited number of aircraft available made logistics a problem of maintaining a delicate balance between the various classes of supplies in order to assure a sufficient amount of each to continue operations. Initially this balance was not maintained, and the troops suffered from lack of food. Fortunately this situation was soon remedied. Much credit for the success of our operations belongs to the airmen of Major General George C. Kenney's Fifth Air Force, who overcame all difficulties and succeeded in delivering our supplies while they were denying the enemy his.

General MacArthur stated that the widespread use of air power both offensively and defensively was the "outstanding military lesson" learned in the campaign in Papua and that it pointed the way to the ultimate defeat of Japan. He also said that air transport "in an effective combination with ground forces represents tactical and

strategical elements of a broadened conception of warfare that will permit the applications of offensive power in swift, massive strokes, rather than the dilatory and costly island-to-island advance that some have assumed to be necessary in a theater where the enemy's far-flung strongholds are dispersed throughout a vast expanse of archipelagoes."

Subsequent Operations (Map 8).—While the ground forces were waging battle with the enemy, our aircraft were striking at his bases at Salamaua, Lae, Finschhafen, Madang, and Wewak. Rabaul and other airfields in New Britain, as well as the barges and ships bringing supplies and reinforcement to New Guinea, were also targets for the air force.

Soon after the first of the year the Japanese, apparently realizing that the Papuan campaign was lost, turned their attention to strengthening their other positions in New Guinea. Troops, supplies, and planes were dispatched from Rabaul in increasing numbers, and it soon became evident that they had more ambitious plans than the mere defense of their bases.

A year before, when the Japanese first landed in New Guinea and occupied Salamaua, the Australian patrols in that area fell back to Wau, about thirty miles inland. There one of the most unusual airstrips in the world was located. The field was 3300 feet above sea level but deep in a valley surrounded by high and rugged mountains. Because of the mountains there was only one suitable route of approach. Poorly drained and covered with alternate bumps and depressions, the 3600-foot runway also featured a slope of 10 per cent. As a result landings were made uphill and takeoffs downhill. In the early days of the enemy's invasion Wau was regarded as an outpost for the defense of Port Moresby, only 150 miles away by air. Accordingly, two companies of Australian Commandos were sent to the area in March 1942 to prevent the Japanese from using the field.

On 9 January a regiment of enemy troops was landed at Lae and then transferred to Salamaua. Soon afterwards they began to move across the mountains on Wau. General MacArthur immediately sent a brigade of Australian troops by air to the threatened point. However, only the advance elements had arrived by the time the enemy had fought his way to within sight of the airstrip, extremely bad weather having delayed the transfer of the remainder of the brigade. On the morning of 29 January the freakish New Guinea weather suddenly cleared after a four-inch rain the night before, and American transports began to ferry the troops from Port Moresby to Wau. Fifty-seven landings were made that day, al-

though the Japanese were then within easy rifle range of the strip. As the troops unloaded, they rushed to previously prepared defenses around the edge of the field. The following day a determined enemy attack was repulsed, and a few hours later the arrival of Australian artillery, also by plane, definitely turned the tide. On 3 February the Japanese began to withdraw, the Australians following close behind. In the months that followed, almost constant fighting, in which the enemy suffered heavy casualties, took place on the jungle-clad ridges between Wau and Salamaua.

On 7 February Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, who was to activate the headquarters of the Sixth Army and become its commander, arrived at Brisbane, Australia, with the advance echelon of his staff. Most of the American troops in the Southwest Pacific Area were immediately assigned to that army. Major units included the 1st Marine Division, the 32d and 41st Army Divisions, the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 158th Infantry Regiment, and certain artillery and engineer organizations. Within a relatively short time the Sixth Army was to become the spearhead of General MacArthur's strategic offensive to recapture the Philippines.

Japanese anxiety over the steadily worsening situation in southeastern New Guinea caused them to send further reinforcements to that area. In turn this weakened their position in the central and northern Solomons, as we have seen. Headquarters of the Eighteenth Army, Lieutenant General Hatazo Adachi commanding, moved from Rabaul to the Lae–Salamaua area early in February, and on 1 March a naval task force transporting a large number of troops was reported moving along the north coast of New Britain headed for the Huon Gulf. All available Allied aircraft of the Fifth Air Force struck the convoy of seventeen ships during the period 2 to 4 March as it passed through Vitiaz Strait. The result of this Battle of the Bismarck Sea was the near-annihiliation of the Japanese task force. Seven transports and four destroyers were sunk, drowning approximately 3000 out of a total of 5500 ground troops; in addition, at least sixty-one enemy planes were destroyed. Only four destroyers got away. Our losses were four aircraft. Largely as a result of this disaster the Japanese Eighth Area Army at Rabaul was forced to change its method of reinforcing the Eighteenth Army in eastern New Guinea. From this time on the majority of reinforcements were staged into the area by way of greatly expanded bases at Wewak and Madang.

On 25 April the Australian units in the Wau–Salamaua area were incorporated into the Australian 3d Division, and a new and broader mission was laid down for them in GHQ's strategic plan. Even then,

General MacArthur was looking forward to the elimination of the Japanese from Lae, the Markham and Ramu River valleys, and the Huon Peninsula. Henceforth the Australian troops were to continue to advance on Salamaua in order to draw enemy strength from Lae and to screen our real drive, which was to be aimed at the latter place.

The Australians slowly fought their way over the rugged country, getting most of their supplies by air. On 30 June the 162d Infantry of the American 41st Division landed at Nassau Bay to join the Australian troops and give some substance to the feint against Salamaua. As we moved closer to the town, the Japanese diverted all reinforcements arriving at Lae southward to the threatened base and even drew on the Lae garrison itself to strengthen the defenses of Salamaua. Unwittingly they had fallen into the trap that had been so carefully prepared during the preceding months.

Early in September General MacArthur sprang the trap by launching what was to be one of the finest examples of small-scale combined operations in the war. Prior to this time aircraft operating from Port Moresby and from our newly won fields in the Buna–Gona area had intensified their attacks on the enemy's bases. A sustained five-day air offensive against Wewak, which began on 17 August, destroyed about 250 planes on the ground and in the air at a cost of only ten of ours. We now had definite air superiority, and much bolder moves could be ventured. Our control of the northeast coast of Papua had been made complete by the Sixth Army's occupation of Woodlark * and the Trobriand Islands ** on 30 June. This facilitated the movement of troops and supplies by water to that area and also gained for us valuable new airfields.

On 4 September the Australian 9th Division landed east of Lae, meeting practically no resistance. Part moved to the west toward that objective and part to the east toward Hopoi. The American 503d Parachute Regiment was dropped to seize an old airstrip at Nadzab, some twenty miles northwest of Lae, on the morning of the 5th, where it was met by Australian units that had moved over jungle trails. So complete was the surprise that no resistance was encountered, and the next day the first echelon of the Australian 7th Division, brought in by air from Port Moresby, landed at Nadzab. By 9 September all but one brigade was en route to Lae. The remaining brigade sent one battalion up the Markham River valley toward Kaiapit, the site of another old landing field.

* Seized by the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, a nondivisional unit.

** Captured by the 158th Regimental Combat Team, a nondivisional unit.

The concentric advance on Lae met with more resistance from the terrain and weather than from the enemy. Only light forces opposed our troops, and on 16 September they entered Lae to find that the enemy had fled into the hills to the north. Salamaua had been overrun on 12 September, the final attack having been delayed until the Lae operation was well under way.

During the period 30 June to 16 September a total of some 10,000 Japanese had been overcome in the Lae–Salamaua area. Our forces killed 4140 at Salamaua and 2240 around Lae. The remainder made their way north as best they could. The Fifth Air Force, by its efficient interdiction of the enemy's line of communication up the coast, had prevented any appreciable reinforcement of the Lae front by the Japanese strategic reserves at Madang and Wewak.

The battalion that had moved up the Markham River from Nadzab had met only light enemy patrols. On 21 September it surprised an outpost at Kaiapit and seized the airstrip there. This strip was made serviceable, and by the 24th the leading regiment of the Australian 7th Division had arrived by plane. The Australians immediately pushed across the divide into the Ramu River valley, and on 5 October they occupied Dumpu, about forty-five miles south of Madang.

Meanwhile General MacArthur exploited the quick success at Lae by pinching off the Huon Peninsula. On 22 September a brigade of the Australian 9th Division embarked at Lae and landed about six miles north of Finschhafen, where the enemy had some 800 men. Another battalion moved toward that town from the south, following the coast line. Finschhafen was captured on 2 October, and our troops halted there to consolidate their gains. Offensive operations in New Guinea during the remainder of the year consisted of a slow advance toward Madang in order to maintain pressure on the enemy. General MacArthur now devoted most of his air strength to neutralizing the enemy's bases, particularly Rabaul, in order to support impending operations in the Solomons.

As we have seen, Admiral Halsey's forces in the South Pacific Area landed on Bougainville on 1 November. This operation required the support of all Allied aircraft within striking distance of Rabaul to insure the neutralization of that important enemy base while the beachhead was being secured. Meanwhile General MacArthur and his staff were planning new moves to isolate Rabaul, and Sixth Army Headquarters was displaced forward to Goodenough Island to assume immediate control of the scheduled operations.

On 15 December the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, which had previously occupied Woodlark Island, landed at Arawe on the southern coast of New Britain and set up defenses for the PT-

boat base which was soon completed there. Eleven days later the 1st Marine Division, which had been recuperating in Australia after the Guadalcanal campaign, landed on both sides of Cape Gloucester, on the western end of New Britain. In a four-day battle, in which over 1000 Japanese were killed, the marines secured control of the two airfields on the cape. Also on 26 December, the date of the landings on Cape Gloucester, Army engineer and air force detachments occupied Long Island.

The lodgements on New Britain severed one of the main enemy supply lines between Rabaul and eastern New Guinea. His barges would now have to run the gauntlet of our shore batteries to reach New Guinea. In addition, the Cape Gloucester airfields would make possible more effective control of the Bismarck Sea approaches, since Rabaul, Kavieng, and the Admiralty Islands were now within striking distance of Allied fighter planes. As the year 1943 drew to a close, Rabaul, the most important enemy base south of Truk and the hub from which radiated Japanese supply lines for the New Guinea–Solomons area, was rapidly being isolated. Map 10 shows how the coordinated drives by MacArthur and Halsey were accomplishing this important step.

CENTRAL AND NORTH PACIFIC AREAS (Map 1)

It will be recalled that the Japanese attacks on Midway Island and the Aleutians were undertaken concurrently early in June 1942. Both attacks were repulsed, the one at Midway with serious losses to the enemy. After the attack on Dutch Harbor the Japanese occupied Attu and Kiska Islands, far out in the Aleutian chain. Following his stinging defeat at Midway the enemy turned his attention to the Solomons and New Guinea, and we in turn shifted our strength to those areas as rapidly as possible. Troops, warships, and planes in excess of the absolute minimum for the defense of Hawaii and Alaska were dispatched to the south in order to stop the Japanese advance. As a result no offensive operations except submarine warfare and raids by air and light naval forces could be undertaken in the Central and North Pacific Areas during the following eleven months. It was a period of watchful waiting during which Admiral Nimitz was slowly gaining the strength with which to commence offensive operations.

During this time troops of the Alaska Defense Command quietly occupied various islands in the Aleutians east of Kiska and immediately began the construction of airfields. By March 1943 our warships and the aircraft of the Eleventh Air Force were holding Kiska

and Attu under such close surveillance that the enemy was forced to use submarines for the supply of his garrisons there. On Attu the Japanese had 2500 men, and on Kiska there were 5400.

The initial plan of operations against the enemy in the Aleutians provided that Kiska should be assaulted first by a large task force under Admiral Kinkaid. However, this plan was abandoned in favor of an attack on Attu in order to make Kiska untenable and so compel its evacuation. Early in January 1943 the 7th Division, which had been undergoing desert training in California, was moved to the northwest coast of the United States, where for three months it engaged in amphibious maneuvers. Late in April the division boarded transports and sailed for Cold Bay, in Alaska, from where the attack on Attu was to be launched. Unfavorable weather held Admiral Kinkaid's task force in port and delayed the attack from the 7th to the 11th of May. A heavy fog on the day of the landing caused several postponements of H-hour, originally scheduled for 0740. The first troops finally moved ashore at 1620.

For the next eighteen days the enemy put up a bitter and bloody defense. It required that much time for almost 12,000 American troops to blast him from the island. The battle ended on 30 May, but mopping-up operations continued for several more days. Only twenty-nine prisoners were taken, the remainder of the Japanese being killed. Many took their own lives when further resistance appeared futile. Our total casualties were 561 killed and 1136 wounded.

The strategic soundness of by-passing Kiska to capture Attu was now demonstrated. The large body of Japanese troops on Kiska was withdrawn on 29 July by light, fast-moving naval vessels that slipped in when visibility was poor. When American and Canadian troops landed on 15 August, they found the island deserted.

Thus, after fourteen months, the Japanese threat to our north flank was eliminated, and the situation was now reversed. Henceforth the Aleutian air bases would serve American aircraft striking at Japan's north flank in the Kuriles.

By mid-summer of 1943 aircraft production in the United States had soared to 7000 planes per month. We had definitely gained superiority in plane production over the Axis, and our progress in naval construction had exceeded even the most optimistic forecasts. At the Quebec conference in August it had been decided to maintain the initiative against Japan by undertaking offensive operations in the Central Pacific Area simultaneously with renewed drives in New Guinea and the Solomons. In accordance with directives from the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Nimitz now prepared to open his offensive with an invasion of the Gilbert Islands while the enemy was fully occupied in the Southwest Pacific (**Map 13**).

While the sea and ground forces were making their preparations, available Army and Navy aircraft in the Central Pacific Area opened an air offensive designed to neutralize Japanese air bases within supporting range of the Gilberts. Land-based bombers of Major General Willis H. Hale's Seventh Air Force, operating from fields in the Ellice Islands, struck hard at the enemy in the Marshall Islands and on Nauru, while carrier task forces made heavy raids on Wake and Marcus Islands. Air attacks against the Gilberts were intense and prolonged, and our superiority in the air was soon absolute.

For the assault on the Gilberts* Admiral Nimitz had collected the largest fleet yet sent into action by the United States. It comprised seven battleships, seven heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, eight escort carriers, and thirty-four destroyers. This impressive array of naval might was to bombard the selected atolls, Tarawa and Makin, beginning on D minus 1, and was to support the landing on D-day. Admiral Turner commanded the entire Amphibious Force, which was divided into a Northern Task Force for operations against Makin and a Southern Task Force for operations against Tarawa. Major General Holland M. Smith, U. S. Marine Corps, was in command of the V Amphibious Corps, correspondingly divided into a Northern and a Southern Landing Force. The Northern Landing Force, under Major General Ralph C. Smith, comprised the 165th Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Division; the 2d Marine Division made up the Southern Landing Force, commanded by Major General Julian C. Smith, U. S. Marine Corps.

The Japanese on Tarawa and Makin numbered some 5500, of whom over half were special landing troops. The latter were tough and experienced marines, well-trained and well-equipped. The garrison on Makin had a strength of 260, with an additional 540 civilian laborers. On Tarawa there were 2700 troops and 2000 civilian laborers.

The approach of the Amphibious Force was effected without incident; and, following the preliminary air and naval bombardment, the assault troops landed on the morning of 21 November. Only moderate opposition was encountered at Makin, and within thirty-six hours more than half of Butaritari, the largest and most important island in the atoll, was in our possession. An attack during the night of 22-23 November smashed the remaining defenses, and by evening of the 23d the capture of Makin had been completed. Our losses were

* Designated Operation Galvanic.

sixty-six killed and 152 wounded. About 100 prisoners were taken, most of them Korean laborers.

At Tarawa, however, much stronger resistance was encountered by the marines. Here the major action took place on Betio Island, site of the main airfield and of the principal Japanese installations on the atoll. The enemy had undertaken a most elaborate program of defensive works to protect this vital base, and most of it had been completed at the time the marines struck. To supplement a fringing reef that lies some 200 to 400 yards offshore, the Japanese built coconut-log barricades along the shore. One such barricade was in the shape of a wide "V," with its vertex out to sea. It was sited so as to divert landing boats into areas covered by flanking fire. The water area adjoining the beaches was sprinkled with concrete tetrahedrons and piles of coral rock that just broke the surface at high tide. These obstacles were placed so as to canalize the approach of assault craft. Underwater mines were set in the spaces between the obstacles, and mine fields were also laid on shore. Bands of protective wire crisscrossed the beach and extended out into the water. Coast-defense guns, ranging up to 8 inches in caliber (some of which the Japanese had transferred from Singapore), had been emplaced on Betio; and a strong network of reinforced concrete pillboxes, coconut-log bunkers, portable steel pyramids (used for command posts), and antitank ditches had been constructed.

Our lack of adequate information about the atoll was remedied to some extent by air photographs, submarine reconnaissance, and the information supplied by a small group of British who had lived on the various islands. The only hydrographic charts available proved highly inaccurate. Our air and naval bombardments were expected to reduce the enemy's fortifications and knock out his large guns. Experiments conducted with amphibious tractors proved their utility in breaking down or dragging away protective wire and log barricades, and enough of these vehicles to carry the entire first wave ashore had been obtained.

On the morning of the 21st, during the preliminary bombardment by aircraft and naval vessels, the transports moved into position, and the landing craft made ready for the run to shore. While the small craft were getting into formation, the transports came under fire. The ships were forced to leave the area, the landing craft following close behind. Our warships, however, immediately brought counterbattery fire to bear and soon silenced the enemy's large guns. The transports returned, and the amphibious tractors in the first wave headed for shore. They were met by heavy fire, which caused

some casualties and knocked out several of the tractors. A few more struck mines and were blown up or disabled, but the great majority reached the beach. The succeeding waves had a much more difficult time. Many of the landing craft grounded on the reef. Thus immobilized, the men in the boats were taken under fire by the enemy. Some of them attempted to walk ashore, only to find the water much too deep in places inside the reef. Others waded ashore in water up to their necks. The amphibious tractors proved their worth in this situation. They were used to pull boats over the reef, to knock down barricades, and to carry stranded personnel to the beaches.

On the beach the leading units were pinned to the ground by the enemy's fire and were unable to advance beyond the shelter of a sea wall, only a few feet from the water's edge. By nightfall three battalions had been landed, but they had suffered heavy casualties, and their advance had been limited to a few yards. During the night artillery, tanks, ammunition, and other supplies were brought ashore. Later it was learned that the Japanese were too stunned and disorganized by the naval and air bombardments to launch a counterattack the first night. Such an assault was the greatest fear of the marines who clung to their precarious toe hold on Betio during the first twenty-four hours.

The next morning the assault reserve battalion was committed, and it, too, suffered many casualties. Now there were fewer tractors in operation, and the men were forced to wade ashore in the face of a withering fire. Some never reached dry land, and many died on the beach. However, the tanks and artillery were making their presence felt, and early in the afternoon the advantage swung to our side. Additional troops were landed that evening. On the 23d an attack, led by tanks, was launched against the enemy's positions, and by nightfall he had been forced back to one end of the island. That night he launched a suicidal counterattack that was repulsed with heavy losses. The marines again took up their advance on the 24th, and by 1400 all organized resistance had been wiped out.

Of the 4700 Japanese on Betio, an island less than one square mile in area, only about 200 were taken prisoner; the remainder were killed. The marines lost 985 killed and 2193 wounded.

Isolated sniper nests were cleaned up, and other islands in both Tarawa and Makin Atolls were occupied during the following days. Within a short time American planes operating from the newly won bases in the Gilberts were hammering at the Marshall Islands.

At Tarawa we learned many lessons concerning the assault of an atoll. We found that there are many points of difference between

such an operation and an amphibious assault against an enemy occupying a large land mass. The use of feints or demonstrations against small islands is not feasible, since the enemy can move troops to any threatened point in a matter of minutes. Detailed information concerning the tides, reefs, and winds is of the utmost importance. Protracted and intensive preparatory fires by all supporting weapons are required to reduce the enemy's installations. Despite the heavy naval bombardment, it was found that many of the fortifications and emplacements had escaped damage. Direct hits are required to knock out properly constructed pillboxes and bunkers. Naval guns have a relatively flat trajectory, and targets must be brought under fire at ranges great enough to insure a rather high angle of fall if the maximum fire effect is to be realized. Supporting artillery, in addition to being moved ashore as rapidly as possible, should be emplaced on adjoining islands where it can support the troops in the landing and during the critical period that follows. (How well we learned this lesson was to be demonstrated two months later at Kwajalein.) The defensive strength that can be provided for a small island (there were about 400 pillboxes and bunkers on Betio) requires the timely arrival of supports and reserves in order to build up the attacking force as quickly as possible.

The capture of the Gilbert Islands was the last offensive operation undertaken in the Central and North Pacific Areas during 1943. We now had bases which could support our operations against the next objective, the Marshall Islands, and from which land-based planes could pound the enemy's great base at Truk.

CHINA–BURMA–INDIA THEATER (Map 11)

China's darkest year was 1942. As we have already seen, the Japanese conquest of Burma had closed her last important route of supply from the outside world, the Burma Road. Now isolated and faced with an almost complete lack of war matériel, she still refused to submit. The Chinese Army, poorly trained and equipped by modern standards, was definitely not an offensive force. For this reason the front in China was comparatively static, with the initiative entirely in the hands of the Japanese. After December 1941 the policy of Japan in China had become primarily one of economic strangulation. Active operations prior to the summer offensive of 1944 consisted mainly of limited offensives in order to train new troops or raid agricultural areas during harvest seasons. The enemy usually returned to his original lines after carrying out his purpose. The coast line, railroads, and vital areas of China were controlled

by the iron hand of Japan, subject only to the inconclusive, harassing raids of Chinese guerrilla forces. In northern China the Japanese Army maintained large strategic reserves along the Russian frontier. Not until early 1944 was any appreciable portion of these troops shifted elsewhere.

With the diversion of aircraft to more active sectors the strength of the enemy air force in China had sunk to little more than 100 planes by July 1942. Early in that month the United States China Air Task Force,* under Major General Claire L. Chennault, began operations with about forty aircraft. The Japanese immediately built up their strength to about 200 planes and began to attack the American air bases, with, however, very little success despite their numerical superiority.

The importance of giving China sufficient support to keep her in the war was early recognized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, when this critical phase of the global war was discussed at the Casablanca conference in January 1943, the Combined Chiefs directed that preparations be made to re-establish surface communications with China and to step up the flow of air supply over the Hump.

In Burma during 1942 most of the action following the Japanese conquest of the country consisted of limited air attacks and patrol clashes along the Burma–India border. This area remained under the strategic direction of the British Chiefs of Staff, while China was an area of United States strategic direction. It will be recalled that during the last days of the first Burma campaign some 9,000 Chinese troops had retreated into India after being cut off from the Burma Road. A training center was established at Ramgarh, India, for the reorganization and training of these troops, and provision was made to transport additional Chinese by air to Ramgarh. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appointed his deputy commander, General Stilwell, to be the commander of the Chinese troops in India. From October to the end of 1942 some 21,000 Chinese soldiers were flown to Ramgarh. Since American ground troops were not available for assignment to the China–Burma–India theater, General Stilwell was forced to delay any large-scale offensive operation until his Chinese divisions would be ready. At the end of 1942 only 17,000 American troops were in the China–Burma–India theater, and these were almost entirely air force and service of supply personnel.

Meanwhile, in December 1942, the Allies had begun the construction of a new road leading from Ledo, in India, across northern

* Successor to the American Volunteer Group.

Burma to an intersection with the Burma Road near the China border. The line of supply from Calcutta to Ledo was under British supervision, while the new Ledo Road became an American responsibility. Pending the reopening of ground communication with China, the only route of supply available was the air transport system over the 500 miles of the Himalayan Hump between the Assam bases in India and Kunming, China. Little material assistance to the Chinese Army could be sent over this air route since the limited quantity of supplies was barely sufficient to enable General Chennault to continue his air operations. To appreciate the logistical problem, it should be noted that the Hump air line was at the end of a 10,000-mile line of supply from the United States and that in order to convey four tons of gasoline to General Chennault in China, a transport plane had to burn three and a half tons of the same precious commodity. Moreover, in order that one American bomber in China could execute a mission against the enemy, an American transport had to make an average of four separate flights over the most hazardous mountain terrain in the world.

At the end of 1942 Japanese ground strength in Burma was about 100,000. The major units were the same ones that had carried out the initial conquest, namely, the 18th, 33d, 55th, and 56th Divisions of the Fifteenth Army. Since air operations in Southeast Asia had been given a low priority by the enemy high command, most of the best air units had been diverted to Rabaul and New Guinea as reinforcements until scarcely 200 planes remained in Burma, and these were of indifferent quality. Air attacks on Calcutta and against the termini of the Hump air route in late 1942 were serious threats to the Allies, but the Japanese did not have the planes with which to continue them.

In China, during the year 1943, air attacks constituted the only offensive operations by the Allies. Anything more was prohibited by the insurmountable logistical problem. The China Air Task Force became the Fourteenth Air Force and was gradually strengthened. Our bombers carried out attacks against enemy bases in Burma, Thailand, Indo-China, Hainan, Hong Kong, and Formosa. Shipping along the China coast was attacked frequently and with good results. The Japanese made some increase in their China-based air strength, but the best planes and pilots continued to go to the Southwest Pacific. From 2 February 1942 to 31 October 1943 General Chennault's pilots shot down 351 enemy aircraft with a loss to themselves of only sixty-eight. By the end of the year we had achieved parity with the Japanese air force.

At the Washington conference in May 1943 it was agreed that top priority should be given the Air Transport Command to increase the capacity of the Hump air route to 10,000 tons a month. It was also decided that the bulk of these supplies should go to the Fourteenth Air Force in accordance with the desires of General Chennault. The request by General Stilwell that some of the supplies go to the Chinese ground forces was denied. Chennault felt that his airmen could rule the sky over China and insure the defense of his air bases, while Stilwell thought that the Japanese could capture our airfields anytime they wished unless the Chinese Army was given a sufficient build-up. The events of 1944 were to show who was right.

As the year 1943 closed, there was an apparent stalemate in China. The map shows what little change had occurred since 1939. During this four-year period the struggle had yielded no impressive military results. There had been no Japanese conquests comparable to the advances of 1937 and 1938, and there had been no Chinese counteroffensives of a scope to suggest that the Japanese grip on the railroads, big cities, and ports could be loosened.

In Burma, during the latter part of 1942 and the first half of 1943, seesaw operations took place in the region around Akyab **(Map 12)**. British troops began to move down the coast in December 1942 in order to stop the Japanese advance on that flank. Initially they met little resistance, and by the end of the year they were only twenty-five miles from Akyab. At this point the enemy stopped the advance. In March the Japanese 55th Division launched a counterattack against the British left flank and forced a withdrawal. After weeks of almost constant fighting, during which the enemy's infiltration tactics threatened to cut them off completely, the British regained the border of India on 11 May.

Meanwhile the Japanese had moved into the Chin Hills of western Burma and by March had occupied most of northern Burma. Along the Burma Road the front had become stabilized on the Salween River line, where Chinese troops prevented any further advance for the time being. The question now was whether the Japanese would halt at the Burma border or would continue into India.

In February 1943, when the British advance on Akyab had already been stopped, General Stilwell moved the 38th Chinese Division from Ramgarh up to Ledo in order to cover the construction of the new Ledo Road.

During the same month an experimental offensive operation behind the enemy lines was inaugurated in the hope of relieving the pressure on India. Brigadier Orde C. Wingate of the British Army

led long-range-penetration units across the natural barrier between India and Burma and into enemy-held territory. Wingate's force comprised eight jungle columns totaling 3200 men, selected from British, Indian, and Burmese troops. Directed by radio and supplied by air, his columns covered a distance of 1000 miles in a period of four months. They gathered topographical and other intelligence in northern Burma, harassed and confused the Japanese forces, and cut lines of communication. In a raid on the Mandalay–Myitkyina railroad, tracks or bridges were destroyed at seventy-five different localities, and the railroad was put out of action for four weeks. Many sharp encounters were fought, and a considerable number of enemy troops were diverted from the front. When ordered to return, the columns dispersed in small groups, each of which successfully fought its way out of Burma. Although the activities of Wingate's forces had no permanent effect on the situation, their heavy losses were not suffered in vain. They opened up new possibilities for offensive operations in Burma, and the force known as Merrill's Marauders, which General Stilwell was to employ in 1944, would benefit greatly from the many valuable lessons learned.

In June 1943 General Sir Claude Auchinleck was appointed commander in chief in India to fill the vacancy created by Wavell's elevation to the post of Viceroy and Governor General. At the Quebec conference in August plans were laid in greater detail to obtain the maximum effect from the resources then available in Asia. The Southeast Asia Command was created under Admiral, the Lord Louis Mountbatten. General Stilwell, who commanded the American China–Burma–India theater, was made his deputy (**Map 13**). Operations in China remained under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek, with Stilwell as his chief of staff and commander of the Chinese troops in India. The dual role of General Stilwell under the Generalissimo and Lord Mountbatten was fraught with particular significance, as events in 1944 were to prove. All air units on the Burma front, including the United States Tenth Air Force, were formed into the Eastern Air Command, under Major General George E. Stratemeyer, chief American air officer in the theater.

At the same conference it was decided that an offensive in northern Burma should be undertaken in the winter of 1943-44 and that the Ledo Road, then under construction by American engineers, should be extended as rapidly as the offensive operations progressed (**Map 11**). In addition, the capacity of the Hump air route was to be raised to 20,000 tons a month, and a pipe line for fuel was to be built paralleling the Ledo Road. The plan for the bombing of the Japanese homeland by B-29's operating out of China was studied

and approved. For the first time it was decided that American ground combat troops could be made available for operations in Burma, although approval was granted for only a relatively small composite unit to carry out long-range-penetration work. Owing to the insufficiency of landing craft, amphibious operations had to be ruled out.

Construction on the Ledo Road, which had been held up near the India–Burma border by the rainy season, began again in October as Chinese troops trained in India moved into northern Burma. By 31 October a force of some 3000 American infantrymen, organized as the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) and commanded by Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, arrived in India. The three battalions composing the provisional unit immediately went into training for combat operations. On 8 January 1944 Merrill's troops were assigned to the field command in northern Burma.

At the Cairo conference in November 1943 the decisions made at the Quebec conference were reaffirmed with the approval of Chiang Kai-shek. It was further decided to initiate B-29 operations in early 1944. For the use of these new aircraft five fields were to be built in China and four in India.

While there was relatively little ground activity in Burma in 1943, Allied aircraft, including Major General Clayton L. Bissell's Tenth Air Force, kept pounding at the enemy's airfields, communications, and rear installations. Rangoon, key point of his supply system, was bombed time after time, with telling effect. The enemy continued to assign a low priority to his air operations in this theater, and by the end of the year Allied aircraft enjoyed complete superiority.

Commencing in August, the Japanese began to reinforce their ground troops in Burma in order to resume offensive operations against India. Headquarters of the Burma Area Army, Lieutenant General Masakazu Kawabe commanding, had been activated at Rangoon in March, and by 31 December 185,000 troops were in Burma, including the newly arrived 31st and 54th Divisions.

COMMENTS (Map 19)

The tide of battle in the war with Japan turned in our favor during the second half of 1942. During those critical months, when our small forces were holding Guadalcanal and driving the Japanese from Papua, the entire course of the war hung in the balance. It was fortunate indeed that we had such commanders as MacArthur, Nimitz, and Halsey, who could wrest victory from the jaws of near disaster and set our forces on the road to Tokyo.

It has been said that fortune smiles upon an ardent wooer, and this is true in war as well as in peace. The aggressive determination that characterized the operations in Guadalcanal and New Guinea was the key to our successes. The vigor displayed by our forces belied the meager strength that we had available in the Pacific. At first underestimating the size of the American forces that attacked Guadalcanal, the Japanese later failed to appreciate that we had but little power in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas to sustain our offensives. We were desperately short of troops, shipping, and naval strength in the early fall of 1942. At one time the only capital ships available to meet any offensive that the enemy might launch were one damaged aircraft carrier and one battleship. The Japanese, however, lost sight of the forest while concentrating on the trees and failed to recognize their opportunity not only to win Port Moresby and Guadalcanal, but also to gain control of the entire South and Southwest Pacific Areas by gathering their forces for one powerful offensive.

Our victories in those areas came at a time when Allied success elsewhere was turning the tide in the global war against the Axis nations. In the fall of 1942 Rommel was defeated in the Battle of Egypt and forced to fall back to Tunisia. In November the Allies landed in North Africa, and the campaign in Tunisia began. Hitler's legions were stopped at Stalingrad, and the Red Army launched a counteroffensive that soon drove the Wehrmacht from that long-besieged city. By the end of the next year, 1943, the Allies held the initiative on all fronts except in Burma and China, where both sides were relatively inactive.

While the individual operations of our forces in the Pacific were small, we must not lose sight of the tremendous front along which the action took place. Never before have the military operations of two antagonists spread over such a vast territory. The war had carried American troops to the remotest corners of the earth. From the steaming swamps and jungles of the Solomons and New Guinea to the bleak slopes of the Aleutians, and from the sun-baked shores of coral atolls to the jungle-clad mountains of Burma, our troops were all fighting one enemy—the Japanese.

During 1942 and 1943 we won the battle of production and supply, thus making possible the operations on those far-flung battlefields. We laid the foundation of a supply system that was to support air and naval power of unprecedented magnitude. The solution of our complex problem of supply was the logistical miracle of the war. This accomplishment was to the everlasting credit of the unsung heroes

in the services of supply in the theaters and in the top organization, the Army Service Forces.

In our counteroffensive we had actually regained only a fraction of the territory that the enemy had seized during the first six months of the war. But the year 1943 had witnessed a gradual weakening of Japanese air and naval strength and a simultaneous increase in Allied power. Troops, planes, and supplies were moving in an ever-increasing stream across the broad Pacific, protected by a Navy that had been doubled in numbers of ships and tripled in aircraft since the dark days of January 1942. Everywhere American airplanes were playing an increasingly important role in the war. From India they struck at the enemy's bases in Burma; from China they attacked Burma and bombed Thailand, Indo-China, and Formosa; from Australia they raided the Netherlands East Indies; from New Guinea and the Solomons they bombed Rabaul; from the Gilberts they lashed at the Marshall Islands; from Midway they struck Wake; and from the Aleutians they attacked the Kuriles.

During the period 7 August 1942 to 31 December 1943 the Japanese air force lost over 6000 planes from all causes. The greater part of this loss was suffered by the naval air arm in the Solomons–New Guinea area and included all the best-trained carrier groups. The Japanese rate of production of combat aircraft in August 1942 was 500 planes per month, but by December 1943 this rate had increased to 1600 per month. The tactical strength of their air force rose from 2800 planes in August 1942 to 4000 by December 1943. Yet despite this numerical increase, the enemy air force steadily deteriorated in quality. Pilot training and maintenance were the most serious deficiencies. Japan's loss of her best air units by piecemeal commitment in the Solomons–New Guinea area affected her over-all war strength and capabilities to such an extent that she was never able to recover. The Japanese Combined Fleet, under Admiral Koga, was concentrated at Truk in the latter part of 1943 in order to seize any opportunity for a decisive engagement with the United States Pacific Fleet. However, the Combined Fleet was deemed incapable of fighting a major action without its air arm and was forced to stand by helplessly while we invaded the Gilbert Islands. Before the enemy's naval air strength could be built up again, our forces were destined to invade the Marshalls, the Marianas, and the Philippines, as we shall see in our study of the events of 1944.

The hands that had seized the initiative at Guadalcanal and in New Guinea had now been made stronger, and our great strategic offensive against Japan was rapidly getting under way.

OPERATIONS, 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 1944

CHINA–BURMA–INDIA THEATER (Map 12)

Burma.—Operations in Burma during 1944 reached large-scale proportions for the first time in two years. The action took place on four separate, though strategically related, fronts. One front was west of the Arakan Range, in the Maungdaw–Akyab area; another was in the Chin Hills, in the Kohima–Imphal region; and a third was in the Hukawng Valley, southeast of Ledo. The fourth, along the Salween River in southwestern China, came to life in May when Chinese troops there attacked westward astride the Burma Road.

At the beginning of the year the American-trained Chinese 22d and 38th Divisions, under the command of General Stilwell, began to push down the Hukawng Valley toward Maingkwan in order to clear the route of the new Ledo Road. By early February the offensive had made good progress, and the highway had been extended 100 miles from Ledo. However, the main defenses of the opposing Japanese 18th Division were still to be reached. The 5307th Composite Unit,* known as Merrill's Marauders, had by now arrived at Ledo, and General Stilwell decided to send it on a wide envelopment across the mountains in order to get in rear of the enemy opposing the advance down the valley. Using pack mules and receiving their supplies by air, this force crossed mountains 8000 feet high and moved over the most difficult terrain imaginable to gain access to the enemy's rear. Once there, the Marauders ambushed supply trains and reinforcements, established road blocks, and generally hamstrung the Japanese forces opposing the advance of the Chinese.

During the first week in March the Marauders reached the enemy's line of supply south of Maingkwan and set up a strong road block which cut off almost 7000 troops of the 18th Division. While the Chinese attacked southward, the Marauders successfully maintained their position against heavy assaults. The Japanese lost over 800 dead and then withdrew cross-country to the south. Our troops continued to advance, but progress was slow because of the delaying tactics of the enemy. By 27 April Myitkyina, with the only hard-surfaced airdrome in northern Burma, was at last within striking distance. To achieve this, however, Merrill's Marauders had fought for almost three months and could not go much longer without rest and reinforcement.

* Officially designated Galahad Force.

Meanwhile, as a supporting operation for the main drive into northern Burma, jungle columns of the 3d Indian Division invaded central Burma with the mission of disrupting the enemy's lines of communication south of Myitkyina and thus facilitating General Stilwell's advance down the Hukawng Valley. These long-range-penetration units, called Chindits, were commanded again by Wingate, now a major general, and were built around the composite force that had performed so well in 1943. Early in March four brigades were flown into central Burma from India, and a fifth made it overland from Ledo. Operating in twenty-six columns of 400 men each, the Chindits by 16 March had set up a road block on the single railroad into northern Burma at a point some eighty miles south of Myitkyina. General Wingate was killed in a plane crash on 25 March, and Major General W. D. Lentaigne of the British Army succeeded to his command. The Chindits were supported by the American First Air Commando Group, under Colonel Philip G. Cochran, all supply as well as evacuation being by air.

While the Allied offensive in northern Burma was thus gaining headway, the Japanese had not been idle. The 2d, 15th, and 53d Divisions had arrived in Burma by mid-April to augment the 185,000 troops already present. The Twenty-eighth Army, Lieutenant General Seizo Sakurai commanding, was formed in January to take over the Arakan front in southwestern Burma, and the Fifteenth Army, under Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi, began massing in the area of the Chin Hills in western Burma. By April the new Thirty-third Army, Lieutenant General Masaki Honda commanding, had assumed control of all forces in northern Burma.

General Kawabe, commander of the Burma Area Army, had decided to open his offensive early in 1944 in order to seize the initiative in western Burma before the Allies would be ready to strike. His strategic plan was promising. While the Allies pressed into Burma from the north, the Japanese counteroffensive would be launched against India. A successful drive into Assam would completely sever the Allied line of communication to northern Burma and, in addition, would overrun the airfields serving the Hump air line.

However, Lord Mountbatten was not unaware of this dangerous enemy capability. The British IV Corps, of three divisions, had been concentrated at Imphal, and advance elements penetrated the Chin Hills, improving the trails for use as supply roads and selecting positions from which to launch an attack later on. At the same time the British XV Corps, of two divisions, moved down the coast toward Akyab. On 23 January the two corps were welded into the new

Fourteenth Army, under the command of Lieutenant General William J. Slim, British Army.

Late in January the Japanese Twenty-eighth Army struck with two divisions at the XV Corps on the Arakan front, and by 4 February one division had enveloped the left flank of the leading British division * and had completely severed its line of communication. For a while it appeared that the campaign was going to be a repetition of the abortive British drive on Akyab the year before; but this time the isolated division set up a perimeter defense, receiving its supplies by air. Other British troops counterattacked to relieve the trapped division, and by 20 February the Japanese attack had collapsed with heavy casualties. The XV Corps advanced slowly on Akyab, and by April was within thirty miles of the town. At this point it became necessary to transfer one division by air to the Kohima–Imphal area, where the main Japanese blow had fallen. The withdrawal of this division and the coming of the rainy season brought about a lull on the Arakan front that lasted until November.

While the Twenty-eighth Army was raising the curtain on the Japanese offensive in western Burma, the Fifteenth Army, which was to deliver the main blow, began to concentrate in the Chindwin River valley, between Kalewa and Homalin. This army was given the task of crossing the Chin Hills and invading the valley of the Brahmaputra. Three divisions, strongly reinforced, had been secretly assembled by early March. The pressure exerted by General Stilwell's forces, which had by now captured Maingkwan in the Hukawng Valley, made it important to the Japanese that the rail line to Ledo be quickly severed.

The offensive of the Japanese Fifteenth Army was launched to the west during the second week in March and achieved initial surprise. Indian National Army troops ** were being used on this front, as well as in the Arakan area, for reconnaissance and propaganda purposes. Two divisions attacked the British IV Corps around Imphal, while a third division drove on Kohima, where the British had only a small garrison. Using the by now well-known tactics of infiltration and envelopment, the enemy moved around the flanks of the advanced units of the IV Corps and forced them to fight their way back toward Imphal. Exploiting their advantage, the Japanese began to surround Imphal and soon cut the only supply route, the hard-surfaced, all-weather road that ran to Kohima and thence to Dimapur, on the railroad. As in the Arakan, traditional tactics

* The 7th Indian Division.

** These were organized by the Japanese from disloyal Indian nationals.

called for a retreat, but the British again elected to fight it out. The fate of Stilwell's offensive in northern Burma now hung by a thread. By early April the IV Corps had established a perimeter defense around Imphal, and the Allied air force undertook the complete supply and reinforcement of the beleaguered troops. Meanwhile the Japanese division advancing against Kohima had entirely surrounded the town.

At this critical juncture the Allied high command effected a large-scale reshuffling and reorganization of forces. While the defenders of Imphal and Kohima held grimly to their tasks, the Eastern Air Command executed major troop movements on a large scale. An entire division of the XV Corps, complete with mountain artillery and mules, was flown into Imphal from the Arakan front. The XXXIII Corps was moved partly by air and partly by rail up to Dimapur. One brigade of Chindits, then operating in central Burma under General Lentaigne, was diverted to harass the enemy communications to the Kohima area.

A vigorous counterattack was launched by the XXXIII Corps from Dimapur against the Japanese who were besieging Kohima, and by 19 April the garrison was relieved and ground communication opened again. However, the enemy retained his positions south of the town and astride the road to Imphal.

By 1 May it was obvious that the Japanese drive on Kohima and Imphal had been stopped. Another division of the British XV Corps was moved from the Arakan front to Kohima to assist in clearing the enemy from the Kohima–Imphal road. As the forces of General Stilwell continued to advance on Mogaung and Myitkyina, the strategic situation of the stalemated Japanese Fifteenth Army became more and more serious. With Allied aircraft hammering their line of communication over the Chin Hills, the Japanese began to suffer desperately from lack of food and other supplies. Nonetheless, they continued to hang on tenaciously to their gains.

After weeks of bitter fighting, during which numerous enemy and Allied road blocks were established throughout the area, the Japanese were finally driven from the Kohima–Imphal road on 22 June. For a period of eighty days this road, the sole route of overland supply to Imphal, had been blocked. During this time the British troops and approximately 40,000 noncombatants at Imphal had been supplied entirely by air. The Eastern Air Command had flown in 61,000 reinforcements and 28,000 tons of supplies. This history-making airborne operation—much larger than any undertaken before—provided the formula for future success in Burma. The Allies had solved the logistical problem presented by the difficult terrain

of a region in which there were no roads. Only with supply by air could a campaign in Burma succeed. We now had air supremacy, which made the few attempts of the Japanese to supply by air a hazardous and costly undertaking.

By 1 July the enemy in the Kohima–Imphal area showed definite signs of disorganization and desperation. He had suffered heavy casualties, and his speedy advance had permitted the use of only primitive and limited routes of supply that were constantly being disrupted by the Chindits and Allied air attacks. The rainy season had begun, and all movement was extremely difficult. The Japanese had originally gone into battle expecting to capture the large stores of food and other supplies in Imphal and, if necessary, to sit out the monsoon there. But their calculations had gone awry. Their hastily built communications were never intended for use during the rainy season; and after the failure to capture Imphal, starvation, along with the ever-present malaria and other tropical diseases, exacted an increasingly heavy toll. At this time the battered divisions of the Fifteenth Army began to withdraw to the southeast, and the XXXIII Corps took up the pursuit.

Meanwhile in northern Burma General Stilwell had been regrouping his forces for a final drive on Myitkyina in early May. Two additional Chinese divisions * were flown from China to India in eight days. After being armed and refitted, these new troops were flown into northern Burma, where they entered the battle for Myitkyina. In order to strengthen Merrill's Marauders, General Stilwell assigned Chinese troops as reinforcements, bringing the Marauders up to 7000 for the operation.

Moving out on 28 April, the reinforced Marauders established several road blocks behind the enemy front lines and directed a strong force toward Myitkyina airfield over a supposedly impassable mountain trail. On 17 May the Marauders fell upon the few surprised defenders of the airfield and captured it intact. Chinese reinforcements were immediately flown in, and an attack was launched against the weakly defended town, some three miles to the east. But the Japanese succeeded in building up their strength sufficiently to hold Myitkyina, and by 23 May they enjoyed numerical superiority in the area. For the remainder of the month our troops were extremely hard pressed to keep possession of the airfield, as attack after attack was thrown against them. Allied reinforcements continued to arrive by air, however, and the enemy was forced back on the town. Most of the original Marauders, completely worn out by over three months of constant fighting, were evacuated to India for

* The 14th and 50th Divisions.

a well-earned rest. The Myitkyina strip soon became one of the busiest in the world. From May through October Major General Howard C. Davidson's Tenth Air Force flew in over 75,000 troops and almost 100,000 tons of supplies.

In the meantime two other Allied forces had gone into action. A British-led force of Ghurkas and Burmese troops moved south from Fort Hertz toward Myitkyina late in April. On 10 May elements of the Chinese 20th Army Group crossed the Salween River in an attack launched down the Burma Road. By the 20th this attack had gained about fifteen miles, but at that point it was stopped by the Japanese, who were using the walled towns of Tengyueh and Lungling as centers of resistance.

While the fighting continued to rage around the town of Myitkyina, General Stilwell's Chinese divisions pressed forward in the Hukawng Valley. Resistance to their advance became much weaker as the Japanese diverted most of their troops to the Myitkyina area. By 18 June Mogaung was under attack. The town fell on the 26th, and the Chinese forces moved rapidly toward Myitkyina in order to open land communication with the Allied forces engaged in battle there. On 1 July, when the Japanese began to withdraw from the Kohima–Imphal region, Myitkyina was still under siege, and the Salween front had become stabilized.

Myitkyina was captured on 3 August, the enemy having evacuated it during the preceding night. During the following two weeks the Allied troops advanced about ten miles along the railroad leading to Mandalay. Rains, which had slowed all operations since late April, continued to hamper the advance, and the Allies needed time to rest and reorganize their forces. No significant gains were made during the next two months.

On 15 October the Allies renewed their attack. From the Mogaung–Myitkyina area two columns moved south—one toward Indaw, on the railroad, and the other toward Bhamo. Meeting strong resistance along the railroad, the first column had to fight its way down the tracks to Indaw, which fell on 9 December. By 17 November the other column had reached Bhamo and was attacking it on three sides.

The troops of the Chinese 20th Army Group had continued their attacks on Tengyueh and Lungling with the able support of the Fourteenth Air Force. The walls of Tengyueh were finally breached by American fliers employing skip-bombing tactics. Chinese soldiers poured through the gaps and captured the town on 14 September. But the siege of Lungling did not progress as well. Early in September the Japanese sent a relief force from Bhamo, which arrived

at Lungling on the 15th and drove the Chinese back. Rains handicapped further operations, and this front quieted down for several weeks. As the Allied forces from Myitkyina advanced on Bhamo, the Chinese, on 1 November, renewed their attack on Lungling. After a two-day battle it fell, and the enemy was driven back along the Burma Road toward Wanting. There the situation again became stabilized, and there was little activity during the remainder of the year.

After a month's siege Bhamo fell on 15 December, and by the end of the year our troops had advanced south of that town to the line shown on the map. The Mars Task Force, a provisional brigade patterned after Merrill's Marauders and commanded by Brigadier General John P. Willey,* had been sent across country south from Bhamo to attack the enemy's communications north of Mandalay. This force was still in that area at the end of the year, protecting the southwest flank.

In the meantime the British continued their pursuit of the enemy retreating from the Kohima–Imphal area. Slowed by rains and desperate rear-guard actions, they nevertheless continued to advance. Kalewa was captured on 2 December, and the following day units moved east to make contact with the Allied forces south of Indaw. By the end of December the advance had carried to the line indicated.

In the Maungdaw sector the XV Corps renewed offensive operations late in November, and by the end of the year it had reached the outskirts of Akyab, its primary objective.

Operations of the Southeast Asia Command in 1944 were not limited to northern Burma. During the year a British naval task force carried out several attacks on the enemy in the Nicobar Islands, Sumatra, and Java **(Map 13)**. In addition, Allied aircraft continually hammered at Rangoon, the enemy's principal supply port, destroying shipping and port facilities.

China (Map 11).—Little ground activity took place in China during the first part of 1944, but on 18 April the Japanese launched an attack to clear the Peiping–Hankow Railway north of Hankow. One column, driving south across the Yellow River, captured Chengchow on the 20th and continued to advance southward along the railroad. A second column moved north along the railroad from the Hankow area, and by 8 May the two columns had joined. The

* The 5332d Provisional Brigade was organized in the summer of 1944, with a nucleus of veteran Marauders. The principal components were the 475th Infantry Regiment (Special) and the 124th Cavalry Regiment (Special).

northern force then moved westward from Chengchow and advanced about fifty miles to the line shown on the map. For the remainder of the year Chinese troops in the rugged hills west of the railroad kept launching attacks against the line to prevent the enemy from using it, and the Japanese attempted to clear the Chinese from the hills and to strengthen their hold on the railroad. At the end of the year this situation was still unchanged.

Late in May the Japanese undertook a series of offensives designed to (1) capture or neutralize the Allied airfields in southern China, (2) provide overland communication between all major Japanese-occupied areas on the Asiatic continent, and (3) reduce further the capabilities of the Chinese Army. To achieve these objectives, Japan made her most extensive military effort in China since 1938, committing over twelve divisions in a campaign of eight months' duration.

The initial offensive consisted of two coordinated drives: a main effort by the Eleventh Army, Lieutenant General Isamu Yokoyama commanding, which advanced south from Hankow; and a lesser drive by the Twenty-third Army, under Lieutenant General Hisakazu Tanaka, which moved west from Canton. The Eleventh Army comprised ten divisions and a tank brigade, a total of some 250,000 men. The Twenty-third Army consisted of two divisions and numbered about 50,000. Both armies belonged to Lieutenant General Teizo Ishiguro's Sixth Area Army. The troops employed included over two divisions drawn from the Kwantung Army in Manchuria.

On 27 May the Eleventh Army attacked south along the Canton–Hankow Railway from the vicinity of Tung Ting Lake. Changsha fell on 19 June, and Japanese troops advancing down the railroad encountered little opposition until they reached Hengyang, the site of an American airfield and an important rail junction. There the Chinese defense, supported by the all-out effort of General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force, was prolonged and stubborn. However, the city was captured on 8 August, and the Japanese spent the next three weeks consolidating their gains.

One bright spot in the China scene at this time was the inauguration of the very-long-range bombardment program against Japan. On 5 June the 58th Wing of the American XX Bomber Command, Major General Curtis E. LeMay commanding, took off on its first bombing mission—to Bangkok, Thailand. Then on the night of 15-16 June B-29's operating from fields in the Chengtu area bombed steel works in the northern part of Kyushu Island and brought the war to

the Japanese homeland.* The enemy air force in China attempted to neutralize the XX Bomber Command's bases there but lacked the strength to interfere seriously with the very-long-range bombing program. The principal limitation upon the B-29 operations was the chronic shortage of fuel and other supplies, which, as we have seen, had to be flown in from India.

After the fall of Hengyang, Chinese resistance, weakened by losses suffered in the battle there, was negligible; and the enemy's advance was limited primarily by his logistical problems. Since the railroad had been torn up by the retreating Chinese and the roads also were in a state of disrepair, the Japanese were forced to depend to a large extent upon river transportation. The Fourteenth Air Force attacked these vulnerable supply lines with great effectiveness until it was forced by the enemy advance to abandon the air bases at Kweilin and Liuchow.

In spite of difficulties with supply, the Japanese pushed on along the railway that runs southwest from Hengyang. Meanwhile the Twenty-third Army, moving west from Canton, joined other units attacking north from the Kwangchowan area and advanced toward Liuchow. By 18 September the enemy had approached to within forty miles of Kweilin, and General Chennault ordered the destruction and evacuation of our air base there.

During September and the first few days of October Japanese amphibious expeditions landed near Wenchow and Foochow, on the southeast coast of China, and quickly reoccupied these ports, which they had evacuated after the initial seizure in 1939. The desirability of a strong grasp on the coast of China was enhanced in the enemy's eyes by our successful invasion of the Marianas, in the Central Pacific Area.

A reorganization of command that now took place can best be described in the words of General Marshall:

> The mission that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had given General Stilwell in Asia was one of the most difficult of the war. He was out at the end of the thinnest supply line of all; the demands of the war in Europe and the Pacific campaign, which were clearly the most vital to final victory, exceeded our resources in many items of matériel and equipment and all but absorbed everything else we had. General Stilwell could have only what was left, and

* In June 1944 the XX Bomber Command (in the China–Burma–India theater, as noted) was incorporated into the newly formed Twentieth Air Force, a global strategic air fleet of Superfortresses operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with executive direction by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The XXI Bomber Command, which began operating from bases in the Marianas in November 1944, became the other half of the Twentieth Air Force.

that was extremely thin. He had a most difficult physical problem of great distances, almost impassable terrain, widespread disease, and unfavorable climate; he faced an extremely difficult political problem; and his purely military problem of opposing large numbers of enemy with few resources was unmatched in any theater.

Nevertheless, General Stilwell sought with amazing vigor to carry out his mission exactly as it had been stated. His great efforts brought a natural conflict of personalities. He stood, as it were, the middleman between two great governments other than his own, with slender resources and problems somewhat overwhelming in their complexity. As a consequence, it was deemed necessary in the fall of 1944 to relieve General Stilwell of the burden of his heavy responsibilities in Asia and give him a respite from attempting the impossible.

At the same time it became obvious the mission of re-establishing communications with China would be accomplished, and as the future objectives of the forces in Southeast Asia and China were to grow continually more divergent, it appeared advisable to make a clear division of the two theaters. Accordingly, the American administrative area of China–Burma–India was separated into the India–Burma and the China theaters. Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan, who had been General Stilwell's deputy, was given command of the India–Burma theater. Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer, formerly chief of the War Department Strategic Planners and later a member of Admiral Mountbatten's staff, was appointed commander of our forces in China, succeeding General Stilwell as the Generalissimo's chief of staff.

No American officer had demonstrated more clearly his knowledge of the strength and weakness of the Japanese forces than General Stilwell and the steps necessary to defeat them in Asia. He was brought back to the United States to reorient the training of the Army Ground Forces for the war against Japan.

On 11 November Kweilin fell to the Japanese Eleventh Army, and on the same day the Twenty-third Army occupied Liuchow. The converging forces soon met, closing the last gap in the Hankow–Kwangchowan corridor. Meanwhile part of the Twenty-third Army moved southwest toward Indo-China, and on 24 November its troops occupied Nanning. The loss of Liuchow threw the Fourteenth Air Force back on its Kunming base, over 400 miles farther west. Nanning was the seventh American airfield to be captured by the enemy during his advance. Japanese troops moving northeast from Indo-China quickly made a junction with the Twenty-third Army southwest of Nanning. The enemy had now established land communication between Korea and Singapore.

After the fall of Liuchow the strong Japanese forces in that area constituted a serious threat to Kunming and Chungking. Either city was a vital objective, Chungking being the seat of the Chinese

National Government and Kunming the air and ground terminus of outside routes of supply into China, including the almost-completed Ledo Road.

In mid-November the Japanese began to advance northwest toward Kweiyang and soon secured most of the Kweichow–Kwangsi Railway, which runs from Liuchow to Tuyun. To stop this new threat, General Wedemeyer transferred two American-trained and -equipped Chinese divisions from the Burma front and flew in from northern China some 37,000 hand-picked troops. The enemy forces, suffering from lack of supplies and improperly equipped for winter operations in the mountains, were then set back by a strong counterattack executed by the hastily concentrated reinforcements. No further Japanese advance took place during the remainder of the year.

By the end of 1944 the enemy had turned his attention to consolidating his gains and to expanding his control of eastern China. Work on roads and railways, which had followed close behind the advancing Japanese troops, was vigorously pushed, and every effort was made to secure the greatest possible measure of control over the coastal area.

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA (Map 13)

In the two years that had passed since the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii had undergone a complete transformation. Our most important naval base in the Pacific, it had also become a great training center and staging area for our troops, as well as the advance supply base for the entire Pacific area. Jungle and amphibious training centers and other facilities for training and housing troops had been established, and acres of warehouses to accommodate huge quantities of supplies had been erected. In excess of 600,000 tons of supplies were transshipped every month from Hawaii to the battle zones.

The capture of the Gilbert Islands in November 1943 was only the first step in a campaign aimed at spanning the Pacific to join hands with General MacArthur when he should be ready to attack the Philippines. Commanding the most powerful fleet ever assembled —and one which was still growing at a rapid rate—Admiral Nimitz had prepared plans for its use that were in keeping with its size and strength.

Invasion of the Marshalls.—Immediately after our occupation of the Gilberts, the Japanese began to move large numbers of troops into the Central Pacific, where the newly activated Thirty-first

Army, with headquarters on Saipan in the Marianas, assumed control. Our continued pressure in the Southwest Pacific limited the enemy air strength in the Marshalls to about 125 planes. At the end of January 1944 it was estimated that there were 8000 troops on Kwajalein and 1000 on Eniwetok.

Even before our attack on the Gilberts had been launched, plans for the assault of the Marshall Islands * had been prepared, and the groundwork for other operations to follow had been laid. The garrison forces that were to occupy the Gilberts had accompanied the assault troops intead of being sent to the area later on. This was done to permit the withdrawal of the assault echelon as soon as possible, so that the transports and warships could be readied for the operations in the Marshalls.

The 7th Division, which had captured Attu in May 1943, had been brought to Hawaii for special training in connection with the attack on the Marshalls. The 4th Marine Division, also to be used, was in San Diego, where it too was undergoing amphibious training.

During the period 7 December 1943 to 31 January 1944, land-based planes of the Seventh Air Force, operating from bases in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, flew more than 1800 sorties against the Marshalls.

D-day was set for 31 January 1944. Admiral Turner assumed command of the Joint Expeditionary Force, which included a naval support group and the V Amphibious Corps, under Major General Holland M. Smith, U. S. Marine Corps. The V Amphibious Corps was divided into a Northern Landing Force, a Southern Landing Force, and a Reserve Landing Force. The Northern Landing Force comprised the 4th Marine Division, under Major General Harry Schmidt. It was to seize the northern half of Kwajalein Atoll, principally the islands of Roi and Namur. The Southern Landing Force consisted of Major General Charles H. Corlett's 7th Division. It was assigned the mission of capturing the southern half of the atoll, principally the island of Kwajalein. The Reserve Landing Force included the 22d Regiment of the 6th Marine Division and the 106th Infantry (less one battalion) of the 27th Division. An additional landing force, composed of a battalion of the 106th Infantry, was assigned the mission of occupying Majuro, one of the finest anchorages west of Pearl Harbor. The entire Joint Expeditionary Force comprised 217 ships carrying 64,000 troops.

Beginning on D minus 2, about 700 carrier-based aircraft of Rear Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Task Force 58, which included twelve fast carriers, attacked the enemy's airfields in the Marshalls with

* Designated Operation Flintlock.

the mission of destroying all hostile aircraft. By D-day there was not an operational enemy plane east of Eniwetok. Following an intense naval bombardment, the assault forces attacked on 31 January, landing initially on small unfortified islands close to Kwajalein and Roi Islands, the first objectives. Artillery was quickly ferried ashore and brought to bear on the selected landing beaches on the two islands. To support the 7th Division, four battalions of 105-mm. howitzers and one battalion of 155-mm. howitzers were thus put in position and registered on Kwajalein. The next morning all guns fired at their maximum rate for more than an hour into the small area where the landing was to be made. Two minutes before the leading assault wave hit the beach, the fire was shifted farther inland.

The bitter lessons we had learned at Tarawa paid large dividends in the Marshalls. Neither the Marine nor the Army landing was opposed, and only slight resistance developed after advances of some 300 yards inland had been made. Six days after the main landings had taken place, all of the islands of Kwajalein Atoll were in our hands. We had also occupied Majuro, where no resistance was encountered. It had not been necessary to commit the Reserve Landing Force, and it departed from Kwajalein on 15 February for Eniwetok Atoll, in accordance with previously prepared plans.

Following the same tactics employed at Kwajalein, the two reinforced regimental combat teams began landing on islands of Eniwetok Atoll on 17 February. Five days later all resistance had been wiped out, and the atoll was in our possession.

In the Kwajalein operation about 8400 Japanese were killed and 265 captured, while the combined Army and Marine casualties were 372 killed and 1582 wounded. On Eniwetok about 3000 enemy were killed and forty-eight captured, with a loss to our combined force of 299 killed and 786 wounded.

In surprising the Japanese with an invasion of the western Marshalls, Admiral Nimitz had by-passed the strong island bases in the eastern Marshalls. These were harassed by air and surface bombardment during the landings, and our aircraft continued neutralization attacks on them throughout the remainder of the year.

Meanwhile the strong carrier task force under Admiral Mitscher executed a two-day strike against Truk on 17 and 18 February in order to screen the assault on Eniwetok. The Japanese fleet had already withdrawn from Truk because of the continuous operation of our carrier task forces in the area. However, when Mitscher attacked, 270 aircraft and thirty-two ships, mostly merchantmen, were destroyed. Encouraged by this success, Task Force 58 went

farther into Japanese waters to launch the first blow at Admiral Nimitz's next objective. On 23 February hundreds of carrier planes hit Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, in the Marianas. Severe damage was inflicted on defensive installations, 120 enemy aircraft were destroyed, and eleven small ships were sunk or damaged; all at the cost of only six of our planes. The ease with which these strikes were accomplished indicated the extent of the deterioration suffered by the Japanese air force since the summer of 1942.

Invasion of the Marianas.—The Marianas Islands are of volcanic origin and present to an attacker a problem much different from that of the coral atolls of the Marshalls and the Gilberts. The individual islands are much larger, and the terrain is more difficult. Precipitous coasts, high hills, and deep ravines are characteristic features of these islands.

The capture of the Marianas would engender certain favorable strategic results. Among the important gains would be: (1) the severing of the principal Japanese north-south axis of sea communication through the Central Pacific; (2) the initial step in the isolation and neutralization of the great enemy base at Truk; (3) the acquisition of suitable air bases for very-long-range bombardment operations against Japan proper; (4) the securing of new advance bases to protect our north flank and to serve as staging areas for a continued offensive across the Pacific; and (5) the loss to the enemy of some of his strongest advance defense bases. Our conquest of the western atolls in the Marshall Islands had already provided the facilities necessary to stage an attack on the Marianas.

During the following months, plans for the assault * were perfected, ships and supplies were collected, and the invasion troops were given special training for the landings. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance commanded the powerful Fifth Fleet, which comprised the Joint Expeditionary Force under Vice Admiral Turner and the strong carrier groups of Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58. Under Admiral Turner, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith commanded all expeditionary troops. Preliminary bombardment and support of the landings was to be provided by naval support groups of the Joint Expeditionary Force.

The expeditionary troops were divided into three general groupings: (1) a Northern Landing Force for operations against Saipan and Tinian; (2) a Southern Landing Force to attack Guam as soon as the situation on Saipan was resolved; and (3) a Reserve Force.

* Designated Operation Forager.

The V Amphibious Corps, under General Holland Smith, was designated the Northern Landing Force. It comprised the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions, reinforced by artillery from the Army's XXIV Corps and by other corps troops. The III Amphibious Corps, commanded by Major General Roy S. Geiger, U. S. Marine Corps, formed the Southern Landing Force. Assigned to it were the 3d Marine Division, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and corps troops. The Reserve Force had the 27th Division in floating reserve and the 77th Division in general reserve in Hawaii. Island garrison troops accompanied their respective assault forces.

During the spring of 1944 Japanese ground and air reinforcements poured into the Central Pacific. With headquarters on Saipan, the Thirty-first Army controlled all units in the mandated islands. The 29th and 43d Divisions, along with other troops, arrived in the Marianas to strengthen the defenses there; and by the time of our invasion the enemy garrison on Saipan numbered about 29,000, on Tinian about 7000, and on Guam some 18,000. In addition, the Japanese assembled over 500 land-based aircraft in the area and made plans for the employment of some 500 carrier-based planes aboard a strong force of nine carriers that had been training in the Singapore area since the naval-air defeats suffered in the Solomons.

Just before the Marianas operation the Japanese diverted about one half of their land-based aircraft in the area to the south in an abortive attempt to oppose General MacArthur's landing on Biak. When our invasion fleet approached Saipan, those planes were ordered to return, but owing to heavy losses only a few reached the Marianas in safety. Beginning on 11 June, the approximately 250 planes remaining in the Marianas attacked our approaching fleet. Little damage was done, and by the 13th the enemy air force was virtually wiped out.

During the period 11 to 15 June American carrier planes of Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 executed an intense and sustained air offensive against enemy defensive installations in the Marianas. Surface vessels arrived off Saipan on 13 June and began a prolonged naval bombardment in preparation for the landing. Early on 15 June the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions landed abreast on the southwest shore of the island. During the first four days of the twenty-five-day campaign Japanese artillery and mortar fire on the beaches and nearby areas exacted a heavy toll from the attackers, and it became necessary to commit the 27th Division as early as D plus 1. On 18 June the enemy attempted to move thirty troop-filled barges down the coast to a position in rear of the marines' front line, but

this sea-borne counterattack was broken up at a cost of thirteen barges sunk by our alert naval craft. By midday of the 19th our troops had captured the airfield and had driven to the east coast of the island.

The Fifth Fleet had in the meantime moved into position to cover the landing on Guam, which was scheduled for 18 June. However, the employment of the floating reserve on Saipan and the receipt of news that a Japanese naval force was approaching resulted in the indefinite postponement of the Guam operation. Steps were taken immediately to meet the new threat. A group of seven fast carriers which had attacked the enemy in the Bonin and Volcano Islands to the north and had successfully neutralized the air bases there was now recalled. Admiral Spruance concentrated his warships and aggressively moved westward from the Marianas. Meanwhile all other ships at Saipan, except a few that were unloading the most necessary supplies, withdrew to the east. Thus the troops ashore were not only stripped of their naval gunfire and air support but also were left with a precarious supply situation. The fate of the whole campaign hung on the outcome of the Fifth Fleet's battle with the Japanese task force.

On 19 June the Battle of the Philippine Sea began. The fighting on this day consisted of a large-scale enemy air attack on the Fifth Fleet and two air battles with hostile carrier planes that attempted to land on the airfields of Guam and Tinian for refueling and rearming. During the day's action 402 enemy planes were destroyed out of a total of 545 seen, at a cost of twenty-six American planes lost and minor damage to four ships. With the opposing air force now wiped out, our fleet headed swiftly toward the west, hoping to bring the Japanese fleet to action. In the late afternoon of 20 June it was discovered at extreme range, and shortly before sunset our carrier planes took off. Pressing home their attack, they sank one carrier and two tankers and in addition severely damaged four carriers, one battleship, one cruiser, and one tanker. We lost twenty planes in the attack, against the enemy's loss of twenty-two. The coming of darkness and the low supply of gasoline in our planes cut the attack short.

The Japanese fleet continued to retire precipitately to the west, and our planes that were sent out on the 21st could not make contact. The chase was abandoned that day in order to take up again the mission of protecting and supporting the expeditionary force in the Marianas. Adding to the destruction inflicted by our naval aircraft, submarines of the Pacific Fleet had meanwhile torpedoed and sunk two enemy carriers on the first day of the battle. The Battle of the

Philippine Sea broke the Japanese effort to reinforce the Marianas; thereafter the capture and occupation of the group of islands went forward without serious threat of enemy interference. Of even greater importance, the half-trained carrier force which Japan had been frantically building up after her losses in the Solomons had fallen victim to the qualitative superiority of American naval air pilots and had been wiped out. The strategic result of this premature sacrifice by the Japanese Navy was the uncovering of the Philippines.

As the enemy fleet was retiring westward, our empty transports were returning to Hawaii to bring up the 77th Division, then in general reserve. On Saipan tanks and heavy artillery added the weight of their fire to renewed naval gunfire and aerial bombardment, and by the 25th the enemy had been driven from the high ground in the central part of the island. After that we made moderate daily advances over the steep hills and deep ravines in the north. During the night of 6-7 July the enemy made a massed counterattack that gained some ground and inflicted heavy losses on our troops. However, the lost ground was recovered on the 7th, and our advance was renewed the following day. On 9 July all organized resistance ceased, but there still remained thousands of enemy troops scattered throughout the island in small groups. Mopping-up operations, which were carried out by the 27th Division, continued for nearly two months longer. Only 2068 Japanese out of the original garrison of 29,000 were taken prisoner. American casualties were 3126 killed, 326 missing, and 13,160 wounded—a total of 16,612.

On completion of the capture of Saipan the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions were reorganized, and preparations were made for an assault on Tinian. The attack was made against the north end of the island early on the morning of 24 July and was principally a shore-to-shore operation, supported by artillery on Saipan. However, some battalions were embarked on transports and sent ashore in landing craft after making a demonstration at another beach to cover the real assault. By the 26th both divisions were on shore and a coordinated attack was launched. The advance met with only light resistance, and by evening of the following day about one half of the island was in our possession. Enemy resistance increased as the marines reached the high ground in the central part of Tinian. But by the end of July the enemy had been driven from this strong position, and on 1 August the remaining part of the island was overrun. About 7000 enemy troops were killed during the battle, and

316 prisoners were taken. Marine casualties were 295 killed and 1554 wounded.

Meanwhile Major General Geiger's Southern Landing Force had begun to land on Guam. Preceded by one of the heaviest and most sustained air and naval bombardments ever conducted in the Pacific —a softening-up operation that lasted for thirteen days—the 3d Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, reinforced by a regimental combat team of the 77th Division, made two separate landings on the west side of the island on 21 July. The initial beachheads were about 7½ miles apart, on either side of a peninsula. By 24 July the rest of the 77th Division had landed on the 1st Brigade's beaches, and attacks from both beachheads were launched toward the base of the peninsula. After three days of fighting, the beachheads were joined, and the enemy troops trapped in the area were mopped up. On 30 July the 77th Division drove east to cut the island in half. It reached the east coast on 31 July, and a coordinated attack, with the 3d Marine Division and the 77th abreast, was then made toward the north end of the island, where the enemy had concentrated his forces. Our troops were hampered by the jungle, but their advance was steady. After a stubborn defense on the high ground in the north the enemy was finally overcome, and on 10 August it was announced that all organized resistance had ceased. As on Saipan, many small groups of Japanese were still scattered about the island, and mopping-up operations were undertaken immediately. Our casualties were 1919 killed and 7122 wounded. The Japanese lost about 17,000 killed and 485 taken prisoner.

Aircraft of the Seventh Air Force began operating from fields on Saipan even before the fighting there had ended. In conjunction with carrier-based planes they supported our landings on Tinian and Guam and struck at enemy installations in the northern Marianas, the Bonins, and the Volcano Islands. Ulithi, Yap, Ngulu, and the Palau Islands were also hit, while aircraft under General MacArthur's command, operating from newly won bases in the Bismarck Archipelago, on Biak Island, and on the northern coast of New Guinea, hammered at the Palau Islands from the south.

Rabaul, in the Southwest Pacific, had already been by-passed and isolated, and our next objective in the Central Pacific Area was the Palau Islands, the occupation of which would complete a ring of American bases around the enemy's stronghold at Truk.

Invasion of the Palaus.—Between 19 August and 14 September the Palaus were heavily bombed twenty-one times. Early in September General MacArthur sent his bombers in repeated attacks

against Mindanao, in the Philippines. On 31 August Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet had begun operating in the western Pacific.* Carrier-based planes struck at targets as far north as the Bonin Islands and as far south as Mindanao. The Palau Islands, Ulithi, and Yap were also hit, but the heaviest attacks were carried out against Luzon and the central islands of the Philippines. By 24 September our Navy fliers had severely damaged the enemy's installations there and had inflicted heavy losses on Japanese shipping and air power. During these twenty-four days 122 enemy ships and sixty-one small craft were sunk; 137 ships and 109 small vessels were damaged; and 978 planes were destroyed. We lost 114 planes but suffered no damage to the ships of the fleet. While Japanese air power was thus being crippled, an American expeditionary force was en route to the Palaus from Guadalcanal.

This expedition, the III Amphibious Force, was commanded by Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson under the over-all direction of Admiral Halsey, Third Fleet commander. All expeditionary troops were commanded by Major General Julian C. Smith, U. S. Marine Corps; and the principal unit employed, the III Amphibious Corps, was under Major General Geiger. The III Amphibious Corps comprised the 1st Marine Division, the Army's 81st Division, and special troops. Nearly 800 vessels participated in the invasion.

On 15 September, following an intense preliminary air and naval bombardment, the 1st Marine Division landed on Peleliu Island, and on the 17th the 81st Division (less the 323d Regimental Combat Team) assaulted Angaur. These two islands are the southernmost of the Palau group. Peleliu was the site of the major Japanese airfield in the islands, while Angaur, only six miles to the south, was important as the only suitable location for the construction of a large-size-bomber base. No landing had been planned on Babelthuap Island, largest in the Palau group and most strongly garrisoned, because there were no important objectives worth the cost of capture.

Opposition on Angaur was relatively light. The Army troops had overrun all organized opposition by 20 September and were engaged in clearing out isolated patches of the enemy in the northwestern

* Admiral Spruance commanded the Central Pacific Task Forces (Fifth Fleet), as we have already noted. Halsey was given command of the newly organized Western Pacific Task Forces (Third Fleet). This effected a necessary division of labor in the planning and preparation for future offensives in the Central Pacific Area. Actually there were two separate fleet headquarters but not two separate fleets, since the same warships functioned under either fleet. For example, Admiral Mitscher's Fast Carrier Force was designated Task Force 58 when serving with the Fifth Fleet and Task Force 38 when with the Third Fleet.

part of the island. Three days later one of the regimental combat teams * was transferred to Peleliu.

The assault on Peleliu met with considerable opposition. Fewer than 200 casualties were suffered during the landing, which was made on the southwest shore, near the airfield; but when the marines had advanced about 600 yards inland, fierce counterattacks supported by tanks were launched against them. These attacks were repulsed, and on the next day our troops seized the airfield. The direction of attack was then to the north, against heavily fortified positions in the hills. Progress was slow over this terrain, where there was little room to maneuver, but by 9 October the enemy had been forced into a small area in the northern part of the island. There it was necessary to ferret him out, a process that was to continue for many more weeks.

Meanwhile the 323d Regimental Combat Team, which initially had been held in floating reserve, was dispatched to occupy Ulithi Atoll, just north of the island of Yap. The landing was made without opposition on 23 September, and steps were taken at once to develop the anchorage at Ulithi, the best available shelter for large surface forces in the western Carolines.

On 16 October elements of the 323d Regimental Combat Team occupied Ngulu Atoll, less than 100 miles southwest of Yap. There was no opposition. Our forces at Ulithi and Ngulu now effectively isolated the enemy on Yap.

The 81st Division assumed control of Peleliu and Angaur on 20 October, and the 1st Marine Division was withdrawn. At this time the enemy was still fighting in the rough northern section of Peleliu, but he was gradually being eliminated. The enemy losses on the two islands totaled 11,968 killed and 468 captured. Our losses were 1097 killed, 242 missing, and 6792 wounded.

During the remainder of 1944 the operations of the powerful forces under Admiral Nimitz consisted largely in neutralizing the enemy bases that had been by-passed and in supporting General MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines. However, other enemy bases—in the Volcano Islands, the Bonins, and the Kuriles—were not neglected by our aircraft, and several bombardments by surface forces were carried out against various islands in these groups. Even Tokyo became a target for American bombers during the course of the year.** On 24 November Superfortresses of the newly created XXI Bomber

* The 321st Regimental Combat Team.

** As has been indicated, these bombers did not operate under Admiral Nimitz's direction.

Command, operating from Saipan, made the first of a series of attacks on the Japanese capital. Together with the XX Bomber Command, already operating from bases in China, these bombers were carrying the war to Japan's own doorstep.

It was in the Philippine area, however, that most of Admiral Nimitz's forces saw action during the last quarter of 1944. On 17 October, little more than a month after the landings in the Palau Islands, American troops landed on Philippine soil. The vital role played in that operation by the units under Admiral Nimitz's command will be described later.

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA

Activity in the South Pacific Area during the year 1944 was mostly confined to isolating and neutralizing the enemy bases there. Such action did not require the use of all the forces assigned to that area, and, as we have seen, many units of Admiral Halsey's command were employed in operations in the Central Pacific Area. Others saw service with the forces of the Southwest Pacific Area **(Map 10)**.

At the beginning of the year the Japanese Seventeenth Army was isolated in the Buka-Bougainville area, with its line of communication to Rabaul severed by Allied air and naval power based at Empress Augusta Bay. At the same time Rabaul, headquarters of the Eighth Area Army and center of the remaining Japanese naval air power, was itself under constant attack by aircraft of the American Thirteenth Air Force based on Bougainville. Because of this situation the Seventeenth Army was ordered to drive the Allied forces from Bougainville. During the period 8 to 25 March a number of major attacks were launched against the Allied beachhead, all of which were stopped by counterattacks, with heavy loss to the enemy. The Japanese then withdrew their shattered forces and reverted to the defensive.

Meanwhile, on 15 February, a task force under Admiral Wilkinson landed troops of the New Zealand 3d Division on Green Island, east of Rabaul **(Map 13)**. The small enemy garrison was soon wiped out, and by 7 March another Allied fighter airstrip was in operation. On 20 March a regiment of the 6th Marine Division made an unopposed landing on Emirau Island, the southernmost of the St. Matthias Islands. Since the Admiralty Islands had already had been invaded by General MacArthur's forces on 29 February, the encirclement of Rabaul was now complete. MacArthur's right flank was sufficiently protected for the advance up the north coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines.

On 15 June the Southwest Pacific Area took over the operations in the Solomons from the South Pacific Area command. Only minor actions took place up to the relief of American troops by the Australian First Army on 26 November. Our casualties in the entire Bougainville campaign up to this date were 973 killed, 271 missing, and 5188 wounded. The enemy lost 9678 killed and eighty-seven captured.

The advances scored in the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas had necessarily pinched out the South Pacific Area of operations. Admiral Nimitz now placed Admiral Halsey in command of the Third Fleet, which was to alternate with Admiral Spruance's Fifth Fleet, as we have already noted.

At the end of 1944 few American units remained in the New Guinea–Solomons area. Even Australia, the main Allied base of operations during the dark days of 1942, had been evacuated by the United States Army and Navy, except for skeleton supply units. All the rest had been drawn into the vortex of the Sixth Army's whirlwind offensive that by this time had cut the Philippines in two.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

During 1944 the tempo of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area grew faster with each passing month. In a series of amphibious thrusts that came in rapid succession, our forces moved swiftly along the New Guinea coast, jumped to Morotai, and then flung themselves into the Philippines. The furious pace set by General Krueger's Sixth Army ate up distance at a phenomenal rate, more than 2000 air-line miles being covered in less than ten months. It is not possible to cover the details of each of the operations that were included in this spectacular campaign, but enough of the pertinent facts will be given to develop the strategy that was employed **(Map 14)**.

On 2 January the first amphibious move of the new year was made when the 126th Regimental Combat Team of the 32d Division landed at Saidor, on the north coast of New Guinea, and captured the airfield there. The hard-pressed Japanese survivors of Lae and Salamaua were forced back toward their base at Madang by this enveloping maneuver, and many of them were left to die of starvation or disease. The remainder of the 32d Division came ashore at Saidor, and on 10 February contact was made with the Australians driving up the coast from Finschhafen.

Late in February General Kenney's reconnaissance planes reported that the Admiralty Islands were occupied by only a few small Japanese units that were guarding the airfields there. General Mac-

Arthur immediately ordered a reconnaissance in force to be made, and General Krueger sent a reinforced squadron from the 5th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division to perform the mission. The squadron landed early on the morning of 29 February on the east shore of Los Negros Island, near Momote Airfield. General MacArthur accompanied them in order to be present to make the critical decision as to whether our troops should hold the island or be withdrawn. The occupation of the Admiralties was included in the itinerary of the forces under his command, but it had been scheduled for 1 April.

Following an unopposed landing, the guards at the airfield were overcome and our men took possession. Deciding that we should remain on Los Negros, General MacArthur ordered the entire 1st Cavalry Division to come up at once. During the night an enemy counterattack against our defensive perimeter was repulsed with heavy losses. Japanese reinforcements from Manus Island, which is separated from Los Negros by only 100 yards of water, were thrown into the battle. They, too, were defeated by our numerically inferior troops. On 2 March the remainder of the 5th Cavalry arrived, followed by the 7th Cavalry on 4 March. By the 23d Los Negros had been cleared of the enemy, except for isolated sniper nests, and the airfield was ready for operation.

The 8th Cavalry landed on the northeast shore of Manus Island in an amphibious movement on 15 March, after the seizure of a few smaller islands off the coast had made possible the emplacement of supporting artillery. The Lorengau Airfield was captured the next day, and the surviving enemy fled to the hills. Many of the smaller islands in the Admiralty group were also occupied, and by the end of April most of the enemy had been mopped up. Our casualties were 290 killed and 1976 wounded. The enemy dead numbered 3300, and 189 prisoners were captured.

Meanwhile, on New Britain, the beachhead established by the 1st Marine Division at Cape Gloucester and the one held by the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team at Arawe were consolidated by mid-March. Our combined casualties were 493 killed and 1402 wounded, while 4600 of the enemy were killed and 329 made prisoner. On 6 March the marines had executed a sea-borne advance to the Willaumez Peninsula, on the north coast. Badly disorganized, the Japanese now began to retreat toward Rabaul, while our forces pursued slowly along the north and south coasts of the island. In June the 40th Division took over the task of driving the foe back on Rabaul. By 26 November, when the American units on New Britain were relieved by units of the Australian First Army, the enemy troops had fallen back to the Gazelle Peninsula. Here they were

contained by the Australians during the remainder of the year, no attempt being made to capture Rabaul itself, which, as we have seen, had been successfully neutralized by our air and sea forces.

Rabaul was now completely hemmed in, and an advance up the New Guinea coast could be undertaken months ahead of schedule. However, Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet, which operated under MacArthur, was not considered strong enough to support the projected offensive. Moreover, many of General Kenney's aircraft were being employed in bombing attacks against the Netherlands East Indies and against the isolated Japanese forces already by-passed in the advance northward; and only a few long-range fighter planes were available for bomber-escort duty. Carrier-based planes were needed to support the next jump up the coast. A hurried conference between Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur took place in Australia, and arrangements were made whereby Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 would assist the Seventh Fleet in supporting the operations.

New Guinea Campaign (Map 13).—Meanwhile the Japanese Army had continued to pour strong ground and air reinforcements into New Guinea.* After the Saidor operation the Eighteenth Army, with over 50,000 men, organized the defenses of the coast between Wewak and Madang. The Japanese were not particularly concerned for the safety of Hollandia, farther west, because they believed it to be beyond the range of Allied fighters. While Hollandia was developed into a major base, and replacement planes crowded the airfields, comparatively few ground troops were in the area. It was not until April that the Eighteenth Army began to withdraw a division for the defense of Hollandia, and by that time it was too late.

General MacArthur's plan of attack was designed to take advantage of the enemy forces, separated as they were by long distances and with only sea and air lines of communication between them. General Krueger was ordered to strike at Aitape and Hollandia simultaneously and to seize the airfields there. Australian troops were to maintain pressure against the Japanese at Madang. Admiral Kinkaid's fleet, assisted by units of the Royal Australian Navy and by

* As early as November 1943 headquarters of the Second Area Army, General Korechika Anami commanding, had been activated at Davao, in the Philippines, and soon afterwards had moved forward to Celebes. Under its jurisdiction the Second Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Teshima, took over the control of Netherlands New Guinea. In March 1944 the Eighteenth Army was removed from the control of the Eighth Area Army, which was isolated and fighting for its existence at Rabaul, and was also placed under the Second Area Army.

Admiral Mitscher's carriers, as we have seen, was to support the landing operations. Landing craft of every description were gathered from all points in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas. The Admiralty Islands were selected as the rendezvous point, and D-day was set for 22 April.

Prior to D-day the Fifth Air Force attacked the air bases at Madang and Wewak until they were completely neutralized and the enemy air force had been driven back to the fancied security of the airfields at Hollandia. On 30 March the Fifth Air Force began a series of the largest strikes yet conducted in this theater. It completely surprised the Japanese at Hollandia in a repetition of the Wewak attack of the preceding August. In four days of concentrated attack General Kenney's bombers, escorted by fighter planes whose range had been effectively increased by the recent addition of detachable fuel tanks, wiped out the main enemy air strength in New Guinea. The Japanese lost 120 planes in combat and almost 400 on the ground at Hollandia. Our land-based planes continued to hammer at the Aitape–Hollandia bases until D minus 1, at which time Admiral Mitscher's carrier-based aircraft assumed that task.

It is interesting to note the strategic mobility possessed by this fast carrier force which was capable of launching 1000-plane air assaults. Its carriers and battleships saw action in the Marshalls in January and February; two weeks later they struck at the Marianas; in March they hit the Palau Islands; and in April they pounded the enemy's bases at Hollandia and on Wakde Island. Not content with destroying 110 enemy planes and large quantities of supplies in New Guinea, Admiral Mitscher carried out a two-day strike against Truk while returning to his base. On 29 and 30 April, 800 tons of bombs were dropped and 123 enemy planes were destroyed, at a cost to us of twenty-seven carrier aircraft.

At dawn on 20 April more than 200 Allied ships, carrying some 50,000 troops, headed northwest from the Admiralties on a course that led toward the Palaus. Three separate attack groups operated under a single amphibious force commander, Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey. Two of the groups were to assault Hollandia in a pincers movement, while the third was to effect a landing just east of Aitape. The expeditionary troops were organized into two independent task forces, coordinated for simultaneous landings under the command of the Sixth Army. The I Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Eichelberger and composed of the 24th Division and the 41st Division (less the 163d Regimental Combat Team), was designated the Hollandia Task Force. The Aitape Task Force was commanded by

Brigadier General Jens A. Doe and comprised the 163d Regimental Combat Team, with the 127th Infantry of the 32d Division in reserve. The Hollandia Task Force was in turn divided into: (1) a Tanahmerah Landing Force, which would land in Tanahmerah Bay, to the west of Hollandia, and which consisted of Major General Frederick A. Irving's 24th Division; and (2) a Humboldt Bay Landing Force, which would land just east of Hollandia. The latter force comprised the bulk of Major General Horace H. Fuller's 41st Division.

On the evening of 21 April the amphibious force altered its deceptive course to the northwest and swung toward its true objectives in the southwest. On the morning of the 22d each of the landing groups was at its appointed place off the coast of New Guinea. Following a heavy preliminary bombardment by our warships, the first waves headed for shore under a protective umbrella of carrier-based planes. Again surprise was complete. The few Japanese at the beaches fled into the jungle, abandoning guns, equipment, and vast supplies of food. Within five days all three airfields at Hollandia and the two at Aitape were in our possession, and the Sixth Army was preparing for its next operation.*

Meanwhile the Australians pushed on to Madang, which they occupied on 25 April without opposition (**Map 14**). They continued to advance along the coast and by 27 June had reached the Sepik River. American troops at Aitape had moved east to the Driniumor River, and the enemy Eighteenth Army was trapped between the two forces. Holding defensive positions on the two river lines, the Allied troops had the Japanese bottled up in an area devoid of food and from which escape was well-nigh impossible. To the north was the sea, which the Allies controlled, and to the south were thick jungles and impassable mountains. From the air they were being pounded by Allied planes. In July and August the Japanese attempted to break out of the trap by attacking the Allied defenses at the Driniumor River. They were repulsed with heavy losses and never seriously attempted it again.** While the enemy in this area was being contained, other units of General Krueger's Sixth Army

* In a general account such as this it is impracticable to go into the details of each operation. If such were possible, it would be shown in almost every case that the success attained with such small losses was not due to lack of enemy strength but to excellent planning and execution. The capture of the Hollandia airfields is a good example. They were defended by some 4600 Japanese, but strategic and tactical surprise and the efficient handling of our troops enabled us to take the objective at a very small cost.

** Responsibility for the Aitape area passed to the Eighth Army in September and to the Australian First Army on 26 November.

had taken several more long strides along the New Guinea coast **(Map 13).**

On 17 May the 163d Regimental Combat Team of the 41st Division debarked at Arara, just east of the major enemy supply and staging point at Sarmi. Again only slight opposition was encountered, and a strong beachhead was soon established. The next day, with artillery on the mainland supporting them, the American troops assaulted nearby Wakde Island in a shore-to-shore movement. By the 19th the island with its large airfield was in our possession, at a cost of about 100 casualties.

While our troops were consolidating their positions in the Wakde–Arara area, other units * of the Sixth Army assaulted Biak Island, about 200 miles to the west. The airfields at Hollandia had been found unsuitable for use by heavy bombers, and the nearest site to the west that would provide satisfactory airstrips was Biak. This urgency resulted in hasty planning and organization for the attack. The landing, made on 27 May, met only feeble resistance, but the next day an advance inland was stopped by heavy fire. The enemy counterattacked on 29 May, and a bitter battle ensued. The Japanese took shelter in large caves from which they would debouch at night to launch attacks on our lines. By 7 June, however, one of the three airfields on Biak was in our possession. On the 8th a Japanese attempt to reinforce their troops on the island was thwarted by our air and naval forces. Six destroyers, three of which were carrying troops, were attacked by Allied planes about 200 miles northwest of Biak. One of the destroyers was sunk. That night our warships encountered the five remaining destroyers west of Biak, but the enemy fled before we could close for battle. By 20 June our ground forces had captured the other two airfields on the island, and all organized resistance had been overcome by the end of the month.**

It is worthy of note that by this time a definite pattern had been worked out for our air operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. First, eliminate or neutralize the hostile air forces; second, isolate the chosen battle area, cutting enemy supply and communication lines; third, cooperate in the closest possible way with the attacking ground troops. When an airfield was constructed after a landing that by-passed an enemy base, or when a field was captured from the enemy and made operational, General Kenney would immediately

* The 41st Division, less the 163d Regimental Combat Team at Wakde.

** Our reinforcements by this time included the 163d Regimental Combat Team of the 41st Division and the 34th Infantry of the 24th Division. General Eichelberger had also moved his I Corps Headquarters to Biak.

send aircraft forward to base there. These planes would then protect our troops from enemy air attack and would provide the air support for the next advance.

From the excellent airfields on Biak our planes were soon striking at the enemy bases on the Vogelkop Peninsula and in the eastern islands of the Netherlands Indies. General Krueger moved his advanced headquarters to Hollandia on 16 June in order to supervise operations more closely.

On 2 July the 158th Regimental Combat Team landed on Noemfoor Island, sixty miles west of Biak, where three large airfields were located. One of these had extensive dispersal areas and a surfaced runway 5700 feet long. Our men went ashore at points where reefs and other natural obstacles made landing operations hazardous, but where the enemy, for that reason, had not prepared defenses. By avoiding the strongly organized positions on the likely landing beaches, we suffered very few casualties. All three airfields were captured by the night of the 6th—with the assistance of the 503d Parachute Regiment, which was dropped directly on the airstrips. The Japanese, preoccupied at this time by our invasion of the Marianas, made no attempt to reinforce Noemfoor.

On 30 July the 6th Division (less the 20th Regimental Combat Team) made an unopposed landing at Sansapor, on the north coast of the Vogelkop Peninsula. The construction of new airfields began at once, unhindered by the enemy. This move by-passed the last important elements of the Japanese Second Army in New Guinea, some 15,000 troops that were concentrated near the eastern tip of the Vogelkop Peninsula. The enemy began an immediate withdrawal to the southwest coast, where he had a large base at Babo and an auxiliary line of communication to Amboina.

The landing at Sansapor was our last on the shores of New Guinea. General MacArthur now had powerful air bases and strong ground forces strategically located for another long step northward. New Guinea, as a base for enemy operations, had been effectively neutralized, and over 200,000 Japanese troops had been by-passed and isolated in the Southwest Pacific Area. The once-powerful Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Second Armies, as well as the Eighth Area Army, were no longer effective. They could not interfere as the Allied forces continued their uninterrupted offensive.

Before invading the Philippines, however, General MacArthur needed one more air base to support the assault and to protect the left flank of his route of advance. The site selected for this base was the southern tip of Morotai Island, just north of the enemy strong-

hold on Halmahera. Plans for the landing on Morotai were closely coordinated with the preparations by Admiral Nimitz for attacking the Palau Islands. D-day for both operations was set for 15 September.

During the weeks preceding D-day General Kenney's newly created Far Eastern Air Force, comprising the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces, had ample time to smash the enemy's air power in this area. The Japanese had succeeded in massing over 250 planes on Halmahera, but heavy losses soon forced the withdrawal of the remnants to Mindanao. No attempt was made to oppose Admiral Nimitz's assault on the Palaus because of the excessive range from their Philippine air bases. Our land-based planes ranged far and wide in attacks on Halmahera, the Palaus, northern Celebes, Ceram, and Mindanao. As D-day approached, the attacks were intensified. On 9 and 10 September carrier-based planes from Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet, which was charged with the operations against the Palaus, struck the enemy's bases on Mindanao. Japanese air resistance proved unexpectedly weak in this area, prompting further carrier strikes into the central Philippines. From 12 to 14 September our naval aircraft destroyed seventy-five enemy planes in the air and 123 on the ground, as well as sinking many ships and damaging installations ashore. On 14 and 15 September the carrier task force attacked Mindanao, Celebes, and Talaud.

As a result of these strikes, enemy air opposition had been all but wiped out when troops of the Sixth Army landed on Morotai on 15 September. Admiral Barbey commanded the amphibious task force; while the expeditionary troops, comprising the 31st Division and the 126th Regimental Combat Team of the 32d Division, were under Major General Charles P. Hall, commander of the XI Corps. The landing was unopposed, and by 30 September several airfields were operational and the Thirteenth Air Force had been established on the island. The total cost to us was forty-four casualties.

With an impressive string of victories already behind them, our troops could now look forward with confidence to the invasion of the Philippines—an operation that was to begin sooner than anticipated.

Leyte Campaign.—It will be recalled that Admiral Halsey's carrier-based planes had attacked enemy bases in the Philippines early in September to cover our assaults on the Palaus and Morotai Island. These attacks were also intended to protect Major General John R. Hodge's XXIV Corps, composed of the 7th and 96th Divisions, which was scheduled to invade Yap. This corps had left

Hawaii on 15 September, the date of our landings in the Palaus and on Morotai and the date on which Admiral Nimitz received an important communication from Admiral Halsey. The latter stated that in view of the relative weakness of enemy air opposition in the central Philippines, it was his recommendation that the three projected intermediate operations against Yap, Talaud, and Mindanao be cancelled and that, instead, our forces attack Leyte as soon as practicable. Admiral Nimitz promptly forwarded this communication, with his concurrence, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then present at the second Quebec conference. He stated that he could immediately place at General MacArthur's disposal for an attack on Leyte the Third Amphibious Force, which included the XXIV Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff requested MarArthur's views and received the prompt reply that he was prepared to land on Leyte on 20 October, instead of 20 December as previously planned. A directive to execute the Leyte operation on the earlier date was issued at once by the Joint Chiefs.

The XXIV Corps was now diverted to the staging area at Manus, in the Admiralty Islands, while MacArthur collected his forces in the Southwest Pacific Area for the coming operation. The occupation of Ulithi Atoll, just north of Yap, on 23 September was another result of the changes made in the over-all strategic plan.

While preparations were being made for the invasion of the Philippines, Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet continued its operations against the enemy's bases in the western Pacific. Taking station east of Luzon, the Third Fleet on 21 and 22 September sent its carrier planes to attack Manila and the aircraft based on Luzon's seventy-one airfields. On 24 September the central Philippines were hit again. Heavy damage was inflicted, and only light air opposition was encountered. The Third Fleet then retired eastward to its forward bases to prepare for the forthcoming invasion. Early in October General Kenney's Far Eastern Air Force neutralized the enemy air strength on Mindanao and attacked Japanese shipping throughout the Netherlands East Indies. At the same time heavy raids were carried out on the oil-production facilities in Borneo.

The plan for the landings on Leyte, where only one enemy division was stationed, provided for the use of two army corps: General Hodge's XXIV Corps, from the Central Pacific Area, and the X Corps, comprising the 1st Cavalry and 24th Divisions, from the Southwest Pacific Area **(Map 15)**. The latter corps was commanded by Major General Franklin C. Sibert. These two corps were to rendezvous at sea about 450 miles east of Leyte and then proceed

to make simultaneous landings on the east coast of that island on 20 October.*

Leyte Gulf, as the map shows, is guarded by three sentinel islands —Suluan, Homonhon, and Dinagat. The 6th Ranger Battalion was assigned the task of capturing these islands prior to the main landings. As soon as the decision to invade the Philippines had been made, General Krueger sent in special detachments to gather information and to destroy a few key enemy posts. Guerrilla forces, including many American survivors of the Japanese conquest of the Philippines in 1942, were alerted and given their instructions.

The Central Philippine Attack Force, which included the greatly augmented Seventh Fleet, was under the command of Vice Admiral Kinkaid. This large force was divided into a Northern Attack Force, Rear Admiral Barbey's Seventh Amphibious Force; a Southern Attack Force, Vice Admiral Wilkinson's Third Amphibious Force; and other special groups. The entire expedition comprised more than 650 ships of all categories. The Central Philippine Landing Force, which included all of the Sixth Army troops mentioned above, was under Lieutenant General Krueger. The X Corps formed the Northern Landing Force and the XXIV Corps the Southern Landing Force. Close air support over the landing beaches would be furnished by the escort carriers of the Seventh Fleet. General MacArthur was in supreme command. Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet, which remained under the Central Pacific Command, was to protect the north flank of the invasion force against any sortie by the Japanese Combined Fleet and also was to furnish air support for the neutralization of enemy air power, particularly in the northern and central Philippines.

On 10 October Admiral Halsey inaugurated a seven-day air attack against bases in the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa, and Luzon **(Map 13)**. In this unprecedented sweep by a carrier force, which at times saw more than 1000 American planes in action, our Navy fliers destroyed 915 enemy aircraft, sank hundreds of ships and small craft, and severely damaged major military and naval installations. The attacks on Formosa were coordinated with a strike by the XX Bomber Command, which sent more than 100 China-based Superfortresses over the island at the same time. The Third Fleet carried out most successfully its vital mission of protecting our expeditionary force from attack by hostile sea or air forces from the north, and General MacArthur's troops arrived off Leyte without incident **(Map 15)**.

* The 381st Infantry of the 96th Division would be in floating reserve. In general reserve were to be the 77th Division (XXIV Corps), on Guam, and the 32d Division (X Corps), at Morotai and Hollandia.

On 17 October one company of Rangers seized Suluan Island, wiping out a small enemy garrison; and three companies landed on the northern end of Dinagat, which proved to be unoccupied. Homonhon was occupied the next day. Following these landings, Navy minesweepers cleared a channel for the approaching armada. Under cover of a severe tropical disturbance the majestic invasion fleet, spread out over hundreds of square miles of the Philippine Sea, moved toward Leyte Gulf. Despite all this activity, strategic surprise proved complete.

Following a heavy preliminary bombardment that lasted two hours, the first waves of our assault forces reached the shores of Leyte at 1000 hours on the 20th. The X Corps struck the beaches in the Palo area, and the XXIV Corps landed between San José and Dulag. Fifty-five miles to the south the 21st Regimental Combat Team of the 24th Division landed without opposition and seized control of Panaon Strait, between Leyte and the nearby island of Panaon. Only the 24th Division met any real opposition. Japanese mortar and artillery fire sank several of its landing craft, and its landing teams were forced to fight their way across the beaches. Elsewhere the enemy appeared to be completely disorganized, and initial beachheads were quickly secured and rapidly extended. In a short time supplies and heavy equipment were flowing ashore in large volume **(Map 16)**.

By the 21st the 1st Cavalry Division had captured Tacloban and the airfield situated on the peninsula southeast of that town. The 24th Division had stormed Palo and was engaged in heavy fighting to the west. The 96th Division had taken San José and was moving against enemy units entrenched on Catmon Hill, to the northwest. Dulag, after being enveloped by the 7th Division, was also captured on the 21st, along with the adjacent airfield.

Progress during the next three days was rapid as our divisions continued to drive the enemy back into the mountains along the western edge of the broad, level Leyte Valley. The Japanese appeared to have no organized plan of defense, and resistance was met only at widely scattered points. While this opposition at times was fierce, it came from relatively small units or groups that had manned separate defensive positions, and there was little indication of a coordinated defense. By the 24th the 1st Cavalry Division had extended our control of the coast by a series of additional landings, all of which were virtually unopposed. Uban, Bacol Island, and Babatngon were occupied by cavalry troops who swept up the narrow strait between Leyte and Samar in landing craft, while other units moved overland from Tacloban. A landing was also made at

La Paz, on Samar Island. The 24th Division, which had met stiff opposition west of Palo, broke the backbone of the enemy's resistance when on 24 October it smashed a suicidal counterattack that penetrated into the center of that town. On the same day units of this division captured Tanauan, and a general advance westward into Leyte Valley was begun.

The 96th Division purposely by-passed Catmon Hill and by the 24th had pushed inland toward Dagami. The 7th Division had advanced westward along the Dulag–Burauen road and on the evening of the 24th was only a few miles from Burauen. It had captured two of the three airfields near that town. Southern Leyte, the wildest part of the island, was only lightly held by the enemy. Our guerrilla forces and the combat team that had landed on the southern tip of the island already had much of this area under control and were moving rapidly toward the north.

It is evident from the success achieved during the first five days of fighting that the Japanese were not prepared to oppose an invasion of the Philippines at Leyte. Nonetheless, it would be a serious error to make the corollary assumption that their defensive potential in the Philippines was negligible. They were fully aware of the unfavorable strategic consequences that would result from a successful Allied assault on the islands and were prepared to make the most lavish expenditure of all available resources in order to prevent an invasion which would jeopardize all that had been gained in their campaigns of conquest during the first year of the war. It was fortunate for us that they were guilty of certain strategic oversights that made it possible for superior American strategy to bear its finest fruit in the surprise achieved by the landing on Leyte.

Let us now go back a few months and see what steps were taken to prepare against an invasion. Between 30 April and 20 October 1944 the enemy's ground strength in the Philippines more than doubled. By the latter date he had over 270,000 Army troops there. At the end of May the Southern Army Group, commanded by Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi, moved its headquarters from Singapore to Manila. This army group controlled seventeen armies operating in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia, with a total strength of more than 1,000,000 men. In July the Fourteenth Area Army was activated at Manila, its commander, Lieutenant General Shigenori Kuroda, being given direct responsibility for the defense of the Philippines. At the same time the Thirty-fifth Army was organized, with Lieutenant General Sosaku Suzuki in command. In August its headquarters was moved to Cebu, from where Suzuki controlled all forces in the central and southern Philippines. The

Fourteenth Area Army retained direct control of the northern Philippines. On 7 October General Kuroda was relieved by General Tomoyoki Yamashita, the conqueror of Singapore in 1942. Yamashita was transferred from the First Area Army in Manchuria, one of the two top field commands in the Kwantung Army. Part of the troop reinforcements for the Philippines also came from Manchuria, as did certain units which moved to Shanghai to serve as general reserves for the islands.

After our successful invasion of the Marianas the enemy high command felt that our next major attack would come in the Philippines. The losses inflicted on the Japanese fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) had given our Navy freedom of movement in the area around the Philippines and Formosa and had left these objectives open to attack. The enemy decided to prepare for a decisive battle on Mindanao and to strengthen his supply line through Okinawa, Formosa, and Luzon. The landings in the Palaus and on Morotai in September confirmed the view that the next American move would be against Mindanao. The opinion of the Japanese staff was that at least two months' time would be necessary for our preparations.

When the carriers of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet began their attacks against the Ryukyus and Formosa on 10 October, the enemy correctly concluded that the purpose was to interfere with the supply of planes to the Philippines. However, the attacks were not regarded as the immediate prelude to an invasion, for the staff was still confident that a major attempt could not be mounted before November. The opinion that Mindanao was the most likely place for a landing persisted, but the suspicion began to grow that American capabilities would permit landings elsewhere in the archipelago —Leyte, Samar, or even Luzon. Defense preparations proceeded, but at a rather leisurely pace. The Japanese felt secure in their specious time calculations and in highly inflated reports by their airmen of losses inflicted upon our Third Fleet off Formosa. By 20 October the major movement of troops and supplies to strengthen the Philippines was only 60 per cent complete, the main enemy forces being concentrated in Mindanao and Luzon. The American landing at Leyte achieved complete strategic surprise by virtue of (1) the time of attack, (2) its weight, and (3) the locality selected.

We have seen that at the time of our assault only one Japanese division was stationed on Leyte. This was the 16th Division of the Thirty-fifth Army, which had taken part in the Philippine campaign of 1942 and had conducted the infamous death march after our surrender on Bataan. The division was some 16,000 strong. For-

tified positions had been constructed on the island, but the over-all plan of local defense proved inadequate to cope with the American landing, despite the warning received from the preliminary operations conducted during the period 17 to 20 October. Although Tacloban was the base of supplies for the Leyte garrison, the defenses were not designed to protect against a landing there, and as a result the enemy lost his vital supplies almost at once. Subjected to an unexpectedly heavy preliminary naval bombardment, the panic-stricken Japanese broke and fled for the hills, abandoning their first two lines of prepared defenses. As the 16th Division withdrew to the northwestern section of Leyte, it became increasingly necessary for the enemy to rush in reinforcements and supplies in order to maintain any effective defense.

While the Japanese were thus caught flat-footed on the ground, the same was not true on the sea, for a still-powerful Navy was prepared to meet an invasion. Admiral Toyoda, in accordance with a prearranged plan, sent his Combined Fleet into action. The resulting naval engagement, known as the Battle for Leyte Gulf, was the greatest of the war and marked the crisis of our invasion of the Philippines.

The Battle for Leyte Gulf took place between 23 and 26 October **(Map 17)**. Actually it was a series of major surface and air engagements, culminating in three almost simultaneous naval actions: the Battle of Surigao Strait, the Battle off Samar, and the Battle off Cape Engano.

It was the mission of the Japanese Combined Fleet to destroy any Allied forces that might attempt a landing in the Philippines. The first intelligence of our attack on Leyte was received at fleet headquarters in Japan on 17 October, and Admiral Toyoda immediately alerted his forces. Information on American activities in Leyte Gulf continued to arrive, but it was not until the receipt of a report that actual landings were taking place on Leyte that Toyoda committed the Combined Fleet. This striking force, comprising more than half the total strength of the Japanese Navy, included the Second, Third, and Fifth Fleets.

It was planned to accomplish the destruction of the American landing forces and supporting ships at Leyte Gulf by means of a two-pronged operation by surface forces. The powerful Second Fleet, Vice Admiral Kurita commanding, was brought up to Brunei Bay, in northern Borneo, from Singapore and was divided into two task groups, the 1st Attack Force and C Force. The 1st Attack Force, personally commanded by Admiral Kurita, comprised five battleships, ten heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and fifteen de-

stroyers. Its mission was to pass through the Sibuyan Sea and San Bernardino Strait and attack the shipping and warships in Leyte Gulf early on 25 October. C Force of the Second Fleet consisted of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers. This group was to cross the Sulu Sea, force Surigao Strait, and attack our ships in Leyte Gulf about one hour before the other force attacked. Vice Admiral Shima's Fifth Fleet from the north, comprising two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and four destroyers, was designated the 2d Attack Force. It was to follow C Force by about one hour. It was anticipated that this 2d Attack Force would be able to proceed at will against the American shipping in Leyte Gulf after the other two forces had disposed of the warships there.

Admiral Toyoda had hoped that by November he would be able to reinforce Admiral Kurita's Second Fleet with two carrier divisions; but when the October invasion made this impracticable, a revised plan was put into effect. Vice Admiral Ozawa's Third Fleet, comprising two battleships, four carriers, three light cruisers, and ten destroyers, was directed to move south from Japan, engage the American Third Fleet, which was known to be operating east of Luzon, and decoy it to the north so that the other attack forces would be free from interference while carrying out their mission at Leyte Gulf. Loss of the entire Japanese Third Fleet would be warranted if its mission could be executed properly.

The Combined Base Air Force, using land-based aircraft, was to make attacks on the American Third Fleet and the ships in Leyte Gulf in addition to furnishing air cover and reconnaissance for the attacking naval forces in the south. The First Air Fleet could muster about 400 naval-type land-based planes, located principally on Luzon, and on 22 October the Second Air Fleet arrived with 300 additional planes. Army aircraft were directed to cooperate with the Combined Base Air Force, but were to prove largely uncooperative and ineffective.

The 1st Attack Force and C Force departed from Brunei Bay on 22 October, headed north. At 0650 on 23 October two patrolling American submarines of the Seventh Fleet discovered the 1st Attack Force just west of Palawan. After reporting their discovery, the submarines launched a torpedo attack that succeeded in sinking two heavy cruisers and damaging a third so severely that it was forced to turn back with an escort of two destroyers. The enemy force scattered, and in the pursuit one of our submarines grounded on a reef and had to be destroyed, after all the crew were safely removed. Other submarines reported contact with Japanese warships off Mindoro and the approaches to Manila Bay.

During the night of 23-24 October the Japanese 2d Attack Force arrived from the north and refueled at Coron Bay, in the Calamian group; the 1st Attack Force passed through the Mindoro and Tablas Straits; and C Force traversed the Sulu Sea. Far to the north, Admiral Ozawa's Third Fleet, which had left the Inland Sea on the 20th, approached Luzon still undetected.

Early on the 24th American search planes located C Force and the 1st Attack Force, both groups steaming east without air protection. At Leyte Admiral Kinkaid alerted and assembled his powerful Seventh Fleet, which now included sixteen escort carriers, six old battleships, five heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, and eighty-eight destroyers. During the morning carrier-based planes of our Third Fleet attacked C Force in the Sulu Sea and slightly damaged one battleship and one destroyer. About noon a very strong attack was made by our carrier planes on the 1st Attack Force, steaming through the Sibuyan Sea. One battleship was sunk and all others received one or more hits, while a heavy cruiser was so seriously damaged that it had to turn back toward its base. The severity of this air attack forced Admiral Kurita to retire westward until nightfall, further delaying his appointed rendezvous at Leyte Gulf with C Force early on the 25th. Meanwhile the 2d Attack Force moved southeast across the Sulu Sea, completely undetected.

During the course of these events, carrier groups of our Third Fleet were subjected to constant attacks by enemy land-based planes. Although 110 hostile aircraft were shot down, one of our light carriers* was lost, the first fast carrier sunk since the loss of the *Hornet* in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands in 1942. Among the attacking planes was one group of carrier-based aircraft that arrived from the north. As a precaution, search planes were dispatched to track them down, and in the late afternoon contact was established with the Japanese Third Fleet, about 150 miles distant. Admiral Halsey immediately moved northward and prepared to strike the enemy early on the 25th. Our Third Fleet at this time comprised eight large carriers, eight light carriers, six modern battleships, six heavy cruisers, two antiaircraft cruisers, seven light cruisers, and fifty-eight destroyers.

On 25 October three separate naval engagements took place, each a part of the Battle for Leyte Gulf. They will be described separately, but it should be borne in mind that they occurred almost simultaneously.

The advance of C Force, followed at a short interval by the 2d Attack Force, brought on the Battle of Surigao Strait. In the early

* The *Princeton.*

hours of 25 October C Force, shielded by darkness, entered the narrow passage in column. The Japanese were first met by our PT boats and then, as they continued on their general course to the north, by three coordinated destroyer torpedo attacks, which inflicted severe losses. Across the northern end of the strait Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf had deployed the cruisers and old battleships* of the Seventh Fleet, and he now awaited the arrival of the enemy ships, which were being tracked by radar. Shortly after 0200 a devastating fire from our warships fell upon the surprised Japanese, who found themselves trapped. In this action, an exemplification of the classical naval tactic of "crossing the T," the deployment of our ships enabled them to concentrate their converging fire on those Japanese vessels which had survived the torpedo attacks. Almost without returning fire, C Force was practically destroyed as it attempted to turn in column. Only one cruiser and one destroyer escaped out of the total of two battleships, one heavy cruiser, and four destroyers; and the cruiser, crippled, was sunk by our carrier planes the next morning.

Meanwhile the 2d Attack Force, following closely behind C Force, entered Surigao Strait just in time to witness the last of the action. The two Japanese forces did not sight each other until the battle had been joined, were never in communication, and in no way coordinated their operations. Both admirals knew the general plan of attack, but neither would subordinate himself to the other, and Admiral Toyoda had failed to designate any one commander. After an abortive attack on our warships in the strait Admiral Shima reversed course and beat a hasty retreat with his 2d Attack Force. Two enemy destroyers were sunk in the action, and during the pursuit a badly crippled light cruiser was sunk by our land-based bombers on 26 October. Total American losses in the Battle of Surigao Strait were one PT boat sunk and one destroyer damaged.

While the southern prong of the Japanese pincers was thus being blunted early on 25 October, the northern arm was also about to meet with disaster after some initial success. Admiral Kurita's 1st Attack Force, which had been turned back in the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October by carrier-based planes of Halsey's Third Fleet, reversed course again during the night and pressed forward to the east. Shortly after midnight this force debouched from San Bernardino Strait unopposed and headed southward off the east coast of Samar. Late for his rendezvous with C Force at Leyte Gulf and unaware of the battle which had already taken place in Surigao Strait, Ad-

* The *West Virginia, Maryland, Tennessee, Mississippi, California,* and *Pennsylvania,* all of which had been modernized.

miral Kurita proceeded at full speed. His first knowledge that there was an American force between him and Leyte Gulf came about daybreak, when carrier planes and then the carriers themselves were sighted. This force was actually the northernmost carrier group of Admiral Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet, but Kurita at first feared that he had run into Admiral Halsey's strong Third Fleet, which by now should have been lured to the north in accordance with the prearranged plan of attack. Nevertheless, Kurita closed for the attack which opened the Battle off Samar.

The American carrier group, comprising six escort carriers and seven destroyers and destroyer escorts, had no choice but to attempt escape from the faster enemy force. Silhouetted against the rising sun, they headed eastward into the wind at the top of their limited speed and launched their planes for an attack. The 1st Attack Force, concealed in the western gloom and barely discernible against the background of the hills on Samar, possessed every advantage of position and fire power. Only air support was lacking. The Japanese continued to close in, forcing the carrier group to head southeast, all the while under continuous fire from enemy guns up to 18 inches* in caliber. Japanese marksmanship was poor and American seamanship excellent; and although frequently straddled, our ships were not heavily damaged during the first part of the engagement. At 0830 the first air strike was launched by planes from the escort carriers. By 0900, though, the carriers began to take considerable punishment. One of them was sunk, and two destroyers and one destroyer escort which courageously charged the enemy also went down under the heavy gunfire. The Japanese pressed the attack, but their ships now became badly scattered and the action uncoordinated.

Then, unexpectedly, the enemy broke off the engagement and retired to the north, much to the astonishment of the battered American forces. With a local victory in his grasp, Admiral Kurita abandoned the original plan of attack and made a new decision on his own initiative. Kurita's unsound decision was based upon consideration of these factors: (1) His force was considerably weakened by the sinking of three heavy cruisers and the severe damaging of another in the air attacks pressed home by American carrier planes; (2) the last radio communication from C Force, off to the south, had intimated that strong resistance was blocking its advance on Leyte Gulf; (3) interception of American radio messages revealed that air assistance from Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet, to

* On the highly secret superbattleship *Yamato*.

the north, could be furnished in about two hours; (4) American land-based planes on Leyte were probably numerous and would undoubtedly attack to defend the shipping in the Gulf; and (5) receipt of a message from Admiral Ozawa, with the Japanese Third Fleet off northern Luzon, indicated a strong attack on Halsey's fleet. Justified in his own mind, Admiral Kurita moved north to cooperate with Ozawa in defeating Halsey. But the vanguard of that portion of our Third Fleet that was returning south at full speed intercepted what was left of the 1st Attack Force and caused Kurita to undergo another change of mind. During the afternoon of the 25th carrier aircraft inflicted sufficient additional damage on the larger ships to slow down the speed of the entire force. A serious shortage of fuel plus the receipt of information that Admiral Ozawa's fleet had been badly defeated off northern Luzon left Admiral Kurita with no choice but to retire homeward through San Bernardino Strait under cover of darkness. Carrier planes of Halsey's fleet harassed the fleeing Japanese and on the 26th destroyed one light cruiser and one destroyer southeast of Mindoro. Fast surface units sank a straggling enemy destroyer east of Masbate on the same day. Another destroyer was sunk on the 27th by air attack while the remnants of the 1st Attack Force retreated toward Brunei Bay.

In addition to the losses already enumerated, our forces in the Battle off Samar suffered considerable damage to four of the escort carriers and several destroyers.

Upon the conclusion of the 2½-hour surface action a strong air attack was launched against our ships by land-based planes. On this day the first planned mass suicide* attack was carried out by Japanese Navy planes, nearly 100 sorties being flown. One American escort carrier was sunk and several other vessels were damaged before the attack was broken up. During the entire battle 105 planes were lost by the Seventh Fleet escort carriers.

A description of the Battle off Cape Engano (northeastern Luzon) will complete the story of the Battle for Leyte Gulf. It will be recalled that the mission of Admiral Ozawa's Third Fleet was to lure the American Third Fleet northward, no matter what the cost. As Admiral Halsey moved to the north during the night of 24-25 October, the way was cleared for the advance of Admiral Kurita's 1st Attack Force through San Bernardino Strait. We have already seen how Kurita dissipated his opportunity. We shall now see what the cost was to Ozawa.

In the expectation that their Third Fleet was going to its doom, the Japanese transferred the bulk of the carrier planes to Formosa

* Called "Kamikaze" (Divine Wind) by the Japanese.

before moving south. Only 110 aircraft remained aboard the four carriers, and eighty of these were launched on the 24th to attack elements of the American Third Fleet and then go on to land on Luzon. As a result, the enemy fleet was practically defenseless against the attacks of Admiral Halsey's carrier-based planes, which commenced at 0900 on the 25th and lasted until nearly 1800. During the morning Halsey dispatched a detachment of fast battleships and carriers to the south in order to assist the Seventh Fleet, as we have already seen, but the fight with the Japanese Third Fleet continued. Late in the day a force of American cruisers and destroyers was detached to finish off enemy ships that had been crippled by air strikes. Total Japanese losses in the battle were four carriers, one light cruiser, and three destroyers sunk. Only two battleships, two light cruisers, and six destroyers escaped to the north, all slightly damaged. The losses of our Third Fleet in this action amounted to forty planes.

The Battle for Leyte Gulf was a decisive victory for our Navy. The Japanese Navy sustained losses and damage which materially weakened its over-all surface and air strength on the eve of the final drive by United States forces on the homeland. A recapitulation of the losses on both sides shows that four Japanese carriers, three battleships, six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and eleven destroyers were sunk; as against one American light carrier, two escort carriers, two destroyers, and one destroyer escort. Many other ships on both sides were damaged, but the Japanese were less able to spare the necessary time for repairs; nor could they return their ships to action as quickly as we could.

Meanwhile General Krueger's Sixth Army continued its advance **(Map 16)**. Elements of the 1st Cavalry Division that had landed on Samar on the 24th met with virtually no resistance as they swept up the west coast of the island. Organized guerrillas advanced up the east coast at the same time. Most of the Japanese garrison had already been withdrawn to Leyte, and those remaining retreated to the northern part of Samar. On Leyte our troops also advanced rapidly. Bitter resistance developed in some areas, while in others we met little or none.

In spite of a severe typhoon that swept over the island during the last few days of October and brought heavy rains and seventy-mile winds, our divisions continued to advance. By 1 November organized resistance in Leyte Valley had virtually ended, and the five airfields in that area were being made operational.

On the flanks our troops continued to advance; but in the center, where the Japanese skillfully used the mountainous terrain, only

small gains were scored. By 7 November enemy reinforcements and the extremely bad weather had stopped the Sixth Army's advance on the line shown on the map.

On 27 October a few planes of the Fifth Air Force had arrived at the Tacloban airstrip. Carrier-based aircraft had continued to cover the area west of Leyte until 29 October. By the end of the month only twenty fighter planes were operational at Tacloban, and the dearth of aircraft was a serious handicap. The basic reason for our weakness in the air was the lack of facilities on the island. Because of the heavy rains only the main airfield at Tacloban was at all usable, and reconstruction proceeded slowly on the other four fields that we had captured in eastern Leyte. Fortunately for us, the Japanese air force failed to mass for an attack on our aircraft at Tacloban, but instead elected to commit its planes in piecemeal attacks.

It was evident that the Japanese had decided to make every effort to hold Leyte. Their 16th Division prepared to make a stand in the northwestern section of the island, while rear-guard elements fought a delaying action against our advancing divisions. Because of our lack of air strength the enemy could land reinforcements almost at will, bringing them in by barge, destroyer, or transport to Ormoc, the principal port in western Leyte. By 1 November the Japanese Thirty-fifth Army had reinforced the 16th Division with part of the 30th Division from Mindanao and elements of the 102d Division from Cebu and Panay. These troops were used to bolster the sagging left flank, overlooking the northern part of Leyte Valley. During the night of 1-2 November a strong convoy arrived from Manila, carrying the crack 1st Division, which had been rushed up from general reserve in Shanghai. This division was one of the four best in the Japanese Army, and its arrival did much to prolong the Leyte campaign. It was immediately sent north from Ormoc and was committed to action in the hills on the left of the enemy line, near Carigara Bay. Planes of the American Thirteenth Air Force, operating from fields on Morotai, raided Ormoc Bay on 2 November and succeeded in sinking two transports. By 3 November the Japanese had brought in some 22,000 fresh troops to reinforce the 16,000 originally on Leyte. Their casualties in the fighting up to this time had been 12,554 killed and 109 captured. Our losses had been 840 killed, 260 missing, and 3419 wounded.

During November an all-out struggle for Leyte developed. Early in the month Field Marshal Terauchi transferred his Southern Army Group Headquarters to Saigon, in French Indo-China; and General Yamashita, commander of the Fourteenth Area Army, took over

full control of the defense of the Philippines. Exaggerated reports of success on Leyte constantly flowed in to Yamashita from Lieutenant General Suzuki, commander of the Thirty-fifth Army. Based upon these glowing but fictitious accounts, Yamashita's decision was to make the defense of the Philippines on Leyte and crush our invasion forces there. He ordered in still more reinforcements. By mid-month the Japanese strength had increased to 50,000, including the bulk of the 26th Division and additional elements of the 30th and 102d Divisions. But as the American land-based air strength increased, intensified attacks were made upon shipping coming into Ormoc Harbor. Of twenty-five transports sent in nine convoys from Luzon alone, our aircraft sank twenty. American PT boats also harassed the enemy barge supply routes west of Leyte and sank many of these smaller craft.

Meanwhile, in order to make a maximum effort to dislodge the invading forces, the Japanese brought more and more planes to the Philippines—some from points as far north as Manchuria and the Kuriles. Despite their heavy losses during the period 10 to 21 October, when Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet attacked their air replacement route from the Ryukyus to the Philippines and destroyed 1419 of their planes, the Japanese were able to bring in 1000 additional aircraft. Of the original 700 planes in the Philippines, over 400 had been shot down in the Battle for Leyte Gulf; and their losses in the air continued to be heavy, particularly since the replacement pilots had received only a minimum of training. Suicide attacks on our shipping and fleet units persisted, some 150 sorties being flown during the month.

Our own air forces continued to be active. Bombers of the Far Eastern Air Force, operating from airfields on Morotai and northern New Guinea, struck at Mindanao and other islands in the southern and central Philippines. Vice Admiral McCain's Task Force 38, comprising the majority of the fast carriers of the Third Fleet, continued in action in support of the Leyte campaign. On 5 and 6 November our carrier-based aircraft struck at Manila and the airfields in the vicinity. They destroyed 439 enemy planes, sank eight ships, including a heavy cruiser and two destroyers, and damaged forty-four other vessels. In response to a request from General MacArthur, one carrier division attacked a Japanese convoy entering Ormoc on 11 November and sank six destroyers and four transports in addition to downing thirteen aircraft. This latter operation effectively ended one major attempt by the enemy to reinforce his Leyte garrison. Returning to Luzon, our carrier-based planes in another two-day strike, on 13 and 14 November, sank three de-

stroyers and six transports, damaged forty-three other ships, and destroyed eighty-four airplanes. On the 19th still another strike netted 124 enemy aircraft destroyed, three ships sunk, and thirteen more damaged. The last attack in support of the Leyte operation was launched by Third Fleet carriers on 25 November. Hitting Luzon again, their planes sank ten ships, including one light cruiser, damaged twenty-nine other vessels, and destroyed eighty-eight enemy aircraft. During these November air operations the losses of our carrier task force totaled only ninety-seven planes.

On land little change had taken place in the situation since 7 November (**Map 18**). Tropical storms continued to lash at the island, making the roads impassable quagmires and turning small streams into rushing torrents that washed out bridges and flooded roads and trails in the mountainous areas, where most of the fighting was taking place. In spite of these conditions, however, the 24th Division succeeded in establishing a road block on the main road south of Limon on 15 November. The enemy made repeated attempts to break this road block, using tanks and artillery in desperate counterattacks, but our troops held their position. On the 16th the newly arrived 32d Division, veterans of the Papuan campaign and now part of the X Corps, relieved elements of the 24th Division east and north of Limon.

Confused and bitter fighting took place in the Limon area during the following two weeks, by the end of which the 32d Division had overwhelmed the Japanese strong points at Limon and had captured that village. Meanwhile the 1st Cavalry and 24th Divisions extended their control of the peaks east of the Limon–Cananga road, while other elements pushed slowly westward over the mountain trail from Jaro. The 96th Division continued to operate against stiff enemy resistance in the hills west of Dagami, while the 11th Airborne Division, newly acquired member of the XXIV Corps, advanced along the trail leading west from Burauen. The 7th Division reached the Palanas River, where strong Japanese defenses stopped its advance. The extremely bad weather, which prevailed almost without letup during the entire month of November, had seriously interfered with the supply of our troops, and air transports were employed to supplement the reduced quantities of supplies that were being moved overland.

Meanwhile the enemy continued to send troop-laden convoys to Leyte, attempting to unload them during hours of darkness or when the weather was too unfavorable for our aircraft to be active. Many troops, including elements of the 8th Division, were thus successfully landed at Ormoc, Palompon, and San Isidro, but thousands more

were sent to watery graves by our land- and carrier-based aircraft, which took to the air under all but the most unfavorable conditions. In late November bombers based on Leyte added their blows to those of the Third Fleet's planes in strikes against the Manila area.

During the night of 27-28 November American warships shelled Ormoc and installations along the bay for 1½ hours, without opposition from shore batteries or enemy naval vessels.

The effectiveness with which our aircraft were operating against the enemy's convoys brought about an abortive attempt on his part to eliminate American air strength on Leyte by a paratroop attack on our airfields. Captured orders later revealed that the plan was thorough and detailed. Certain ground troops were ordered to infiltrate through our lines and join the airborne units in destroying planes on the ground and the servicing facilities at the airstrips. However, actual performance did not measure up to the plan. Forty-nine transport planes were shot down by our antiaircraft guns as they swept over eastern Leyte during the night of 6-7 December. At Burauen, where the enemy was to make his main effort, only two or three hundred paratroops reached the ground in condition to fight. Although they did some damage to our installations at the airfields there, it was not serious, and no dislocation of essential activities resulted. The infiltrating ground troops and the airborne attackers were entirely wiped out by American infantry units by nightfall of the 11th. The attacks at Dulag and Tacloban completely miscarried. Only a handful of enemy troops reached each objective, and they were mopped up immediately.

In the meantime General Krueger undertook new offensive operations. The 77th Division, which had participated in the invasion of Guam in July and which had joined the XXIV Corps in Leyte on 23 November, was sent by boat through Surigao Strait to the west coast of the island. Early on the morning of 7 December this division landed just south of Ipil and quickly established a secure beachhead there. By exerting strong pressure on the Japanese at the Palanas River for the two days preceding the landing, the 7th Division had drawn the bulk of the enemy's reserves in this area to the south, thus enabling the 77th to land unopposed. A part of the 77th then moved against the rear of the enemy on the Palanas River while the 7th Division attacked him in front. The 11th Airborne Division, coming from Burauen, reached Anas on 9 December and made contact with flank patrols of the 7th Division on that date. By the 10th most of the Japanese resistance in this area had been overrun, and the survivors had fled to the hills.

The bulk of the 77th Division, however, had moved north on Ormoc. On the 10th, following a day of brisk fighting in torrential rains, these troops overwhelmed stubborn resistance south of Ormoc and swept through the town, using bayonets, flame throwers, and tanks to wipe out the defenders, who fought to the last man. The capture of Ormoc and the strangling of the last major line of communication of the enemy on Leyte proved to be the decisive action of the campaign.

The landing of the 77th Division at Ipil, while unopposed, did bring about an enemy reaction in the air. Swarms of Japanese planes attacked our ships after all of the troops had been put ashore and succeeded in sinking one destroyer and a destroyer transport. However, eighty-one of the enemy's planes were shot down by our land-based aircraft and naval antiaircraft fire. We lost only five planes, the pilots of which were rescued. In addition, our airplanes intercepted a thirteen-ship convoy early on the 7th off San Isidro Bay. All thirteen—six transports and seven destroyers—were sunk by the end of the day, although some 2000 troops came ashore. Sixty-four hostile planes were shot down in the action. On 11 December three destroyers and three transports were sunk off Palompon, and on the following day one destroyer was sunk and three other ships badly damaged in the same area. After this the Japanese were able to commit no more of their valuable ships to the campaign, and they attempted to supply their forces on Leyte by sailboat.

The X Corps, fighting in mountainous territory made almost impassable by the rains, had continued to exert pressure on the enemy in the Limon–Cananga area, where General Suzuki had concentrated the bulk of his Thirty-fifth Army, now about 35,000 men. However, little change had taken place in the situation there.

The Japanese were now being pressed on three sides by our superior forces, and we began to close in. The 77th Division enveloped the enemy positions north of Ormoc and advanced rapidly on Valencia. On 18 December it captured that town and pushed on to take Libungao on the 20th. On 21 December Cananga was captured by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, which had moved down from the mountains. Advance elements of the 77th and 1st Cavalry Divisions were now about to meet, the enemy's forces having been broken into small groups that were attempting to retreat westward to the coast. Late in the day our forces effected a juncture south of Cananga, from where they turned westward in pursuit of the remnant of the Thirty-fifth Army, which was being harassed by guerrillas in its flight toward the coast.

On Christmas Day a reinforced battalion of the 77th Division captured Palompon, following a landing about one mile north of the town. This force then moved east and joined with other troops of the 77th Division who were advancing west from Libungao. The 24th Division, meanwhile, had driven northwest of Carigara Bay, and by the 25th it was engaged in mopping-up operations in the San Isidro area. On 30 December elements of the 7th Division landed at Port Bello, on the west coast of Ormoc Bay, in order to move from the south against the enemy around Palompon. A few days earlier, on 26 December, a communiqué issued by General MacArthur had announced that the Leyte campaign could be regarded as closed except for minor mopping-up operations. General Eichelberger's Eighth Army assumed combat responsibility for the Leyte–Samar area on this date, and by 31 December all Leyte had been secured, with only isolated pockets of the enemy remaining to be cleaned out. Battle casualties of the Sixth Army on Leyte were 2888 killed, 9858 wounded, and 161 missing. Enemy losses during the same period numbered 56,263 killed and 389 captured.

Even before this great victory was completely won, Sixth Army troops were executing another part of the over-all plan to liberate the Philippines. On 15 December a landing was effected on Mindoro, nearly 300 miles to the northwest **(Map 17)**. The Western Visayan Task Force, Brigadier General William C. Dunckel commanding, comprised the 19th Regimental Combat Team of the 24th Division and the 503d Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team. Under a protective umbrella of land- and carrier-based planes, the convoy steamed for two days and three nights through the hazardous inland waters of the central Philippines. Enemy aircraft from Luzon attacked the convoy en route, but they were beaten off successfully.

Operations by guerrilla forces on the islands along the route taken by the Mindoro-bound convoy gave effective aid to the enterprise. The coastal areas of Bohol, Cebu, Negros, and Panay were seized by these irregulars before the amphibious force departed from Leyte.

The landing on Mindoro was not anticipated by the enemy, and no opposition was encountered when our forces went ashore on the southwest coast. San José was captured the first day, and all objectives were reached without a single casualty. Immediate construction of three airfields was initiated behind a strong perimeter defense established by our troops, and by the 20th fighter planes were operating from one of the strips. On 1 January the Eighth Army relieved the Sixth of combat responsibility for Mindoro.

In a sustained three-day attack in mid-December carrier aircraft of our Third Fleet struck Manila and the airfields on Luzon. Our

planes sank twenty-seven ships, damaged sixty more, and destroyed 269 aircraft. Our losses in combat were only twenty planes. Land-based planes of the Far Eastern Air Force were also active, striking targets as far north as Luzon.

The landing on Mindoro was the last major operation undertaken in the Southwest Pacific Area during 1944. Mopping-up operations on Leyte and increased activity by guerrilla forces throughout the Philippines were still under way at the close of the year. On 22 December bombers of the Seventh Air Force, based in the Palaus, added the weight of their bombs to those being dropped on Luzon by the planes of the Third Fleet and the Far Eastern Air Force.

Map 19 shows the general situation at the end of 1944, when this account ends.

COMMENTS

Great gains were scored by the Allies on all fronts during 1944, except in China. There the Japanese resumed offensive operations on a large scale, but from a strategic point of view even those operations were undertaken for purposes of defense. The sweeping advances made in the Pacific by Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur were largely responsible for the enemy's renewed efforts in China. The Japanese high command was already preparing for the defense of the homeland and sought to establish complete control over eastern China before the Allies could reach those shores. By driving south through China, the Japanese had established a land route of communication from Korea to Singapore—a route which our invasion of the central Philippines made doubly important, since the South China Sea was no longer a safe waterway to Japan's southern empire. The enemy's advance through China carried far enough to the west to include all the principal north-south railroads, and at the same time forced the evacuation of a number of American air bases. The fortifications, submarine bases, and airfields that the Japanese constructed along China's coast were designed not only to meet a possible Allied invasion of that country but also to serve as outer defenses for Japan itself.

Evidence indicates that the enemy exerted every effort to make his forces in China self-sufficient. Factories, railroads, and roads were built, and particular attention was paid to the development of the coastal area around the Yellow Sea. The Japanese had had many years in which to develop the vast resources of Manchuria, and a large army could be supported there.

The Allied advance in Burma resulted in the clearing of the entire route of the new Ledo Road except for a small stretch near its junction with the Burma Road. The opening of this ground route of supply to China in January 1945, together with the increased tonnage being carried over the Hump by American transport planes, promised to alleviate materially the logistical problem that had handicapped Allied operations both on the ground and in the air.

Without doubt, the most important lesson to be learned from a study of the operations in Burma is the utilization of air power. In addition to its primary role as an effective arm in combat, it was used to supply isolated garrisons as well as troops on the move in offensive operations; it was employed to transport units rapidly from one sector to another; and it was assigned the task of hurdling the treacherous Himalayas to carry supplies to China. Of the manifold tasks imposed upon the air force, all of which were discharged with commendable efficiency, probably its performance as "pack mule" for the ground forces contributed most to the Allied success. Aircraft maintained a constant flow of supplies to the troops and made possible the vigorous offensive in 1944.

While giving credit to the air force for much of the Allied success in Burma, we must not overlook the fine job accomplished by the ground troops and their commanders. Caught off balance by the Japanese surprise offensive early in the year, they quickly rallied, held the key point of Kohima, and then drove the enemy back. Admiral Mountbatten and General Stilwell aggressively continued to drive against the foe in spite of the handicap of the rainy season. For the first time in two years of fighting in Burma, major operations continued during the monsoon season, and the Japanese were not afforded an opportunity to rest and reorganize their troops.

It was in the Pacific, however, that the tempo of the war reached a new high in 1944. American strategy had set the forces under Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur in motion in converging drives on the Philippines. Admiral Nimitz adhered to a strategy the basic concept of which was to seize only those islands essential for our use, by-passing many strongly held intervening ones that we did not need. This was made possible by the rapidly increasing disparity between our own naval power and that of the enemy, who was unable to support the garrisons of the by-passed atolls. These isolated and exposed Japanese forces were thus rendered innocuous without our having to attack them.

By mid-1944 the outer defenses of Japan had been ruptured by our seizure of Guam, Tinian, and Saipan, in the Marianas. Tokyo

was now only 1500 miles away—well within reach of our Superfortress bombers. Truk, the enemy's main stronghold in the Carolines, had been outflanked, and in September it was completely isolated by our seizure of the Palaus.

The advance to the Marianas threatened the enemy's home islands and brought about a change in the totalitarian government of Japan. On 22 July Tokyo announced that General Hideki Tojo, in whose hands the reins of government and the direction of the war had rested since before the attack on Pearl Harbor, had been replaced as premier by General Kuniaki Koiso. A complete revision of the cabinet also was announced, only three members of the Tojo regime retaining their places. This shake-up in the high command, which removed from office the men who had been identified with the enemy's war effort since its inception, clearly indicated the seriousness with which the Japanese viewed the situation.

The sustained operations by the powerful naval forces under Admiral Nimitz's command opened a new era in naval warfare. So large and powerful had our Pacific Fleet grown that the need for fixed bases no longer dictated its range of operations. While land bases were still needed, they did not exercise the control over operations that they had in the past. For weeks on end the Third Fleet operated in the western Pacific, where it was more than 5000 miles distant from Pearl Harbor, about 3500 miles from its newly established bases in the Marshall Islands, and some 1500 miles from the yet unfinished facilities in the recently conquered Marianas. The tremendous power of our Navy enabled it to go to any area of the Pacific and to give battle there for an indefinite period. Units of the fleet in need of repair or rehabilitation were withdrawn and replaced by other ships, in the same manner that Army divisions are relieved from the front lines while operations are still under way. Hundreds of supply ships shuttling between the fleet and its bases maintained a continuous flow of supplies to the zone of operations.

Much of the striking power of the United States Navy was in its numerous aircraft carriers, which during 1944 launched record-breaking 1000-plane attacks. These high-speed floating airfields were protected by equally speedy battleships and cruisers with their accompanying screen of destroyers. The mighty punch packed by the forces of Admiral Nimitz was most eloquently described by Secretary of the Navy Forrestal in a brief summary of losses inflicted on the Japanese by the Third and Fifth Fleets during the period 7 June to 17 October 1944. During that time our naval forces, operating in an area extending from the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands in

the north to Halmahera and the Palau Islands in the south, destroyed 3080 enemy planes, sank 356 ships, and damaged 549 other vessels. Numerous small craft were also sunk, and extensive damage was inflicted on the enemy's shore installations. In rolling up this impressive score, the two fleets suffered a combat loss of only 341 aircraft. It should be noted that the above figures do not include the heavy losses sustained by the enemy in his decisive defeat in the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

An important factor in the defeat of the Japanese was our submarine fleet. It was recognized early in the war that Japan's merchant shipping was her Achilles' heel, and a campaign of attrition was waged by American submarines deep within enemy-controlled waters. At the start of the war Japan had in operation about 6,500,000 tons of shipping, just about the required amount to support her wartime operations. An additional 4,000,000 tons were constructed during the war years, but by the start of 1943 the rate of tonnage sunk was much greater than the rate of delivery from the shipyards. The size of the usable merchant fleet thus declined continuously, and this spelled tremendous difficulties for the enemy's war effort. Our submarines accounted for over 60 per cent of the total enemy shipping sunk and by the end of 1944 had destroyed some 4,500,000 tons.

The Navy also carried out its historic tasks of convoying troops, protecting our sea routes of communication, and supporting the Army's ground operations. While but few words are required to name those tasks, they were, of course, vital to the Army's operations in the Pacific.

The spectacular amphibious leaps that carried General MacArthur's troops from southeastern New Guinea to Mindoro, in the Philippines, will stand forever as one of the most brilliant series of operations in military history. The unprecedented speed of the advance and the unbelievably small losses incurred are unmatched in the annals of modern warfare. They are the recorded facts that testify to the unsurpassed strategy that fathered the operations. In less than nine months General MacArthur had spanned some 1500 miles of land and sea to reach Morotai, and in less than a year his advance had carried to Mindoro for a total gain of over 2400 miles. The great enemy defense bastion at Rabaul, like Truk, had been completely isolated; and by the time we returned to the Philippines, over 135,000 Japanese troops, survivors of a once proud force of some 250,000, had been left behind to "wither on the vine." All this had been accomplished with a truly remarkable economy of force. A study of the total casualties sustained by General Krueger's Sixth Army reveals an amazing record. From Port Moresby to Mindoro,

up to the end of 1944, the Sixth Army suffered only 31,500 casualties, of which number some 12,750 were incurred on Leyte. In that campaign alone 56,000 Japanese dead were counted. The small number of casualties indicates the thoroughness of the planning and preparations that preceded all of the operations in the Southwest Pacific Area.

The tremendous blows struck by General Kenney's aircraft were an important contribution toward minimizing our losses. During 1944 his fliers destroyed 2414 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed 563, and damaged 692, while losing in combat only 818 of their own planes. In eleven months they sank 325,000 tons of enemy shipping, probably sank an additional 200,000 tons, and damaged 540,000 tons. In addition, the Far Eastern Air Force inflicted severe casualties on the enemy's ground forces and heavily damaged his land installations.

These operations by the Far Eastern Air Force are indicative of the great role played by our air forces throughout the Pacific theater. In like manner, Major General Willis H. Hale's Seventh Air Force, in the Central Pacific Area, supported Admiral Nimitz's advance; while Major General Davenport Johnson's Eleventh Air Force, based in Alaska and the Aleutians, continued to pound the Kuriles and the northern islands of Japan, forcing the enemy to deploy part of his rapidly dwindling air strength in that area. The Tenth Air Force, under Major General Howard C. Davidson, was carrying out its multiple missions in the Burma–India area while General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force was hammering at the enemy in China and his shipping in the South China Sea.


The Twentieth Air Force was created during 1944 as a global air force and, as already noted, was kept under the executive direction of General Arnold. In other words, it was not placed under any one theater commander. By the end of the year its Superfortress bombers, operating in the China–Burma–India area and from bases in the Marianas, had carried out thirty-nine strikes against the enemy. Japanese industry was the principal target for these strategic bombers. Although this air offensive was still in its early stages at the close of the year, the number of planes participating in the attacks was rapidly growing; and large-scale raids on the industrial cities of Japan, similar to the pattern of Allied air strikes against Germany, were soon to be launched. By the end of 1944 our bomb lines in all principal theaters had been advanced far enough to overlap, and shuttle-bombing operations appeared to be a distinct possibility in 1945.


The juncture of our land forces (from the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas) in the Philippines resulted in the victorious Leyte

campaign and the subsequent landing on Mindoro. The Philippine Archipelago—the strategic importance of which was due to its geographic location in the center of the enemy's vast holdings—was split in two by this rapid thrust. Thousands of Japanese troops in the southern islands and thousands more in the Netherlands East Indies were in imminent danger of being cut off from Japan proper by this move. We now had a window overlooking the South China Sea, but before this so-called Japanese lake could be closed completely to enemy traffic, Luzon, with its fine air bases and excellent harbor, would have to be captured—an operation that was soon to be undertaken.

No appraisal of our operations would be complete without mention of the magnificent accomplishments in the field of supply. The logistical flexibility achieved by our forces played a vital role in the success of our campaigns. Our ability to supply forces operating on widely scattered battlefields, and separated from their homeland by thousands of miles of open sea, was one of the greatest achievements of the war. That such a vast supply system not only functioned well, but was flexible enough to meet sudden changes in the military situation—such as the overnight decision to invade Leyte—was one of the principal reasons for our victory.

As the year 1944 closed, the enemy nowhere exhibited any deterioration of his will to resist. He continued to fight with the same fanatical zeal and tenacity of purpose that characterized his fighting in the early days of the war. While Japanese air, ground, and naval strength had been considerably pared down, yet strong forces for defense were still at their disposal. The reduced length of the enemy's defensive perimeter and his lines of supply inevitably worked to his advantage. Japan had lost the war, but she would not yet admit defeat.


1
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ALASKA
CANADA
BERING SEA
KODIAK
ALEUTIAN ISLANDS
SEA OF OKHOTSK
KAMCHATKA
SAKHALIN
KURILE IS.
OUTER MONGOLIA
SINKIANG
MANCHURIA (MANCHUKUO)
SEA OF JAPAN
NORTH PACIFIC AREA
CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
International Date Line
U.S.
SEATTLE
SAN FRANCISCO
LOS ANGELES
CHINA
PACIFIC
OCEAN AREAS
TIBET
YELLOW SEA
SHANGHAI
EAST CHINA SEA
RYUKYU IS.
OKINAWA
BONIN ISLANDS
VOLCANO ISLANDS
MARCUS
MIDWAY
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
PEARL HARBOR
OAHU
INDIA
BURMA
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
HONG KONG
HAINAN
WAKE
MARIANAS ISLANDS
SAIPAN
GUAM
THAILAND (SIAM)
INDO CHINA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
MANILA
CLARK FIELD
ANDAMAN IS.
SOUTH CHINA SEA
SPRATLY IS.
CAROLINE IS.
TRUK
YAP
PALAU IS.
MARSHALL IS.
KWAJALEIN
MALAKAL
PALMYRA
MALAYA
SINGAPORE
BORNEO
SUMATRA
JOLO
MINDANAO
CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
CHRISTMAS IS.
Equator
GILBERT IS.
CANTON
ELLICE IS.
CELEBES
MOLUCCAS
ARAFURA
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO
SOLOMON IS.
NEW BRITAIN
GUINEA
PORT MORESBY
BATAVIA
JAVA
TIMOR I.
SANTA CRUZ IS.
SAMOA
NEW HEBRIDES
FIJI IS.
TAHITI
CORAL SEA
DARWIN
DERBY
BRISBANE
TOWNSVILLE
NEW CALEDONIA
INDIAN OCEAN
AUSTRALIA
PERTH
ADELAIDE
SYDNEY
MELBOURNE
AUCKLAND
NEW ZEALAND
WELLINGTON
TASMANIA
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
PACIFIC THEATER
U.S. STRATEGIC DIRECTION
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
Area Under Japanese Control
6 August 1942


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 2
GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN
The Landing 7 August 1942
and Concurrent Operations
0 50 100 200 300
SCALE OF MILES
to TRUK 385 mi.
Equator
ADMIRALTY IS.
MANUS
LOS NEGROS
ST. MATTHIAS ISLANDS
KAVIENG
NEW IRELAND
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO
RABAUL
WEWAK
NORTHEAST NEW GUINEA
MADANG
LONG
SAIDOR
DUMPU
C. GLOUCESTER
TALASEA
ARAWE
GASMATA
NEW BRITAIN
FINSCHHAFEN
LAE
SALAMAUA
HUON GULF
MOROBE
GULF OF PAPUA
OWEN STANLEY MTS.
PORT MORESBY
KOKODA
SONA
BUNA
22 July 1942
RIGO
GOODENOUGH
FERGUSSON
NORMANBY
MILNE BAY
RABI
TROBRIAND ISLANDS
WOODLARK
LOUISIADE ARCHIPELAGO
CORAL SEA
SOLOMON SEA
GREEN
BUKA
BOUGAINVILLE
KIETA
EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY
BUIN
CHOISEUL
TREASURY ISLANDS
VELLA LAVELLA
KOLOMBANGARA
NEW GEORGIA
MUNDA
RENDOVA
SANTA ISABEL
MAY 1942
7 Aug.
FLORIDA
TULAGI
MALAITA
RUSSELL ISLANDS
GUADALCANAL
SAN CRISTOBAL
RENNELL
Carrier Force
Amphibious Force
SOLOMON ISLANDS


THE WAR WITH JAPAN


GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN

Initial Landings and Capture of Henderson Field 7-8 August 1942

0 1 2 4 6 8 10

SCALE OF MILES





THE WAR WITH JAPAN

GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN

Landing Schedule and Operations in the Tulagi Area 7–8 August 1942

0 1 2


SCALE OF MILES

THE WAR WITH JAPAN

GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN

Operations During
August and September 1942

0 1 2 4 6 8 10
SCALE OF MILES




THE WAR WITH JAPAN

GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN

Operations During
October and November 1942

0 1 2 4 6 8 10
SCALE OF MILES



THE WAR WITH JAPAN


Japanese Evacuation of Guadalcanal

1–7 February 1943 and

Operations Since 1 January

0 1 2 4 6 8 10

SCALE OF MILES







THE WAR WITH JAPAN


NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN


Allied Advance to Buna - Gona Area
28 September - 18 November 1942 and
Subsequent Operations to 31 December 1943

0 25 50 75 100 125 150


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 9
PAPUAN CAMPAIGN
Operations in the Buna - Gona Area
18 November 1942 - 22 January 1943
SCALE OF MILES
CAPE KILLERTON
GONA
Captured 9 Dec.
16 Jan.
8 Jan.
SANANANDA
22 Jan.
GIRUWA
2nd. corridor to sea 29 Dec.
TARAKENA
Corridor to sea 5 Dec.
Killerton Trail
2/163
16 Jan.
III/163(-)
9 Jan.
30 Nov.
3/126
BUNA VILLAGE
BUNA MISSION
30 Nov.
1 Jan. 1943
CAPE ENDAIADERE
Girua River
21 Nov. to 5 Dec.
URBANA FORCE
22 Nov.
19 Nov. to 18 Dec.
WARREN FORCE
(Very Dense)
Aus. 7
U.S. 32
ANGO CORNER
JUMBORA
SOPUTA
Limit of advance nightfall 18 Nov.
Aus. XX 7
Vasey
U.S. XX 32
Harding
(Waldron)
128
From Kokoda
Samboga River
POPONDETTA
XXX
Advanced New Guinea Force
HERRING
(EICHELBERGER)
DOBODURA
126 (-1 bn.)
INONDA
EMBI
1/126


THE WAR WITH JAPAN
10
Operations in the Solomon Islands
August 1942 to December 1943 and
Concurrent Operations in New Guinea and
New Britain
0 50 100 200 300
SCALE OF MILES
10 TRUK 385 mi.
CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
Equator
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
ADMIRALTY IS.
MANUS
LOS NEGROS
ST. MATTHIAS ISLANDS
KAVIENG
NEW IRELAND
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO
RABAUL
WEWAK
NORTHEAST NEW GUINEA
PAPUA
GULF OF PAPUA
MADANG
SAIDOR
LAE
SALAMAUA
HUON GULF
FINSCHHAFEN
SOUMPU
LONG
C. GLOUCESTER
TALASEA
ARAWE
GASMATA
NEW BRITAIN
26 Dec. 1943
22 Sept.
15 Dec.
4 Sept.
30 June 1943
MOROBE
OWEN STANLEY MTS.
22 Jan. 1943
BUNA
SONAI
KOKODA
PORT MORESBY
6 Aug. 1942
RIGO
ABAU
MILNE BAY
TROBRIAND ISLANDS
Occupied 30 June 1943
WOODLARK
Nov. 1942
GOODENOUGH
FERGUSSON
NORMANBY
LOUISIADE ARCHIPELAGO
CORAL SEA
GREEN
BUKA
BOUGAINVILLE
KIETA
EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY
1 Nov. 1943
BUIN
28 Oct.
TREASURY ISLANDS
26 Oct.
VELLA LAVELLA
15 Aug.
KOLOMBANGARA
CHOISEUL
Vella Lavella 6-7 Oct 1943
Vella Gulf 6 Aug. 1943
Kolombangara 13 July 1943
Kula Gulf 6 July 1943
Savo Island 9 Aug. 1942
Cape Esperance 11-12 Oct.
Guadalcanal 13-15 Nov.
Tassafaronga 30 Nov.
Santa Cruz Is. 26 Oct. 1942 (50 mi. southeast)
SANTA ISABEL
NEW GEORGIA
2 July
MUNDA
RENDOVA
30 June
21 Feb. 1943
RUSSELL ISLANDS
SAVO
FLORIDA
TULAGI
7 Aug. 1942
Eastern Solomons 23-25 Aug. 1942
MALAITA
GUADALCANAL
SAN CRISTOBAL
RENNELL
SOLOMON SEA
SOLOMON ISLANDS


U. S. S. R.
TRANS-SIBERIAN R.R.
LAKE BAIKAL
IRKUTSK
AMUR R.
KHABAROVSK
SERGIOPOL
OUTER MONGOLIA
CHARYAN AND MOTOR ROUTE
31 Dec. 1944
TSITSIHAR
MANCHURIA (MANCHUKUO)
HARBIN
VLADIVOSTOK
HSINKING
URUMCHI
CARAVAN AND MOTOR ROUTE
GOBI DESERT
MUKDEN
CHAHAR
JEHOL
SUIYAN
SINKIANG
INNER MONGOLIA
ANSI
PAOTOW
KALGAN
TATUNG
PEIPING
KWANTUNG PENINSULA
PORT ARTHUR
TIENTSIN
GREAT WAN
31 Dec. 1939
31 Dec. 1944
KOREA (CHOSEN)
SHANTUNG
TSINAN
Area seized 1940-1943
TSINGTAO
YELLOW SEA
TAIERCHWANG
HAICHOW
LANCHOW
HSUCHOW
CHINA
Area seized in 1944
NANKING
PUKOW
KYUSHU
HONSHU
JAPAN
ANKANG
LUHOKOW
SHANGHAI
HANKOW
Dec. 1939
HANGCHOW
CHENGTU
CHUNGKING
Yangtze River
ICHANG
TUNG TING LAKE
CHANGTEH
CHANGSHA
CHIHKIANG
WENCHOW
OKINAWA
RYUKYU ISLANDS
KWEITANG
TUYUN
KUNMING
BURMA ROAD
FOOCHOW
AMOY
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
HONG KONG
SWATOW
KWANGCHOWAN
PAKHOI
HAIPHONG
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
HAINAN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
SPRATLY ISLANDS
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
BAY OF BENGAL
THAILAND
RANGOON
MOULMEIN
AKYAB
MANDALAY
CALCUTTA
RAMGARH
BHUTAN
NEPAL
HIMALAYA MTS.
TIBET
INDIA
ASSAM
Brahmaputra R.
Ganges River
SADIYA
LEDO
31 Dec. 1943
Recovered in 1944
31 Dec. 1944
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
CHINA-BURMA THEATER
General Situation 31 December 1944
and
Principal Operations in China in 1944
0 100 200 300 400 500
SCALE OF MILES


TIBET
BHUTAN
ASSAM
INDIA
BURMA
CHINA
FRENCH INDO CHINA
THAILAND
BAY OF BENGAL
Brahmaputra R.
Brahmaputra River
ASSAM BENGAL RAILROAD
Ganges R.
NAGA HILLS
CHINDWIN R.
Irrawaddy R.
Sittang R.
Salween R.
Mekong R.
ARAKAN RANGE
PEGU YOMAS
BURMA ROAD
to CHANGSHA
CHUNGKING
KUNMING
HANOI
HAIPHONG
CALCUTTA
RAMGARH 175 mi
DIMAPUR
SADIYA
LEDO
MYITKYINA
MOGAUNG
TENGYUEH
LUNGLING
HOPAOSHAN
HOMALIN
IMPHAL
TAMU
KALEWA
INDAW
WUNTHO
BHAMO
LASHIO
SHWEBO
MANDALAY
MEIKTILA
THAZI
TAUNGTY
MONG PAYAK
RAGAN
MAGWE
LOIKAW
AKYAB
MYEBON
TAUNGDAW
CHITTAGONG
TAUNGUP
PROME
TOUNGOO
PEGU
PAAN
MARTABAN
MOULMEIN
MESOD
DCHIENGMAI
RANGOON
BILIN
GULF OF MARTABAN
CAPE NEGRAIS
ANDAMAN IS. 140 mi
BANGKOK 100 MI.
XXXX NORTHERN BURMA AREA COMMAND
STILWELL
Merrill's Marauders
10 May 1944
XXXIII
IV
10 May 1944
Chindits
XXXX FOURTEENTH
SLIM
XXXX THIRTY-THIRD
XXXX FIFTEENTH
31 Dec. 1944
XXX XV
XXXX TWENTY-EIGHTH
XXXXX BURMA AREA
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
BURMA CAMPAIGN
Situation 31 December 1944 and
Principal Operations Since January
0 50 100 200
SCALE OF MILES


THE WAR WITH JAPAN (13)

Landings in the Gilbert Islands 21 November 1943
and Operations in the Central and Southwest
Pacific Areas January - December 1944

0 200 400 600 800 1000
SCALE OF MILES

TIBET
CHINA
INDIA
BURMA
THAILAND
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
EAST CHINA SEA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINE SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
AUSTRALIA
JAVA SEA
BANDA SEA
ARAFURA SEA
TIMOR SEA
CORAL SEA
SOLOMON SEA
CELEBES SEA
GULF OF SIAM
TORRES STRAIT
MOLUCCA PASSAGE
MAKASSAR STRAIT
HONSHU
KYUSHU
TOKYO
RYUKYU ISLANDS
FORMOSA
HAINAN
LUZON
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
MINDANAO
BORNEO
SUMATRA
JAVA
CELEBES
NEW GUINEA
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
NEW BRITAIN
NEW IRELAND
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO
SOLOMON ISLANDS
MARIANAS ISLANDS
CAROLINE ISLANDS
MARSHALL ISLANDS
GILBERT ISLANDS
BONIN ISLANDS
VOLCANO ISLANDS
RYUKYU ISLANDS
NEW HEBRIDES
NEW CALEDONIA
ESPIRITU SANTO
SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS
ELLICE ISLANDS
ANDAMAN ISLANDS
NICOBAR ISLANDS
CHRISTMAS
CALCUTTA
RANGOON
BANGKOK
SINGAPORE
MANILA
DARWIN
BATAVIA
SOERABAJA
PORT MORESBY
GUADALCANAL
RABAUL
TRUK
PONAPE
YAP
PALAU ISLANDS
GUAM
SAIPAN
TINIAN
ROTA
WAKE
NAURU
MAJURO
MILI
JALUIT
MAKIN
TARAWA
KWAJALEIN
ENIWETOK
MALEOLAP
HALMAHERA
MOROTAI
SANSAPOR
BIAK
NOEMFOOR
WEWAK
HOLLANDIA
AITAPE
MADANG
SAIDOR
LAE
BUNA
SALAMAUA
LORENGAU
MANUS
ADMIRALTY ISLANDS
ST MATTHIAS ISLANDS
BOUGAINVILLE
KAVIENG
AMBOINA
CERAM
VOGELKOP PEN.
SARMI
MOMOTE
LOS NEGROS
BALIKPAPAN
PALEMBANG
SINGORA
PATANI
KOTA BHARU
PENANG
KUANTAN
MALAY STATES
SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
EQUATOR
SOUTH CHINA SEA
SULU SEA
CELEBES SEA
SARAWAK
SERIA
MIRI
JOLO
TALAUD
SANDAKEN
NORTH BORNEO
SPRATLY
PALAWAN
NEGROS
PANAY
SAMAR
VISAYAN ISLANDS
MINDORO
LINGAYEN GULF
CAM RANH BAY
SAIGON
VICTORIA POINT
MOULMEIN
MESOD
CHIENG MAI
AKYAB
MANDALAY
LASHIO
BHAMO
KUNMING
KWEILIN
CHUNGKING
CHANGSHA
HANKOW
HANGCHOW
SHANGHAI
NANKING
SWATOW
AMOY
CANTON
HONG KONG
TAKAO
SAKISHIMA
OKINAWA
IWO
Brahmaputra R.
Irrawaddy R.
Salween R.
Mekong R.
Yangtze R.


15 June
Battle of the Philippine Sea 19-20 June 1944
24 July
21 July
23 Sept
16 Oct.
15 Sept.
15 Dec.
20 Oct.
17 Feb. 1944
31 Jan. 1944
21 Nov. 1943
30 July
2 July
27 May
17 May
22 April
29 Feb.
20 Mar
2 Jan. 1944
15 Feb 1944
15 Sept





THE WAR WITH JAPAN


Operations in New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago
January — November 1944


0 25 50 75 100 125 150


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 15
LEYTE CAMPAIGN
Landings 17–20 October 1944
SCALE OF MILES
BILIRAN
SAMAR
CARIGARA BAY
SAN ISIDRO
BABATNGON
BACO
LA PAZ
UBAN
PINAMOPOAN
BARUGO
LIMON
CARIGARA
SAN MIGUEL
TACLOBAN
TUNGA
CAVITE
CANANGA
JARO
SAN PEDRO BAY
SANTA FE
PALO
LIBUNGAO
MT. MAMBAN
PASTRANA
TINGIB
VALENCIA
ALTO PLANO
TANAUAN
20 Oct. 1944
PALOMPON
DAGAMI
ORMOC
CATMON HILL
PORT BELLO
IPIL
ANAS
BURAUEN
ORMOC BAY
PANGGAN
SAN JOSE
DULAG
BALOGO
LA PAZ
CAMOTES
LEYTE GULF
PONSON
ABUYOG
BAYBAY
PACIJAN
PORO
SEA
CEBU
SUZUKI
SOGOD
SURIGAO STRAIT
BURGOS
PANAON ISLAND
BOHOL
SIBERT
24 (-)
16
96(-)
HODGE
7
SIXTH
KRUEGER
381 (96th Div.)
Floating reserve landed 22 Oct.
CALICOAN
18 Oct.
17 Oct.
SULUAN
HOMONHON
6 Ranger
17 Oct.
DINAGAT ISLAND
20 Oct.
21 (24 Div.)


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 16
LEYTE CAMPAIGN
Situation 7 November 1944 and
Operations Since 20 October
0 5 10 20
SCALE OF MILES
BILIRAN I
BILIRAN STRAIT
SAN ISIDRO
CARIGARA BAY
PINAMOPOAN
LIMON
CARIGARA
BABATNGON
BACO I
LA PAZ
UBAN
BARUGO
SAN MIGUEL
TUNGA
TACLOBAN
CAVITE
SAN PEDRO BAY
JARO
SANTA FE
CANANGA
LIBUNGAO
MT MANBAN
MT PINA
ALTO PEAK
7 Nov.
VALENCIA
TINGIB
TANAUAN
PALOMPON
ORMOC
ORMOC BAY
IPIL
PORT BELLO
ANAS
BURAUEN
PANGDAN
LA PAZ
BALOGO
BAYBAY
ABUYOG
PONSON
CAMOTES SEA
PACIJAN
PORO
LEYTE GULF
SAMAR
24
1
96
16 (-)
30 (-)
102 (-)
7
(part)
32
XXX X SIBERT
XXX XXIV
XXX XXIV HODGE
XXXX SIXTH KRUEGER
XXXX THIRTY-FIFTH SUZUKI (arriving)


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 17
Battle for Leyte Gulf
23-26 October 1944
Landing on Mindoro 15 December 1944
0 25 50 75 100
SCALE OF MILES
THIRD FLEET
2 Battleships
4 Carriers; 4 sunk
2 Light Cruisers; 1 "
8 Destroyers; 3 "
Battle off Cape Engano morning 25 Oct. (150 mi. north)
24 Oct.
Third Fleet
Third Fleet (-)
Afternoon 25 Oct.
U.S. Losses
1 Light Carrier
2 Escort Carriers
2 Destroyers
1 Destroyer Escort
Noon 24 Oct.
Night 24 Oct.
26 Oct.
27 Oct.
Landing 15 Dec.
1st ATTACK FORCE
5 Battleships; 1 sunk
6 Heavy Cruisers; 3 "
2 Light Cruisers; 1 "
14 Destroyers; 2 "
2 Heavy Cruisers sunk, 1 damaged 23 Oct.
2d ATTACK FORCE
2 Heavy Cruisers
1 Light Cruiser; 1 Sunk
4 Destroyers; 2 "
C FORCE
2 Battleships; 2 sunk
1 Heavy Cruiser; 1 "
4 Destroyers; 3 "
Morning 24 Oct.
26 Oct.
Battle off Samar 25 Oct.
24-25 Oct.
Morning 25 Oct.
Landings 20 Oct.
Seventh Fleet
Escort Carriers
Battle of Surigao Strait 0200, 25 Oct.
LUZON
MINDORO
PANAY
NEGROS
CEBU
BOHOL
MINDANAO
SAMAR
LEYTE
PALAWAN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
SULU SEA
VISAYAN SEA
PANAY GULF
CAMOTES SEA
TABLAS SEA
MASBATE
SIBUYAN
CALAMIAN GROUP
BAGUIO
DAMORTIS
LINGAYEN
TARLAC
CABANATUAN
SAN FERNANDO
MANILA
MAUBAN
LUCENA
BATANGAS
CABANATUAN
MARINDUQUE
LEGASPI
CATANDUANES
BONGABONG
SAN JOSE
ILOILO
CEBU
TACLOBAN
ORMOC
ABUYOG
BAYBAY
PUERTO PRINCESA
BRUNEI BAY
TABLAS STRAIT
MINDORO STRAIT
SURIGAO STRAIT
LEYTE GULF


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 18
LEYTE CAMPAIGN
Situation 31 December 1944 and
Operations Since 7 November
0 5 10 20
SCALE OF MILES
BILIRAN I
BILIRAN STRAIT
CARIGARA BAY
SAN ISIDRO
24
PINAMOPOAN
LIMON
24
(32)
BARUGO
CARIGARA
SAN MIGUEL
BABATNGON
BACOL I
LA PAZ
UBAN
XXXX
THIRTY-FIFTH
SUZUKI
2 Dec.
CANANGA
MT PINA
7 Nov.
TUNGA
XXX
X
SIBERT
CAVITE
TACLOBAN
SAN PEDRO BAY
SANTA FE
JARO
LIBUNGAO
MT MANBAN
20 Dec.
PASTRANA
PALO
XXXX
SIXTH
KRUEGER
TINGIB
ALTO PEAK
VALENCIA
77 (-)
XXIV
TANAUAN
96
11 (77 Div.)
25 Dec.
PALOMPON
DAGAMI
ORMOC
ORMOC BAY
PORT BELLO
7 (part)
30 Dec.
IPIL
7 Dec.
BURAUEN
11
SAN JOSE
XXIV
HODGE
DULAG
ANAS
PANGDAN
7 Nov.
LA PAZ
77
7
LEYTE GULF
CAMOTES SEA
PONSON
ABUYOG
BAYBAY
PORO
PACIJAN



THE WAR WITH JAPAN

Situation 31 December 1944 and

Area Recovered Since

August 1942

~~RESTRICTED~~

THE WAR WITH JAPAN

PART 3

(January to August 1945)



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DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
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1951

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THE WAR WITH JAPAN

PART 3

(January to August 1945)



DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY ART AND ENGINEERING
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FOREWORD

This account of the war with Japan has been written for use in the instruction of cadets at the United States Military Academy. It is based for the most part on material furnished by the Historical Division, Special Staff, Department of the Army. Much valuable information has also been obtained from the publications of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and the Office of Naval Intelligence. However, in acknowledging indebtedness to others it is not desired to place on them the responsibility for any factual errors or for any conclusions drawn.

This and other pamphlets on World War II are constantly being revised as additional information becomes available. It will be appreciated if military personnel who note any apparent errors or discrepancies, or who have comments or suggestions for the improvement of the subject matter, will communicate them to:

The Professor of Military Art and Engineering
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INTRODUCTION (Map 1)

The strategic offensive against Japan, inaugurated in late 1942 by the tactical victories gained on Guadalcanal and in the mountains of Papua, had flourished under the skillful leadership of General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz until by October 1944, when those two commanders joined hands at Leyte, it had matured into a powerful demonstration of military might. It had come a long way since the days of its infancy, when the requirements of the European theater had left but few of the tools of war for use in the Pacific. Now the days of "living on a shoestring" were over; and troops, ships, and planes were arriving in steadily increasing numbers.

We now had enough troops to be organized into armies—two in the Philippines and a third being formed—whereas MacArthur and Nimitz had been able to send only a few divisions into action in those critical days of August and September 1942. In January 1945 there were available in the Pacific twenty-seven American combat divisions (including six Marine Corps divisions), four Australian divisions, one New Zealand division, some units of the Netherland East Indies Army, and additional corps and army troops. Total Allied land, sea, and air forces under General MacArthur's command alone numbered almost 1,500,000 men. Hundreds of thousands more were pitted against the Japanese in China and Burma.

On 1 January 1945 the United States Navy had over 61,000 vessels of all types and about 37,000 planes. Included in the ship total were 1,167 combat vessels and 54,206 landing craft and assault ships. Patrol boats, minelayers, minesweepers, and miscellaneous auxiliaries accounted for the remainder. When it is realized that most of this fleet was deployed in the Pacific, the power wielded by Admiral Nimitz can be more fully appreciated.

In the air, thanks to American productive efficiency, our planes had achieved both qualitative and quantitative superiority over those of the enemy. To the great striking power possessed by each of the individual air forces had been added the advantage of overlapping bomb lines, which made it possible to concentrate a large part of our total air strength on a single target.

The increase in our offensive power lay not only in additional numbers but also in the excellent coordination of the land, sea, and air forces. That we had successfully welded these components into a well-balanced fighting team was proved in the Leyte campaign. There, for the first time in the war, both sides employed large forces on land, at sea, and in the air. The victory was won largely through our mastery of three-dimensional warfare, an art that never before in history had been practiced so proficiently and on so large a scale. Triphibious, rather than amphibious, best describes the type of operations that had been perfected.

At the beginning of 1945 less than eight months of fighting separated our advancing forces from their final objective—the unconditional surrender of Japan. These eight months, however, were to see some of the bitterest fighting of the war.

It will be recalled that at the close of 1944 the Allies held the initiative in all theaters save China. In Burma the British Fourteenth Army was slowly pushing the Japanese southward toward Rangoon. Lord Mountbatten's naval forces were busy executing carrier attacks against the Nicobars, Sumatra, and Java. Australian troops had taken over the task of containing the by-passed Japanese forces in the New Guinea–Solomon Islands area and were being readied for offensive action there and in Borneo. General MacArthur had smashed through the central Philippines and was preparing to assault Luzon. Admiral Nimitz had dispatched most of his naval strength (the Third Fleet under Admiral Halsey) to assist and cover the amphibious operations in the Philippines. The remainder of the Pacific Fleet was being employed in raids against the Bonin and Volcano Islands, particularly Iwo Jima. The map shows the general situation on 1 January 1945. The shaded area indicates the extent of Allied control rather than the actual territory occupied by our forces.

In the following pages the principal military events that took place during 1945* in China, Burma, the Southwest Pacific Area, and the Pacific Ocean Areas will be treated in turn, although the scope of the narrative precludes a detailed examination of every operation under-

* For an account of the war up to January 1945 see *The War With Japan, Parts 1 and 2.*

taken. However, the Philippine campaign (particularly the fighting on Luzon), the battle for Iwo Jima, and the conquest of Okinawa will each be accorded special treatment.

CHINA–BURMA–INDIA THEATER

BURMA (Map 2)

On 1 January 1945 the Allied counteroffensive in Burma, which had begun in mid-1944, was still in full swing. By that time it had forced the enemy back to the line shown. Lieutenant General Daniel I. Sultan,* commander of all American forces in Burma and India, was attacking southeastward from Bhamo against the Japanese, who were desperately clinging to the last stretch of the Burma Road that was still in their possession. The force under General Sultan, known as the Northern Combat Area Command, now included one British division, three American-trained and -equipped Chinese divisions, and the Mars Task Force. The latter, which consisted of two regiments** of American troops and one of Chinese, was operating behind the enemy's lines south of Wanting. Troops of the Chinese Expeditionary Force*** had captured Lungling and were attacking astride the Burma Road toward Wanting.

Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese now commanded all Allied land forces in Southeast Asia,**** while at the same time exercising direct command of the 11th Army Group, as the combined British forces in Burma were designated. Lieutenant General Sir William J. Slim was in command of the British Fourteenth Army, less the XV Corps, which had been detached for operational reasons. The XXXIII and IV Corps of the Fourteenth Army were driving toward Mandalay. The XV Corps was pushing southward along the coast of the Bay of Bengal and had almost reached Akyab.

Thus far the Japanese retreat had continued unabated, only rearguard actions punctuating an otherwise steady withdrawal. Enemy resistance grew stronger, however, as the Allies approached Mandalay. Lieutenant General Hyotaro Kimura, who had replaced General Kawabe as commander of the Burma Area Army in December

* The ranks of all commanders named are those held at the time of the events being described.

** The 475th Infantry and the 124th Cavalry.

*** The 20th Army Group, commanded by Marshal Wei-Li-Huang. This formation came under control of the Southeast Asia Command after it crossed the Burma frontier.

**** A total of twenty divisions.

1944, decided to make a determined stand along the general line Akyab–Mandalay–Lashio. The Japanese Fifteenth Army was accordingly assigned to the defense of the Mandalay area, and considerable artillery was collected there. The Twenty-eighth Army reorganized the western part of the defensive front, and the Thirty-third Army* took over the eastern portion.

Kimura based his decision not to make a stand farther north on the premise that the Allies' supply problem would become more difficult as they advanced southward, while his own logistical difficulties would lessen as he drew nearer his rear bases. But his reasoning, although correct when terrain and ground communications only were considered, fell far short of a true appreciation of the Allied air arm. Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer's Eastern Air Command was already the greatest factor in Allied supply, to a degree without parallel in the entire war. In the Burma campaign it was demonstrated that whole armies can be transported, supported, evacuated, and supplied entirely by air. More than 1,700 tons of supplies were being flown into Burma each day to keep the Allied advance going. In addition, the Eastern Air Command struck numerous blows at the enemy's lines of communication. Railroads, bridges, and supply dumps were struck daily; and the flow of supplies through the port of Rangoon was practically cut off by the combined action of our aircraft and the British naval units that were sweeping the Indian Ocean clear of Japanese ships.

As later events were to prove, Kimura underestimated Allied capabilities in one other important respect. The line of battle had now moved into the relatively flat, open lowlands of the Mandalay region, where armor could be advantageously employed during the dry season. The use of strong armored columns, supplied by air, was a distinct Allied capability, and one that was soon to materialize with disastrous results for the Japanese.

In the west, Akyab, abandoned by the Japanese for more favorable positions inland, was seized by the XV Corps on 3 January in the first of what was to be a series of landings along the Burma coast. However, by 9 April, as shown by the phase line on the map, these small amphibious operations had not produced important gains except to secure airfields from which the Fourteenth Army could be supplied by air.

Meanwhile the XXXIII and IV Corps made excellent progress on the central Burma front. The XXXIII Corps advanced southward

* It should be borne in mind that a Japanese army was the equivalent of our corps.

until stopped by stubborn resistance north of Mandalay. The IV Corps reached the line of the Irrawaddy and by 19 February had established a bridgehead in the Pagan area. From there an armored column, completely supplied by air, smashed its way southeastward to capture Meiktila and its cluster of eight airstrips. Thazi, on the Mandalay–Rangoon railway, was also occupied, and some 30,000 Japanese troops to the north were cut off from their supplies and their best route of escape. The fighting around Meiktila and Thazi grew more severe as Kimura shifted troops from the Mandalay front to that area and also rushed up reinforcements from southern Burma in an effort to regain his communications. Thazi was retaken by the enemy, who then began to withdraw troops from the pocket northwest of the town.

At this time XXXIII Corps troops drove toward Mandalay, which they reached late on 7 March. A typical Japanese suicide defense withstood all assaults until 20 March, when the city fell. The XXXIII Corps immediately exploited the success by pushing rapidly southward. Resistance crystallized about eighteen miles north of Thazi, and despite substantial losses the Japanese were able to hold open an escape gap until the end of March. Even so, a considerable number of them were trapped when the corridor was closed. While the reduction of this pocket was being effected, General Slim halted the advance and began regrouping his forces along the line marked "9 April".

In the Wanting area constant Allied pressure from the northeast and northwest had, by mid-January, gradually reduced the Japanese hold on the Burma Road to a stretch of about eighteen miles. At this time General Sultan announced that the all-weather road from Ledo to Myitkyina, 262 miles long, had been completed and that the first convoy of American trucks loaded with military supplies had arrived at Myitkyina, where it was waiting for the enemy to be cleared from the Wanting area. He also disclosed that the pipeline from India, which paralleled the road, was already delivering gasoline.

Wanting fell on 20 January, and two days later the road to China was completely in Allied hands. During the following weeks most of the action in this area consisted of repulsing counterattacks, clearing out pockets of enemy forces, and driving Japanese artillery from positions where it was still within range of the road.

On 4 February the first Allied convoy to travel over the newly

named Stilwell Road* reached Kunming, China. They were the first trucks to reach Kunming from the outside world since the Japanese closed the Burma Road in April 1942.

After clearing the Wanting area of all resistance, the Allies pushed down the Burma Road toward Lashio. That town was captured in early March, and by 9 April our forces in eastern Burma were disposed along the line shown. The enemy was withdrawing across the Shan Plateau. Their mission of clearing the road to China having been accomplished, General Sultan's forces remained in this area. They took no part in the last phase of the campaign.

The battle for Burma entered its final stage on 9 April. On that date the British forces in central Burma launched a two-pronged drive, one arm of which was aimed at Toungoo and the other at Prome. Led by armored columns that punched through thin crusts of resistance and by-passed more strongly held areas, the swift Allied advance was convincing evidence that the enemy had spent himself in the Mandalay–Meiktila area and was incapable of defending lower Burma. By the 23d the eastern column had reached Toungoo, and the western column had seized Magwe and pushed more than twenty miles down the road to Prome. Disintegration of Japanese resistance appears to have reached an advanced state by this time, their forces having been split into three groups.

After the capture of Toungoo on 23 April, Allied tanks, trucks, and guns poured south along the highway to Rangoon, covering 124 miles in a week. In the valley of the Irrawaddy River strong resistance north of Prome had temporarily delayed the advance there as the enemy battled desperately to hold open an escape route for his troops west of the river. The evacuation of Rangoon had already begun; and by the end of April, when the British had reached the line shown, no appreciable enemy force was in the city.

On 2 May, within a few hours after paratroopers had been dropped, amphibious forces of the XV Corps landed at the mouth of the Rangoon River. Only one small enemy rear guard was met, and the next day other troops proceeded up the river and landed without opposition on the Rangoon waterfront. On 6 May contact was made twenty miles north of the city with units of the Fourteenth Army advancing from Pegu. Heavy rains, forerunners of the monsoon, had flooded streams and retarded the Fourteenth Army's progress. Less than two weeks later Allied forces advancing down the Irrawaddy contacted elements of the XV Corps northwest of Rangoon.

* In honor of General Joseph W. Stilwell, former commander of American and Chinese troops in Burma, who initiated the project.

The Japanese forces in Burma were now completely separated into three groups: one west of the Irrawaddy, one in the Pegu Hills, and the third generally east of the Sittang River. The action in Burma during the remaining months of the war resolved itself into repeated and violent attacks by the Japanese in the two pockets west of the Sittang to open an escape route to the east. The enemy forces in the bridgehead near Pegu launched a number of attacks in an attempt to draw British strength to that sector and thus assist their comrades to the northwest.

Casualty figures for the period 1 January to 27 May reveal that troops of the British Fourteenth Army had killed over 31,000 Japanese and had taken 700 prisoners. During the fifteen-month period of the Japanese Imphal campaign and the Allied counteroffensive 97,000 enemy dead had been counted, and his total casualties in Burma had risen to 347,000.

Early in June, Burma became an all-British theater of operations. All American combat units had been, or were being, withdrawn from the country for service in China. Only Service of Supply and Air Transport Command units, whose chief concern was the transportation of supplies to China, were to remain. General Stratemeyer, commander of the combined American and British Eastern Air Command, was succeeded by Air Marshal W. A. Coryton. Stratemeyer later assumed command of all American air forces in China. At the same time it was announced that headquarters elements of the British Fourteenth Army had been withdrawn from Burma.* All troops there were now under the control of the newly formed British Twelfth Army.**

The arrival of the monsoon in Burma and the desperate attempts of the surrounded Japanese forces to break through the British cordons prevented the Twelfth Army from undertaking any large-scale advance east of the Sittang. By 18 June the Japanese pockets had shrunk to the size shown on the map. Of the 30,000 troops isolated there by the seizure of the Mandalay–Rangoon railroad corridor in early May, approximately half had been killed or captured or had died of disease by 1 August. Some 1,500 to 2,000 more were still in

* The Fourteenth Army Headquarters was withdrawn in order to prepare for an assault on Singapore in September. American B-29's based in Burma were already pounding that famous base; and British air and naval units were bombing and shelling Japanese installations in the Nicobars, Sumatra, and Java to clear the route for the invasion force.

** The IV and XXXIII Corps, less detachments, remained in Burma. The XV Corps and the newly organized XXXIV Corps were soon assigned to the Fourteenth Army.

the Pegu Hills, the remainder having escaped to the east bank of the Sittang. The Japanese Twenty-eighth Army, the hapless victim of Allied armor, had ceased to exist.

Minor operations continued during the first two weeks in August; but the line of battle along the Sittang River, as shown on the map, did not change materially. The fighting on the main front in Burma ceased when the Japanese nation surrendered to the Allies on 15 August.* But for several weeks afterward isolated groups of the enemy, unaware of the cessation of hostilities, continued to give battle. The formal capitulation of all Japanese armed forces in southeastern Asia, including those in Burma, took place at Singapore on 12 September. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten received the surrender.

CHINA (Map 3)

The general situation in China on 1 January 1945 is shown on the map. As a result of campaigns undertaken in 1944 the Japanese had driven a corridor through guerrilla-infested southern China from Changsa southwest to the border of French Indo-China. An attempt to seize Kweiyang, however, had been stopped by a Chinese counterattack late in December.

During the first two months of 1945 the enemy showed little inclination to renew fighting in the hinterland. Instead he directed his attention to the territory east of his corridor, much of which was still under Chinese control, and to strengthening his hold along the coast. In mid-January the Japanese launched a drive southward along the Hengyang–Canton Railroad. By 5 February the entire railway was in their hands, and a part of the force had turned eastward to seize three former Allied air bases in that area.

Allied activity in China during these weeks was confined almost entirely to the air. The Fourteenth Air Force concentrated on the enemy's aircraft, supply dumps, and communications. In mid-January, when Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet made its daring sortie into the South China Sea to screen the Sixth Army's assault on Luzon, the Fourteenth Air Force and the XX Bomber Command assisted the carrier-based aircraft in attacks on enemy air bases along the China coast. In the month of January the Fourteenth Air Force alone destroyed 305 enemy planes. In February, when Philippine-based bombers began to hammer at Japanese shipping and ports along the China coast, General Chennault's planes were

* 14 August (VJ-day) in the United States. All dates and times given herein are those of the respective theaters of operations.

able to give more attention to the enemy's rail communications and his shipping on the Yangtze River. Nor were targets in Indo-China neglected, for American planes struck repeated blows at the enemy's installations there.

On 9 March, in a surprise move, the Japanese seized complete control of Indo-China from the French, who by agreement were still administering the country despite its occupation by the enemy in 1940. The Japanese explained their action by charging that the French had been aiding the Allied cause, but the real reason was the fear of an Allied invasion.

Meanwhile indecisive fighting had continued in China. On 21 March, however, the Japanese launched a coordinated attack westward between the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, aimed at the American air bases at Laohokow and Ankang. These bases, located on the enemy's flank, had long been a thorn in his side. (The approaching harvest season in this rich food-producing area also influenced the choice of objective.) The advancing Japanese mechanized columns forced the Americans to exacuate the airfield at Laohokow on the 26th, but a valiant Chinese rear guard held the town itself until 8 April. On the 10th and 11th Chinese counterattacks not only stopped the Japanese advance but regained much of the lost territory. Laohokow, however, remained in the enemy's hands.

In late March and early April the Fourteenth Air Force concentrated again on the enemy's air power. All Japanese airfields in China within range of our planes were attacked in an effort to ground the hostile air arm while the American Tenth Army assaulted Okinawa. The Far Eastern Air Forces undertook its first major operations against the China coast when Philippine-based bombers dropped more than 400 tons of bombs in the Hong Kong area between the 3d and 5th of April.

In April the Japanese began a drive westward toward Changteh and Chihkiang. The former city lies in the "rice bowl" district, and the latter was the site of an Allied air base. Chinese troops, aided by strong American air attacks, slowed the Japanese advance and on 8 May launched a coordinated counterattack spearheaded by two American-trained Chinese divisions flown in from Burma and India. The counterattack, which was particularly noteworthy for the excellent air-ground cooperation, was a complete success. Some 11,000 casualties were inflicted on the enemy, and he was forced to draw back. This was the first important victory that Chinese troops had won in China in over two years. The fine support rendered by the Fourteenth Air Force was a major contribution to the victory. Hav-

ing been relieved of much of the strategic bombing of China's coast by the Far Eastern Air Forces, General Chennault was able to concentrate his aircraft in support of the Chinese ground operations.

This defeat forced the Japanese to a decision which other events had already greatly influenced—that of withdrawing from southern China. The enemy saw now that he had miscalculated the speed of our advance across the Pacific. Iwo Jima had already fallen to American marines, and two-thirds of Okinawa was under our control. The capitulation of Germany on 9 May meant that even stronger American forces would soon be available for the assault on the main islands of Japan. The Japanese defeat in Burma would permit Allied forces from that area to reinforce Chiang Kai-shek's troops in China. Rumblings from Moscow also caught the attentive ear of the Japanese High Command. In November 1944 Premier Joseph Stalin had made his famous speech in which he had branded Japan as an "aggressor nation". And in April 1945 Russia served notice on Japan that their five-year nonaggression pact would not be renewed upon its expiration on 25 April 1946. In her communication Russia charged Japan with having already breached the pact by furnishing military aid to Germany, thus establishing a basis for terminating it before the expiration date. In the face of these developments the Japanese wisely but belatedly began withdrawing their troops from southern China.

Foochow was abandoned on 19 May, and the garrisons at other coastal cities were greatly reduced. Large troop movements northward through the corridors from the Canton and Kweilin areas were noted, and the Fourteenth Air Force immediately took the trains and convoys under fire. So effective were these air attacks that the enemy soon limited his movements to the hours of darkness. No air opposition was met by our planes, and it was evident that what little remained of Japanese air power was being husbanded for use elsewhere. At sea the ever widening range of Allied bombers had crippled enemy shipping, and only small boats moving at night were able to transport troops along the coast.

The Chinese were quick to press forward against the withdrawing enemy. Nanning was occupied without opposition on 28 May, and by the end of the month the Japanese corridor to Indo-China had been completely severed. The Chinese attacked at many other points along the avenues of retreat, inflicting some casualties but not seriously impeding the movement of Japanese troops across the Yellow River to the north. In mid-June Wenchow was evacuated, and by the 20th over 100,000 enemy troops had crossed into northern China en route to strengthen the defenses along the Russian border.

Harassed by Chinese regulars and guerillas on land and attacked constantly from the air, the Japanese evacuation proceeded slowly. More than 100,000 enemy troops were still in the Canton area at the end of June. By this time American planes based on Okinawa had joined with our Philippine-based bombers in strikes at targets along the coast from Shanghai to Kuantan, in Malaya.

In July, China entered her ninth year of war. During eight years of fighting, according to a Chinese Army spokesman, her casualties had totaled 3,178,000, including 1,310,000 killed. The same source estimated that the Japanese had suffered over 2,500,000 casualties at the hands of Chinese forces, including about 1,180,000 killed.

When General Stratemeyer assumed command of all United States air units in China on 16 July, both the Fourteenth and the Tenth Air Forces (the latter had recently moved in from Burma and India) came under his control. It was now possible to rain down even heavier blows on the retreating enemy.

Kweilin, former site of one of the Fourteenth Air Force's most important bases, was recaptured by the Chinese on 27 July as they pressed forward along the railroad toward Hengyang. During the following weeks no notable gains were made, and no important battles took place. Northern China became the center of action on 9 August when Russian armies burst into Manchuria, but those operations will be described later. The map shows the general situation in China and Manchuria at the time of the Japanese surrender.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

RECONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES (Map 1)

In the over-all plan for the liberation of the Philippine Islands the invasions of Leyte and Mindoro were but the first steps in a sequence of operations designed to secure the key island of Luzon. Although the complete liquidation of isolated enemy ground forces on Leyte was destined to be prolonged for some time to come, there was no question but that the Sixth Army had established a firm base for the continuation of General MacArthur's strategic offensive. Moreover, an obstructive wedge had been driven through the central Philippines, splitting the archipelago and effectively separating the large Japanese garrison on Luzon from the troops defending Mindanao and the other islands in the south.

The genesis of the plan to invade Luzon is illustrative of the flexibility achieved by our High Command in the strategic planning of the war in the Pacific. As early as March 1944 the Joint Chiefs of

Staff had established as the primary strategic objective of our great two-pronged drive across the Pacific the general area Formosa–Luzon–China coast. Initial plans called for the seizure of Mindanao as the first step in an advance to Formosa either directly or by way of Luzon. In addition to reviving Allied prestige in the Far East, the recapture of the Philippines would sever the line of communication between the Japanese homeland and the rich southern areas and also would provide a staging area for subsequent attacks on China, Formosa, or Japan.

When in June 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the by-passing of the Philippines entirely, in favor of a direct invasion of Formosa, General MacArthur urged that there be no change in the existing plan. Admiral Nimitz, who felt that Formosa could not be assaulted prior to the successful neutralization by our land-based planes of the enemy's air strength on Luzon, lent his support to MacArthur's views. Approving the recommendations of the two theater commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September issued their directive calling for the seizure of Leyte as a preliminary step to operations early in 1945 against either Luzon or Formosa. The unexpected advancement of the Leyte operation by two months led to a proposal by General MacArthur that he move directly against Luzon on 20 December 1944.

Up to this time the Joint Chiefs of Staff had come to no definite conclusion as to the relative priority to be assigned the two operations, the attack on Luzon by Southwest Pacific forces and the invasion of Formosa by the Central Pacific Command. When the opinion was expressed that the invasion of Luzon would require the Pacific Fleet to occupy an exposed position for at least six weeks in order to guard the line of supply to the beachhead, General MacArthur countered by stating that after the initial landing resupply of our forces at Lingayen could be routed through the Visayas* under the protective cover of land-based aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then concluded, at the end of October 1944, that the advantages to be gained from attacking Luzon were commensurate with the risk; and General MacArthur was instructed to proceed with his plan of operations, with 20 December as the target date. At the same time the decision was made to shelve temporarily the entire plan for invading Formosa, and a project for assaulting the Ryukyu Islands in March 1945 was adopted in its place.

As the Leyte campaign progressed, it soon became evident that the target date for the Luzon operation would have to be reconsidered.

* The central group of the Philippine Islands.

The Japanese had elected to reinforce Leyte in a futile effort to win an all-out victory, which had caused the fighting to be prolonged beyond the original expectation of General MacArthur. Although the enemy's extremely large ground, air, and naval losses had compromised his entire defensive plan for the Philippines, our forces were not immediately prepared to exploit their initial success. The limited air facilities and the slow progress of airfield construction on Leyte made it well-nigh impossible for our Far Eastern Air Forces to support a new amphibious operation while furnishing air support for the Leyte battle. Also, the overlong participation of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet made it imperative that our naval forces be retired temporarily for repair and resupply.

So S-day* for the landing on Luzon was postponed to 9 January; and the date for the seizure of Mindoro, a preliminary to the Luzon landing, was changed from 5 to 15 December. The airfields to be constructed on Mindoro were considered essential to the planned neutralization of the Japanese air force on Luzon by our land-based aircraft.

In order to free Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army for the invasion of Luzon the Eighth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, assumed control of operations in the Leyte–Samar area on 26 December.** The Eighth Army was assigned the mission of destroying all enemy forces in the archipelago south of Luzon, in addition to rendering such assistance to the future operations of the Sixth Army as might be needed.

The operations of each army will be treated in turn, although their campaigns were concurrent. Space limitations permit a detailed account of only the operations on Luzon, where the principal fighting took place; but we should not minimize the importance of the swiftly executed amphibious assaults carried out by the Eighth Army in the liberation of the southern Philippines.

Luzon Campaign.—During the last three months of 1944 our combined air forces operating in support of the Leyte campaign had almost completely destroyed Japanese air power in the Philippines. Nearly 1,500 enemy planes had been destroyed by the land-based aircraft of Lieutenant General George C. Kenney's Far Eastern Air Forces, and the carrier planes of Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet had accounted for some 2,000 more. By the opening of the new year the

* Because of the concurrent planning of various separate offensive operations the use of the terms *D-day* and *H-hour* had to be restricted to avoid confusion. For Luzon *S-day* and *J-hour* were substituted.

** The Eighth Army was given the responsibility for Mindoro on 1 January.

enemy's 120 air bases in the Luzon–Visayas area had been virtually neutralized and his air strength reduced to less than 1,000 operational aircraft.

Having secured control of the skies over the central Philippines, our land-based aircraft began increasingly heavy attacks against important Japanese installations on Luzon. The establishment of airfields on Mindoro afforded a valuable staging point for planes operating from our main bases on Leyte, Morotai, and in the Palaus. Heavy-bomber strikes against the Manila–Clark Field complex of airdromes, which began as early as 22 December, drove the disorganized Japanese to a further dispersion of their few remaining aircraft. Maintenance and supply facilities on the ground broke down completely, resulting in the collapse of effective enemy air operations except on a piecemeal, day-to-day basis. Fighter resistance to our bombing raids neared the vanishing point, and it soon became apparent that the enemy was saving the last of his aircraft for attacks against our invasion fleet.

As the new year opened, another phase of our air operations swung into high gear. In order to preserve our air superiority over Luzon and to prevent the enemy from bringing in aerial reinforcements, an organized campaign was launched to effect by air power the strategic isolation of the Luzon area. While Superfortresses of the XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas struck at targets in the Japanese home islands, the China-based XX Bomber Command and the Fourteenth Air Force neutralized enemy air installations in Formosa and along the China coast. The Far Eastern Air Forces continued to maintain unremitting pressure against Japanese bases in the southern Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies. Departing from its anchorage at Ulithi on 30 December, the Third Fleet sailed northward to smother the enemy's air and naval forces in the Formosa–Ryukyus–China coast area.

While the air and sea lanes were thus being swept clean of the enemy, the Sixth Army was busily engaged in staging for its assault on Luzon (**Map 4**). As in past operations, General Krueger was charged with the responsibility of coordinating the plans of all participating air, ground, and naval forces. In essence, the missions assigned the Sixth Army were: (1) to land in the Lingayen–Damortis area; (2) to establish a base of operations, including facilities for uninterrupted naval and air operations; (3) to seize the Central Plain–Manila area by an overland advance to the southward; and (4) by subsequent operations, as directed by General MacArthur, to complete the destruction of hostile forces and establish control over the remainder of Luzon.

The underlying objective of the entire campaign was, of course, to obtain an adequate base for the support of future operations against Japan.

Assigned to the Sixth Army for the Lingayen landing were Major General Oscar W. Griswold's XIV Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions; Major General Innis P. Swift's I Corps, consisting of the 6th and 43d Divisions; and a reserve that included the 25th Division, the 158th Regimental Combat Team,* the 6th Ranger Battalion,* and the 13th Armored Group.* Most of these units had long been occupied in containing by-passed Japanese forces in the New Guinea–Solomons area. When the Australian First Army took over that task late in 1944, the American units became available for employment in the Philippines. The wide dispersion of these forces, however, presented additional problems in operational planning.

Over a long period of time a considerable amount of information had been collected concerning the strength and disposition of Japanese forces. Prior to the invasion of Leyte it had been estimated that there were about 150,000 enemy troops on Luzon. But the arrival of numerous reinforcements during November and December, including three additional divisions, caused an upward revision of our intelligence estimates. Guerilla reports as well as other sources indicated by early January that nearly 235,000 Japanese were on Luzon, of whom about one-third were in the Central Plain–Manila area. General Tomoyuki Yamashita, considered by many to be the ablest soldier in the Japanese Army, commanded the 14th Area Army, which was charged with the defense of Luzon.

In view of the increased strength of General Yamashita's forces it was decided to assign additional troops to the Sixth Army. The 1st Cavalry, 32d, 33d, and 41st Divisions, plus the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, were designated reinforcing troops and scheduled to arrive in the Lingayen area on staggered dates between S plus 18 and S plus 32.

Temporarily augmented by forces of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet was charged with providing direct naval-air and surface support for the Luzon campaign. More than 850 vessels were made available, including six old battleships, eighteen escort aircraft carriers, ten cruisers, 141 destroyers, and a host of smaller craft. This fleet, designated the Luzon Attack Force, had the mission of transporting, landing, protecting, and supporting the Sixth Army in the invasion of Luzon.

* Nondivisional units.

The plan for direct air support of the Lingayen assault provided that immediately preceding S-day the Luzon Attack Force, Third Fleet, and Far Eastern Air Forces would coordinate their operations in order to cover the passage of the invasion fleet between Luzon and the enemy's bases in the Formosa–China coast area. During the landing and subsequent ground operations the Far Eastern Air Forces and the Luzon Attack Force were to cooperate in providing direct air support, with emphasis on denying the movement of and destroying hostile reserves moving overland from the Aparri, Central Plain, and Manila areas toward the Lingayen area. At the earliest practicable date after the establishment of land-based aircraft ashore the Far Eastern Air Forces would assume full responsibility for the direct support of all ground operations.

General Krueger's plan for the employment of his Sixth Army was designed to accomplish his mission by the division of operations into three successive phases (**Map 5**):

1. An amphibious assault to seize and consolidate beachheads in the Lingayen–San Fabian area, including the rapid establishment of air and base facilities.
2. An attack to destroy all hostile forces north of the Agno River and to seize and secure crossings.
3. The destruction of hostile forces in the Central Plain area and the continuation of the attack to capture Manila.

In the execution of the plan the Sixth Army was to land two corps abreast. S-day was confirmed as 9 January; J-hour was to be at 0930. The I Corps, on the left, was to land on beaches in the San Fabian area; the XIV Corps was to land in the vicinity of the town of Lingayen. Each corps was directed to go in with two divisions abreast, and it was planned to put ashore on S-day the maximum force consistent with the capacity of the beaches. The location of the army beachhead line was determined by the necessity for securing (1) sufficient depth to protect the landing beaches from long-range artillery; (2) adequate space for setting up initial air installations, dispersing supply dumps, and deploying large forces; (3) the main access roads leading to the south across the Agno River as well as an adequate lateral road net; (4) the road net in the Pozorrubio–Binalonan area, the best terrain for the use of armor; and (5) the high ground on the flanks of the lodgement area, at Sual and in the vicinity of Rosario.

Since the enemy was known to occupy a strong position in the general area Damortis–Baguio, the left wing of the Sixth Army was considered to be much more vulnerable to attack than the right wing. So

General Krueger planned to land the 158th Regimental Combat Team north of San Fabian, in the I Corps zone of action, on S plus 2. The 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group, both in floating reserve, were also to land in the I Corps zone on S plus 2 unless the tactical situation demanded otherwise.

While the enemy had prepared very strong defenses guarding the best landing beaches along the shore of Lingayen Gulf—generally in the Damortis–San Fernando area—very little had been done in the vicinity of San Fabian, and no fortifications at all had been prepared around the town of Lingayen. The beaches selected by the Sixth Army for the assault possessed the additional advantages of being capacious and affording access to excellent road nets, a fair harbor at Sual, and an airstrip at Lingayen. Principal disadvantages of the chosen landing area were the rough seas that might be whipped against the unprotected southern shore of the gulf by high winds and the serious obstacle presented by the numerous swamps, fish ponds, and small streams that lie immediately inland.

Although the Japanese defenses at the head of Lingayen Gulf were all but negligible, the enemy possessed excellent north-south communications and ample troop reserves to counterattack effectively. The natural terrain compartment formed by the mountains and rivers surrounding the Central Plain would assist the defenders in any effort to contain our beachhead troops while bringing up reinforcements over the fine road net. The high, rugged terrain east and northeast of San Fabian in particular would give the enemy excellent observation and defiladed positions for artillery that would be difficult to reach with the flat-trajectory guns of our warships. To delay the arrival of reinforcements at the scene of action, guerrilla forces were ordered to sabotage the Japanese communications; and, as already pointed out, sustained air attacks were initiated prior to S-day in order to block the defiles leading into the Central Plain. Particular attention was paid to the Plaridel–Calumpit defile, the bottleneck through which passed the traffic between the Manila area and the Central Plain.

To divert the attention of the Japanese from Lingayen Gulf, General MacArthur directed the Eighth Army to carry out an elaborate cover plan with the support of appropriate air and naval elements (**Map 4**). The purpose was to create by deceptive operations a strong enemy expectation that an offensive would be launched against the western Bicol or Batangas areas of Luzon. On 1 January, with the landing of a small infantry force at Bongabong on the east coast of Mindoro, the diversionary campaign got under way. Subsequent shore-to-shore movements were employed to seize suitable objectives

in northeastern and northwestern Mindoro, and on 3 January the Marinduque Islands were captured without opposition. Aircraft cooperated by executing photographic missions and dropping dummy paratroopers over the Batangas–Bicol area. Naval forces simulated mine-sweeping and landing operations along the southern Luzon coast. Guerrillas contributed to the deceptive plan by intensified activity against Japanese communications south of Manila. While these operations were taking place, the Luzon Attack Force was steaming toward the real objective, Lingayen Gulf.

On 3 January the Third Fleet struck its first blow in support of the invasion of Luzon. Carrier-based aircraft achieved complete tactical surprise and won moderate successes in two days of attacks on Formosa and the southernmost Ryukyus.

From the rendezvous area in Leyte Gulf advance elements of the Luzon Attack Force began to move through Surigao Strait as early as 2 January. Threading their way through the inland waters, the mine-sweeping, bombardment, and escort-carrier groups formed the vanguard of the largest invasion armada yet assembled in the Pacific.

Although the Third Fleet had successfully neutralized the enemy's air strength on Formosa, the approach of the Luzon Attack Force was greeted by numerous air attacks, mainly of the suicide variety. It quickly became evident that the Japanese were committing in a last furious effort the hoarded remnants of their Philippine air garrison. On 4 January one of our escort carriers was sunk by a suicide plane off Panay. The attacks grew more severe on the following day, and four of our warships were heavily damaged. With the arrival of the advance force at Lingayen Gulf on 6 January it was found that because of our inability to secure air superiority* no preliminary bombardment of the beaches could be conducted. During the day the Japanese air offensive reached its peak, sixteen of our ships being hit.

Since the escort carriers were fully occupied at the objective area and our land-based planes were unable to neutralize completely the enemy's Luzon airfields, it was necessary to obtain additional coverage from the fast carriers of the Third Fleet. In response to a request by General MacArthur the Third Fleet on 6 January extended its attacks to include Japanese air installations as far south as Manila. On the following day the strikes were repeated, and the bombardment ships in Lingayen Gulf were able to carry out their

* Inclement weather and the low efficiency of radar equipment employed in the vicinity of high hills were important contributing causes to this failure.

missions unhampered. After 8 January the enemy attacks dwindled to mere token efforts, and it was apparent that the Japanese air force in the Philippines had been totally expended. When suicide aircraft began to appear in small numbers from bases on Formosa, General MacArthur requested the XX Bomber Command (in China) to shift its attacks to Formosa objectives. On 9 January, S-day at Lingayen, Admiral Halsey's carrier planes inflicted more damage on the enemy's Formosa installations, ending, at least temporarily, the threat of any further air offensive by the Japanese.

The attrition suffered by the Luzon Attack Force through 8 January was an impressive testimonial to the effectiveness of the enemy's suicide tactics. Altogether, three ships were sunk, thirteen sustained major damage, and fourteen received minor damage. Of these thirty vessels twenty-seven were hit by suicide planes. The success of this new form of attack led the Japanese to a radical reorganization of their entire air force, an event that was destined to have important consequences in the forthcoming battle for Okinawa.

While the battle for air superiority over Luzon was being decided in our favor, the bombardment, escort-carrier, and mine-sweeping groups of the Luzon Attack Force were busily engaged in the usual prelanding activities. On 7 and 8 January the selected landing beaches and the areas beyond were drenched by naval gunfire and air bombardment. Underwater demolition teams discovered no beach defenses or underwater obstructions, and by the 9th it was apparent that the Japanese did not intend to defend the beaches. Meanwhile the assault convoys proceeded through the Visayas and up the west coast of Luzon, reaching Lingayen Gulf early on 9 January without encountering enemy air reaction.

At J minus 2½ hours on S-day the fire-support ships commenced an intensive bombardment of the landing beaches (**Map 5**). The assault convoys arrived at their debarking points, which extended over a distance of twelve miles. Immediately prior to J-hour (0930) the naval gunfire shifted to targets inland and on the flanks of the landing area, covering the high ground, important roads, and towns. When the assault waves neared the shore, gun-, mortar-, and rocket-equipped landing craft assumed the task of neutralizing the beaches, with the assistance of low-flying carrier-based aircraft.

No opposition was met initially, and by 0940 the leading waves were ashore and pushing rapidly inland. Amphibious tractors proved to be very effective in ferrying our troops across the rice fields, fish ponds, marshes, and streams that were encountered beyond the beaches. These water obstacles were undefended by the enemy, although all bridges had been demolished. Only in the zone of the 43d

Division did any resistance develop during the day. Sporadic artillery fire from the hills fell on the division's landing beaches, and opposition was offered to the advance of one battalion that was sent northward along the coastal highway. By nightfall the Sixth Army had achieved an initial lodgement with negligible casualties. Some 68,000 men and a great quantity of supplies had been poured into a beachhead that was seventeen miles wide and up to four miles in depth.

During the two days after the initial landing the 43d was still the only division to encounter any real resistance. In the foothills east and northeast of San Fabian units of the 43d began to develop a strong network of cave positions that were fiercely defended by the enemy. On 11 January the 158th Regimental Combat Team landed in the zone of the I Corps and took over the drive up the coast toward Damortis. The 25th Division, the 13th Armored Group, and the 6th Ranger Battalion went ashore the same day, also in the zone of the I Corps.

The extent of the advance thus far exceeded the most optimistic hopes of those who had planned the Lingayen operation. The enemy's failure to oppose our landing caused a strong suspicion that a trap had been prepared, and great care was exercised not to overextend our forces. Potentially the Japanese were much stronger at Lingayen than they had been at Leyte. Almost 36,000 troops were within striking distance of the American beachhead, but General Yamashita did not feel that his forces could withstand the weight of our attack.

Whether or not the Japanese were surprised by the Lingayen assault,* the fact remains that they were totally unprepared to receive it, although they had plenty of troops available on Luzon. At the time of our landing on 9 January the enemy was in the midst of a last-minute regroupment and reorganization. Contact between units was poor, and considerable confusion existed in lower echelons as to command responsibilities. The sustained air and guerrilla attacks against lines of communication made it extremely difficult for the Japanese to move central reserves to the battle area. Although Yamashita had originally planned to establish a defensive position south of the beachhead, sufficient time was not available after the landing. Enemy movements were poorly coordinated, and offensive potentialities were not exploited. Although the Japanese held excellent defensive positions in the mountains, they could not concentrate and

* After the war Yamashita insisted that he had fully expected our forces to invade Luzon in the Lingayen area.

organize for more than extemporized local counterattacks by small units. Continuous piecemeal attacks resulted inevitably in a rapid depletion of the enemy's striking forces.

General Yamashita held little hope that he could prevent the loss of Luzon to our forces. Knowing full well the hostile attitude of the native Filipinos and conceding superiority to American air power, artillery, armor, and logistics, the Japanese commander assumed from the outset that he would meet ultimate defeat. Interpreting his mission as one of delaying action, he planned to defend Luzon by organizing strong positions in suitable isolated areas in order to force the commitment of the maximum number of American troops in protracted operations over difficult terrain. Formidable cave defense systems were constructed in three general areas: (1) the line of the Caraballo Mountains, extending from Lingayen Gulf to Baler Bay; (2) the Sierra Madre Mountains, east and northeast of Manila; and (3) the Zambales Range, west of Fort Stotsenburg. The withdrawal into these mountain fortresses was covered by extremely heavy fighting in the foothills during the entire month of January.

Once the Sixth Army was firmly established at Lingayen Gulf, the Third Fleet moved into the South China Sea (**Map 1**). It was Admiral Halsey's intention to seek out and destroy all major units of the Japanese Navy that might attempt to retain control of the sea lanes connecting the rich conquests in the south and southeast with the home islands of Japan. No important air or naval opposition was offered; and the Third Fleet secured undisputed control of the South China Sea, an accomplishment that marked the enemy's loss by default of his entire southern empire, for possession of which he had originally gone to war. On 12 January our fast carriers struck at the coast of Indo-China; and on the 15th they began two days of attacks against Hong Kong, Canton, Hainan Island, and Formosa. Rough weather prevented further strikes until 21 January, when Halsey's carrier planes returned for a two-day attack on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands. Upon the completion of this final destructive blow the Third Fleet, which had been at sea since 30 December, returned to its base at Ulithi in order to prepare for the invasion of Iwo Jima.

In the meantime the Sixth Army on Luzon was proceeding rapidly toward the accomplishment of its mission (**Map 5**). On 17 January the Lingayen airstrip was completed, and the Far Eastern Air Forces assumed responsibility for the support of ground operations. Concerned now with the defense of other strategic areas, the Japanese High Command conceded the eventual loss of Luzon and sent no fur-

ther air reinforcements to the Philippines. For the remainder of the Luzon campaign only Allied aircraft were to be seen in the skies.

As the land campaign unfolded, two completely dissimilar types of fighting were encountered by the two corps, principally because of the defensive strategy adopted by Yamashita. In contradistinction to the lack of organized resistance on the front of the XIV Corps, bitter opposition was encountered by the I Corps on its left, where strong hostile forces in the Caraballo Mountains constituted a serious threat to our base of supply at Lingayen Gulf. Until Manila, 120 miles to the south, could be captured and reestablished as a port, it was imperative that our Lingayen facilities be safeguarded.

The I Corps pressed forward vigorously to develop the enemy's main battle position. It was soon discovered that the Japanese were well emplaced in the mountains, where the superior weight of our mechanized forces and artillery was largely nullified by the rugged terrain. In the sector of the 43d Division resistance crystallized generally along the line Rosario–Pozorrubio–Binalonan. The 6th Division met its first strong opposition in the Cabaruan Hills, where a reinforced enemy battalion had dug in for a last-ditch defense. Here, as in the mountains to the north, and as in all of his defensive positions on Luzon, the enemy had built pillboxes, dugouts, and tunnels of every description. Likely approaches were covered by artillery and automatic weapons so painstakingly camouflaged that close-range scrutiny often failed to disclose them. A double envelopment by the 6th Division succeeded in isolating the force in the Cabaruan Hills; and while two battalions of the division undertook the task of eliminating the strong point, the remainder pushed on across the Agno River. It was not until 28 January, however, that the Cabaruan area was completely mopped up. About 1,400 Japanese were killed and seven taken prisoner. Our casualties totaled 279, including seventy-four killed.

During this time the 43d Division was able to make but little headway against the increasingly strong opposition it encountered in the foothills of the mountains near San Fabian. On 17 January the 25th Division, which had been in reserve, was committed between the 6th and 43d Divisions. It drove through Binalonan, where large stores of ammunition and other supplies were captured, and then pushed on to the Agno River. Meanwhile the 158th Regimental Combat Team took Damortis but was unable to break through the enemy's defenses on the commanding ground before Rosario. By 20 January the I Corps had reached the line shown on the map. At this stage of the advance we had severed all of the main north-south routes of communication except Highway 5.

The 6th Division continued its advance during the following days, meeting only sporadic resistance until it reached Highway 5. There it encountered elements of a Japanese armored division, which fought furiously to retain the last important communication line between northern and southern Luzon. But by the end of the month the 6th Division had possession of the stretch of highway north and south of Baloc and was engaged with a heavily reinforced regiment of the armored division at Munoz.

The 25th Division, in the meantime, took San Manuel in a coordinated attack that climaxed several days of savage fighting in which forty-five enemy tanks were destroyed. By 31 January the 25th had reached San Quintin.

The 32d Division, newly arrived from Leyte, entered the line on the left of the 25th on 30 January. The 32d pushed on toward San Nicolas, where one of this veteran division's most gruelling fights, the Battle of the Villa Verde Trail, was soon to begin.

Some of the most severe fighting in the I Corps zone had taken place on the extreme left flank. There the 43d Division and the 158th Regimental Combat Team had finally cleared the Damortis–Rosario road, had captured Rosario, and were probing the mountain defenses along the road to Baguio, where Yamashita had established his headquarters. The Sixth Army's beachhead was now secure against the threat of a large-scale counterattack from the north; and the I Corps began what was to be a four-month, uphill campaign against the "Yamashita Line", as the defensive position that stretched across the mountain fastnesses of central Luzon was called.

Before turning to an examination of the activities of the XIV Corps, mention should be made of the daring raid staged by 134 picked fighters of the 6th Ranger Battalion on a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp at Pangatian, northeast of Cabanatuan. Supported by guerrilla forces, the raiding party penetrated far behind the Japanese lines and struck the camp just after dark on 30 January. The enemy guards were surprised and overcome, and 512 Allied prisoners were released. Among those rescued were 486 Americans, most of them survivors of Bataan and Corregidor. Both rescuers and rescued were safely behind the American lines by daylight on the 31st, after having beaten off repeated Japanese attacks along the road back. In this action more than 200 enemy troops were killed; our losses were two killed and ten wounded.

We have seen that by the end of January most of the I Corps was engaged in mountain warfare in which mechanized forces and artillery could only occasionally be used with telling effect. The brunt

of the fighting was borne by the infantrymen, who employed mortars, automatic weapons, hand charges, and flame throwers to root out the burrowing Japanese. However, such was not the case in the zone of action of the XIV Corps. From the very beginning of its drive this corps met only scattered knots of opposition, which were soon eliminated. Even the Agno River, which it was fully expected would be defended in strength by the enemy, was crossed without a fight. The rate of advance up to 20 January, when the corps reached the line shown on the map, was largely governed by the ability of the supply services to keep pace. By that time, however, the XIV had outstripped the I Corps, which was charged with the protection of the army's left flank; and part of that task had to be assumed by General Griswold. The 37th Division was therefore halted when it reached La Paz and directed to face eastward and hold along the line Nampicuan–La Paz.

One regimental combat team of the 40th Division was protecting the right flank of the XIV Corps, which extended almost fifty miles back to Lingayen Gulf. This combat team had seized Sual on 13 January and by the 20th had sent patrols to the tip of Cape Bolinao and south along the coast to Dasol Bay. Since the Japanese had already evacuated this area, no resistance was met. Contact was made near Bolinao with elements of the 6th Ranger Battalion, which had previously landed on the islands east of the cape and had then crossed to Luzon. Thus not only had the corps been forced to divert the 37th Division to a security mission on its east flank, but it was left with only two combat teams of the 40th Division to continue its drive southward. Caution had to be exercised until the enemy situation became more clearly defined or until the I Corps could catch up. Moreover, intelligence reports indicated that strong enemy forces were probably in the Fort Stotsenburg area and in the Zambales Mountains to the west, posing a grave threat to Griswold's right flank.

By evening of 23 January the 40th Division was heavily engaged in the town of Bamban. A brief but intense skirmish, in which the enemy displayed more strength than hitherto encountered, was fought before the position was won. Patrols moved west to Camp O'Donnell, which they found deserted. Hot food still on the stove was evidence of the enemy's hasty departure. The resistance at Bamban, the hurried retreat from O'Donnell, and the caves and emplacements that were being developed in the mountains to the west made it clear that the Japanese were in force on the right flank. Since it had now been ascertained that there was no immediate danger to the left flank, and since the I Corps had resumed its advance to

the southeast, the 37th Division moved to the line La Paz–Concepcion and prepared to cross the Bamban River in force on 26 January.

It was now a question as to whether the XIV Corps should contain the enemy on its right with the 40th Division and continue its advance on Manila with the 37th or throw the entire weight of the corps against his emplacements. The possibility that a strong counterattack against the 40th, which, as stated, had only two regimental combat teams in this area, might result in cutting the line of supply as the corps moved on Manila was the basis for General Griswold's decision to attack with his entire force.

Leaving only one regimental combat team and the reconnaissance troop of the 37th Division to protect his left flank, Griswold hurled the remainder of his troops against the enemy concentration on his right. On 26 January the 37th Division launched an attack against the Clark Field–Fort Stotsenburg area. The advance over this relatively flat terrain was rapid; and the 37th soon drew abreast of the 40th Division, which had attacked on the same day in the hills north of the Bamban River. By 31 January, Clark Field, with the largest number of airstrips in the Philippines, and Fort Stotsenburg were in American hands; but the enemy was fighting desperately in his mountain defenses along the line indicated on the map.

Meanwhile the regiment that was guarding the left flank of the corps pushed troops southward. Expected Japanese resistance in the narrow corridor between the swampy area south of San Fernando and the Pampanga River failed to materialize, and Calumpit was seized without opposition. The extent of the XIV Corps' advance up to 31 January, when it redeployed its forces preliminary to its final drive on Manila, is shown on the map.

Having now been strengthened by the assignment of the veteran 1st Cavalry Division* to his command, General Griswold issued orders for the resumption of the advance to the south (**Map 6**). The 40th Division, with one regimental combat team of the 37th attached, was directed to clear the enemy from the high ground west of Fort Stotsenburg. The 37th Division, less one combat team, and the 1st Cavalry Division were ordered to seize the line Malolos–Sibul Springs–Cabanatuan and be prepared to advance promptly on Manila. This redirection of the XIV Corps' main effort toward the capital of Luzon while considerable enemy strength was still in the mountains on the right flank was part of a Sixth Army plan that also provided for two additional landing operations by American troops.

On 29 January, Major General Charles P. Hall's XI Corps, com-

* This division had landed on Luzon on 27 January.

prising the 38th Division, reinforced, and the 34th Regimental Combat Team (24th Division), landed on the west coast of Luzon in the San Antonio–San Felipe area. The landings were unopposed, the total absence of enemy forces making even the usual preliminary naval bombardment unnecessary. The XI Corps had been assigned three missions: (1) to seize the airfield east of San Marcelino; (2) to secure the naval base at Olongapo; (3) to seal off Bataan from northern Luzon in order to prevent the withdrawal of enemy forces into the peninsula. San Marcelino and its airfield were captured the first day, and Olongapo fell to the 34th Regimental Combat Team on 30 January.* On the latter date troops occupied Grande Island without a struggle, making our control of Subic Bay complete. By the 31st the XI Corps had redisposed its troops for a drive across the base of the Bataan Peninsula and the accomplishment of its third mission. The situation of the enemy forces in the Zambales Mountains was deteriorating rapidly into one of complete isolation. For this reason the XIV Corps could well afford to withdraw part of its troops from the Fort Stotsenburg area and resume its advance southward.

Another landing operation that affected the action of the XIV Corps took place south of Manila Bay. On 31 January two regiments of the 11th Airborne Division, under the command of Major General Joseph M. Swing, landed near Nasugbu. Originally planned as a reconnaissance in force, the operation became a full-scale invasion after the leading elements ashore seized their objectives without opposition. By evening the troops had consolidated their position and were prepared to move eastward toward Lake Taal and the excellent highway system that leads north to Manila. Our forces were now committed to an advance on that city from both north and south. The situation was not without danger, however, for unless the XIV Corps moved on Manila without delay, the 11th Airborne Division** might find itself opposed by overwhelming force.

Map 7 shows the general situation on Luzon on 31 January, only twenty-two days after General Krueger's troops landed at Lingayen Gulf. During those three weeks of fighting over 15,000 Japanese had been killed and 586 captured. American casualties had totaled 5,754, including 1,297 killed and 220 carried as missing.***

* The XI Corps, which had been under Eighth Army control during the landing phase, was assigned to the Sixth Army on 30 January.

** This division remained under Eighth Army control until 10 February.

*** Casualties suffered by both sides during each month of the fighting on Luzon are listed in Appendix 1.

After the landing our air and naval forces continued to support the ground troops on Luzon. Out of a total of 7,717 sorties flown in the entire Southwest Pacific Area during January 2,552 were directed at Luzon. Over 2,200 tons of bombs were dropped on various targets on the island. Our Navy carried out many important missions during the month, but its most signal accomplishment was the landing of ten combat divisions and thousands of other troops without the loss of a single transport or cargo ship.

On the night of 31 January–1 February the drive on Manila by the XIV Corps began in full force (**Map 6**). Shortly after midnight the 1st Cavalry Division marched on Cabanatuan, where the important bridge across the Pampanga River was captured before the enemy could destroy it. Sending out detachments to protect its left flank, the division hurried southward to join in the attack on Manila; and by the evening of 2 February it had reached the Bustos–Santa Maria area. A detachment made contact with elements of the 37th Division that had advanced from Calumpit. The intermediate objective assigned the two divisions—the line Malolos–Sibul Springs–Cabanatuan—had been reached. On this date General Krueger ordered the XIV Corps to capture Manila and secure the line Cavite–Taytay–Antipolo–Montalban.

Enemy strength in greater Manila was estimated to be 18,000. It was a heterogeneous group, about three-fourths of which was Navy personnel. Since he had anticipated that American forces would invade by way of southern Luzon, Rear Admiral Mitsuji Iwafuchi, the commander of the garrison, found his organized positions facing the wrong way when the 1st Cavalry and 37th Divisions moved into Manila from the north. The defenders, however, fought with a stubbornness born of frustration, which further manifested itself in the ruthless destruction of property and the inhuman treatment accorded the inhabitants of Manila.

Word had been received that several thousand American citizens and Allied subjects were interned at the University of Santo Tomas in Manila, and it was also understood that there might be others at Malacanan Palace (**Map 8**). The mission of rescuing these internees was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division, which organized a "flying column" of two motorized squadrons for the purpose. At dawn on 3 February these squadrons left Santa Maria, dashed across the bridge at Novaliches, and sped on to Manila, the outskirts of which were reached about 1830 hours. The enemy's resistance during the advance to Manila was negligible, but within the city it stiffened. A night attack on the university gained a measure of surprise, and our troops succeeded in liberating all but 300 of the internees. The

latter were being held as hostages in one of the buildings by an enemy force of about the same number. As the result of unprecedented negotiations the hostages were released without harm on 4 February in exchange for the safe-conduct of the Japanese force to the outskirts of Manila. Some 3,500 internees were liberated at Santo Tomas, but a detachment that had been sent to seize Malacanan Palace found no prisoners there.

Meanwhile the remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division, less one regiment left behind to protect its rear, began to close in the Novaliches area. Early on the morning of the 4th the enemy had succeeded in destroying the bridge at Novaliches, over which the "flying column" had passed en route to Manila. The next day, after detaching another regiment to secure the Novaliches Dam and the Balara Filters and to protect the division's left flank, the remainder of the troops moved on Manila. That night the division, less the two regiments left behind, was in the Santo Tomas–Malacanan Palace area.

The 37th Division, brought to full strength by the release of its regiment previously attached to the 40th Division, also moved south on the morning of 3 February. Improvised rafts and amphibious tractors were used to ferry the troops across the numerous streams, all of the bridges having been destroyed by the enemy. Stiff resistance that developed in the vicinity of Polo was by-passed by the leading elements, which pushed on and reached Bilibid Prison on the evening of the 4th. Over 1,000 prisoners, who had been abandoned by their jailers, were found there.

During the following two days the smoke and flame from buildings being demolished by the Japanese slowed the advance of the 37th Division. So also did some of the enemy's previously prepared strong points, against which it was necessary to use tanks. On 7 February the 37th took over that part of the front held by the 1st Cavalry Division in the vicinity of Malacanan Palace. The 37th was then holding the line of the Pasig River from Manila Bay to the palace and had started to cross the Pasig east of the latter point. Good use was made of amphibious tractors in this crossing.

It had been hoped that the Japanese would withdraw from Manila without destroying it, and restrictions on the use of our artillery had been imposed in order to lessen the damage and to avoid killing or injuring Filipino civilians. However, the enemy's barbarous intentions were clearly defined by the burning city and by the reports of atrocities being committed against noncombatants. Most of our restrictions on the use of artillery were then lifted, and the bitter fight for the capital began in earnest.

On 7 February, after their relief by the 37th Division, the two regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division in the Santo Tomas–Malacanan Palace area moved eastward into the division's newly assigned zone of action to begin an envelopment of Manila. By the 11th the leading squadrons, in a night crossing, had seized a bridgehead across the Pasig River without opposition and had made contact on their right with elements of the 37th Division that on 7 February had crossed the river just east of Malacanan Palace.

We have seen that two regiments of the 11th Airborne Division landed south of Manila on 31 January (**Map 6**). The next day they drove eastward toward Tagaytay and the commanding ridge of the same name. On 3 February the parachute regiment was dropped on the ridge and secured that important terrain objective. The division then reorganized and pushed northward along the highway to Manila. Resistance en route was meager, coming chiefly from small detachments—apparently suicide squads—guarding bridges and other key points along the highway. But at Paranaque the opposition stiffened, and the airborne infantrymen's advance was slowed (**Map 8**). Continued pressure drove the enemy back to the Nichols Field area, where he had constructed permanent emplacements of concrete and steel, known as the "Genko Line," in anticipation of General MacArthur's main drive on Manila being made from the south. By early morning of 10 February the 11th Airborne Division had reached the line shown on the map.* On that date an attack was launched against the "Genko Line"; but the division was able to gain only a few hundred yeards against the stubborn enemy, who had ringed his emplacements with liberal quantities of mines and, in addition to numerous smaller-caliber automatic weapons, had installed 20- and 40-mm. guns and even 6-inch naval guns. On the 11th, during a lull in the fighting, contact was made with the 1st Cavalry Division, to the north. The next day the attack on Nichols Field was renewed after an effective air strike by Navy scout bombers. By 1600 hours the administration building was in our hands. Nichols Field was completely cleared the next day, and by the 14th the division was holding the line shown. Cavite, site of our prewar naval base, had been seized on the 13th.

Meanwhile the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team** had been attached to the 1st Cavalry Division and had taken over the task of protecting the northern part of the line of communication.

* This division, which had operated under Eighth Army control, passed to control of the Sixth Army on 10 February and was attached to the XIV Corps.

** This nondivisional unit landed on Luzon on 27 January.

Three other squadrons were posted for protection against a possible attack from the hills east of Marikina, and another was dispatched to contain the enemy at Fort McKinley. The units of the division south of the Pasig River advanced rapidly to the southwest, overrunning Neilson Field and breaking through to the shore of Manila Bay on 11 February. The Japanese within the capital were now completely hemmed in. The map shows the line of contact on 14 February in the zones of action of both the 37th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions.

At this stage the enemy had been compressed into an area small enough to require the attention of only a part of the XIV Corps, and a new distribution of forces was effected. The 37th Division, with the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division attached, was assigned the mission of clearing the rest of the city. The remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to seize Fort McKinley and to push across the Marikina River to develop the enemy's defenses in the hills to the east. These two operations were in preparation for the accomplishment of the second mission of the corps, which, as previously noted, was to secure the line Cavite–Taytay–Antipolo–Montalban. Large-caliber naval guns and long-range artillery emplaced along what was known as the "Shimbu Line" had already been employed by the enemy to interdict roads and destroy installations in rear of our east-flank security forces. The 6th Division, which had been transferred from the I to the XIV Corps, was to assist the 1st Cavalry Division in its task. The 11th Airborne Division, after supporting the cavalry division's attack on Fort McKinley, was to drive through to the northwestern shore of Laguna de Bay and then turn southward.

In Manila the fighting continued from house to house and street to street. Most of it followed the same pattern: A strongly fortified structure was first subjected to point-blank artillery fire from pieces ranging in size from 75-mm. guns to 155-mm. howitzers; troops would then assault the building, using small arms, grenades, flame throwers, and drums of gasoline ignited by thermite. Some structures, particularly the larger public buildings, lent themselves well to the role of individual fortresses; and it sometimes required more than a day of continuous fighting to reduce one. Our troops progressed steadily despite these strong points; and by 22 February, after a fierce seven-day struggle for the University of the Philippines, the Japanese had been forced back into the small area shown on the map. The core of their defense was now the Intramuros (the medieval Walled City) and a small area to the south that embraced most of the modern fireproof Government buildings.

The walls of the Intramuros were sixteen feet high, about forty feet thick at the base, and tapered to a width of about twenty feet at the top. It was known that many nonbelligerents were within the perimeter, the majority of whom were women and children. As early as 16 February, when it became apparent that the final struggle for Manila would take place there, a message was broadcast in Japanese offering an honorable surrender and requesting that, in any event, all civilians be evacuated. When this message went unheeded, plans were immediately formulated for the assault. Artillery fire was directed on targets such as observation posts and mortar and artillery emplacements. Under cover of this fire 155-mm. and 8-inch howitzers were moved into position. The centuries-old stone ramparts were breached in two places, one on the north side and the other on the east. During the night of 22-23 February all available artillery, including tank destroyers and medium tanks, was concentrated north and east of the Intramuros. At 0730 the next morning all weapons opened up and continued to fire for one hour, after which the troops of the 37th Division promptly moved forward to the assault under cover of a dense smoke screen.

Little opposition was met at the walls by either the troops on the north, who crossed the Pasig in assault boats, or those who attacked from the east. But once inside the walls, the most savage kind of house-to-house and floor-to-floor fighting took place. One by one the ruined buildings, ancient dungeons, and numerous tunnels and recesses that harbored the enemy were turned into deathtraps by hand grenades, flame throwers, and gasoline poured down into holes and ignited. Progress was delayed while some 2,000 refugees streamed out, but by noon of the 25th the entire area of the Walled City was held by American troops.

The 1st Brigade Combat Team, assisted later by a regiment of the 37th Division, operated outside the Intramuros, attacking northward along the shore of Manila Bay. Its zone included the area occupied by the Government buildings. Here the struggle was no less fierce, the large steel and concrete structures proving to be formidable strong points. For nine days the fighting moved from building to building and room to room. Finally, on 4 March, the last building was cleared; and Manila, which had cost the Japanese 16,665 counted dead, was completely in American hands.

East of the capital Fort McKinley was overrun on 19 February. The next day the 1st Cavalry Division (less the brigade attached to the 37th Division in Manila) pushed across the Marikina River to develop the enemy's positions in the Sierra Madre Mountains. The 6th Division, which had moved into the line on the 18th, joined in

this eastward advance. Japanese outposts along the Marikina were quickly driven back, and both divisions crossed without difficulty. By 22 February the 1st Cavalry Division had secured Taytay, and two days later the 6th Division entered Montalban. Resistance grew increasingly strong in the foothills of the mountains. Artillery, rocket, and mortar fire from the heavily wooded slopes and ravines harassed our troops as they moved slowly forward over the rough terrain to secure the approaches to the enemy's main line of defense.

After Manila had been secured on 4 March, the 1st Brigade Combat Team rested and reorganized for two days and then moved east to rejoin the 1st Cavalry Division. By that time the enemy's defensive position had been clearly defined (**Map 6**). The "Shimbu Line," extending from Antipolo to Mount Oro, was occupied by an estimated 13,000 Japanese troops, while north of Mount Oro another 7,000 manned an independently organized defensive position in the Ipo area. These forces comprised elements of two combat divisions that had been withdrawn from the region south of Manila during January and reinforced by a miscellaneous assortment of air, service, and naval units.

General Griswold decided to attack the "Shimbu Line" and ordered an offensive for 8 March in which the 1st Cavalry Division was to make the main effort (**Map 8**). For two days our planes bombed the enemy's positions, dropping about 500 tons of missiles. Strongly supported by artillery and aircraft, the attack was launched at 0630 on the 8th. The 6th Division met with only light resistance until the main defenses were reached two days later. The 1st Cavalry Division's attack centered on the hill masses controlling the approaches to Antipolo. The Japanese fought fiercely to hold these positions, displaying a suicidal tenacity that baffled all understanding. Although an occasional counterattack was made, on the whole they seemed content to remain in their many elaborately equipped and well-supplied caves until they were destroyed by flame throwers or forced into open areas where our automatic weapons could cut them down. From one such cave, after flame throwers had been used, came more than a hundred Japanese, each carrying a rifle or submachine gun. They continued to fire until they fell victims to the flames or to our weapons. One hundred and forty-seven dead were found in front of the cave and many more inside. Antipolo was captured on the 12th; and the advance continued eastward over the series of parallel ridges that, like stairs, ascend to the crest of the Sierra Madres.

On 12 March the 43d Division (less one regimental combat team) began to relieve the depleted 1st Cavalry Division, which was sent

to a rest area. The 6th and 43d Divisions continued the drive eastward on the 14th and by nightfall had reached the line shown on the map. On 15 March both divisions were transferred to the control of the XI Corps, which now took over the responsibility for the attack against the Shimbu defenders. The XIV Corps prepared to devote all its effort to a newly assigned mission, that of opening Batangas Bay and completing the clearing of southern Luzon, where the 11th Airborne Division had already made considerable progress.

After the capture of Fort McKinley on 19 February the 11th Airborne Division had driven eastward to the shores of Laguna de Bay and had then turned south (**Map 6**). It was given the dual mission of rescuing some 2,000 civilian internees at Los Banos, on the southern shore of Laguna de Bay, and of destroying enemy forces that had been by-passed west of the lake during the division's rapid advance on Manila.

Assisted by a parachute company that was dropped near the internment camp, a special task force liberated the internees at Los Banos. The remainder of the 11th Airborne Division—with the help of the 158th Regimental Combat Team, which had been transferred on 5 March from Sixth Army reserve to the XIV Corps*—mopped up enemy resistance in the areas north, west, and south of Lake Taal. By 15 March it had reached the line shown.

In its advance from Lingayen Gulf the XIV Corps had exacted a heavy toll of the enemy. Japanese known dead numbered more than 32,000. The corps' own casualties included 1,340 killed.

During February the XIV Corps' other division, the 40th, continued to press westward against the approximately 15,000 enemy in the Zambales Mountains. Progress was slow over this exceedingly difficult terrain, where the diligent Japanese had constructed a network of pillboxes, trenches, and caves. Restrictions imposed by the terrain and the necessity of protecting the corps supply line from attack prevented the 40th Division from maneuvering against the enemy. Consequently the division's only recourse was to attack frontally, and the Japanese strong points were methodically wiped out one by one. Gradually the defenders were forced back from the hills that commanded Fort Stotsenburg and Clark Field, without our troops going so far afield that an enemy counterthrust elsewhere could not be promptly met. At the same time 40th Division patrols were active both north and south of the Fort Stotsenburg area, and on 5 February contact was made with the XI Corps at Dinalupihan.

* The same army order detached the 37th Division from the XIV Corps and gave it the task of garrisoning Manila under the direct control of the Sixth Army.

By 14 February the 40th Division, aided by daily air strikes, had forced the enemy back to the line shown on the map. Although the yardage it had gained was small, the division had secured the high ground commanding Fort Stotsenburg and Clark Field, had greatly reduced the threat to the line of communication of the XIV Corps, and had inflicted severe losses on the Japanese. A total of 5,837 enemy dead had been counted during the fighting around Fort Stotsenburg, of which number the 40th Division had been credited with more than 4,400 by the time it was transferred from the XIV to the XI Corps on 21 February. In addition, the division had captured large quantities of enemy equipment.

Let us now return to the XI Corps, which on 1 February started its drive eastward to seal off the base of the Bataan Peninsula. Advancing from Olongapo along the highway to Dinalupihan, the 38th Division met strong resistance at Zigzag Pass. Here for a distance of eight miles the highway, in a series of loops and hairpin curves, winds its way around and between hills which completely dominate it. The Japanese had constructed a network of mutually supporting strong points, each designed to provide an all-around defense. Excellently camouflaged artillery pieces and mortars had been carefully registered on predetermined key targets.* Antitank guns were sited to cover effectively the few practicable routes for tanks.

Against this well-prepared position the 38th Division initially made but little progress, although suffering heavy casualties. One regiment of the division was sent to envelop the enemy by a trail on the north flank. This trail, known only to native guides, crossed a series of heavily wooded ridges and ravines. All equipment had to be carried by hand and supply maintained by air. On 5 February, after an exhausting march over the mountains, the regiment arrived at Dinalupihan, where, as previously noted, contact was made with patrols of the 40th Division. After dispatching a detachment down the highway to Orani, the regiment reversed its direction and on the 7th attacked westward toward Zigzag Pass.

At the same time the other two regimental combat teams of the 38th Division attacked from the west. But, as had been anticipated, the defenses were not easy to overcome. Repeated attacks were necessary, and it was not until 14 February that the highway was opened.**

* On Luzon as elsewhere, however, Japanese methods of fire control were inadequate for the employment of mass fires.

** One of the 38th Division's regimental combat teams, the 151st, was withdrawn on 11 February and sent to Olongapo to prepare for a landing at Mariveles.

Even before the last of the Japanese were eliminated at Zigzag Pass, the XI Corps had started operations designed to clear the Bataan Peninsula. On 13 February the 1st Regimental Combat Team of the 6th Division passed to control of the XI Corps and began to move down the east coast of Bataan. By the night of the 14th, Pilar had been seized without difficulty. Early on 15 February the 151st Regimental Combat Team, reinforced, landed at Mariveles behind a curtain of naval gunfire and air bombardment. The two forces on Bataan made contact near Limay on the 18th, and all organized resistance on Bataan had vanished by the 20th.

Corregidor, too, was being assaulted at this time, as part of the plan for opening Manila Bay to our shipping. On 16 February one battalion* of the force which had landed at Mariveles the day before took off from that point and landed on the south shore of the island. Its assault was closely coordinated with that of the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team, which had been flown up from Mindoro and dropped on Corregidor two hours earlier.

This assault on the island fortress had been preceded by a long and intense air and naval bombardment. General Kenney's planes had made the island a target for daily air attacks for over three weeks prior to the landings and on D-day had dropped 185 tons of bombs. Warships of the Seventh Fleet had taken Corregidor and other island forts in Manila Bay under fire as early as the 13th and had continued to shell them at intervals until the landings were made.

By afternoon of the first day the water-borne and airborne troops on Corregidor had joined hands, and before the next dawn they had split the island in two. The defenders, dazed by the bombardments and completely surprised by the paratroops, offered only spotty initial resistance. They soon rallied, however, and from caves, tunnels, and concrete mortar pits put up a determined defense. Having suffered very heavy casualties, the battalion making the original seaborne assault was relieved by a battalion of the 38th Division on 24 February; and after four more days of fighting the last organized resistance was wiped out. On 27 February, Corregidor was once again in our hands, although weeks later individual Japanese were still being flushed from their hiding places. The recapture of the fortress cost us 209 killed, 725 wounded, and nineteen missing. Enemy casualties were 4,497 dead and nineteen prisoners.

While operations in southern Bataan and on Corregidor were taking place, there was also some activity in the mountainous region north of the Bataan Peninsula. By 25 February the 40th Division,

* Part of the 34th Regimental Combat Team.

with the aid of rather large-scale air operations, had broken the back of organized resistance west of Fort Stotsenburg; but strong remnants of the Japanese force still remained in the area east of Mount Pinatubo, as shown on the map.*

Meanwhile the I Corps, which was being employed to fend off the Japanese in the Caraballo Mountains while the XIV Corps was making its dash for Manila, was successfully carrying out its mission (**Map 9**). General Krueger ordered the I Corps to attack southeastward on 1 February for the purpose of capturing San Jose and securing the line Cabanatuan–Bongabon–Rizal. The seizure of these objectives would cut the last line of communication between enemy forces in northern Luzon and the Central Plain, thus removing the threat of a large-scale counterattack against the left flank of the Sixth Army.

The 6th Division, charged with making the principal effort, pushed forward on the right flank of the corps. The Japanese garrison at Munoz, reinforced by tanks, offered a fanatical resistance. While one regiment of the 6th Division applied frontal pressure, another enveloped the town from the northeast. The remainder of the division by-passed Munoz to the south and drove for San Jose. By 6 February, San Jose had fallen; and the enemy's last major exit from the Caraballo Mountains had been sealed. During the night of 6-7 February the Japanese garrison at Munoz attempted to withdraw toward San Jose, but our troops intercepted the column and annihilated it. Munoz was secured on the following morning, and other 6th Division troops occupied Rizal without opposition. Bongabon was captured on the 8th, and strong detachments were pushed out to the east. When patrols reached the east coast of Luzon in mid-February, the Japanese forces in the north were definitely separated from those in the area east of Manila.

In the meantime the 25th Division had been engaged in a bitter struggle to capture Lupao and the road leading southeast toward San Jose. On 8 February, Lupao was finally occupied; and the 25th Division joined with the 6th in mopping up the last of the enemy in that part of the Central Plain lying within the I Corps zone of action. In the many small battles that had taken place in this area during early February the Japanese had wasted their entire 2d Armored Division

* On 2 March the 43d Division completed relief of the 40th Division, the latter having been assigned to the Eighth Army for duty in the western Visayas. On 11 March, as we have seen, the 43d, less one regimental combat team, was detached from the XI Corps and sent to the XIV Corps, east of Manila. The 38th Division, reinforced by the combat team left behind by the 43d, assumed control of operations in the Stotsenburg area. The combat team of the 43d Division rejoined the division on 31 March.

in piecemeal commitments. Nothing now remained for the enemy but to go on the defensive in the Caraballo Mountains.

At this time the I Corps initiated preparations for an all-out offensive to destroy hostile forces in the mountains of northern Luzon and to force an entrance into the Cagayan Valley. The 33d Division arrived on Luzon on 10 February and relieved the 43d Division and the 158th Regimental Combat Team* in the Rosario area. The 32d Division was strengthened for a continuation of its drive up the Villa Verde Trail, and the 25th Division relieved the 6th** of its responsibility on the right flank of the corps.

By 22 February the I Corps had begun a methodical, relentless advance to drive in the defenders blocking the approaches to the enemy's mountain stronghold. The 25th Division initiated an attack northward toward Balete Pass, advancing in two columns, one up Highway 5 and the other up the valley of the Pampanga River. The division seized Carranglan on 26 February and Digdig on 3 March. By 15 March it had reached the line shown.

Forming the left arm of a pincers closing on Balete Pass, the 32d Division drove up the tortuous Villa Verde Trail toward Imugan. Extremely rugged terrain combined with a fanatical enemy resistance to make the advance slow and costly. Profiting from their central position in the Santa Fe area, the Japanese shifted reinforcements at will between Highway 5 and the Villa Verde Trail. While the bulk of the 32d Division slugged it out with the enemy for possession of the back door to Balete Pass, one battalion, operating to secure the left flank, advanced as far as Teb-bo.

As the right wing of the I Corps pressed vigorously forward, the 33d Division, on the left flank, conducted operations to improve its position preparatory to a full-scale drive on Baguio. Night attacks with limited objectives were frequently employed, which in many instances succeeded in easily destroying Japanese strong points that previously had withstood repeated daylight assaults. By 15 March the 33d had driven the enemy back from the high ground dominating the road net in the vicinity of Rosario and had pushed three columns northward, one up the coastal road toward Bauang and two toward Baguio. Meanwhile guerrilla forces, operating behind the enemy lines, seized control of the northwest coast of Luzon except for a few major Japanese strongholds.

* Sent to the XI and XIV Corps, respectively, as already noted.

** As we have seen, the 1st Regimental Combat Team was sent to the XI Corps for employment on Bataan during the period 13-23 February. The bulk of the 6th Division was attached to the XIV Corps, east of Manila, on 17 February.

Although weeks of fighting along this northern front had produced no impressive gains, the continuous offensive action of the I Corps had forced General Yamashita to remain on the defensive. Because of the constant pressure maintained by our forces it was impossible for the Japanese commander to organize a coordinated counteroffensive against the left flank of the Sixth Army, a plan of action that General Krueger feared and that, as was learned later, the enemy seriously considered. Even so, the Japanese held every advantage of terrain; and many more weeks were to elapse before the "Yamashita Line" was finally to be broken through.

Map 10 shows the general situation on Luzon on 15 March. The enemy was now divided into three isolated major groups, enabling the Sixth Army to conduct simultaneously three separate corps operations with all the advantages of interior lines and possession of the initiative. In the north the I Corps faced the strongest body of opposition, some 100,000 troops firmly established in the Caraballo Mountains. The XI Corps, now responsible for the central part of the island (Manila excluded), operated primarily to liquidate the 20,000 enemy troops in the mountain area east of Manila. In southern Luzon the XIV Corps prepared to clear the Batangas–Bicol area of the estimated 16,000 Japanese scattered about there.

Communications between the northern and southern flanks of the area held by the Sixth Army were rapidly undergoing improvement. Roads and railroads were being repaired, and good work was being done on the replacement of bridges that had been destroyed by the enemy in his withdrawal. General MacArthur established an advance echelon of his headquarters in devastated Manila. The 37th Division, directly under control of the Sixth Army, garrisoned the capital; and great efforts were made to restore order and maintain the health and safety of the civilian population. The clearing of Manila Harbor and the restoration of its dock facilities also moved forward at a swift pace, and the problem of supplying our widely dispersed forces on Luzon was soon simplified by the full use of this fine centrally located port.*

Thus far in the Luzon campaign the Japanese had lost 85,492 known dead; some 1,400 had been taken prisoner. Sixth Army casualties totaled 18,579, including 3,813 killed. General Yamashita had expected that his forces defending the important mountain areas

* A total of about 10,000 tons per day was passing through the port by 15 March. The clearing of the harbor and the repair of the piers was one of the most extensive salvage tasks undertaken in any theater during the war. By the end of April 195 sunken vessels had been raised from the bottom of the bay.

of Luzon would make American troops pay a high price for every advance, but up to this time the expenditure of Japanese troops had been considerably greater than was warranted by the results achieved.

In southern Luzon the XIV Corps reorganized and regrouped preparatory to the final clearing of that portion of the island. On 23 March the 1st Cavalry Division completed relief of the 11th Airborne in the area north of Lake Taal. The 158th Regimental Combat Team was withdrawn for a new landing operation, and the 11th Airborne sideslipped to a newly assigned zone south of Lake Taal. Bypassing a Japanese mountain stronghold east of the lake, the two divisions drove to a junction at Lipa on 30 March. It quickly became evident that the enemy was incapable of a coordinated defense of the area or a large-scale counterattack. While elements of the 11th Airborne Division remained behind to mop up the Japanese pocket near Lake Taal, the rest of the XIV Corps drove swiftly eastward.

Meanwhile the 158th Regimental Combat Team, now directly under Sixth Army Headquarters, prepared for a shore-to-shore operation against Legaspi in order to secure the northern exits of San Bernardino Strait, in conjunction with an Eighth Army operation designed to secure the southern exits. The successful accomplishment of this project would open up a short water route of communication to Luzon and the Visayas. On 1 April the 158th Regimental Combat Team landed at Legaspi and soon overran southeastern Luzon. The 158th passed to control of the XIV Corps on 22 April, by which date an early junction between the troops advancing northward up the peninsula and those moving southeastward from Batangas seemed sure.

In the meantime the XIV Corps continued its drive eastward across southern Luzon. Elements of the 11th Airborne Division captured Tiaong on 4 April and joined hands again with the 1st Cavalry Division, isolating a strong enemy force in the mountain area just west of the town. Leaving sufficient troops to mop up the Japanese pocket of resistance, both American divisions raced eastward, completing another double envelopment at Lucban on 9 April. Two days later the 1st Cavalry Division occupied Mauban, and the 11th Airborne entered Antimonan. The latter division then assumed the task of mopping up the overrun areas, while the former (less detachments) was redisposed for a drive southeastward down the Bicol Peninsula. By 1 May the 1st Cavalry Division had effected a junction with the 158th Regimental Combat Team a few miles south of Naga, and only scattered enemy forces remained to be mopped up in the peninsula. On the same date the strong Japanese pocket west of Tiaong was reduced, marking the last major resistance in this area.

Elements of the 1st Cavalry Division that had been left in the area adjoining Lamon Bay seized Infanta on 24 May. On 1 June the corps commander advised General Krueger that organized resistance no longer existed in his zone of operations. The number of Japanese killed up to this time by the XIV Corps in southern Luzon totaled 14,530. In addition, many others met their death at the hands of guerrillas, a large number of whom had been employed by the corps.*

In central Luzon the XI Corps also made good progress (**Map 6**). While the 6th and 43d Divisions continued to drive the enemy farther back into the mountains east of Manila, the 38th Division broke the last organized enemy resistance in the Zambales Mountains, mopped up the Bataan Peninsula, and seized the remaining island forts in Manila Bay. Resistance on one of these islands, El Fraile (on which Fort Drum is located), was overcome in a unique manner. It will be recalled that this concrete fort is similar in shape to a battleship. Troops were landed on the "deck" by means of an ingenious drawbridge mounted on a landing ship. After the top of the fort had been seized, a mixture of gasoline and oil was pumped down the ventilators into the lower chambers and then ignited. The resulting fires and explosions destroyed the entire enemy garrison.

At the end of April the 6th and 38th Divisions exchanged zones of action, and the latter division joined with the 43d in attacking the Shimbu forces east of Manila (**Map 10**).** Noteworthy events in what was a dogged, bitter struggle for the almost inaccessible ridges and peaks of the Sierra Madre Mountains were the use of searchlights for battlefield illumination, supply by air, and the effective close support rendered by American combat planes. The use of searchlights in this manner was indeed an innovation. At night the lights were set up at points within the defensive perimeter from which they could illuminate the possible enemy routes of approach. They were thus employed on six successive nights by the 43d Division to expose Japanese troops attempting to infiltrate into its position.

* On 15 June, XIV Corps Headquarters and certain corps troops were ordered to move to San Jose, north of Cabanatuan, and prepare for operations against the enemy in northern Luzon.

** In mid-April the 6th Division exchanged one regimental combat team with the 37th Division, then garrisoning Manila. When the 6th was transferred north, the attached combat team was left behind to reinforce the 38th Division. A regrouping of forces east of Manila saw the 43d Division take over the northern part of the front, while the 38th sideslipped to the south to replace it. The 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team, which all along had been screening the northern flank, was shifted to the southern flank.

Constant pressure by the XI Corps gradually forced the weakened Japanese to relinquish their original "Shimbu Line" positions one by one and fall back toward the coast. By 1 July they had withdrawn to the line shown on the map. In the general regroupment of American forces that became effective on that date only the 38th Division was kept in the area east of Manila to continue the fight there against the enemy's isolated troops. The division was still engaged in that task when hostilities ceased on 15 August.

In northern Luzon the I Corps was fighting in mid-March along the line shown **(Map 9)**. The 33d Division made only small gains during the remainder of the month in its attack toward Baguio; but the column moving up the coast seized Bauang in a night attack and pushed on to San Fernando, where contact with the Northern Luzon Guerrilla Force was made on 20 March. An advance was then begun eastward along the Bauang–Baguio road. Between 26 March and 11 April the 37th Division, less one regimental combat team,* joined the I Corps in the Bauang area. Thus augmented, the left wing continued the advance on Baguio while slowly clearing the mountains on either side of the road. Heavily bombarded by aircraft and massed artillery, the enemy's defenses around the former summer capital crumbled; and the 37th and 33d Divisions, led by tanks that with great effort were moved through the mountains, converged on the city. Baguio was entered on 27 April with practically no opposition. The I Corps then concentrated its efforts at Balete Pass.

After taking Sapit in late March, the 32d Division turned the control of that area over to newly organized units of the Philippine Army and then continued its main effort along the Villa Verde Trail toward Imugan. The entire month of April was spent in reducing organized enemy positions on the ridges some two to three miles west of that town.

South of Balete Pass the 25th Division faced the same problems of terrain and enemy defenses. During March the division moved forward ten miles in an advance that necessitated the construction of more than 130 miles of mountain roads and trails. Progress along Highway 5 was made possible only by the seizure of commanding terrain by columns operating in the mountains east of the road. In May, however, the constant pounding broke Japanese resistance at Balete; and the pass was seized on the 13th. Fourteen days later Santa Fe fell to the 25th Division; and on the 28th contact was made with the 32d Division, which had taken Imugan earlier in the day.

* As already noted, the detached combat team was sent to the front east of Manila. It did not rejoin the division until 2 June.

The 32d Division's long struggle up the Villa Verde Trail had occupied Japanese forces that might otherwise have been employed against the 25th and had contributed materially to our success in opening Balete Pass. It was, however, a gruelling climb in which every step had to be won against determined defenders. The capture of Imugan culminated an advance of 6,000 yards in a period of thirteen weeks, during which 214 enemy caves were sealed by our troops. Almost 9,000 Japanese died in the defense of the trail; and the 32d Division suffered a total of 3,473 battle casualties, including about 900 killed.

On 31 May the 37th Division, which early in the month had been withdrawn from the Baguio area in order to be available for the exploitation of a breakthrough on the right flank of the corps, passed through the 25th Division and took up the pursuit of the retreating enemy. Smashing through incomplete defenses at Aritao, the 37th seized Bayombong on 7 June. Thenceforth its rapid drive northward was virtually uncontested (**Map 10**). At Tuguegarao, which was reached on 25 June, the division joined hands with guerrilla forces that had been battling the Japanese for three days for possession of the town.

The Northern Luzon Guerrilla Force had long since cleared the northwestern coast of Luzon, and by early June it controlled practically all of the territory north of Bontoc and west of the Cagayan River valley. On 21 June a combined force of guerrillas and American Rangers seized Aparri, and two days later a reinforced parachute battalion of the 11th Airborne Division was dropped near that town. The paratroopers immediately pushed southward toward Tuguegarao and on 26 June met elements of the 37th Division moving north from there. The Japanese forces in northern Luzon were now split into two main groups. One group had taken refuge in the mountains in northeastern Luzon, and the other had been isolated in the Kiangan area and was already being attacked.

The 6th Division, less one regimental combat team, was brought up and on 12 June relieved elements of the 37th Division in the Bayombong area. Advancing northwestward, the division, in conjunction with attacks by the 33d Division (later replaced by the 32d Division) in the west and guerrilla forces in the north, began the task of reducing the Kiangan pocket. Its greatest advances were scored along the road to Kiangan, where Yamashita's headquarters was located.

The spectacular drive into the Cagayan Valley in June by the I Corps was a fitting climax to the Sixth Army's last offensive on Luzon and, as later events proved, its final combat operation of the

war. While capitalizing on the enemy's disintegrating defenses in their respective areas, both the Sixth and Eighth Armies regrouped their forces during June in preparation for major command changes that became effective on 1 July.* On that date the Eighth Army assumed responsibility for all of the Philippines; and the Sixth Army initiated a program of regrouping, rehabilitation, and retraining in preparation for an invasion of Japan.

The 6th, 32d, 37th, and 38th Divisions** passed to the control of the XIV Corps (now under the Eighth Army), which was charged with destroying the remaining enemy forces on Luzon. The 37th Division, with the aid of guerrillas, secured the north-south highway through the Cagayan Valley and pushed strong patrols into the rugged Sierra Madre Mountains to probe the enemy's defenses. No organized position was found, and fighting was confined to engagements with isolated Japanese units. Numerous dead—victims of starvation and disease—clearly indicated the enemy's desperate situation in this area.

Assisted by guerrillas, the 6th and 32d Divisions made vigorous attacks on the Kiangan pocket; but the enemy, who had ample supplies there, put up a stubborn defense. Nonetheless, Kiangan was seized by the 6th Division on 12 July; and on the 23d contact was made with guerrilla forces moving south from Bontoc. By 15 August, when hostilities officially ceased, the pocket had been cut into three parts.

Reports reveal that American casualties on Luzon totaled 40,565, including 7,933 killed. The Japanese lost over 192,000 killed and about 9,700 captured.

By the time the fighting ceased, the redeployment of American troops from Europe to the Pacific had already begun. In July the first contingent of service troops arrived at Manila, and on 7 August the American First Army established its command post on Luzon.

Comments.—The invasion of Luzon bore the same distinguishing marks of sound strategic concept and skillful execution that had identified previous operations in the Southwest Pacific Area.

Once again the full weight of our air power was brilliantly employed to neutralize the enemy's air arm and to isolate the battlefield.

* See Appendix 2 for the units assigned to each army as a result of this regrouping.

** In the reorganization the 25th and 33d Divisions had been assigned to the Sixth Army. They took no further part in the fighting. As stated previously, the 38th Division continued to operate against the enemy pocket northeast of Manila.

Control of the air over Luzon was first wrested from the Japanese by the combined action of land- and carrier-based planes. Then while the Third Fleet and all available long-range Army air units struck at Japanese bases within supporting distance of Luzon, other aircraft attacked the enemy's installations and communications on the island itself.

Our complete naval victory in the great Battle for Leyte Gulf had crippled Japanese sea power beyond recovery, and the continual attacks carried out against the enemy's shipping by our aircraft and submarines contributed to victory by seriously reducing the tonnage available for the shipment of supplies and reinforcements to Luzon. Cut off from outside aid, General Yamashita was forced to wage his battle with only such resources as were already on hand.

The deceptive operations conducted prior to the actual landing at Lingayen Gulf went far toward confusing the enemy, if they did not fool him completely. It is obvious that Yamashita's awakening came too late to cope with the surprising rapidity of our move forward to Luzon. Despite a lack of shipping and the delay occasioned by the unexpected duration of the Leyte operations, thoroughly competent staff work had enabled General Krueger's divisions to assault Luzon long before they were expected. With his troops unwisely scattered throughout the island and his communications throttled by guerrillas and American bombs, the Japanese commander was forced to improvise as the situation developed.

It is seldom that history provides two such analogous situations as the war produced on Luzon in the space of three years. In 1941 and early 1942 General MacArthur had been confronted with the same problem of defending the island as Yamashita faced three years later. Each commander was cut off from his home base of supplies; each was opposed by an enemy who had overwhelming air superiority; the battlefield was identical in both instances; and neither commander could expect assistance from any other part of the theater of operations.

There were, however, some important differences in the two situations. General MacArthur had only a small group of trained troops and little time and equipment available to train more. Unprepared as the United States was when war threatened, it was possible to send MacArthur only limited reinforcements of men, supplies, and equipment. On the other hand, Yamashita had more than 235,000 well-equipped troops available for the defense of Luzon. Many of these were veteran fighters, and all of them had received wartime training. The Japanese had been in possession of the island for al-

most three years and had had two years after the turn of the tide at Guadalcanal and Buna in which to prepare for its defense.

From these facts we must conclude that Yamashita's efforts fell far short of General MacArthur's accomplishments. Nowhere can more convincing proof of the value of leadership and generalship be found than in the two Luzon campaigns.

Our use of airborne troops in conjunction with other forces to seize important objectives was a noteworthy feature of the campaign. On three different occasions such action was employed with excellent results: at Tagaytay Ridge, Corregidor, and Aparri. It was at Corregidor, however, that the vertical envelopment proved most effective. The surprise that was gained caused the strongly garrisoned island to fall quickly. It had taken the Japanese six months to capture Corregidor and open Manila harbor in 1942, but General Krueger's men accomplished it in less than two months after the first landings were made on Luzon.

The enemy's organization of the ground was, as usual, excellent. His habit of burrowing into the hills made it exceedingly difficult to drive him from his positions. However, superior American troops and weapons took a frightful toll of Japanese lives. Seldom does an attacker lose fewer troops than the defender, but General MacArthur's campaigns in the Pacific, are among the exceptions. Luzon, where the killed-to-killed ratio was greater than twenty-four to one in our favor, is an outstanding example.

Operations in the Visayas and Southern Philippines (Map 11).— When the Eighth Army relieved the Sixth in the Leyte–Samar area on 26 December 1944, it inherited no small task. General Eichelberger was charged with the dual mission of eliminating the remaining Japanese troops on these two islands and of supporting the Sixth Army's operations on Luzon. The 24th Division, most of which was on Mindoro, was not available for the "mopping-up" operations. The X Corps, on Leyte, was stripped of its troops when the 1st Cavalry and the 32d Divisions were sent to Luzon in January. The XXIV Corps, comprising the 7th, 77th, and 96th Divisions, went into rehabilitation areas on the east coast of Leyte in mid-February and prepared to join the Tenth Army in the assault of Okinawa. This rapid depletion of the forces at his command complicated General Eichelberger's task of clearing Leyte and Samar of the more than 25,000 Japanese troops which were still on those islands when the Eighth Army assumed control. Both the commander and his staff met this difficult problem in a highly successful manner. By careful coordination the rehabilitation and mounting of troops for Luzon and

Okinawa was made to proceed smoothly, while a sufficient force was always maintained in the field to operate against the enemy. First, both corps were employed; then when the X Corps was withdrawn prior to sending its two divisions to Luzon, the XXIV Corps carried on alone. When the latter was withdrawn to prepare for Okinawa, the Americal Division, which had just arrived from Bougainville, was assigned to the X Corps and employed against the surviving Japanese, most of whom were in the northwestern part of Leyte. Philippine Army and guerrilla units were also employed in the mopping-up operations on Leyte and Samar. On 24 February the Eighth Army Area Command assumed responsibility for the final clearing-up operations on those two islands. It inherited the Americal Division and the Philippine units formerly under X Corps control. The X then prepared to undertake operations against Mindanao with the 24th and 31st Divisions.

It is true that the Sixth Army had so badly defeated the Japanese Thirty-fifth Army on Leyte that never again was there any indication of centralized control or organization. However, much credit is due the Eighth Army, for by the judicious use of the troops available it frustrated any chance the enemy might have had of reassembling or reorganizing his forces. This was particularly true during the first two months of 1945, when the transfer of American troops was at its height. The mopping-up on Leyte and Samar continued without pause even after the Eighth Army had shifted its main effort to clearing up the other islands in the archipelago. By 8 May 24,294 Japanese had been killed or found dead and 439 taken prisoner in the Leyte–Samar area. Eighth Army casualties were 432 killed, 1,852 wounded, and twenty-two missing in action.

On 5 February, two days after the 1st Cavalry Division had entered Manila, General MacArthur directed the Eighth Army to clear the Visayan Sea area in order to secure a shorter supply route from Leyte to the capital city. Units of the 24th Division, then on Mindoro, and all troops in excess of the minimum required on Leyte and Samar were employed in this task.* The 40th Division, from Luzon, was made available to the Eighth Army in March; and it (less one regimental combat team that was sent to Leyte and later to Masbate) was thrown into Panay and Negros during that month. The Americal Division, less one regimental combat team, attacked Cebu in March and the following month sent troops to Bohol and Negros.

* The 41st Division arrived on Mindoro from New Guinea in February, but it was preparing for operations against Palawan and Mindanao.

Naval patrols, particularly those established by PT boats, were of great assistance in clearing the Visayan Sea area. Enemy traffic, not only between the southern islands but that northward to Luzon as well, was soon blocked; and the Japanese on each of the islands were isolated. The Eighth Army's task was thus made easier, since the foe could now be engaged and defeated in detail. In each of the amphibious operations the enemy withdrew to the interior of the island and attempted to make his stand there. As soon as the American troops had eliminated all organized resistance, they were withdrawn; and the mopping-up operations were taken over by guerrilla forces. By mid-May all of the islands in what was later to become the Eighth Army Area Command's zone of action (as shown on the map) were under our control, although mopping-up was still under way on Negros, Panay, and Masbate. It is of interest to note that Eighth Army units had made a total of fifty-one landings up to this time and were rapidly becoming masters of the art of amphibious warfare.

Meanwhile the 41st Division assaulted Palawan and Mindanao. In February a regimental combat team landed near Puerto Princessa on the former island and seized the two airfields there without opposition. These fields were less than 250 miles from Borneo and only 650 miles from Indo-China. In April troops from Palawan cleared the main islands of the Calamian group, to the north, and also seized Balabac Island, to the south.

The remainder of the 41st Division landed near Zamboanga, Mindanao, in March and seized the airfields there. Patrols sent to Basilan Island quickly overcame scattered resistance and secured the strait. In April control of the Sulu Archipelago was gained by landings on Jolo and Sanga Sanga Islands. The airfields, or sites suitable for fields, that the 41st Division seized on these islands and in the Palawan area enabled the long arm of our air forces to stretch farther to the southwest and pave the way for the Australians' attack on Borneo.

As previously indicated, when the Eighth Army Area Command assumed control on Leyte and Samar, the X Corps began to prepare for the invasion of Mindanao. The 24th Division (on Mindoro) and the 31st Division (at Morotai and Sansapor) were assigned to the corps for this purpose.

On 17 April the 24th Division landed in the Malabang–Cotabato area and drove toward Davao Gulf. Only slight resistance was met; but as the enemy retreated, he destroyed all of the bridges across the numerous streams in the area. The 31st Division landed behind the 24th on 22 April and assumed responsibility for the rear areas.

Digos fell to the 24th Division four days later, and Davao was taken on 4 May. Guerrilla forces joined the Americans in the advance across the island and also seized control of the northern and eastern coasts of Mindanao.

The 31st Division advanced to Kibawe and then north along the highway. On 23 May it made contact north of Malaybalay with a regimental combat team of the 40th Division that had landed at Macajalar Bay on 9 May. Another force moved by water to Butuan, where it joined guerrillas in an advance up the valley of the Agusan River.

Northwest of Davao the bulk of the 24th Division met strong opposition in the hills, but other units of the division moved northeastward and gained contact with the guerrilla forces that controlled the eastern coast of Mindanao. By 1 July, when the Eighth Army assumed responsibility for the entire Philippine Archipelago, most of the enemy troops on Mindanao had been driven into the mountains in the central part of the island, where they were completely hemmed in and subjected to intense aerial bombardment.

During July a smaller pocket of Japanese was isolated in southern Mindanao when elements of the 24th Division landed at Sarangani Bay and moved northward to meet other units driving to the south from Digos. The capability of effective defense having been lost, the problem of survival was now the enemy's chief concern. Cut off from supplies and bombed continually from the air, the isolated Japanese remnants faced the ravages of disease and starvation plus the constant attrition of their forces by guerrilla patrols bent on revenge. To them the end of hostilities in mid-August must have been most welcome.

During its 7½-month campaign in the Philippines the Eighth Army suffered a total of 11,968 casualties, of which 2,556 were killed. The Japanese lost 61,000 killed and 2,900 taken prisoner. Of the more than 350,000 troops that the enemy employed in the entire archipelago, only an estimated 50,000 were left when Japan capitulated. It was indeed fitting that the formal surrender of the enemy forces in the Philippines, which took place on 3 September, should have been accepted by General Wainwright, who had recently been released from a Japanese prison camp.

Comments on the Philippine Campaign.—The Philippine campaign presented problems that differed from those involved in any operation previously undertaken in the Southwest Pacific Area. Heretofore strong enemy forces had been by-passed and contained. Beachheads had been seized where the rapid construction of airdromes

and ports was possible, the primary consideration being the support of future operations. The isolated enemy troops had been left to "wither on the vine." The liberation of the Philippines, however, demanded that all Japanese forces in the islands be destroyed so that control could be restored to the civil government. This meant that overland operations would be on a larger scale, since the battle area would be more extensive, and that there would be heavier demands for supplies and equipment of all kinds, particularly bridge and road-building equipment, tanks, and trucks. The foresight used in providing the equipment and vehicles to maintain communications was a great factor in the American victory.

General MacArthur's willingness to advance the date of the assault on the Philippines was indeed well justified. By catching the Japanese off balance at Leyte he gained an advantage that remained with him throughout the campaign, for the enemy was never given the opportunity to rest and reorganize. At Leyte we won a central base from which operations against the other islands of the Philippines could be undertaken. Yamashita recognized its importance too late, but he continued to pour reinforcements into the island in a desperate attempt to hold it. Once Leyte was ours, the outcome of the Philippine campaign was never again in doubt, since the Japanese commander was unable to shift his forces to meet the next American assaults.

The speed with which the islands were liberated indicates the thoroughness of the planning and the excellent coordination of the ground, sea, and air forces. Guerrilla activities, controlled largely by GHQ, played an important part in the campaign. Sound strategy and the skillful handling of troops once again gained a great American victory. Modern warfare furnishes few examples of a smaller force attacking a larger one and none in which the smaller gained such a decisive victory.

The Sixth Army's victory on Luzon was indeed a fitting climax to an already enviable record. The campaign completed a two-year period of continuous combat operations by General Krueger's troops. During that time the Sixth Army conducted twelve major operations involving twenty-one separate landings, moved by plane and ship 846,566 men and 3,242,916 tons of supplies, and advanced a distance of 3,500 miles. Over 250,000 of the enemy were killed by its troops, and several hundred thousand more were isolated. In accomplishing these feats the army established a record of losses which must always be a source of amazement to students of military history. Its casualties during those two years were 13,199 killed, 51,162 wounded, and 528 missing, a total of only 64,889.

General MacArthur eloquently summarized the Philippine campaign in a communiqué issued in July, extracts from which are as follows:

> The Philippine Islands are now liberated, and the Philippine campaign can be regarded as virtually closed. Some minor isolated action of a guerrilla nature in the mountain ranges may occasionally persist; but this great land mass of 115,600 square miles, with a population of 17,000,000, is now freed of the invader.
>
> The enemy during the operations employed twenty-three divisions, all of which were practically annihilated. Our forces comprised seventeen divisions. This was one of the rare instances when in a long campaign a superior ground force in numbers was entirely destroyed by a numerically inferior opponent. . . .
>
> Our naval and air forces shared equally with the ground troops in accomplishing the success of the campaign. Our naval battles reduced the Japanese Navy to practical impotence, and air losses running into many thousands have seriously crippled his air potential. Working in complete unison, the three services inflicted the greatest disaster ever sustained by Japanese arms.
>
> The objects of the campaign were as follows:
>
> 1. To penetrate and pierce the enemy's center so as to divide him into north and south, his homeland to the north, his captured Pacific possessions to the south. Each half could then be enveloped and attacked in turn.
>
> 2. The acquisition of a great land, sea, and air base for future operations both to the north and to the south comparable to the British Islands in their use as a base for Allied operations from the west against Germany.
>
> 3. The establishment of a great strangulation air and sea blockade between Japan and the conquered possessions in the Pacific to the south. . . .
>
> 4. The liberation of the Philippines, with the consequent collapse of the enemy's imperial concept of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the reintroduction of democracy in the Far East.
>
> 5. The liberation of our captured officers and men and of internees held in the Philippines.
>
> 6. A crippling blow to the Japanese Army, Navy, and Air Force.
>
> All of these purposes were accomplished.

OTHER OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (Map 12)

While American troops were liberating the Philippines, Australian forces continued to press against the isolated Japanese garrisons on New Guinea, New Britain, and Bougainville. At the same time the Australians were preparing to advance farther to the west—to Borneo.

On 1 May an amphibious force of Australian and Netherland East Indies troops, supported by units of our Seventh Fleet and the Royal

Australian Navy and by American planes based in the southern Philippines, landed on oil-rich Tarakan Island, off the northeast coast of Borneo. By the end of the month all important installations on the island were in Allied hands. On 10 June troops of the Australian 9th Division, veterans of the North African campaigns, made an unopposed landing on the northwest coast of Borneo, at Brunei Bay. The important oil fields at Seria and Miri were quickly secured by overland and amphibious operations. The air and naval facilities that were established at Brunei Bay, together with those already in operation in the Philippines, completed a chain of mutually supporting bases from which Allied air and naval forces could cover the Asiatic coast from Singapore to Shanghai, interdicting the enemy's communication and escape routes in Indo-China and Malaya.

The Australian 7th Division extended the Allies' hold on Borneo when on 1 July it landed at Balikpapan, on the southeast coast. The assault was preceded by heavy aerial and naval bombardments, and only light casualties were suffered. By mid-July Balikpapan harbor was open to Allied shipping.

There was little further activity on Borneo, the enemy having withdrawn into the jungles of the interior. The mission of the Australians had been fully accomplished by the seizure of the best harbors and the most important sources of oil. The general situation on the island and in all of the Southwest Pacific Area when hostilities ceased in August is shown on the map.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

Long before General MacArthur invaded the Philippines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed Admiral Nimitz to seize Iwo Jima* in order to deny the enemy the use of airfields there and to provide an advance base from which our own air forces could support the ultimate invasion of Japan. However, the diversion of troops, shipping, and naval strength from the Central Pacific to assist and support the Philippine campaign made it necessary for Admiral Nimitz to postpone the assault on Iwo Jima. Plans were altered to conform to the schedule of operations in the Philippines so that naval forces employed in the assault on Luzon would be available for the attack on Iwo.

IWO JIMA

Iwo Jima's importance was out of all proportion to its size. This waterless waste of volcanic rock and sand has an area of only eight

* *Jima* means *island.*

square miles. But it is the only island in the Volcano and Bonin groups that is suitable for the installation of air-base facilities of any consequence. The Japanese had placed two airfields in operation, and a third was nearing completion at the time of our attack. Lying midway between Saipan and Tokyo, the island was close enough to both so that fighter planes and medium bombers based there could be used against either target. In Japanese hands Iwo was a threat to Saipan and our other newly won bases in the Marianas, as several damaging raids had already demonstrated. In American hands Iwo would provide an advance base from which fighters could escort Marianas-based Superfortress bombers to the Japanese home islands. In addition, the island would provide an emergency landing field for the large bombers returning from Tokyo —a sixteen-hour round trip from the Marianas.

The battle for Iwo Jima, in the strategic sense, began in August 1944, when our aircraft first bombed the island. Intermittent air attacks were continued during the following months in order to neutralize the enemy's air bases and destroy all other installations that photographic reconnaissance revealed. Japanese opposition to these raids increased rather than decreased, indicating that the defenses on the island were so well concealed that they had escaped detection. Saturation bombing was then decided upon by our High Command, and in early December 1944 daily attacks were begun. These continued for seventy-two consecutive days—right up to the day of the assault—both land- and carrier-based planes being used. Naval forces shelled the island on five separate occasions during December and January, but the heaviest attack did not begin until 16 February. On that day a task force of six battleships and supporting cruisers and destroyers began a three-day bombardment. Circling the island, the warships poured ton after ton of steel into the already bomb-saturated area.

However, as was afterwards discovered, the prolonged aerial bombardment and the three-day shelling of Iwo Jima were not as effective as had been expected. Despite the tremendous fire power that had been brought to bear on such a small target, the marines were to find themselves assaulting a veritable fortress—another Tarawa but on a larger scale.

Covering operations for the invasion began on 16 February, when the Fast Carrier Force* of the Fifth Fleet, under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, commenced a two-day strike against the Tokyo area. Almost 1,200 planes were employed in attacks on airdromes and air-

* Task Force 58.

craft manufacturing plants. Another strike was made on the 25th. These carrier-plane bombardments of Japan itself were coordinated with attacks by the XXI Bomber Command, whose planes also covered the withdrawal of the carriers. As a screen for the assault on Iwo Jima these operations were highly successful, and the only Japanese air reaction of consequence was a raid in the Iwo area by about fifty planes on 21 February.* Suicide attacks resulted in the sinking of the escort carrier *Bismarck Sea* and in such severe damage to the carrier *Saratoga* that she was forced to retire to Pearl Harbor. Two other ships suffered minor damage.

About 23,000 Japanese troops, including naval personnel, garrisoned Iwo Jima **(Map 13)**. Their commander, Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, had set up an elaborate system of defenses that was designed to utilize fully the advantages of an area too small to permit maneuver. He literally honeycombed the entire island with caves and interconnecting tunnels and then constructed well-camouflaged pillboxes and covered gun positions to supplement them. Many of the caves were wired for electricity, and the larger ones could accommodate more than 300 men. All of these underground shelters had several exits, each of which was carefully camouflaged. Most of them had at least thirty-five feet of overhead cover, ample protection against the heaviest bombs and shells. In some places tanks were dug in and used as pillboxes. Mortars ranging in size from 90 to 320 mm. and guns from 20 to 150 mm. were emplaced so that every square yard of the island could be covered by their fire. Extensive mine fields were laid behind the beaches and across the island from the north end of Airfield No. 1 to the east shore. Long before the battle began, Kuribayashi had his troops take an oath to defend the island to the last man and "to kill ten of the enemy before dying."

The plan for the landing called for the V Amphibious Corps, comprising the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, to go ashore on the southeastern beaches of the island. The 4th and 5th Divisions were to land abreast, and the 3d was to be held in floating reserve. The only other feasible landing beach on the island was on the western shore; but since the water there was too shallow to accommodate the larger landing craft and the surf too rough for small boats, it was decided to make the assault on the southeastern beaches. Major General Harry Schmidt was in command of the V Corps, which con-

* Japanese plans in effect at the time did not call for any large-scale commitment of forces to the defense of Iwo Jima. In general, only local forces were to be employed.

tained most of the troops that were to be used. Over him was Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, an officer with much experience in amphibious operations. The naval commander was Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner.

At 0900 on 19 February the first waves of the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions landed under cover of supporting fires from our warships. Enemy fire was only moderate, and it appeared that resistance would not be as strong as had been expected. No underwater obstacles were found, and the heavy bombardment had partially destroyed the mine fields that were nearest the beach. The water was calm, and everything moved according to plan. By 1000 hours the assault battalions were ashore, and one unit had advanced about 300 yards inland. Suddenly the enemy came to life. From Mount Suribachi, the 550-foot extinct volcano on the south end of the island, and from the ridges to the north mortars and artillery laid down an increasingly heavy volume of enfilade fire on the marines.

A series of steep terraces separate the shore line from the higher central plateau where Airfield No. 1 was located. Automatic weapons from the edge of the airfield and from numerous other emplacements swept the beaches with a withering fire. Tanks had already been brought ashore, but it was quickly discovered that the loose volcanic soil would not bear their weight and that egress roads would have to be constructed before the full power of the armored vehicles could be brought to bear. Trucks bogged down to their frames, and supplies were soon piled high along the shore.

Meanwhile the enemy had turned more of his guns on the beaches and the adjoining water area. Casualties among the troops that had landed began to mount, and hits were registered on landing craft at sea. Our warships took some of the enemy's gun positions under fire; but many could not be located, and the rain of steel continued to fall on the beaches.

Later in the day heavy swells, induced by an easterly wind, added to the difficulties. Boats were picked up bodily by the waves and thrown broadside to the beach in such a manner that succeeding waves swamped them. Even tracked landing craft had difficulty in climbing from the pounding surf up the steep shore, and many were swamped. The resulting accumulation of wreckage piled higher and higher and extended seaward to form obstacles for incoming landing craft. Difficulties of unloading increased as available grounding space on the beach became less.

Despite these conditions the attack moved forward, and by 1800 hours the 5th Marine Division had crossed the island and had occupied the southern part of Airfield No. 1. The stiffest opposition had

been encountered on the right, where mines and pillboxes had held up the advance. The large amount of magnetite in the soil made the use of mine detectors impracticable, and probing with bayonets was resorted to in order to clear the fields. However, enough ground was taken on D-day to insure that the beachhead would be held; and sufficient supplies were ashore to permit the continuation of operations the next morning.

On the following day high winds seriously interfered with the work of clearing the beaches, and more landing craft were wrecked. Adverse weather conditions persisted for four days, until the ammunition supply ashore became critical. Call fire missions increased during this period, and the supply of ammunition on the warships grew dangerously short. Fortunately the weather cleared on the 25th, and ammunition both ashore and afloat was replenished. The work of clearing the beaches progressed, and supply problems were never again critical.

On D plus 1 both the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions—less the left regiment of the 5th, which attacked Mount Suribachi—launched a coordinated attack on the heels of a preliminary bombardment by artillery, warships, and aircraft. Airfield No. 1 was completely overrun; and the marines reached the enemy's strongest defensive installations, which extended across the island from the rocky terrain at the "Quarry Cliffs" (as they came to be known) to Hiraiwa Bay.

As the attack advanced to the north, the fighting grew more severe; and it became apparent that more troops would be required to smash the skillfully designed defenses. By 24 February the 3d Marine Division, less one regiment held back in reserve, had been placed in line between the 4th and 5th Divisions. The rear areas and landing beaches were still being subjected to harassing and destructive fires by enemy artillery, mortars, and rockets. These fires continued even after Mount Suribachi was taken on 23 February. During the first five days our casualties totaled 6,251, evidence of the severity of the fighting.

Making his main effort in the center, where the ground was more favorable than the rocky terrain on the right or the rough ridges on the left, General Schmidt continued to attack the strong defenses. One by one, pillboxes were knocked out and caves sealed, weakening the enemy's complex defense system. By 1 March all of Airfield No. 2 was in our possession, and our line had been advanced to the western tip of Airfield No. 3. During the following days the 4th Marine Division made only slight gains against stubborn resistance in the difficult terrain east of Airfield No. 2. However, the 3d and 5th

Marine Divisions moved forward more rapidly and seized the commanding plateau on which Airfield No. 3 was located. By 4 March the marines had reached the line shown. Although the 3d Marine Division was now only about 1,000 yards from the northeastern shore, five days of severe fighting was to take place before it reached the water's edge. By this time the Japanese had been compressed into a small area, and our advance was slowed by intense small-arms fire. The coast was reached on 9 March, and by the 11th the remaining enemy resistance was confined to the northern tip of the island and to a small pocket on the right flank of the 4th Marine Division. Steady progress against these areas was made during the next five days, and on 16 March it was officially announced that all organized resistance had been overcome. Mopping-up in the Kitano Point area continued for many days.

Up to 21 March over 21,000 Japanese dead were counted on Iwo Jima, and 212 prisoners were taken. The exact number of enemy dead will never be known, since many were sealed up in their underground shelters. It had been necessary to annihilate the entire garrison in order to win the island—a task that cost the marines 20,538 casualties up to 21 March. Of these, 4,503 were killed in action. In addition, 1,254 naval personnel, including 176 killed, became casualties during the operation.

In considering the casualty figures it should be borne in mind that Iwo was probably the most strongly fortified island selected as an objective during the war. As stated previously, its small size made maneuver impracticable; and there was no choice but to attack frontally against the series of fortified positions. Also, it was necessary to expedite the capture of Iwo Jima in order to release shipping and naval forces for the impending Okinawa operation.

Within a few months after its capture Iwo Jima had more than repaid its cost in American lives. On 17 March sixteen Superfortress bombers returning from a strike against Japan made emergency landings there, and by mid-June more than 850 of the great bombers had used the landing strips.* This meant 9,000 crew members had been saved. The morale of the bomber crews soared and was reflected in the efficiency with which they attacked the Japanese home islands.

OKINAWA CAMPAIGN (Map 12)

As early as August 1943 the possibility of offensive operations against the Ryukyu Islands had been taken under consideration by

* By the close of the war more than 2400 B-29's had made emergency landings on Iwo.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then present at the Quebec Conference between the Chiefs of State. On 3 October 1944 the necessary specific directive was issued for the assault on Okinawa by Central Pacific forces.* The commencement of operations was tentatively scheduled for March 1945, depending upon the time of relief of covering naval forces in the Luzon and Iwo Jima areas.

In addition to maintaining unremitting pressure on the Japanese, our strategy in the Pacific was directed toward the seizure or destruction of the industrial heart of Japan—almost the final objective. Along the southern shore of Honshu, between the Tokyo plain and the Strait of Shimonoseki, lay concentrated most of the enemy's war-making potential. It was our policy to reach this critical area by successive steps across the Pacific designed to avoid the main hostile forces and to take advantage of Japanese vulnerability to blockade and air attack.

The line Marianas–Luzon had already been advanced on the right to Iwo Jima, enabling our longest-range land-based fighter planes to reach Tokyo itself. The invasion of Okinawa would secure the general line Bonins–Ryukyus and give us bases from which the full weight of our air power could be thrown against the Japanese homeland, and in particular against the vital industrial heartland. The full exploitation of our air superiority might force the defeat and surrender of Japan without actual invasion; but if not, our air forces would be in a position to provide the necessary air support for the invasion.

In directing that a position be secured in the Ryukyu Islands the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisioned the fulfillment of four major missions: (1) the establishment of bases for the invasion of Japan proper; (2) the gaining of a *point d'appui* for additional operations against the enemy in regions bordering the East China Sea; (3) the severance of Japanese communications to the south; and (4) the maintenance of unremitting pressure against the enemy, with the consequent fatal attrition of his air and naval forces. Far-reaching strategic plans provided that upon the completion of our operations in the Ryukyus preparations would be made for a full-scale assault on the southern part of the Japanese homeland. The island of Kyushu was scheduled for attack in the late fall, and Honshu itself was to be invaded in early 1946.

The most logical choice of targets in the Ryukyu Islands was Okinawa, the largest land mass in the entire archipelago. Approxi-

* The invasion of Luzon and the capture of Iwo Jima were results of this same directive, as already noted.

mately sixty-five miles long and from two to eighteen miles in width, this long, narrow island has a total area of some 485 square miles. Unlike most of the Ryukyu group, Okinawa possesses a considerable amount of level terrain that is suitable for the construction of large airfields. In addition, the island affords several excellent anchorages and locations for important naval facilities as well as sufficient land area for the staging of major ground forces.

By direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the invasion of Okinawa was planned and executed under the guidance and on the responsibility of Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. Upon completion of the occupation of Iwo Jima the principal effort of the Central Pacific forces was directed toward Okinawa without any perceptible time lag. Continuity of operational and logistical planning greatly facilitated the rapid development of this two-pronged drive against the final line of Japan's defenses.

Although strategically defeated, the enemy seemed determined to continue the war to the bitter end. The remnants of the once-powerful Japanese Navy were reduced to a furtive existence in home ports, and the enemy's surviving air strength could no longer be considered effective in terms of conventional employment. But Japan's ground forces were still numerous and strong; and the special attack, or Kamikaze, corps furnished one final offensive potential that had not yet been exhausted. There still existed the faint hope that the Allies might negotiate a relatively favorable peace if it could be demonstrated that very heavy casualties would attend offensive efforts against the homeland itself.

As the Japanese girded for an all-out effort to hold their inner defensive perimeter, the tempo of our offensive operations was sharply accelerated. In the Southwest Pacific Area the occupation of the Philippines proceeded rapidly. General Kenney's Far Eastern Air Forces supported ground operations and effectively interdicted the sea lanes to Japan from the south. As a result of this air blockade Japanese naval and air units in the home islands were forced to depend upon rapidly diminishing fuel reserves that were irreplaceable. From bases in the Marianas the XXI Bomber Command was engaged in direct attacks upon the home islands. Early in March the destructive low-level fire raids were inaugurated against the enemy's largest cities, and by the end of the month our Superfortresses were contributing to the effective blockade of Japan by a large-scale aerial minelaying campaign. In China the enemy's ground offensive had temporarily limited the activity of our Fourteenth Air Force, and the XX Bomber Command was about to shift its base to the Marianas for more economical and efficient operation. The strategically mobile

United States Pacific Fleet, now reinforced by a strong British task force, exercised complete control in the western Pacific and could bring its overwhelming power to bear against the enemy at any point and time called for by our strategy.

The planning for Operation Iceberg, as the invasion of Okinawa was designated, involved a thorough consideration of many unusual factors. In the first place, a dual mission had been assigned. Not only were Okinawa and the adjacent smaller islands to be seized by assault, but bases were concurrently to be established for the support of further operations against the enemy. The anticipated end of the war in Europe would release large forces for redeployment to the Pacific theater. General Doolittle's Eighth Air Force alone was scheduled to operate almost 800 large bombers from bases on Okinawa, and initial estimates envisioned the building of twenty-three airfields. So our plan of invasion had to include provisions for the transportation and supply of a large island garrison, including the necessary service and construction personnel.

It was expected, moreover, that the assault on Okinawa would be stubbornly contested. The proximity of Kyushu, southernmost of the main Japanese islands, had been an important factor in the selection of Okinawa as a target; but the advantages of close range would rest with the enemy until our forces were firmly established on land. The comparative remoteness of Okinawa from our land-based air power in China, Luzon, and Iwo Jima meant that the carrier planes of the Pacific Fleet would have to engage the enemy's still-potent air units operating from the numerous fields on Kyushu. Pending the development of extensive air bases on Okinawa our carrier air forces would bear the brunt of battle against Japan's land-based air power, a task of unprecedented magnitude and incalculable implications.

Although our intelligence of the enemy on Okinawa was but rudimentary, all indications pointed to the presence of more than 60,000 troops in well-prepared defensive positions. The Japanese Thirty-second Army, Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima commanding, was charged with the over-all responsibility for the island's defense. Photographic reconnaissance by our XXI Bomber Command and Task Force 58 yielded excellent aerial maps of Okinawa well before the actual assault. The principal defenses were discovered to be in the more-cultivated southern portion of the island, where the bulk of the 450,000 native Okinawans dwell. The best landing beaches were strongly fortified; and seven airfields were in existence, of which only four were actually being used by the enemy to any extent. The fact that American troops for the first time would be operating in a thickly populated hostile territory also complicated the planning.

Provision had to be made for control of the local inhabitants by military government after our forces had landed.

Of all the factors that influenced planning none was more important than the problem of logistics. The assault and occupation of Okinawa was to be the largest amphibious operation of the entire war in the Pacific, and logistical requirements would far exceed in scope anything previously experienced. Enhancing the difficulties of planning the complicated movement of troops and supplies was the necessary consideration of the great distances to the objective from our ports of loading and major staging areas. The time element would be critical, compelling extremely long-range, comprehensive logistical planning.

As envisioned by Admiral Nimitz, the over-all strategy of the invasion would consist of (1) the isolation of the Okinawa area by our mobile, long-range air and naval striking units and (2) the destruction of the enemy on Okinawa by joint operations of ground, air, and naval forces. A complete operational plan, taking into account all major factors that would influence the campaign, was issued on 3 January 1945. The target date for the landing on Okinawa was established as 1 April, designated L-day.

Logistical plans were governed by the great distances from the mounting points and sources of supply to the objective, the availability of shipping, the capacity of the beaches, and the need for flexibility. Logistical planning chiefly involved:

1. The arrangement for initial supplies and equipment; the procurement and allocation of shipping for mounting assault units at Leyte, Espiritu Santo, Guadalcanal, the Russell Islands, Saipan, Eniwetok, and Hawaii; and the preliminary movement of certain troops and cargo to the mounting points in time for loading with the assault troops.

2. Schedules for the movement of garrison troops, equipment, and base-development materials from the West Coast, Hawaii, Leyte, the Marianas, and New Caledonia to the objective area to support the assault and meet construction schedules.

3. The procurement of maintenance supplies on the West Coast, 6,250 nautical miles or twenty-six days steaming time from the objective, and the scheduling of shipments in accordance with the estimated population build-up and consumption rates.

Supply requirements for the forces involved were initially estimated about ninety days in advance; but logistical planning, because of its complexity, continued up to the very eve of L-day.

To conduct the Okinawa campaign Admiral Nimitz established a

unified command* headed by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet. Amphibious forces under Vice Admiral Turner were assigned the responsibility for the capture, occupation, and defense of Okinawa. Concurrent operations were to be carried out by special long-range air and naval task forces in general support of the invasion.

The isolation of the objective was to begin well in advance of L-day. While the amphibious expedition was being mounted for the assault, our naval striking forces were to advance against the enemy's principal centers of resistance. Concurrently Army air forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, China, and the Marianas were to launch attacks designed to assist in the isolation of the Okinawa area.

Strategic surprise was to be sacrificed in order to exploit fully our overwhelming combat power. Although the Japanese would undoubtedly take alarm from our preliminary operations, it was anticipated that the weight of our attack would crush the defenses of Okinawa in approximately seventy days, during which time the enemy would not be able to penetrate the area with any sizable reinforcements. Every attempt was to be made to secure tactical surprise in the landing, and once our troops were ashore on Okinawa maneuver and mobility were to be used to the maximum in order to prevent the enemy from unduly prolonging the ground campaign. It was originally planned that the operation would be divided into three distinct phases **(Map 14)**:

1. Capture of the southern half of Okinawa, including the small adjacent islands; the concurrent development of base facilities.

2. Seizure of the remainder of Okinawa and of Ie Island; the continuing development of base facilities in favorable locations.

3. Exploitation of our foothold in the Ryukyus to include the seizure of additional islands with forces locally available.

All elements that were to be engaged directly in the landing operations were organized as the Joint Expeditionary Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Turner, as already noted. Including assault and first-echelon garrison shipping, a total of 1,213 vessels composed the invasion armada, with 564 supporting aircraft aboard a group of eighteen escort carriers. In the mounting of both the assault and first-echelon garrison forces almost 195,000 troops and 825,000 measurement tons of cargo were loaded into 458 ships at eleven widely separated ports, including Leyte, Honolulu, San Francisco, and Seattle. The size of the expeditionary force, the scattered loading points,

* A list of the main units and their commanders is given in Appendix 3.

and the great distances involved created a logistical problem more difficult than any previously encountered in the Pacific.*

Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Jr., was assigned to command the Expeditionary Troops, in addition to his duties as commander of the Tenth Army. The Expeditionary Troops comprised the Tenth Army, which was the assault force; the Tactical Air Force, composed initially of Marine Corps air units; and the Island Command, which included all garrison, service, and military-government forces. Major combat elements assigned to the Tenth Army included three Marine and four Army divisions. The assault troops numbered slightly more than 180,000, with an additional Army division in area reserve in New Caledonia.

After a careful terrain study it was decided that the Tenth Army's assault on Okinawa could best be made over the Hagushi beaches, on the western shore. From a logistical point of view these beaches would provide more satisfactory support of the assault forces than any other landing site on the island. Other important factors that influenced the selection of the Hagushi beaches were the protection afforded from the open sea and the presence in the immediate landing area of two airfields that could be quickly overrun and converted to our use.

Once the point of assault had been determined, an operational plan for the Tenth Army was soon formulated. The Western Islands Landing Force, comprising the reinforced 77th Division, was given the mission of seizing the Kerama and Keise groups of islands prior to L-day. The Kerama Islands were to be assaulted beginning on L minus 6 in order to secure a protected anchorage, seaplane facilities, and a base for logistic support. The Keise Islands were to be captured on L minus 1 so that long-range field artillery could be emplaced there to support the main landings on Okinawa. On L-day and L plus 1 the Demonstration Landing Force, consisting of the 2d Marine Division, was to execute a realistic feint against the southeastern coast of Okinawa. The Northern and Southern Landing Forces, comprising respectively the III Amphibious Corps and the XXIV Corps, were to land on the Hagushi beaches, with the XXIV Corps on the right. Each corps was to land with two divisions abreast, and each division was to have two regiments in line. H-hour was designated as 0830 on 1 April.

Once ashore, the two corps were to drive eastward across the island. Upon reaching the coast, the XXIV Corps was to seize an east-

* Appendix 4 shows the nature and magnitude of several problems incident to the assembly, loading, and movement of forces and equipment for the Okinawa campaign.

west line through Kuba in order to prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements from the south. The right division of the III Amphibious Corps was to drive to the east coast while the left division turned north to seize the Ishikawa Isthmus and thus prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements from the northern part of Okinawa. By this plan of maneuver the central portion of the island would be effectively blocked off, after which the attack would be resumed.

During the assault landing the 77th and 2d Marine Divisions were to remain afloat in army reserve. The 27th Division, embarked at Ulithi, was to be held in area reserve until called for.

By mid-March the increasing intensity of our long-range air operations heralded the commencement of the Okinawa campaign. As planned by Admiral Nimitz, the strategic isolation of the battlefield was to be achieved by the coordinated effort of all available Allied striking forces. Since the objective area was within easy flying range of a multitude of Japanese air bases, it was imperative that these bases be neutralized to the maximum practicable extent **(Map 12)**. It was anticipated that the principal enemy air opposition would emanate from airfields on Kyushu, to the north, and on Formosa and the Sakishima Island group, to the south. Accordingly our main pre-assault operations were directed against these major targets.

On 14 March, Vice Admiral Mitscher's Fast Carrier Force (Task Force 58) departed from Ulithi for an attack on Kyushu. At this juncture the task force comprised ten large aircraft carriers,* six light aircraft carriers, eight fast battleships, sixteen cruisers, and forty-two destroyers.** The Fifth Air Force, operating from fields on Luzon, threw approximately 200 bombers and 150 fighters against Formosa on both 16 and 17 March in order to cover the movement of the fast carriers to the Japanese home islands. From the Marianas the XXI Bomber Command concentrated the weight of its attack against the industrial cities of Honshu.

At 0545 on 18 March the carriers of Task Force 58 began to launch their planes from a position 100 miles east of southern Kyushu. Although the enemy had discovered the approaching carrier force some eight hours beforehand, our attack on the Kyushu airfields met with complete success. Many base installations were heavily damaged, 102 Japanese planes were shot down, and numerous other aircraft were destroyed or damaged on the ground. At dawn on the following day our carrier planes took off to attack warships at Kure and

* The large carrier *Randolph* had been seriously damaged on 11 March by the attack of suicide planes from the northern Ryukyus against our fleet anchorage at Ulithi.

** The total air complement of Task Force 58 was 919 planes.

Kobe, enemy naval bases in the Inland Sea. Despite extremely intense and accurate antiaircraft fire our planes damaged sixteen Japanese warships, shot down ninety-seven planes in the air, and badly damaged installations and grounded aircraft at many airfields on Shikoku and southern Honshu. Meanwhile Japanese counterattacks against Task Force 58 were being carried out with obvious determination. Four of our carriers received minor damage, one was considerably damaged, and another* was very seriously damaged. During the afternoon of 19 March the Fast Carrier Force began to retire southward. A running air battle continued for two days, but the enemy was unable to inflict further damage. By 23 March, Task Force 58 had withdrawn to the area immediately north of Okinawa in preparation for the forthcoming assault. At a cost of 116 of our carrier planes the enemy's air strength on Kyushu had been effectively knocked out for a period that would include the first week of operations on Okinawa.

While the Fast Carrier Force took up station near Okinawa in order to furnish daily air support over the objective and establish a planned air defense of the entire area, other air forces continued the effort to isolate the battlefield. Daily from 18 to 25 March the Fifth Air Force struck Formosa with nearly 200 bombers and fighters. After that an average of forty-five planes per day continued to neutralize the enemy's airfields, and missions were also carried out against shipping along the China coast. Superfortresses of the XXI Bomber Command executed heavy attacks on the Kyushu airfields from 27 March through L-day and then resumed their devastating attacks on urban areas of Honshu. On 18 and 19 March the Fourteenth Air Force struck Japanese air facilities at Hong Kong and then continued its neutralization attacks against the enemy's airfields along the coast of China. The Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, flew missions against Japanese air bases in the Bonins and northern Ryukyus. Commencing on 26 March a British carrier task force operating under the Fifth Fleet began neutralization strikes against the Sakishima Island group and Formosa. This force, designated Task Force 57, comprised four carriers, two battleships, six cruisers, and fourteen destroyers.**

Joint operations against Okinawa itself began on 23 March with the arrival of Task Force 58 in the objective area. Absolute control in the air was quickly established, and both surface warships and carrier aircraft commenced a vigorous bombardment of enemy de-

* The *Franklin.*

** The total air complement of Task Force 57 was 244 planes.

fensive installations. On 24 March a flotilla of mine sweepers, the vanguard of the Joint Expeditionary Force, arrived from Ulithi and began their work.

The Amphibious Support Force, which reached Okinawa on 25 March, was assigned the mission of coordinating all activities preliminary to the main landing on L-day. In addition to its own escort carriers, mine sweepers, underwater demolition flotilla, and various other vessels the Amphibious Support Force was reinforced by the Gunfire and Covering Force, which initially comprised ten old battleships, twelve cruisers, and twenty-seven destroyers. Assigned a dual mission, the Gunfire and Covering Force supplied fire support to the Amphibious Support Force as required and also served—usually at night—as a covering force.

While associated air forces were waging a campaign of neutralization against the enemy's air bases nearest to Okinawa, elaborate measures were undertaken within the objective area to safeguard our forces engaged in preliminary operations. In lieu of further offensive strikes against Kyushu the strategy of Task Force 58 was to adopt a defensive role. Operating generally northeast of Okinawa, the Fast Carrier Force was in constant readiness to repel enemy air or surface attacks. Searches were conducted daily to a maximum range of 325 miles. At night and during periods of poor visibility the warships of the Gunfire and Covering Force were grouped northwest and northeast of Okinawa in order to intercept any "express runs" by the enemy. Destroyers serving as radar pickets were stationed well out to give timely warning of air attacks, and aircraft from the escort carriers also performed daily reconnaissance missions. It was fully expected that strong enemy counteraction would develop at any time.

Behind this protective barrier the work of the Amphibious Support Force progressed as scheduled. Surface ships conducted a systematic bombardment of both the actual and demonstration landing beaches, supplemented by daily air attacks **(Map 14)**. The Kerama Islands were reconnoitered by underwater demolition teams, and mine sweepers continued to clear the approaches to the selected landing sites.

On 26 March the Western Islands Attack Group arrived from Leyte, and the 77th Division began its task of seizing the Kerama group. Although handicapped by narrow beaches and difficult terrain, our troops quickly established beachheads against light opposition. By 29 March organized resistance had collapsed, and on the following day the islands were declared secure. Construction of a seaplane base was initiated immediately, and long-range patrol

bombers of Fleet Air Wing I soon began regular search missions to the north and east. In addition to the accomplishment of the original mission it soon developed that our capture of the Kerama group had unexpectedly disrupted the enemy's planned defense of Okinawa. Over 350 Japanese suicide boats, hidden in caves, were captured or destroyed by our assault troops. The enemy, anticipating a landing on the Hagushi beaches, had intended to strike at our expeditionary shipping with suicide attacks from the Kerama Islands.

On 31 March elements of the 77th Division seized the Keise Islands without opposition, and by evening two battalions of 155-mm. guns had been put ashore to support the main landings on Okinawa the next day.

In the meantime preparatory operations had been in progress in the vicinity of the Hagushi beaches and the demonstration landing sites along the southeastern coast of Okinawa. In both areas the approaches had been swept of mines, the beaches reconnoitered by underwater demolition teams, and the shore bombarded by warships and carried-based aircraft. Enemy surface resistance prior to L-day was almost nonexistent, despite our expectations. Only in the air did any important attacks take place. About 100 enemy aircraft, of which nearly half were suicide planes, reached the area and inflicted damage on ten of our ships, including one battleship and two cruisers.

L-day—1 April 1945—dawned with cloudy but clearing skies, a moderate east wind, negligible surf, and a temperature of 75° F. **(Map 15)**. During the night over 1,300 ships had converged on Okinawa, including the main body of the Joint Expeditionary Force. The Demonstration Landing Group was in position off the southeast coast of the island, prepared to execute the planned feint landings. Assault transports of the Northern and Southern Attack Forces were disposed off the Hagushi beaches. To execute the preparatory bombardment there was assembled a fleet of ten battleships, nine cruisers, twenty-three destroyers, and a group of 177 fire-support craft equipped with rocket launchers, mortars, and rapid-firing guns. Carrier-based aircraft patrolled the skies to protect against enemy aircraft, and two groups of sixty-four planes each were ready to strike the beaches just prior to the assault.

The preliminary bombardment, heaviest ever to support a landing in the Pacific, commenced at 0530, twenty minutes before dawn. Targets in rear and on the flanks of the landing area were pulverized by the sustained fire of our larger warships. Carrier planes napalmed the beach defenses at 0745, and within ten minutes all fire-support vessels had joined in laying down a drenching fire on the landing area. From their transports the assault troops were transferred to am-

phibious vehicles, and control craft formed the assault waves in rotating circles disposed in depth opposite each landing beach. As H-hour approached, the leading waves uncoiled and formed abreast of their control craft. Finally, at 0820, an almost unbroken eight-mile line of armored fire-support craft and troop-carrying amphibious vehicles swept forward toward the seemingly lifeless beaches.

In view of the enemy's vigor in defending Iwo Jima it was expected that the struggle for the Hagushi beaches would be severe. Carrier planes strafed the landing sites as the assault troops neared shore, and a curtain of gunfire was maintained a few hundred yards in front of the advancing troops. Despite all intelligence forecasts, however, no opposition was encountered during the landing.

At 0830 hours the first assault troops landed on the Hagushi beaches, and during the next ten minutes the entire leading wave came ashore in good order. Within the first hour over 16,000 men and some 250 amphibious tanks were landed. Advancing rapidly inland, the assault regiments captured both Yontan and Kadena Airfields by 1240, encountering virtually no resistance. Defensive installations protecting the landing beaches and the airfields were found unmanned. No mines or booby traps were discovered, and only occasional small-arms fire was encountered. By 1600 over 50,000 American troops were ashore, including the major elements of all division artillery. The unloading of supplies began immediately after the debarkation of the assault troops and progressed even better than anticipated. By nightfall the advance had reached the originally scheduled L-plus-3 line, and as a result of the first day's operations the Tenth Army held a beachhead approximately eight miles long and up to three miles in depth. Only in the air had the Japanese attempted any counteraction. One battleship and three smaller ships had been damaged by enemy suicide planes that had managed to penetrate our fighter screen.

Supported by naval gunfire and carrier-based aircraft, both corps continued to make excellent progress during the next few days. On 2 April the 2d Marine Division again executed a realistic feint at landing on the southeastern coast of Okinawa. On the same day the 7th Division reached the eastern shore of the island, completely severing the enemy's north-south communications. On the 3d, while the XXIV Corps reorganized and regrouped for an advance southward, the III Amphibious Corps attacked both north and east. The 1st Marine Division reached the east coast and reconnoitered the Katchin Peninsula with negative results. Meeting only scattered groups of Japanese, the 6th Marine Division approached the Ishikawa Isthmus. On 4 April the III Amphibious Corps secured the

L-plus-15 line, thus completing the first phase of its operations. Meanwhile the XXIV Corps advanced southward against steadily growing resistance.

In spite of comprehensive American intelligence estimates the Japanese plan of defense for Okinawa did not become clear until after the tremendous weight of the initial assault had fallen on empty air. It was then found that the total lack of opposition to our landing on L-day did not mean that an all-out effort would not be made to hold the island. After testing Kamikaze tactics in the Philippine and Iwo Jima campaigns, the enemy had become convinced that only by the coordinated, large-scale employment of such tactics could the advance of United States forces toward the home islands be halted. When it became evident that invasion of the Ryukyu Islands was only a matter of time, air reinforcements were sent to bases on Kyushu; and plans were drawn up for suicide attacks in sufficient strength to saturate Allied air and antiaircraft defenses. Orthodox air operations and sorties by naval surface forces were also planned.

The local defense of the Thirty-second Army on Okinawa was firmly integrated with the counteroffensive features of Admiral Toyoda's* strategic plan. The ground forces were charged with executing a prolonged resistance so that United States fleet units would be forced to remain in the objective area for the longest possible time. During this period of stalemate the Japanese Fifth Air Fleet was to bring the full power of organized suicide attacks against our exposed surface fleet.

To accomplish his mission General Ushijima made the decision not to oppose the initial American landing on Okinawa. The Hagushi beaches were correctly selected as the most likely point of assault, but late in March the area was abandoned in favor of a strong position defense in the more favorable terrain of the southern portion of the island. Extensive mine fields were planted in the waters surrounding Okinawa; and, as we have seen, a strong concentration of suicide boats was effected in the Kerama Islands in order to carry out attacks against invasion shipping off the Hagushi beaches.

During the eight days prior to L-day the preliminary operations conducted by our advance forces largely nullified the dangerous capabilities of the enemy's suicide boats and mine fields. While our troops ashore were still probing for the main ground defenses, the expected air offensive began. On 6 April the Kamikaze Corps inaugurated a spectacular thirty-six-hour mass suicide attack, one of

* Admiral Toyoda was in command of the Combined Fleet.

the greatest and most destructive air battles of the war. During this period over 350 suicide planes, accompanied by almost as many orthodox bombers and fighters, struck at both the Joint Expeditionary Force and Task Force 58. Although 383 of the attacking planes were shot down, some thirty American ships were sunk or badly damaged.

Before 6 April the planned air defense of the Okinawa area had seemed almost too elaborate, but from that day on the extensive organization paid handsome dividends. In addition to maintaining a vigilant search toward Kyushu, Task Force 58, operating well north of Okinawa, was prepared to interpose a barrier of carrier aircraft against any enemy attempt to penetrate the objective area. The next line of protection for the Expeditionary Force consisted of a ring of radar picket ships with fighter-director teams on board. The pickets, usually destroyers, were stationed in outlying positions for the early detection of enemy raids. Combat air patrols, comprising from fifty to 120 or more fighters, were assigned as required to the various fighter-director teams. These aircraft were furnished both by the escort carriers and Task Force 58.

Comparatively few of the attacking Japanese planes reached the anchorage area on 6 April. Those that slipped through the barrier established by Task Force 58 fought their way southward to the ring of radar pickets, initially eight in number. The temptation to attack these exposed vessels proved too strong to withstand, and as a result the picket ships bore the brunt of the suicide offensive. Most of the Japanese suicide planes were of obsolete types and were manned by poorly trained pilots who frequently were too inexperienced to take evasive action. Losses before reaching the target area were therefore high. It was the enemy's purpose to saturate our defenses by attacks in mass so that a reasonable number of planes would reach the objective. It was our policy to cushion the blow by a defense in depth, and in this we were aided by the enemy's error in selecting the picket ships as the object of his attacks.

Deeming the time propitious, Admiral Toyoda directed that a strong naval task force (one superbattleship,* one light cruiser, and eight destroyers) carry out a surface attack on our shipping at Okinawa. Detected leaving the Inland Sea by our submarines, the task force moved around the tip of Kyushu during the night so as to approach Okinawa from the northwest. Early on 7 April scouting planes from Task Force 58 located the Japanese warships southwest of Kyushu. Shortly after noon our carrier planes reached the area and opened the attack. Caught without air power, the enemy task

* The *Yamato*, last of Japan's modern battleships.

force was completely destroyed except for four destroyers that suffered varying degrees of damage. A total of 386 American planes participated in the attack, of which ten were lost. Air raids on Task Force 58 during the day succeeded in badly damaging one large carrier* as against fifty-four enemy planes destroyed. After this conclusive defeat the Japanese Navy no longer possessed the capability of offensive surface action.

Meanwhile the Tenth Army on Okinawa continued to advance. The XXIV Corps encountered increasing resistance, and by 9 April a highly organized enemy position had been uncovered along the line Machinato–Kakazu–Kaniku–Minami–Tsuwa. The corps was forced to suspend its attack until supplies could be assembled and the nature of the defenses determined more fully.

Patrols of the III Amphibious Corps in the north reconnoitered toward the Motobu Peninsula and reported negligible resistance (**Map 14**). In view of the general situation General Buckner now made the decision to complete Phase 2 of the campaign—the conquest of northern Okinawa—prior to the completion of Phase 1—the capture of southern Okinawa. The early conquest of northern Okinawa would not only be economical but would also prevent the enemy from landing reinforcements at a later date. While the 1st Marine Division conducted mopping-up operations, the 6th Marine Division pushed northward along both coasts. Forward progress was hindered only by poor roads and the limits of physical endurance. Advance elements reached Nago on 7 April, and during the next three days about one-half of the Motobu Peninsula and most of northern Okinawa were cleared of enemy resistance. The 6th Marine Division encountered its strongest opposition in the western portion of the peninsula. A force of about 2,500 Japanese, equipped with mortars and machine guns, fought desperately in the hills south of Manna. The rough terrain, bad weather, and inadequate communications helped to delay our conquest of the interior, although by 12 April the greater part of the coast had been secured.

Because of the early capture of Yontan and Kadena Airfields the movement of land-based aircraft to Okinawa became possible much earlier than expected. The first planes of the Tactical Air Force were transported from Ulithi by escort carriers, the leading group of 105 fighters arriving at Yontan on 7 April. Another group came ashore on the 9th. Combat air patrols were initiated immediately, and direct support of troop operations commenced on the 14th.

* The *Hancock*.

During the period 6 to 8 April the small islands east of Okinawa were reconnoitered by a Marine reconnaissance battalion. Only Tsugen Island was found to be occupied by Japanese troops. Early on 10 April one battalion of the 27th Division landed, and by evening all opposition had been overcome. The assault troops re-embarked on the following day and rejoined the 27th Division, which had meanwhile debarked at Okinawa.

The second of the great mass suicide attacks was launched by the enemy on 12 and 13 April. About 185 suicide planes, supported by an equal number of conventional aircraft, were in the attacking force; and a new weapon, the Baka bomb*, was used in quantity for the first time. Running the gauntlet of fighters established by Task Force 58 some 200 miles north of Okinawa, the surviving Japanese suicide planes smashed at the ring of radar picket ships, where they were intercepted by our combat air patrols. Again only a few of the attackers reached the inner anchorage area.

On 13 April troops of the 6th Marine Division reached the northern tip of Okinawa, securing a site for the construction of a long-range radar and fighter-director installation. Minna Island was reconnoitered and found to be unoccupied. Operations continued against the strong pocket of enemy resistance on the Motobu Peninsula, and by 19 April most of the 2,500 Japanese had been destroyed.

The relative ease with which the III Amphibious Corps conquered northern Okinawa led to the advancement of the date for the planned assault on Ie Island, which was desired as the site for a large air base. On 15 April three battalions of field artillery were landed on nearby Minna Island for support of the attack to be launched against Ie on the following day. Assisted by a heavy air and naval bombardment, troops of the 77th Division stormed the beaches at 0800; and by nightfall the western two-thirds of the island was in our possession. Bitter fighting took place before the enemy's cave defense system was finally overcome on 22 April. Mopping-up operations continued until the 27th, at which time the 77th Division was transferred to southern Okinawa. By 23 April the other islands near the Motobu Peninsula had been occupied by marines.

The Japanese Kamikaze Corps continued to launch mass suicide

* This piloted short-range flying bomb, which had a ton of explosive in its war head, was carried to the target area slung beneath a twin-engine medium bomber. When released, its suicide pilot directed it at the target in a rocket-assisted dive, often attaining speeds of 400 to 500 miles per hour. Before launching, the mother ship was very vulnerable to attack; and the bomb itself was often inaccurate because of its lack of maneuverability. Our forces christened the new weapon *Baka*, Japanese for *fool*.

attacks spaced at intervals varying from two days to two weeks, but they became progressively smaller and farther apart as losses mounted. During the periods between major raids both suicide and orthodox aircraft conducted small-scale operations. Enemy planes drawn from every theater were funneled through either Kyushu or Formosa and thrown into the fight.*

After the mass suicide attack of 12 April steps were taken by our forces to strengthen the air defense of the objective area. Fire-support craft were assigned to reinforce the radar destroyers, and the Tactical Air Force undertook to maintain a constant two-plane combat air patrol over each picket station. The early conquest of northern Okinawa and Ie Island permitted the establishment of land installations that replaced some of the radar pickets. After the capture of the airfield on Ie work progressed rapidly on one of the finest sites for an air base in the western Pacific. On 17 April the XXI Bomber Command began daily attacks on the Kyushu airfields, devoting about 40 per cent of its effective strength to this task through 11 May. When the Japanese initiated their third mass suicide raid on 15 and 16 April, Task Force 58 countered with fighter sweeps against Kyushu. Dispersion, camouflage, and heavy antiaircraft fire, however, rendered this attack uneconomical, and our carrier forces reverted to the policy of intercepting the enemy in the air. By the end of April the Japanese had succeeded in sinking twenty of our ships and damaging 157, many of them seriously. But it was apparent from the steadily dwindling scale of the enemy's effort that he could not keep up the pace indefinitely.

Concurrently with the great air battles and the seizure of northern Okinawa by the III Amphibious Corps, the XXIV Corps, in the south, engaged the Japanese Thirty-second Army in a struggle of life or death. By 9 April it was evident that the enemy had moved his main forces to the area north of Naha and that he intended to make his stand there (**Map 15**).

The high ground held by the Japanese in southern Okinawa was ideal for a prolonged defense. The limestone hills, honeycombed with natural caves, afforded every advantage of terrain. As at Iwo Jima the enemy concentrated on a system of cave defense in order to offset our tremendous fire superiority. By the construction of extensive tunnels and caves each hill was capable of being transformed into a very large and almost indestructible pillbox, affording excellent cover as well as a strong tactical position. North of Naha the

* See Appendix 5 for a summary of Japanese suicide attacks during the Okinawa campaign.

broken ridges and steep escarpments generally spanning the width of the island form a natural series of defensive lines. In this area, five miles wide and four miles deep, the Japanese had constructed a complex network of interlocking defenses in depth, with a hard core at Shuri. It was at the first line of resistance in the Shuri Zone, the Machinato Line, that the XXIV Corps had been brought to an abrupt halt.

From 9 to 12 April our troops were able to make only limited gains against the well-entrenched enemy. The 96th Division, making the principal effort of the XXIV Corps, pushed to the crest of Kakazu Ridge on 12 April; but the defenders clung tenaciously to the reverse slope of this key center of resistance. During the night a well-organized counterattack, supported by the most intensive mortar and artillery barrage yet experienced by our troops in the Pacific, forced the 96th Division to withdraw to the original line of departure. The enemy assault, evidently timed to coincide with the second of the great mass suicide attacks, was broken up by a heavy concentration of fire laid down by our warships and the division field artillery.

On 14 April the XXIV Corps was ordered to consolidate its position and prepare for an all-out attack on the 19th. The 96th Division, at reduced combat efficiency because of the 2,700 casualties it had suffered, was moved to the center of the line; and the 27th Division on 15 April assumed responsibility for the right flank of the XXIV Corps in a zone extending from the west coast to the eastern nose of Kakazu Ridge. About this time General Hodge, the XXIV Corps commander, wrote:

> It is going to be really tough. There are 65,000 to 70,000 fighting Japs holed up in the south end of the island, and I see no way to get them out except blast them out yard by yard. Our attack is set to go soon, and I think we are ready.
>
> The Japs have tremendous amounts of artillery and have used it far more intelligently than I have ever seen them use it to date. With best estimate, it shows around 500 or more individual weapons of 75 mm. or better, including some 175 of caliber 105 or better. The most powerful weapon of long range we have encountered to date is the 150 rifle with range of 27,000 yards, which fires occasionally upon the two airfields from the vicinity of Shuri. They are using quite a few of the Spigot 320-mm. mortars, 250-mm. mortars, and aerial bombs up to 250 kilograms fitted as rockets. They are also using large-sized rockets. . . .
>
> The terrain is decidedly rugged and cut up with many cliffs and natural and man-made limestone and coral caves, organized over long periods of time. . . .

The second assault on the Shuri Zone was to be a powerful coordinated attack by three divisions abreast. Unremitting pressure was

to be brought against the enemy all along the line, and key terrain localities were to be seized after the defenders had been blasted out by the concentrated fire of twenty-seven battalions of artillery. The general plan of attack called for the 27th Division to effect a penetration near the west flank and in the event of a complete breakthrough to roll up the entire enemy line. In order to achieve tactical surprise the division was to launch its attack before dawn, signalling the commencement of the general offensive. Planes of the Tactical Air Force and warships of the Gunfire and Covering Force were to lend their assistance by bombarding key fortifications and rear-area targets. A feint at landing on the southeastern coast of Okinawa was to be executed by the 77th Division in order to prevent the reinforcement of the Shuri defenses by troops known to be stationed in the south.

The XXIV Corps launched its coordinated attack against the Machinato Line early on 19 April. Before daylight the 27th Division effected a surprise crossing of Machinato Inlet and drove south along the coastal corridor. Fire from the supporting field artillery and naval units off both coasts played up and down the enemy line of resistance. Over 650 aircraft equipped with bombs and rockets attacked the Japanese fortifications. Napalm fire bombs were particularly effective in destroying the vegetation and camouflage that concealed many unsuspected emplacements. All along the line our troops encountered intense mortar and machine-gun fire, reinforced by artillery covering the principal approaches. The town of Machinato was taken late in the day, and moderate gains were made along the entire front. Although the 27th Division, aided by tactical surprise, had succeeded in making the farthest advance, no penetration had as yet been achieved. Within twenty-four hours it had become evident that to break through the Shuri Zone would be a slow and costly task.

The Japanese concept of a cave defense to nullify our tremendous fire superiority proved to be entirely correct. Despite the intense bombardment that supported the assault of the XXIV Corps very little damage was done to the enemy fortifications, and very few of the defenders were killed. The crack 62d Division, which garrisoned the Machinato Line, offered a fanatical resistance; and the 24th Division, fixed in position in southern Okinawa by our realistic feint, was scarcely needed on the constricted northern front.

After the first day the XXIV Corps continued to attack all along the front with the object of seizing key terrain features of the Machinato Line. A step-by-step advance, moving slowly forward on the heels of repeated artillery barrages, registered limited success at a heavy cost in casualties. Local counterattacks by the enemy were

frequent, and some positions changed hands several times. Kakazu Ridge, which had been initially by-passed by the 27th Division in its advance, was finally captured on 24 April. With the concurrent seizure of key positions in the zones of the 7th and 96th Divisions resistance began to weaken, and the Japanese initiated an orderly withdrawal to their next line of prepared defenses. The Machinato Line had been broken by sheer power.

During the next few days sizable advances were made by all three divisions of the XXIV Corps. On 28 April the 27th Division captured Machinato Airfield, and by the 30th our forces were disposed along the line shown.

Since 19 April the heavy casualties suffered by the XXIV Corps had demonstrated the high cost of frontal attacks against the enemy's zone defense. The Japanese still possessed many strong centers of resistance blocking every route of advance southward; and when these had been overcome, our troops would be up against the formidable Shuri Line, a complex network of mutually supporting fortifications with a very strong nucleus at Shuri.

At this point in the campaign General Buckner had to make a difficult decision. Having suffered heavily in combat, the 27th and 96th Divisions were too depleted to participate in a full-scale attack on the redoubtable Shuri Line; but the 77th and the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were in effective fighting trim. General Buckner's problem was where and how to commit these fresh troops so as to exercise the most decisive influence on the battle. There were two alternative courses of action: (1) to replace the exhausted divisions in line and renew the frontal assault until the Shuri Zone was completely penetrated; (2) to effect a new landing on the southeastern coast of Okinawa and close the pincers on the Japanese in the Shuri area. In addition to the purely normal stresses inherent in making an important command decision, certain unusual pressures lay heavily on General Buckner's shoulders. The collapse of Germany, spelling the end of the European war, had fired all personnel with the desire to finish off Japan, and in particular the Okinawa campaign, as soon as possible; and an amphibious attack on southern Okinawa, if successful, would give the earliest results. Also, a majority of the Marine Corps commanders serving in the Tenth Army believed that their units would be far more effective if employed in the familiar assault of a beach and swift exploitation.

After carefully examining the feasibility of an attack against the southeastern coast of Okinawa, General Buckner decided against it. The principal disadvantages were that it would split our forces beyond adequate supporting distance and that, according to the logisti-

cal planners, not over one division could be adequately supplied over the beaches. Since the enemy could be expected to oppose in force the projected landing, there was little question but that the disadvantages were insurmountable at this time. Instead, a new plan was drawn up for the relief of the battered divisions and a renewal of the frontal attack on the Shuri Line. The plan provided for a principal effort on each flank with the objective of achieving a double penetration that would be followed by a double envelopment of Shuri itself. Admiral Nimitz visited the area and endorsed General Buckner's plan.

By 1 May the 1st Marine Division had taken over the zone of the 27th Division, and the 77th Division had replaced the 96th (**Map 16**). The 7th Division, which had suffered less punishment, remained in line. The 6th Marine Division turned over its security mission in northern Okinawa to the 27th Division and prepared to move south to the battle area.

During the night of 1-2 May the 7th Division launched two attacks, gaining up to 1,200 yards. The assault was also renewed at other points along the front, but only limited progress was made against the enemy's fanatical resistance.

In accordance with his assigned mission to prolong the land fighting on Okinawa, General Ushijima had up to this time confined himself to the defensive, employing only small local counterattacks. But at length he yielded to the views of offensive-minded officers and ordered a full-scale offensive to be launched. The fresh 24th Division, which had been moved up from the south, was to carry the brunt of the ground attack, fully supported by tanks and artillery.

The Japanese offensive opened during the night of 3-4 May. In support of the ground operations another mass suicide raid was launched from airfields on Kyushu. A relatively large number of planes reached the inner area and bombed Yontan and Kadena Airfields as well as the Hagushi beaches and our ships offshore. Landings in rear of both flanks of the XXIV Corps were attempted by small groups of Japanese equipped with demolition charges for use in destroying American tanks and artillery. Many of the landing craft were sunk off the beaches by gunfire, and the troops that succeeded in coming ashore were quickly surrounded and destroyed.

After a heavy shelling of the front, elements of the 24th Division at 0300 on 4 May advanced through their own artillery barrage to attack the American 7th Division in the eastern sector. Lesser attacks were directed against the 1st Marine Division in the west. The struggle continued all during the day, the defenders inflicting heavy losses on the Japanese who had at last come out into the open

to fight. Shortly after midnight the assault was renewed against the 7th Division, and strong infantry and tank attacks were thrown against the 77th Division in an attempt to penetrate the center of our line. American aircraft and artillery pounded at the enemy's troop concentrations, dispersing the attackers into small groups that were then committed piecemeal. The attacks persisted throughout the 5th, but there was no breakthrough. By the end of the day General Ushijima had given up all hope of success. The offensive had been crushed with heavy losses that seriously weakened the enemy's overall position. Japanese dead alone totaled over 5,000 as against our casualties of 1,066, a ratio of nearly five to one. In addition to the wastage of some of his best remaining troops the enemy had disclosed the location of many hitherto undiscovered weapon emplacements, including artillery firing positions. General Ushijima reverted to the defensive, fully resolved to prolong the campaign and thus delay the opening of an Allied offensive against the home islands of Japan.

On 7 May, General Buckner assumed direct command of the operations in southern Okinawa. With the introduction of the III Amphibious Corps on the right of the line the front was reorganized on a two-corps basis. By 10 May the 6th Marine Division had taken over the west-coast part of the zone manned by the III Amphibious Corps, and the 96th Division had completed the relief of the 7th Division on the east flank of the XXIV Corps.

General Buckner now ordered a full-scale attack with the two corps abreast. The initial mission was the envelopment and destruction of the Japanese forces occupying the Shuri Line, with the ultimate mission of destroying all enemy forces in southern Okinawa. After an intense thirty-minute artillery preparation* the attack was launched at 0700 on 11 May. The III Amphibious Corps gained up to 1,100 yards, the 6th Marine Division on the right approaching the outskirts of Naha against relatively light opposition. The 96th Division, on the east flank of the XXIV Corps, fought through strong enemy defenses to reach the northwestern slope of Conical Hill. On the second day of the attack the 1st Marine and 77th Divisions made moderate gains over the high ground in the central sector. The 96th Division crept westward around the face of Conical Hill, gaining a position from which the enemy stronghold could be reduced. Inevitably the attack began to break down into a number of small, bitterly disputed battles for key terrain features. In lieu of massed fire,

* Thirty-six battalions of field artillery were available for use against the Shuri Line.

which had earlier proved to be largely ineffective, the American artillery pinpointed the most important enemy cave emplacements.

On 13 May an important success in the zone of the 96th Division marked what proved to be the turning point of the entire battle. On this date our troops captured the northern slopes and the crest of Conical Hill. A small infantry force, led by two staff sergeants, reached the top by way of the northeastern face while nearly 1,000 Japanese were concentrated against our main attack up the northwestern slope. Although the enemy swiftly counterattacked, fresh reserves were committed by the 96th Division; and the crest of the hill remained in our possession. Conical Hill was not the highest elevation in this area, but it proved to be the key to the Shuri Line. Its seizure led to control of the area from which our forces would be able to outflank the entire complex of defenses around Shuri. The first step had been taken in effecting a complete breakthrough.

Both corps renewed the attack on 14 May. A considerable advance was made by the 6th Marine Division in the west while the 96th Division captured Yonabaru Airfield.

Beginning in mid-May torrential rains seriously interfered with the movement of supplies and equipment to the front, and eventually the road system in southern Okinawa broke down almost completely. Armored elements were immobilized, and supplies for front-line units had to be carried by hand or delivered by air. In spite of the adverse weather* our troops continued to make steady though unspectacular progress. Constant pressure was maintained all along the army front, with the strongest efforts directed against the flanks of the Shuri Line. Naval gunfire, massed artillery and mortar fire, and continuous strikes by tactical aircraft supported the advance, although hand-to-hand fighting with small arms, bayonets, grenades, and flame throwers was necessary to dislodge the enemy from many of his strongest fortifications.

The principal centers of activity were Sugar Loaf Hill, where the 6th Marine Division struggled to gain a foothold, and the ridges south of Conical Hill, scene of the 96th Division's drive to open up completely the Yonabaru corridor. By 21 May the III Amphibious Corps had secured Sugar Loaf Hill** and severed the Shuri–Naha road. The 77th and 1st Marine Divisions, advancing abreast, entered the outskirts of Shuri while the 6th Marine Division penetrated the northern suburbs of shattered Naha. On the left the 96th Division

* Almost fifteen inches of rain fell during May.

** This position changed hands ten times before it was finally secured by the 6th Marine Division.

captured the ridges southwest of Conical Hill, effectively turning the Shuri Line and opening the east-coast corridor for a strong drive to the south. On 22 May the 7th Division was committed from reserve to exploit the gap on the left flank. Quickly seizing Yonabaru, the fresh troops drove south to the Ozato hill mass. Meanwhile the 96th Division advanced westward along the Yonabaru–Naha road. High water and deep mud slowed all movements; but the 7th Division continued to advance while the 96th, 77th, and 1st Marine Divisions converged on the enemy's stronghold at Shuri.

On 24 May the Japanese again launched a mass suicide air attack against Okinawa. That night five twin-engine planes carrying suicide demolition squads attempted to land on Yontan Airfield. Four planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire, and the fifth crashed in landing. Ten Japanese who survived the crash succeeded in destroying seven of our planes before they were killed.

On 26 May troops in considerable strength were detected moving on various roads to the south. Suspecting that the enemy was retreating, General Buckner called for strong and unrelenting pressure to keep the Japanese off balance and if possible to prevent them from establishing a new defensive position. On the last day of the month, the date when the enemy's Shuri stronghold was finally shattered, our troops reached the line shown on the map.

The construction of base facilities on Okinawa was carried on concurrently with the operations. An important air base was developed on Ie Island; and the first contingent of long-range Army fighter planes arrived on 13 May, adding to the strength of the Tactical Air Force. Admiral Halsey, commander of the Third Fleet, relieved Admiral Spruance on 28 May as over-all commander. At the same time Vice Admiral McCain replaced Vice Admiral Mitscher as commander of the Fast Carrier Force, now designated Task Force 38.

General Ushijima, the able commander of the Japanese Thirty-second Army, had not been caught unawares by the collapse of the Shuri position. The loss of Conical Hill, followed by the breakthrough at Yonabaru, was recognized as decisive. When all counterattacks failed to restore the line, Ushijima took immediate steps to strengthen the threatened flank while the major portion of the army withdrew to the south for a last-ditch stand near the tip of the island. The withdrawal of the main body was orderly and received invaluable assistance from the adverse weather, which concealed the enemy's movements while seriously impeding our own advance.

It was the intention of General Ushijima to prolong the campaign by assembling his seriously depleted forces along the general line of the Yaeju Dake escarpment. However, the surviving naval troops

under his command, some 2,000 in number, decided that their prepared position on the Oroku Peninsula south of Naha was too advantageous to give up. So these forces did not join in the general withdrawal.

On 2 June the Tenth Army took up the pursuit, advancing as rapidly as the rugged terrain and muddy roads would permit. The 77th Division was left in the Shuri area to mop up, and the 6th Marine Division prepared for a shore-to-shore assault on the Oroku Peninsula. The 96th Division captured Kamizato and Inasomi on 3 June; the 7th Division reached the southeastern coast above Minatoga, cutting off the Chinen Peninsula from the remaining portion of southern Okinawa.

The 6th Marine Division assaulted the Oroku Peninsula on 4 June, capturing part of Naha Airfield and the area to the northeast along the bay. In coordination with the new landing the 1st Marine Division drove south to cut off the peninsula along its base. By 7 June the southwestern coast had been reached by way of Hanja, isolating the Japanese forces still fighting on the peninsula. The 6th Marine Division overran Naha Airfield and drove the enemy into an area just south of the town of Oroku. Despite fanatical opposition the pocket was gradually compressed on all sides until organized enemy resistance collapsed on 13 June.

Meanwhile the XXIV Corps continued to advance against slight resistance. The 7th Division captured Minatoga on 4 June, and the 96th Division took Iwa on the following day. Rain and inadequate roads continued to hamper all movements, making it frequently necessary to supply by water or air. By 7 June the corps had reached the line Yunagusuku–Tomui–Gusichan, less than a half mile northeast of the Yaeju Dake escarpment. The enemy's defensive position was probed and discovered to be well organized.

During the next few days artillery and supplies were brought forward to support an attack on the escarpment. The 1st Marine Division captured Itoman and developed strong enemy positions along Kunishi Ridge. On 10 June the 96th Division launched a coordinated attack, and under cover of a heavy smoke screen two companies of infantry climbed the face of the escarpment and seized a position on the edge of the plateau. On the following day the 1st Marine and 7th Divisions extended the front of the attack, overrunning the enemy's advance positions. A gradual improvement in the weather permitted the full employment of all our supporting arms, but the enemy as yet exhibited no lessening of his will to resist. Counterattacks were frequent and aggressively pressed home.

On 12 June predawn attacks were launched all along the Tenth Army front. The Japanese were surprised, and important gains were made in all sectors. The 1st Marine Division advanced 1,000 yards before daybreak and captured positions on the crest of Kunishi Ridge. The 7th and 96th Divisions breached the enemy's lines in many places, particularly heavy fighting developing around Yuza. By 14 June the XXIV Corps had secured positions on top of the Yaeju Dake escarpment along a broad front, and the enemy's resistance in this area began to shown signs of weakening. The 1st Marine Division eliminated the last major opposition on Kunishi Ridge on the 16th and began to advance on Mezado. Part of the 6th Marine Division and one newly arrived regiment of the 2d Marine Division were brought up by the III Amphibious Corps in preparation for a coordinated attack to the south. Launched on 17 June, the attack gained up to 1,600 yards during the first day of fighting. On the 18th* the marines drove to the Kuwanga–Makabe road; in the zone of the XXIV Corps left-flank elements advanced to within 400 yards of Medeera. Crushing all opposition, the III Amphibious Corps advanced to the southern coast; and on 20 June the two corps made contact north of Komesu. The remaining Japanese were now split into three isolated groups, offering only disorganized resistance. As the pockets rapidly shrank in size before the pressure of our converging forces, enemy soldiers began at last to surrender en masse. Others, however, committed suicide or made death-seeking charges. On 21 June, Okinawa was declared secure, although the next ten days saw a final organized mop-up that resulted in the death of nearly 9,000 more Japanese and the capture of another 3,000.

During June the occupation by marines of Aguni, Kumi, and the Iheya Islands facilitated the establishment of land-based fighter-director stations, thus permitting a reduction in the number of radar picket ships (**Map 14**). After a last blow against the Kyushu airfields the Fast Carrier Force retired to Leyte on 10 June for a much-needed period of replenishment and rehabilitation. The enemy's tremendous losses in aircraft plus the rapidly deteriorating situation of the Thirty-second Army on Okinawa marked the collapse of the plan for an all-out defense of the Ryukyus. Admitting defeat, the Japanese by 22 June had begun to concentrate their forces for a last-ditch defense of the home islands.

In addition to the loss of a great base at the very doorstep of Japan itself the battle for Okinawa cost the enemy 107,500 known dead and

* General Buckner was killed in action on this date, and Lieutenant General Geiger assumed temporary command of the Tenth Army.

7,400 prisoners. An estimated 20,000 more dead were never acually viewed, for the hundreds of caves that were sealed by our troops during the campaign became the graves of their garrisons. Tenth Army casualties totaled 39,430, including 7,374 killed.* While American losses were indeed high, the ratio of better than three to one (our total casualties against the number of Japanese killed and taken prisoner) compared favorably with the comparative ratios of five to four at Iwo Jima, two to one at Saipan, and five to three at Tarawa.

Off Okinawa our Navy suffered the heaviest losses of any campaign in the war. A total of 368 American warships, transports, and other ships were sunk or damaged from all causes during the three-month conflict. Of the thirty-six vessels sunk, however, not one was a capital ship, although a number of capital ships were damaged. Our losses in aircraft totaled 763. To inflict these losses the Japanese seriously depleted their already dwindling air strength. Over 4,000 of their planes were destroyed in combat, and almost as many more were lost from a combination of other causes. This was a serious blow to a nation faced with an imminent invasion of her home territory.

Comments.—The struggle for Okinawa differed in many respects from any campaign that had taken place in the Pacific. In each of the previous amphibious assaults we had first achieved air superiority and then had sent the troops ashore. But at Okinawa this was not possible; and the enemy air force was able to render impressive support from bases in the home islands, particularly from Kyushu, only 350 miles away.

Lacking the ability to wage orthodox aerial warfare, the enemy was fully prepared to exploit the unique potentialities of organized suicide attacks against surface vessels. Since the mounting of large-scale air strikes was simplified by the close proximity of extensive ground facilities, the Japanese planned for attacks in sufficient force to saturate our fighter and antiaircraft defenses. In sharp contrast, our lack of nearby airfields from which to support the assault on Okinawa forced us to depend entirely on aircraft carriers until suitable

* Losses in the divisions of the Tenth Army were as follows:

	Total Casualties	Killed in Action or Died of Wounds
7th Infantry Division	10,893	1,122
27th Infantry Division	5,224	711
77th Infantry Division	7,126	1,018
96th Infantry Division	10,247	1,506
1st Marine Division	13,002	1,115
6th Marine Division	12,725	1,622

landing strips could be secured and developed in the objective area. Carriers, as compared to land bases, are highly vulnerable, since they can be sunk or damaged beyond immediate repair by even a single bomb, torpedo, or suicide plane. Moreover, the necessity for remaining in one area, such as occurred at Okinawa, dissipates one great advantage of carrier-based air power, its strategic mobility.

The enemy's strategy for the defense of Okinawa was designed to capitalize upon the advantage he possessed in mounting and sustaining large-scale air attacks over the area. On land the Thirty-second Army was concentrated in a highly organized defensive zone with the mission of holding our ground forces at bay while Japanese air power, reinforced by surface elements, destroyed our supporting fleet. Once the line of supply to the beachhead had been severed, American troops ashore would be isolated and subject to eventual defeat.

The invasion of the Ryukyus brought about a sustained struggle between our carrier air force and the Japanese land-based air fleet. While considerable aid was rendered by the long-range Army aircraft that pounded Kyushu and Formosa and by the land planes that after a time operated from captured fields on Okinawa, the carrier-based planes of our Navy carried the main burden of the battle. Their victory under conditions so favorable to the enemy was one of the great achievements of the war.

In considering the heavy losses sustained by our Navy it should be noted that they were not suffered during a short engagement, as is usual in naval warfare, but during a campaign that lasted three months. Although subjected to continual attacks by the enemy's suicide aircraft, our fleet was forced to remain in an area barely one hundred miles square. Enemy counteraction against our naval air power was particularly violent and resulted in the damaging of eight fast carriers and three escort carriers.

The accomplishments of the radar picket ships contributed in no small way to the success of the Navy in keeping open the sea lanes to the beachhead on Okinawa. The early radar detection of approaching raids, the excellent direction of fighter interception, and finally the picket ships' own contribution in planes shot down were all noteworthy incidents in the campaign. So efficient did the interception of suicide aircraft become that the harassed enemy began to attack the first ships that came in sight. Since these were normally the radar pickets, very few planes slipped through to the inner anchorage, the ultimate objective of the mass suicide attacks. The obsolete Japanese aircraft, flown by partially trained pilots, were incapable of effective evasive action in the air, with the result that our fighters and antiaircraft downed unusually large numbers of them.

Possessing even less maneuverability, the Baka bomb scored only four hits during the entire campaign, although hundreds were launched.

An outstanding logistical feature of the Okinawa campaign was the complete support of a great fleet at sea over a protracted period.* Because of the Navy's operational requirements the problem of repair and upkeep assumed a progressively more important role. The Kerama Islands, seized prior to L-day, became the principal haven for damaged ships. Complete repairs allowed the prompt return of many naval units to action, while emergency repairs to the more seriously damaged vessels rendered them seaworthy for retirement to rear bases.

The enemy's failure to defend the Hagushi beaches, despite the almost certain knowledge that we would land there, was a serious error. An amphibious force is never more vulnerable than during the early stages of the landing. It seems likely that the casualties of the Tenth Army would have been much greater in the Okinawa campaign if the enemy had properly capitalized upon his opportunity to resist our initial landing. Although General Ushijima's stated purpose was to prolong the battle ashore, it is difficult to see how this was aided by calmly handing over two airfields intact and failing to place even artillery fire on the landing beaches.

The defenses of the Shuri Zone were among the strongest encountered by our troops in the Pacific; and the enemy's employment of artillery was more effective than ever before**, although he had still not learned the technique of massed fire. The narrowness of the island allowed little room for maneuver, but it did make it possible for naval gunfire from both flanks to interdict completely the enemy-held area. Our fire superiority, however, was nullified to a considerable degree by the cave defense system employed by the Japanese.

The period 8 April to 31 May witnessed a struggle involving a total of 190,000 troops along a front of approximately 8,000 yards. During these fifty-three days the average daily gain by the Tenth Army was 133 yards.

FINAL COLLAPSE OF JAPAN

The jump to Okinawa, on the threshold of Japan, was planned to be the last American island-hopping operation before the final move into the enemy's homeland (**Map 19**). Even while our forces were

* This had been accomplished before but not over such a long period.

** Even so, it is reported that the 100,000 rounds of artillery ammunition fired by the Japanese was only 6 per cent of that fired by us.

fighting in the Philippines, on Iwo, and on Okinawa, preparations were being made for what would be the last great struggle of the war. The preliminary operations had been undertaken to provide the necessary bases for launching the greatest amphibious assault of all time. From Iwo fighter planes could escort our Marianas-based Superfortresses in attacks on Japan; and from Okinawa, Superfortresses and other bombers would join in the assault. While this pre-invasion bombing was under way, our ground forces would be concentrating in the Philippines, Okinawa, and other already conquered areas.

On 6 April, shortly after his promotion to general of the army, General MacArthur was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assume command of all Army forces in the Pacific; and Admiral Nimitz, who had been elevated to the rank of fleet admiral, was given complete control of all naval forces.* Both commanders were directed to prepare plans for the invasion of Japan.

During April the XX Bomber Command was disbanded, and all combat and service units were moved from the China–Burma–India theater to the Marianas to build up our Superfortress strength there.** In July this step was followed by a major reorganization of the air command in the Pacific. The XXI Bomber Command was redesignated the Twentieth Air Force, under the command of Lieutenant General Nathan F. Twining. The Twentieth and Eighth Air Forces, the latter headed by Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle, made up the United States Army Strategic Air Forces,*** under General Carl A. Spaatz. The Fifth, Seventh, and Thirteenth Air Forces constituted General George C. Kenney's Far Eastern Air Forces, which operated under the control of General MacArthur. The Eleventh Air Force, based in Alaska and the Aleutians, remained under the operational control of Admiral Nimitz.

While these changes, aimed at streamlining the Pacific command, were being effected, our air attacks on Japan were growing in intensity and effectiveness. Tokyo, which had first been struck by

* Since the Okinawa campaign was already under way, the Tenth Army was left under Admiral Nimitz's control. It came under General MacArthur's command on 31 July.

** Operations from India ceased on 30 March. By 1 May the 58th Wing—the only formation actually deployed in Asia—had been established on Tinian under control of the XXI Bomber Command. Headquarters personnel of the XX Bomber Command were transferred to Okinawa as the nucleus for the Eighth Air Force, which, as already noted, was being redeployed from Europe to function as an additional very heavy bombardment air force in the Pacific.

*** The Strategic Air Forces operated under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with General Arnold as their executive agent.

111 Superfortresses on 24 November, bore the brunt of air assaults that soon spread out to other industrial centers and grew in size until more than 800 of the huge bombers were being used. During December 1944, the first full month of operations, our Marianas-based Superfortresses dropped 1,700 tons of bombs on Japan. This figure soared to 42,700 tons for the month of July 1945.

Many operational problems had to be solved during those eight months in order to bring about not only this increase in striking power but the effectiveness with which it was applied. Initially our planes dropped their bombs from altitudes of over 25,000 feet. Adverse weather conditions often made it necessary to bomb by radar rather than visually, and winds as high as 180 miles per hour were not uncommon at those altitudes. Primary targets were passed over many times because of unfavorable conditions and secondary targets attacked instead. The sixteen-hour flight to and from the targets was entirely over open water or enemy-held territory. There was little chance of a crippled plane or one short of fuel returning to its base. Enemy fighters from Iwo often picked off damaged Superfortresses. All of these things reduced the effectiveness of our attacks.

In March, Major General Curtis E. LeMay, then commanding the XXI Bomber Command, made one of the important decisions of the war: to bomb Tokyo at night with incendiaries at low level, using his full force. This attack by 279 Superfortresses was made on the night of 9-10 March at a mean bombing altitude of 7,000 feet. The Japanese defenses were confused, and we suffered only moderate losses. Almost sixteen square miles of the heart of Tokyo were burned out in what was up to then the most destructive air operation in history (**Map 18**). This attack was followed in quick succession by night incendiary strikes on Nagoya, Kobe, and Osaka; and thereafter the air campaign to destroy Japan's war industry continued by night and by day until the capitulation.

The capture of Iwo Jima, as already pointed out, provided a base from which fighters could escort our big bombers to Japan. It also served as a haven for damaged planes or those forced down for other reasons. The fighter escort permitted lower bombing altitudes during daylight operations,* with a consequent saving of fuel that was reflected in the increase of the bomb load per plane from 2.6 tons in November 1944 to 7.4 tons in July 1945. Improved radar equipment also made our operations more effective and more independent of weather conditions. (During July more than 75 per cent of all bomb

* During periods of good weather daylight raids were carried out against precision targets from altitudes of 12,000 to 20,000 feet.

releases were by radar.) By July the planned destruction of the industrial areas of Tokyo, Yokahama, Nagoya, Kobe, and Osaka had been completed **(Map 17)**; and our bombers turned their attention to Japan's secondary industrial centers. We now had available 1,000 Superfortresses in the Marianas, which enabled us to send groups of fifty to a hundred planes in simultaneous attacks on widely separated targets. These tactics baffled the enemy, who was unable to intercept all of our formations and who apparently was saving most of his planes for the day of invasion. His fighter opposition continued to dwindle; and by the end of July it was so meager that we were announcing our targets in advance, warning the Japanese people to evacuate their cities. Conditions close to panic were created in many parts of Japan by this system of forewarning cities of their impending doom and then destroying them. The civilian population was rapidly becoming aware of the true course of the war and of the inability of their own armed forces to stop or even interfere with the destruction of their homeland. The will to resist—at least among those charged with the direction of the war—was already weakening.

While the industries of Japan were being leveled, our Superfortresses were also engaged in mining operations designed to complete the blockade of Japan that our submarines had already initiated **(Map 18)**. These operations, which began in March 1945, are summarized in a report to the Secretary of War by General Arnold, which states in part as follows:

> . . . This was the first use of aerial mines as a truly strategic weapon. Concerning the B-29 mining operations Admiral Nimitz cabled General LeMay: "The planning . . . and technical operation of aircraft mining on a scale never before attained has accomplished phenomenal results. . . ."
>
> By combining the four basic types of influence mines, each with a wide range of adjustments, 200 different mines could be produced, each tailored for a special job.
>
> The mining program was divided into five major phases. The first phase, started on 27 March 1945, involved the mining of the vital but narrow Shimonoseki Strait between Honshu and Kyushu and certain naval bases out of which Japanese naval units were likely to steam to the defense of Okinawa. In the second phase B-29's ranged from Shimonoseki Straits to Tokyo Bay, the plan being to interdict the shipping lanes between the great industrial cities, which depended on water transportation for 75 per cent of their requirements. In the third phase attention was turned to the secondary ports along the western and northern coasts of Honshu, on which Japan was becoming more and more dependent for any commerce from Manchuria and Korea across the Sea of Japan. The fourth phase involved intensified mining of ports of northern

> and western Honshu and Kyushu, Kobe, and Osaka. In phase five every port of consequence used by the Japanese on the southern and eastern coasts of Korea was mined, and re-mining of other ports was continued. Mining the port of Rashin, Korea, only 125 miles from Vladivostok, involved a round trip of 4,160 miles, using Iwo for staging purposes. Throughout the mining campaign nearly half the mines dropped were reserved for Japan's shipping bottleneck, Shimonoseki Strait. All mines were dropped by radar at night.
>
> Accumulating evidence points to the fact that this mining campaign achieved greater success than was anticipated. More than half a million tons of shipping were sunk, damaged, or immobilized. The blockade as a whole was so complete that only the thinnest trickle of raw materials flowed from the Asiatic continent, shipments of food were a fraction of that required to keep the home islands above a starvation diet, and the Japanese were unable to supply their vast forces in "Greater East Asia" with adequate equipment. . . .

Meanwhile Admiral Nimitz dispatched Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet to Japanese waters to contribute its efforts to the ever tightening blockade of Japan and to the destruction of her industry and resources for waging war. On 10 July more than 1,000 carrier-based planes struck the Tokyo area, concentrating their attacks on the enemy's airfields. This was the first of a series of raids and surface bombardments that were carried out by the Third Fleet and units of the British Pacific Fleet during the following three weeks. Despite bad weather which curtailed operations several times during this period, targets from Kyushu to Hokkaido were struck with telling effect. The enemy's air opposition was meager, but pilots reported that he still had aircraft dispersed in woods, graveyards, and villages —in some cases a considerable distance from an airfield. There seemed to be little doubt that he was conserving his remaining planes for the day of our invasion.

A particularly fruitful attack by our naval planes was carried out on 24 and 25 July. On those two days, and again on the 28th in a follow-up attack, Japanese warships in various harbors in the Inland Sea were our targets. Thirteen of them, including three battleships and a newly completed carrier, were sunk or irreparably damaged; and an additional thirty-six received some damage.

While these air strikes were being carried out, our surface forces were steaming up and down the east coast of Honshu, shelling steel-producing centers, transportation facilities, and other installations.

By 31 July the forces under Admiral Halsey's command had destroyed 940 enemy aircraft and had damaged many more. Most of the remaining major naval units of the Imperial Fleet had been sunk

or damaged. About 20 per cent of Japan's iron production had been knocked out; and numerous railroad lines, tunnels, locomotives, bridges, and railroad maintenance establishments had been destroyed.

Meanwhile hundreds of our Okinawa-based planes were hammering Kyushu and sweeping Japanese shipping from the Korea and Shanghai areas. General Doolittle established the headquarters of his Eighth Air Force on Okinawa on 28 July. At that time he predicted that Superfortresses under his command would be striking at Japan by late August and that soon after that daily attacks by 5,000 planes of all types would be under way. He estimated that the total tonnage dropped on Japan would be about twice that dropped on Germany. In one statement he said: "Because of the high efficiency of the Superfort, one ton of bombs will be dropped on Japan for every 2¾ tons of AAF material brought over the beaches at Okinawa, whereas in England 5½ tons of material were required for each ton of bombs dropped on Germany. One Superfort group will drop as many bombs per day as four groups of other types of heavy bombers."

It was now apparent to all that the full might of American air and sea power was just beginning to be unleashed in preparation for the invasion of Japan which General MacArthur was readying for 1 November 1945. The plan that he and Admiral Nimitz had developed is shown on the map. Two major invasions were scheduled: Kyushu was to be assaulted about 1 November by the Sixth Army, and landings on Honshu were to be made by the Eighth and Tenth Armies about four months later. The redeployed First Army was to follow the Eighth and Tenth into Honshu. It was known that some 2,000,000 fresh enemy troops were in the home islands and that the Japanese still had an air force of 8,000 to 9,000 planes. The probability that suicide tactics would be employed by every defensive enemy element made it likely that the invasion would be costly.

On 26 July the Allies issued the Potsdam Proclamation, which called for the unconditional surrender of Japan but offered a just peace. Its announced purpose was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction. For a time Japan ignored this ultimatum, despite military disasters that would have already forced a less fanatical enemy to sue for peace.

The enemy's refusal to surrender was the signal for the Allies to unloose a fresh series of devastating blows. At 0815 on 6 August a Superfortress bomber released a single atomic bomb over Hiroshima, the site of important Japanese military installations. Sixty per cent of the city was destroyed. It has been estimated that this

the most destructive agent ever devised by science* had done the job of 220 Superfortresses carrying full loads of conventional bombs. In its first test the new weapon—the most closely guarded secret of the war—had revolutionized our entire concept of aerial bombardment and had opened a new era of warfare.

While the enemy was still reeling under the impact of the first atomic bomb, a second overwhelming blow was delivered on 8 August. On that date Russia declared war on Japan, and on the 9th the Red Army smashed across the borders of Manchuria (**Map 3**). Three army groups under the command of Marshal Alexander M. Vasilevsky, former chief of staff of the Russian Army, were employed in the offensive against the Japanese Kwantung Army. This army, commanded by General Otozo Yamada, had a strength of about 925,000, including 300,000 Manchurian puppet troops who were suitable for garrison duties.

The Russian plan was to pinch off all of Manchuria. Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky's Third Far Eastern Army Group made the main effort, driving into western Manchuria from Outer Mongolia. The other drive was made by Marshal Kyrill A. Meretskov's First Far Eastern Army Group, which attacked westward into the Japanese puppet state from the Vladivostock area. General Maxim Purkaev's Second Far Eastern Army Group applied pressure along the northern border of Manchuria. At the same time Russian troops moved into Karafuto, the Japanese half of Sakhalin Island.

By 15 August the Soviet forces had made sizable advances against indifferent opposition. The fighting in Manchuria continued until 20 August, the Russians stating that the surrender could not be regarded as complete until the enemy forces had laid down their arms. The final line reached by the Soviet armies is shown on the map.

At 1102 on 9 August, the day on which Marshal Vasilevsky put his troops in motion, a second atomic bomb was dropped on Japan (**Map 18**). This time Nagasaki, industrial city and important port on the west coast of Kyushu, had been selected as the target. About 45 per cent of the city was wiped out by this bomb, which was of a more destructive type than the first one, although because of the difference in terrain and point of fall it did less damage.

On the 9th our Third Fleet returned to carry out a two-day air attack on Honshu, during which 412 Japanese planes were destroyed or damaged. Forty-four small ships were sunk and thirty-eight damaged. This air assault was followed by increased attacks by our

* The most striking result of the atomic bombings was the tremendous loss of human life.

Okinawa-based planes and by Superfortresses from the Marianas. On 14 August more than 800 of the great bombers delivered heavy attacks against targets on Honshu.

The succession of rapid blows delivered by the Allies was too overwhelming for even Japan, and on 15 August* she capitulated. Thus after three years and eight months the war in the Pacific, and with it the struggle between the United Nations and the Axis powers, came to an end. The general situation on VJ-day is shown on **Map 19,**** which also shows the limit of the Japanese advance in 1942 and the area regained by the Allies since that time.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC

When General MacArthur, as Supreme Allied Commander, accepted the formal surrender of the Japanese nation on the deck of the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945, that twenty-minute ceremony dramatically rang down the final curtain on the greatest war in history.

Our grand strategic plan for the global war was simple: defeat Germany first and then turn on Japan. This plan was based on the fact that Germany was the more formidable foe and that our help was needed in Europe if our Allies were to be able to continue the struggle. It conformed to the age-old principle of concentration of combat power.

Distance was one factor that helped us to hold in the Pacific while we were building up our strength. Another was the breaking of the Japanese secret code, which enabled Admiral Nimitz to concentrate his smaller naval forces and defeat parts of the more powerful enemy fleet in the Coral Sea and at Midway. A third factor was the series of blunders made by the Japanese. Had they concentrated their superior forces in the Southwest Pacific, it would probably have been impossible for us to save Australia.

After our counteroffensive started, we were aided by the enemy's persistence in trying to hold every last one of his ill-gotten gains. This led to continued piecemeal use of his forces and brought on a situation in which at the time of the threatened invasion of the home islands he found that he had available for use in the final battle only slightly more than one-third of his 5,500,000-man armed force. The remainder, still bearing arms, had been isolated in China, Burma,

* As previously stated, 14 August in the United States, which was the date on which notice of Japan's surrender was received in Washington.

** The order of battle of our forces on VJ-day is given in Appendix 6.

Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and on many other by-passed islands in the Pacific. Truk alone had a garrison of 38,000.

Surprised by our bold strategy, the enemy could not, after a time, draw in his scattered forces even if he had been willing to give up territory. Not only were we moving too fast, but his Navy and merchant fleet had dwindled to a mere fraction of their former strength. Out of a total of 1,197 warships on hand at the beginning or built during the war, only 648 were left at the time of the surrender, and most of those were small craft. Only one battleship (heavily damaged) out of twelve, five carriers (one serviceable) out of twenty-five, and five cruisers (two serviceable) out of forty-three were left. Of a total of 10,100,000 tons of merchant shipping, only 1,200,000 tons remained, and barely 300,000 tons of this was serviceable. To American submarines, which had carried on their silent war since the day of Pearl Harbor, belongs much of the credit for the destruction of the enemy's merchant shipping* and some of the glory for the destruction of his navy. Our undersea craft sank over 1,200 enemy vessels, including 189 combatant ships. We lost fifty-two submarines from all causes.

The figures on losses give one indication of our achievements in the Pacific. Our total Army casualties** in the global war were 948,418. including 229,238 killed in battle.*** Of these, only about 175,000 were suffered in the war with Japan, including about 52,000 killed. According to *our* official calculations the Japanese suffered over 1,500,000 Army casualties during the war, including 1,219,000 battle dead. Postwar *enemy* estimates of battle dead in all the armed forces range from 550,000 to 1,106,000. The absence of official Japanese records precludes any more accurate computation.**** The Japanese policy of sacrificing troops to make the war costly for the Americans proved to be a boomerang.

Many technical innovations of outstanding importance appeared during the war, such as radar, rocket-propelled and guided missiles, the jet engine, and long-range aircraft. Among the most interesting developments was the evolution of our system of supply. In the

* Our submarines sank almost 60 per cent of the 8,900,000 tons of merchant shipping lost by Japan. Army and Navy aircraft accounted for another 30 per cent.

** Total Army and Navy casualties, as tabulated in May 1946, were 1,097,193.

*** Total fatalities from all causes in the armed forces were 396,637, of which the Army suffered 308,978.

**** The figures given do not include almost 800,000 civilian casualties that were suffered in air raids on Japan, of which about 300,000 were dead. The two atomic bombs alone killed over 70,000 and injured another 110,000.

South and Southwest Pacific Areas seventy-two combat landing operations were successfully undertaken during a period of less than three years—an average of more than two per month. The logistical support of those operations, thousands of miles from sources of supply, was a tremendous achievement. Our ability to land on a hostile shore and supply our troops over the beaches obviated the need for large ports or harbors that had always been considered necessary.

In the years to come there will be endless discussions as to "who won the war" in the Pacific. The sailors can rightly claim that without them there could have been no victory. The airmen can with reason contend that they delivered the final blows which, for the first time in history, brought a great military power to her knees without an invasion of her soil. The ground soldiers (including marines) will counter with the fact that but for the seizure of bases near the home islands (operations in which the Navy was a full partner) there could have been no destructive bombing of Japan. Those who developed the atomic bomb will argue that though Japan was defeated, her will to resist was not broken until after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.* The verdict of history will be that the war was won by the combined efforts of all, including those who worked without glory in the zone of the interior.

* After we landed in Normandy and advanced to the Seine, Germany had no chance to avoid defeat; but many bitter battles had to take place before her will to resist was broken.

APPENDIX 1

CASUALTIES ON LUZON, 1945

	United States			Japanese	
Month	*Killed*	*Wounded*	*Missing*	*Killed*	*Captured*
January	1,297	4,237	220	15,033	586
February	2,002	8,132	107	44,804	578
March	1,255	5,308	47	42,208	553
April	1,813	7,653	54	26,209	774
May	1,052	4,435	62	19,741	1,181
June	338	1,564	10	24,221	3,494
July	126	690	3	14,295	1,734
August	50	110	0	6,050	736
Totals	7,933	32,129	503	192,561	9,656

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APPENDIX 2

Major American ground combat units assigned to the Sixth and Eighth Armies by the general reorganization of 1 July 1945:

SIXTH ARMY

Corps: I, IX (arrived Leyte 10 July), XI.

Divisions: Americal, 1st Cavalry, 11th Airborne, 25th Infantry, 33d Infantry, 40th Infantry, 41st Infantry, 43d Infantry, 77th Infantry (returned from Okinawa 15 July), 81st Infantry (arrived in Leyte in May).

Independent regimental combat teams: 158th, 112th Cavalry.

EIGHTH ARMY

Corps: X, XIV.

Divisions (all infantry): 6th, 24th, 31st, 32d, 37th, 38th, 93d (at Morotai and New Guinea).

Regimental combat team: 503d Parachute Infantry.

APPENDIX 3

OPERATION ICEBERG

United States Pacific Fleet—Admiral C. W. Nimitz
Fifth Fleet (Central Pacific Task Forces)—
Admiral R. A. Spruance
Fast Carrier Force (TF 58)—Vice Admiral M. A. Mitscher
British Carrier Force (TF 57)—
Vice Admiral H. B. Rawlings, R. N.
Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet—
Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, Jr.
Strategic Air Forces, POA—Major General W. H. Hale
Joint Expeditionary Force (TF 51)—
Vice Admiral R. K. Turner
Amphibious Support Force (TF 52)—
Rear Admiral W. H. Blandy
Gunfire and Covering Force (TF 54)—
Rear Admiral M. L. Deyo
Northern Attack Force (TF 53)—
Rear Admiral L. F. Reifsnider
Southern Attack Force (TF 55)—
Rear Admiral J. L. Hall, Jr.
Expeditionary Troops (TF 56)—
Lieutenant General S. B. Buckner, Jr.
Tenth Army (Assault Troops)
XXIV Corps (Southern Landing Force)—
Major General J. R. Hodge
7th Division—
Major General A. V. Arnold
96th Division—
Major General J. L. Bradley
III Amphibious Corps (Northern Landing Force)—Major General R. S. Geiger, U.S.M.C.
1st Marine Division—Major General P. A. del Valle, U.S.M.C.
6th Marine Division—Major General L. C. Shepherd, Jr., U.S.M.C.
Western Islands Landing Force
77th Division—
Major General A. D. Bruce

Demonstration Landing Force
2d Marine Division*—Major General
T. E. Watson, U.S.M.C.
Floating Reserve
27th Division—
Major General G. W. Griner, Jr.
Area Reserve
81st Division**—
Major General P. J. Mueller
Tactical Air Force—
Major Gen. F. P. Mulcahy, U.S.M.C.
Island Command—
Major General F. C. Wallace

* Left target area on 14 April and returned to Saipan.
** Released from area reserve on 18 April and transferred to Southwest Pacific Area.

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APPENDIX 4

I. Timing of some loadings and movements (latest dates for completion of actions indicated).

Depart From			Arrive at Mounting Point Named	Start Assault Loading	Depart for Objective	Sailing Time to Objective
West Coast	Oahu	Guadalcanal				
14 Jan.			Oahu, 24 Jan.	23 Feb.	10 Mar.	21 days
14 Jan.	24 Jan.	28 Jan.	Marianas, 9 Feb.	11 Mar.	26 Mar.	5 "
10 Jan.	21 Jan.		Guadalcanal, 3 Feb.	5 Mar.	20 Mar.	11 "
9 Jan.	19 Jan.	27 Jan.	Leyte, 9 Feb.	11 Mar.	26 Mar.	5 "

II. Ship and cargo requirements.

Source	Ships	Personnel	Measurement Tons	Short Tons
San Francisco and Roi (Marshalls)	7	1,500	17,188	8,052
Seattle	6	1,611	12,856	4,216
Oahu	39	12,837	69,423	26,762
Saipan, Tinian, Guam	61	31,771	119,673	47,446
Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santo, Russells	159	74,970	285,279	108,435
Leyte	186	71,163	320,148	117,884
Totals	458	193,852*	824,567	312,795

* This figure includes the assault force of 182,112 and the first-echelon garrison of 11,740. The remainder of the garrison force to follow totaled 258,014 and required the unloading of over 1,000,000 measurement tons of supplies and equipment.

III. Cargo unloaded over the beach at Hagushi, 1 April to 15 May.

Period	Measurement Tons
L-Day to L + 10	532,291
L + 10 to L + 20	147,878
L + 20 to L + 30	132,013
L + 30 to L + 40	147,498
L + 40 to L + 45	71,777
Total	1,031,457*

* During this period an additional 224,829 measurement tons were unloaded at other points in the Ryukyus.

APPENDIX 5

JAPANESE SUICIDE SORTIES DURING OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

Dates	*Approximate Number of Planes*
6-7 April	355
12-13 April	185
15-16 April	165
27-28 April	115
3-4 May	125
10-11 May	150
24-25 May	165
27-28 May	110
3-7 June	50
21-22 June	45
Total for 10 mass suicide attacks	1,465
Additional suicide sorties between mass attacks	185
Suicide sorties flown from Formosa bases	250
Grand Total	1,900
Orthodox sorties during same period	3,700

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APPENDIX 6

ORDER OF BATTLE OF U. S. ARMY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC 14 AUGUST 1945

Unit	*Commander*
General Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific	General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
Sixth Army	Gen. Walter Krueger
40th Infantry Division	Brig. Gen. D. J. Myers
11th Airborne Division	Maj. Gen. J. M. Swing
I Corps	Maj. Gen. I. P. Swift
25th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. C. L. Mullins
33d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. P. W. Clarkson
41st Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. J. A. Doe
IX Corps	Maj. Gen. C. W. Ryder
77th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. A. D. Bruce
81st Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. P. J. Mueller
XI Corps	Lt. Gen. C. P. Hall
43d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. L. F. Wing
Americal Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. W. H. Arnold
1st Cavalry Division	Maj. Gen. W. C. Chase

APPENDIX 6—(Continued)

Eighth Army	Lt. Gen. R. L. Eichelberger
93d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. H. H. Johnson
96th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. J. L. Bradley
X Corps	Maj. Gen. F. C. Sibert
24th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. R. B. Woodruff
31st Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. C. A. Martin
XIV Corps	Lt. Gen. O. W. Griswold
6th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. C. E. Hurdis
32d Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. W. H. Gill
37th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. R. S. Beightler
38th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. F. A. Irving
Tenth Army	Gen. J. W. Stilwell
XXIV Corps	Lt. Gen. J. R. Hodge
7th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold
27th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. G. W. Griner, Jr.
U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific	Lt. Gen. R. C. Richardson, Jr.
98th Infantry Division	Maj. Gen. A. M. Harper
U. S. Army Forces, Western Pacific	Lt. Gen. W. D. Styer
Far Eastern Air Forces	Gen. G. C. Kenney
Fifth Air Force	Lt. Gen. E. C. Whitehead
Seventh Air Force	Brig. Gen. T. D. White
Thirteenth Air Force	Maj. Gen. P. B. Wurtsmith

ORDER OF BATTLE OF U. S. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES 14 AUGUST 1945

Headquarters, U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces, Guam, Marianas Islands:	
Commanding General	Gen. Carl Spaatz
Deputy Commander	Lt. Gen. B. McK. Giles
Chief of Staff	Maj. Gen. C. E. LeMay
Eighth Air Force, Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands:	
Commanding General	Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle
Twentieth Air Force, Guam, Marianas Islands:	
Commanding General	Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining

THE WAR WITH JAPAN (1)

Situation 1 January 1945 and

Area Recovered Since

August 1942

0 200 400 600 800 1000

SCALE OF MILES

TIBET
CHINA
INDIA
BURMA
THAILAND
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
EAST CHINA SEA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINE SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
CORAL SEA
TIMOR SEA
ARAFURA SEA
BANDA SEA
JAVA SEA
CELEBES SEA
SULU SEA
MOLUCCA PASSAGE
MALAY STATES
SUMATRA
BORNEO
JAVA
AUSTRALIA
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
PAPUA
HONSHU
KYUSHU
TOKYO
SHANGHAI
NANKING
HANKOW
HANGCHOW
CHUNGKING
KWEIYANG
KUNMING
CHANGSHA
KWEILIN
SWATOW
HONG KONG
AMOY
FORMOSA
TAKAO
OKINAWA
RYUKYU ISLANDS
SAKISHIMA
BONIN ISLANDS
VOLCANO ISLANDS
IWO
MARCUS
WAKE
MARIANAS ISLANDS
SAIPAN
GUAM
TINIAN
ENIWETOK
MARSHALL ISLANDS
WOTJE
MILEOLAP
KWAJALEIN
MAJURO
JALUIT
MAKIN
NAURU
ELLICE ISLANDS
CAROLINE ISLANDS
ULITHI
YAP
NOUMA
PALAU ISLANDS
TRUK
PONAPE
ADMIRALTY ISLANDS
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO
NEW IRELAND
NEW BRITAIN
BOUGAINVILLE
SOLOMON ISLANDS
GUADALCANAL
SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS
ESPIRITU SANTO
NEW HEBRIDES
NEW CALEDONIA
EQUATOR
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
LUZON
MINDORO
MINDANAO
PALAWAN
PANAY
LEYTE
NEGROS
ISABELA IS.
MANILA
DAVAO
SPRATLY
HAINAN
LINGAYEN GULF
CAM RANH BAY
GULF OF SIAM
VICTORIA POINT
NICOBAR ISLANDS
ANDAMAN ISLANDS
CALCUTTA
RANGOON
MANDALAY
LASHIO
CHIENG MAI
MESOD
MOULMEIN
BANGKOK
SAIGON
SINGORA
PATANI
KOTA BHARU
PENANG
KUANTAN
SINGAPORE
STRAIT OF MALACCA
SERIA
MIRI
SARAWAK
NORTH BORNEO
SANDAKEN
JOLO
TALAUD
MOROTAI
HALMAHERA
SANANA
BIAK
SAMAMI
MANOKWARI
HOLLANDIA
AITAPE
WEWAK
SARMI
DUTCH NEW GUINEA
AMBOINA
CERAM
BALIKPAPAN
PALEMBANG
BATAVIA
SOERABAJA
BALI
FLORES
TIMOR
SOEMBA
CHRISTMAS
DARWIN
PORT MORESBY
TORRES STRAIT
GILBERT ISLANDS
BURMA ROAD
LEDO ROAD
IRRAWADDY R.
SALWEEN R.
YANGTZE R.
MEKONG R.
MOLUCCA PASSAGE
MAKASSAR STRAIT

Aug. 1942


1 Jan. 1945


Aug. 1942


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
1 Jan. 1945


Aug. 1942



2
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
BURMA CAMPAIGN
Situation 18 June 1945 and
Principal Operations Since 1 January
0 50 100 200
SCALE OF MILES
XXXXX
C.E.F.
WEI
XXXXX
11
LEESE
XXX
NORTHERN COMBAT AREA COMMAND
SULTAN
XXXX
FOURTEENTH
SLIM
XXX
IV
XXX
XXXIII
XXXX
THIRTY-THIRD
XXXX
FIFTEENTH
XXX
TWENTY-EIGHTH
XXX
XV
XXX
XV
XXXXX
BURMA AREA
1 Jan.
9 Apr.
30 Apr.
18 June
18 June
BAY OF BENGAL
BHUTAN
TIBET
CHINA
INDO
FRENCH
THAILAND
BURMA
CHUNGKING
KUNMING
BURMA ROAD
To CHANGSHA
CALCUTTA
CHITTAGONG
RAMGARH
175 mi.
IMPHAL
KOHIMA
DIMAPUR
LEDO
SADIYA
FT HERTZ
MYITKYINA
MOGAUNG
HOMALIN
SHAMO
LUNGLING
PAOSHAN
MANDALAY
AKYAB
MAGWE
PROME
PEGU
RANGOON
MOULMEIN
MESOD
CAPE NEGRAIS
GULF OF MARTABAN
BANGKOK
100 Mi.
CHIENGMAI
HANOI
HAIPHONG
MONG PSTAK
Brahmaputra R.
Chindwin R.
Irrawaddy R.
Salween
Mekong R.
Yangtze R.
ASSAM-BENGAL RAILROAD



3
U. S. S. R.
TRANS-SIBERIAN R.R.
LAKE BAIKAL
IRKUTSK
SERGIOPOL
OUTER MONGOLIA
CARAVAN AND MOTOR ROUTE
URUMCHI
GOBI DESERT
SINKIANG
ANSI
INNER MONGOLIA
GREAT WALL
PAOTOW
KALGAN
TATUNG
PEIPING
TIENTSIN
CHAHAR
JEHOL
SUIYA
MANCHURIA (MANCHUKUO)
TSITSIHAR
HARBIN
KHABAROVSK
VLADIVOSTOK
HSINKING
MUKDEN
KWANTUNG PENINSULA
PORT ARTHUR
KOREA (CHOSEN)
JAPAN
HONSHU
KYUSHU
SHIKOKU
OKINAWA
RYUKYU ISLANDS
FORMOSA (TAIWAN)
PHILIPPINES
SHANTUNG
TSINAN
TSINGTAO
YELLOW SEA
TAICHOWANG
HAICHOW
SUCHOW
LANCHOW
HWANG HO
CHENGCHOW
SIAN
ANKANG
NANKING
SHANGHAI
HANKOW
LAKE TAI
Yangtze
CHENGTU
ICHANG
CHUNGKING
CHANGTEH
CHANGSHA
WENCHOW
FOOCHOW
AMOY
SWATOW
CANTON
HONG KONG
KWEIYANG
KUNMING
BURMA ROAD
HIMALAYA MTS
TIBET
NEPAL
BHUTAN
SADIYA
LEDO
Brahmaputra R.
ASSAM
Ganges River
INDIA
RAMGARH
CALCUTTA
BAY OF BENGAL
BURMA
MANDALAY
AKYAB
RANGOON
MOULMEIN
Salween R.
Mekong R.
THAILAND
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
HAIPHONG
PAKHOI
KWANGCHOWAN
HAINAN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
SPRATLY ISLAND
500 MI.
15 Aug.
1 Jan.
20 Aug
Seized in 1945
Recovered in 1945.
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
CHINA — BURMA THEATER
General Situation 15 August 1945
and
Principal Changes Since 1 January
0 100 200 300 400 500
SCALE OF MILES



THE WAR WITH JAPAN 4
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
Situation in the Central Philippines
Early January 1945
0 25 50 75 100
SCALE OF MILES
NORTHERN LUZON
CENTRAL LUZON
(75,000)
An additional
160,000 in
these areas
Invasion convoy
BATANGAS
BICOL
Demon-
stration
3 Jan.
2 Jan.
1 Jan.
LINGAYEN
TARLAC
CABANATUAN
SAN FERNANDO
MANILA
ALABAT I.
LUCENA
BATANGAS
LUBANG
MARINDUQUE
CATANDUANES
LEGASPI
SIXTH
XXXX
EIGHTH
SIBUYAN
MASBATE
TABLAS
SEA
CALAMIAN
GROUP
VISAYAN SEA
PANAY
LEYTE GULF
ABUYOG
BAYBAY
ILOILO
CEBU
CAMOTES
SEA
PANAY
GULF
NEGROS
BOHOL
PUERTO PRINCESA
SULU SEA
MINDANAO SEA
SURIGAO STRAIT
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
MINDORO STRAIT
TABLAS STRAIT
SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT
PALAWAN
BRUNEI BAY
435 MILES



Reinforcements to arrive and land at Lingayen Gulf area between S+18 and S+32:
1
32
33
41
112 RCT
THE WAR WITH JAPAN 5
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
Landings on Luzon 9 January 1945 and Operations to 31 January
0 5 10 20 30
SCALE OF MILES
SIXTH
KRUEGER
FLOATING RESERVE:
6 Ranger (Part)
13 Group
6 Ranger
25
158 RCT
I
SWIFT
XIV
GRISWOLD
40 (Part)
9 Jan.
20 Jan.
31 Jan.
31 Jan.
See Map 6 for operations in this area.
LINGAYEN GULF
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
LUZON
ZAMBALES MOUNTAINS
CARABALLO MOUNTAINS
MADRE MOUNTAINS
SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS
SAN FERNANDO
BAGUIO
BOLINAO
AGNO
DAGUPAN
SAN CARLOS
DASOL BAY
BACABAC
AGUILAR
CAMILING
PANIQUI
TARLAC
CUYAPO
NAMPICUAN
GUIMBA
ROSALES
LUPAO
SAN JOSE
MUNOZ
RIZAL
BALOC
BONGABON
PANTABANGAN
BALER
BALER BAY
CABANATUAN
PINAGPANAAN
SCABU
PANGATIAN
GAPAN
PAPAYA
DINGALAN BAY
UMIRAY
SAN JOSE
SIBUL SPRINGS
CLARK FIELD
FT. STOTSENBURG
MT. PINATUBO
MT. ARAYAT
ARAYAT
MASALANG
ANGELES
DAU
DELORES
SAN FELIPE
SAN MARCELINO
SAN ANTONIO
SUBIC
IBA
BOTOLAN
OLONGAPO
CAMP O'DONNELL
CAPAS
CONCEPCION
TARLAC
LA PAZ
PORAC
DAMBAN
MEXICO
SAN FERNANDO
LUBAO
DUCAL
CALUMPIT
BUSTOS
PLARIDEL
NORZAGARAY
IPO
Pampanga R.
Angat R.
Maasin R.
BAUANG
PALALAM
BAGUIO
BIRAC
TEB-BO
ARITAO
SAPIT
SANTA ROSA
SALACSAC
SANTA FE
IMUGAN
BALETE PASS
DANGUL
BURGOS
CARRANGLAN
DIGDIG
SAN QUINTIN
SAN NICOLAS
SAN ROQUE
SAN MANUEL
BINALONAN
URDANETA
MANGALDAN
POZORRUBIO
SAN FABIAN
DAMORTIS
BINMALEY
LABRADOR
SUAL
LINGAYEN
BAYOMBONG
BABULIN
BALAKBAK
SAN FERNANDO


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 6
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
Operations in Central Luzon
31 January – 15 March 1945
0 5 10 20 30
SCALE OF MILES
LUZON
ZAMBALES MOUNTAINS
SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS
CARABALLO MOUNTAINS
MANILA BAY
LAGUNA DE BAY
LAMON BAY
LAKE TAAL
TAYABAS BAY
SOUTH CHINA SEA
MANILA
PASAY
CLARK FIELD
FT. STOTSENBURG
CAMP O'DONNELL
SAN FERNANDO
SAN ANTONIO
SAN FELIPE
CABANATUAN
GAPAN
SAN JOSE
MUÑOZ
BALIWAG
MALOLOS
BULACAN
NOVALICHES
MARIKINA
PASIG
PINUGAY
TAYTAY
SAN DIEGO
SINILOAN
LOS BAÑOS
CANLUBAN
CALAMBA
PAGSANJAN
OLONGAPO
SUBIC
BATAAN
CORREGIDOR
MARIVELES MTS.
MT. NATIB
MT. ARAYAT
NAIC
CAVITE
MONTINLUPA
SAN PABLO
LUCBAN
LUCENA
TIAONG
BALAYAN
BATANGAS
15 Mar.
14 Feb.
31 Jan.
XXX XI HALL
XX 38
III 34 RCT (24th DIV.)
III (151 RCT)
III 151 RCT (38th DIV.)
III 503 RCT
III (34 RCT)
III 158 RCT
XX 43 (part)
XX 40 (43)
XX 38
III 1 RCT (6th DIV.)
XX 37
III 112 RCT
XX 6
XX 1
XX 11
XX 43


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 7
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
General Situation on Luzon
31 January 1945
0 25 50 75 100
SCALE OF MILES
BABUYAN ISLANDS
APARRI
VIGAN
TUGUEGARAO
LUZON
BONTOC
KIANGAN
SAN FERNANDO (LA UNION)
BAUANG
CAMP JOHN HAY
BAGUIO
BAYAMBONG
CABALLO MTS
SIERRA MADRE MTS
CENTRAL PLAIN
LINGAYEN GULF
LINGAYEN
AGNO River
BALER BAY
PACIFIC OCEAN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
31 Jan.
TARLAC
IBA
CABANATUAN
DINGALAN BAY
SAN FERNANDO (PAMPANGA)
INFANTA
MANILA
FORT McKINLEY
CAVITE
LAMON BAY
CORREGIDOR
ALABAT I.
MAUBAN
LUCBAN
TIAONG
LIPA
LUCENA
BATANGAS
TAYABAS BAY
ANTIMONAN
NAGA
CATANDUANES
MARINDUQUE
LEGASPI
MINDORO
SIXTH
XXXX
EIGHTH
SIBUYAN
SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT
MINDORO STRAIT
TABLAS STRAIT
SAN JOSE
SIBUYAN
TABLAS
SEA
MASBATE
SAMAR


8
Marilao R.
37th x 1st Cav.
37
OBANDO
POLO
10 Feb.
MALINTA
Tullahan R.
CALOOCAN
GRACE PARK
NOVALICHES
NOVALICHES RESERVOIR
6
14 Feb.
SAN MATEO
Marikina River
MONTALBAN
Mariquina R.
BALARA FILTERS
15 Mar.
10 Feb.
6th x 1st Cav.
MARIKINA
MANILA BAY
LIBIS
37
SANTO TOMAS UNIV.
MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA
INTRAMUROS
22 Feb.
UNIV. OF PHILIPPINES
14 Feb.
10 Feb.
Posig River
43 after 12 March
ROSARIO
ANTIPOLO
TAYTAY
PASIG
NEILSON FIELD
FORT WILLIAM McKINLEY
PASAY
14 Feb.
11
NICHOLS FIELD
10 Feb.
PARAÑAQUE
LAGUNA DE BAY
CAVITE
LAS PIÑAS
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
Operations in the Manila Area
3 February — 15 March
0 1 2 3 4
SCALE OF MILES


THE WAR WITH JAPAN 9
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
Situation in North Central Luzon
15 August 1945
and
Operations Since 31 January
0 5 10 20 30
SCALE OF MILES
15 Aug.
30 June
15 Mar.
31 Jan.
For operations of the XIV Corps see Map 5.
LINGAYEN GULF
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
LUZON
ZAMBALES MOUNTAINS
CARABALLO MOUNTAINS
SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS
SAN FERNANDO
BAGULIN
BALAOAN
BAUANG
PALALAR
BAGUIO
BIRAC
BOLINAO
AGNO
DAGUPAN
LINGAYEN
BACABAC
SAN CARLOS
MALASIQUI
AGUILAR
DASOL BAY
SUAL
LABRADOR
SAN FABIAN
MANGALDAN
POZORRUBIO
ROSARIO
SAPIT
SANTA ROSA
SALACSAC
IMUGAN
SAN ROQUE
SAN MANUEL
SAN NICOLAS
BINALONAN
TAYUG
URDANETA
SAN QUINTIN
ROSALES
CUYAPO
NAMPICUAN
CAMILING
PANIQUI
GUIMBA
VICTORIA
TARLAC
LA PAZ
CAMP O'DONNELL
CAPAS
CONCEPCION
IBA
BOTOLAN
OTIAONG
BAMBAN
CLARK FIELD
FT. STOTSENBURG
DAU
ANGELES
MT. PINATUBO
DOLORES
SAN FELIPE
SAN MARCELINO
SAN ANTONIO
SUBIC
MEXICO
SAN FERNANDO
LUBAO
DUCAL
CALUMPIT
MASALANG
ARAYAT
ARAYIT
Bamban R.
Pampanga R.
Agno R.
Angat R.
Maasin R.
BUSTOS
PLARIDEL
NORZAGARAY
IPO
SAN JOSE
SIBUL SPRINGS
GAPAN
PAPAYA
DINGALAN BAY
UMIRAY
BALER BAY
BALER
CASIGURAN
DINALUNGAN
DILASAG
CABANATUAN
CABU
PANGATIAN
PINAGPANAAN
BALOC
RIZAL
HUNGZ
SAN JOSE
PANTABANGAN
BONGABON
DIGDIG
SARRANGLAN
BURGOS
DANGUL
ARITAO
BAYOMBONG
BALETE PASS
SANTA FE
TA-BO
LUPAO
37 (-)
33
33
40
32
25
25
37
6
1
6 (part)
I
XIV
XXV



THE WAR WITH JAPAN 10
PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN
Situation on Luzon 15 August 1945 and Operations Since 15 March
0 25 50 75 100
SCALE OF MILES
BABUYAN ISLANDS
11 (511 Pcht.)
APARRI
VIGAN
NLGF
LAOAG
1 July
37
SAN FERNANDO (LaUNION)
15 Aug.
32
BAGUIO
15 Aug.
LINGAYEN
15 Mar.
BALER BAY
TARLAC
CABANATUAN
IBA
FORT STOTSENBURG
DINGALAN BAY
15 Mar.
1 July – 15 Aug.
SAN FERNANDO (PAMPANGA)
OLONGAPO
43
38
INFANTA
MANILA
FORT MCKINLEY
LAMON BAY
CORREGIDOR
1
1 (part)
ALABAT I.
LUCBAN
11
15 Mar.
LUCENA
BATANGAS
TAYABAS BAY
158 RCT
MARINDUQUE
MINDORO
MINDORO STRAIT
SAN JOSE
TABLAS STRAIT
SIBUYAN
TABLAS
SIBUYAN SEA
NAGA
CATANDUANES
158 RCT
LEGASPI
SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT
MASBATE
SAMAR
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN

THE WAR WITH JAPAN

PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN

Situation in the Southern Islands
15 August 1945 and Operations Since January

0 25 50 75 100
SCALE OF MILES



THE WAR WITH JAPAN (12)


SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

General Situation 15 August 1945

0 200 400 600 800 1000

SCALE OF MILES

TIBET
CHINA
INDIA
BURMA
THAILAND
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
EAST CHINA SEA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINE SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
AUSTRALIA
JAVA SEA
BANDA SEA
ARAFURA SEA
TIMOR SEA
CELEBES SEA
CORAL SEA
SULU SEA
SOLOMON SEA
GULF OF SIAM
HONSHU
KYUSHU
TOKYO
NANKING
SHANGHAI
HANKOW
HANGCHOW
CHUNGKING
CHANGSHA
KWEIYANG
KUNMING
KWEILIN
CANTON
SWATOW
HONG KONG
AMOY
TAKAO
FORMOSA
OKINAWA
SAKISHIMA
RYUKYU ISLANDS
BONIN ISLANDS
VOLCANO ISLANDS
IWO
NARCUS
WAKE
MARIANAS ISLANDS
SAIPAN
GUAM
ENIWETOK
MARSHALL ISLANDS
WOTJE
MALEOLAP
ROI
KWAJALEIN
MAJURO
MILI
JALUIT
GILBERT ISLANDS
TARAWA
MAKIN
NAURU
ELLICE ISLANDS
CAROLINE ISLANDS
ULITHI
YAP
NGULU
PALAU ISLANDS
TRUK
PONAPE
CALCUTTA
BHAMO
LASHIO
MANDALAY
AKYAB
CHIENG MAI
RANGOON
MESOD
MOULMEIN
BANGKOK
ANDAMAN ISLANDS
NICOBAR ISLANDS
VICTORIA POINT
SAIGON
CAM RANH BAY
HAINAN
LINGAYEN GULF
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
MANILA
MINDORO
SAMAR
VISAYAN IS.
PANAY
LEYTE
NEGROS
PALAWAN
MINDANAO
DAVAO
SPRATLY
SINGORA
PATANI
KOTA BHARU
PENANG
MALAY STATES
KUANTAN
SINGAPORE
STRAIT OF MALACCA
SUMATRA
PALEMBANG
BATAVIA
JAVA
SOERABAJA
BALI
FLORES
TIMOR
SOEMBA
CHRISTMAS
DARWIN
BORNEO
SARAWAK
BRUNEI BAY
SERIA
MIRI
KUCHING
NORTH BORNEO
SANDAKEN
JOLO
TALAUD
MOROTAI
HALMAHERA
MOLUCCA PASSAGE
CELEBES
MAKASSAR STRAIT
BALIKPAPAN
TARAKAN
SANGKULIRANG BAY
SANGASPOR
TOGELKOP PEN.
BIAK
SARMI
WAKDE
SARAMA
CERAM
AMBOINA
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
HOLLANDIA
AITAPE
WEWAK
NORTHEAST NEW GUINEA
PAPUA
SAIDOR
MADANG
LAE
BUNA
PORT MORESBY
TORRES STRAIT
ADMIRALTY ISLANDS
ST MATTHIAS ISLANDS
NEW IRELAND
BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO
NEW BRITAIN
GREEN
BOUGAINVILLE
SOLOMON ISLANDS
GUADALCANAL
SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS
ESPIRITU SANTO
NEW HEBRIDES
NEW CALEDONIA
EQUATOR
SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
XX 96 Aus.
10 June
1 May
1 July
XX 7 Aus.



THE WAR WITH JAPAN

THE BATTLE FOR IWO JIMA

Landings 19 February 1945 and Operations to 11 March


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
SCALE OF MILES

THE WAR WITH JAPAN

Landings on Adjacent Islands
and
Operations in Northern Okinawa
From 1 to 23 April 1945

0 5 10 15
SCALE OF MILES






THE WAR WITH JAPAN

OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

Landings 1 April 1945 and
Principal Operations to 30 April

0 1 2 3 4 5 6
SCALE OF MILES





THE WAR WITH JAPAN


OKINAWA CAMPAIGN

Operations in Southern Okinawa
30 April – 21 June 1945

0 1 2 3 4 5 6
SCALE OF MILES


KOBE
OSAKA
OSAKA BAY
NAGOYA
TOKYO
TOKYO HARBOR
SHINAGAWA BAY
KAWASAKI
YOKOHAMA
NEGISHI BAY
TOKYO BAY
YOKOSUKA
OTSU BAY
Tama R.
Edo R.
LEGEND
Burned-out Areas
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
THE DESTRUCTION OF JAPAN
Principal Cities Showing Extent of Destruction by Bombing
0 5 10
SCALE OF MILES


U. S. S. R.
VLADIVOSTOK
MANCHURIA
RASHIN
HOKKAIDO
MURORAN
HAKODATE
ANTUNG
KOREA
JAPAN SEA
HEIJO
SAKATA
KEIJO (SEOUL)
NIIGATA
TOYAMA BAY
TOYAMA
HONSHU
PACIFIC OCEAN
TSURUGA
TOKYO
YOKOHOMA
YONAGO
NAGOYA
FUSAN
Korea Strait
Tsushima Strait
Shimonoseki Strait
KOBE
OSAKA
HIROSHIMA
KURE
INLAND SEA
SHIKOKU
NAGASAKI
KYUSHU
FEINT
IX CORPS
3 infantry divisions
(FLOATING RESERVE)
1 infantry division
I CORPS
3 infantry divisions
EAST CHINA SEA
KAGOSHIMA
V MARINE CORPS
3 divisions
XI CORPS
2 infantry divisions
1 cavalry division (Mech.)
SIXTH ARMY
OPERATION OLYMPIC
(about 1 November 1945)
OPERATION CORONET
(about 1 March 1946)
EIGHTH ARMY
TENTH ARMY
9 infantry divisions
2 armored divisions
3 marine divisions
FLOATING RESERVE
FIRST ARMY
10 infantry divisions
1 airborne division
THE WAR WITH JAPAN
THE INVASION OF THE MAINLAND
Proposed Plan of Operations for
November 1945 and March 1946
0 100 200
SCALE OF MILES



THE WAR WITH JAPAN

General Situation 15 August 1945 and Principal Changes Since August 1942

DATE DUE *(DA Pamp 12-25)*

JUN 1 '65			
JAN 28 '66			
[illegible] 14 '68			
NOV 2 6 1975			
FEB 4 19[illegible]			
[illegible]			
MAR 6 1987			
NOV 0 9 2001			

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2. Any item drawn from the Library must be returned within one month.

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(1) Material issued to classes as a whole.

(2) Material issued to instructors for professional use.

(3) New books which are in demand must be returned within one week.

(4) Books required for faculty use are subject to recall at any time.

(5) All persons having library material in their possession will return same before leaving the post permanently.

(6) Books loaned outside the School must be returned within two weeks.

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U. S. ARMY

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